Insurance Policies Broadly Defining “Suits” May Prompt an Insurer’s Duty to Defend and Indemnify During the Chapter 558 Pre-Suit Notice Process
May 30, 2018 —
Daniel Garcia - Gordon & Rees Construction Law BlogIn Altman Contractors, Inc. v. Crum & Forster Specialty Insurance Company, No. SC16-1420, 2017 WL 6379535 (Fla. Dec. 14, 2017), the Florida Supreme Court addressed whether the notice and repair process set forth in chapter 558, Florida Statutes, constitutes a “suit” within the meaning of a commercial liability policy issued by Crum & Forster Specialty Insurance Company (“C&F”) to Altman Contractors, Inc. (“Altman”). The Court found that because the chapter 558 pre-suit process is an “alternative dispute resolution proceeding” as included in the definition of “suit” in the policy by C&F to Altman, C&F had a duty to defend Altman during the chapter 558 process, prior to the filing of a formal lawsuit.
Chapter 558, titled “Construction Defects,” sets forth procedural requirements before a claimant may file a construction defect action. It requires a claimant to serve a written notice of claim on the applicable contractor, subcontractor, supplier, and/or design professional prior to filing a construction defect lawsuit. The legislature intended for Chapter 558 to be an alternative dispute resolution mechanism in certain construction defect matters allowing an opportunity to resolve the claim without further legal process.
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Daniel Garcia, Gordon & Rees Scully MansukhaniMr. Garcia may be contacted at
daniel.garcia@grsm.com
English v. RKK. . . The Saga Continues
December 16, 2019 —
Christopher G. Hill - Construction Law MusingsRemember back in 2018 when I thought I’d told you the end of the English Construction story regarding its various consultants, etc.? I was wrong. The matter went up on appeal to the 4th Circuit Court of Appeals where the Appeals Court considered the summary judgment granted to the defendant Rummel, Klepper & Kahl (“RKK”) based upon what came down to a contributory negligence reading of the indemnity clause that was allowed to survive in the first district court opinion relating to these ambiguous contracts finding that English was negligent so couldn’t recover. The 4th Circuit also considered the finding that defendant CDM Smith did not breach its contract as a matter of law and that English’s negligence was the cause of the damages.
The Court of Appeals reversed both of the holdings by the Western District of Virginia court, essentially stating that there was enough of a factual dispute to render any summary judgment to be premature.
As to English’s arguments regarding the indemnity scheme in the contracts, the court found that the interpretation was at least ambiguous enough that summary judgment was inappropriate, stating:
While we are not prepared to settle conclusively these interpretation disputes at the summary judgment stage, English’s proffered interpretation is, at the very least. reasonable. Indeed, of the two interpretations, English’s seems to be more closely aligned with the actual language in the contract. The district court thus erred in rejecting English’s interpretation and adopting RK&K’s interpretation as a matter of law.
[A]t bottom, while the district court was authorized to construe unambiguous language as a matter of law, it could not resolve genuine disputes regarding the meaning of ambiguous contractual language against the nonmoving party on summary judgment. We therefore vacate the court’s grant of summary judgment to RK&K and remand for further proceedings.
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The Law Office of Christopher G. HillMr. Hill may be contacted at
chrisghill@constructionlawva.com
Congratulations 2020 DE, MA, NY and PA Super Lawyers and Rising Stars
November 16, 2020 —
White and Williams LLPSixteen White and Williams lawyers have been named by Super Lawyers as a Delaware, Massachusetts, New York or Pennsylvania "Super Lawyer" while eleven received "Rising Star" designations. Lawyers are selected through a process that takes into consideration peer recognition and professional achievement. The lawyers named to this year’s list represent a multitude of practices throughout the firm.
Reprinted courtesy of
White and Williams LLP
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How Construction Contracts are Made. Hint: It’s a Bit Like Making Sausage
October 07, 2016 —
Garret Murai – California Construction Law BlogConstruction can be a messy affair. In a sense, that’s to be expected when you’re building a complex structure, involving the coordination of several parties and numerous persons, in the natural environment and in the elements, subject to an increasing array of laws, regulations, ordinances and codes, and often at the cost of hundreds if not billions of dollars.
So too can construction contracts.
There’s the plans, the specifications, the general conditions, the special conditions, the addenda, the prime contract, the subcontracts, the purchase orders, and the change orders, to name just a few of the documents which bind parties, which should ideally be consistent and complimentary with one another, when the reality is that the parties bound to those contracts often have very different interests.
Perhaps the analogy goes a little too far afield, but it makes the point, that it can sometimes be a bit like making sausage.
The next case,
Watson Bowman Acme Corporation v. RGW Construction, Inc., California Court of Appeals for the Fifth District, Case No. F070067 (August 9, 2016), highlights the problems which can arise from the numerous documents which make up the typical construction contract today and the lengths that juries and judges must go to interpret what those agreements mean.
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Garret Murai, Wendel, Rosen, Black & Dean LLPMr. Murai may be contacted at
gmurai@wendel.com
South Carolina Court of Appeals Diverges from Damico Opinion, Sending Recent Construction Defects Cases to Arbitration
October 24, 2023 —
Laura Paris Paton - Gordon Rees Construction Law BlogCould the latest opinion from the South Carolina Court of Appeals be the distant ringing of a death knell for runaway construction defects verdicts? On the heels of the Damico ruling earlier this year, the courts have issued several opinions distinguishing various arbitration agreements from the one analyzed in Damico and have sent subsequent cases to arbitration.
This summer, the Supreme Court and Court of Appeals compelled arbitration in Cleo Sanders v. Savannah Highway Automotive Company, et al. Appellate Case No. 2021-000137 / Opinion No. 28168 (petition for rehearing pending) and Joseph Abruzzo v. Bravo Media Productions, et al. Appellate Case No. 2020-001095 / Opinion 6004. Now, in the matter of Jonathan Mart, on behalf of himself and others similarly situated, Respondent, v. Great Southern Homes, Inc., Appellant, Appellate Case No. 2018-001598, the Court of Appeals reversed the circuit court’s order denying a homebuilder’s motion to dismiss and compelled arbitration in this action, which was brought by the homeowner, individually and on behalf of other similarly situated homeowners.
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Laura Paris Paton, Gordon Rees Scully MansukhaniMs. Paton may be contacted at
lpaton@grsm.com
Professional Liability Alert: California Appellate Courts In Conflict Regarding Statute of Limitations for Malicious Prosecution Suits Against Attorneys
April 28, 2014 —
David W. Evans & Stephen J. Squillario – Haight Brown & Bonesteel LLPIn conflict with an earlier decision by a different division within the same District, and with a prior decision of another District which followed the earlier case, Division Three of the Second Appellate District has concluded, contrary to established precedent, that the general two-year limitations period set forth in Code of Civil Procedure section 335.1 (“Section 335.1”) applies to malicious prosecution claims against attorneys, rather than the specific one-year statute of limitations for claims against attorneys codified in Code of Civil Procedure section 340.6 (“Section 340.6”).
In Roger Cleveland Golf Co., Inc. v. Krane & Smith, APC (filed April 15, 2014, Case No. B237424, consolidated with Case No. B239375), Roger Cleveland Golf Co., Inc. (“Cleveland Golf”), filed a malicious prosecution action against Krane & Smith (“the Attorneys”), who had unsuccessfully prosecuted the underlying breach of contract matter for their client against Cleveland Golf. In that action, on April 26, 2010, the trial court entered its order granting a motion for nonsuit and dismissing the complaint in favor of Cleveland Golf. On May 24, 2011, or approximately 13 months after the trial court had dismissed the underlying complaint, Cleveland Golf commenced a malicious prosecution action against the Attorneys. In the interim, the Attorneys initiated an appeal of the underlying judgment, which was eventually dismissed approximately seven months later. In response to the complaint, the Attorneys filed a special motion to strike, commonly referred to as an anti-SLAPP motion, which included the argument that the malicious prosecution claim was time-barred under the one-year limitations period of Section 340.6. The trial court granted the Attorneys’ motion based on the statute of limitations (and Cleveland Golf’s failure to demonstrate a probability of success on the merits) and dismissed the case. Cleveland Golf’s appeal followed.
Reprinted courtesy of
David W. Evans, Haight Brown & Bonesteel LLP and
Stephen J. Squillario, Haight Brown & Bonesteel LLP
Mr. Evans may be contacted at devans@hbblaw.com, Mr. Squillario may be contacted at ssquillario@hbblaw.com
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CGL Policy May Not Cover Cybersecurity and Data-Related Losses
March 25, 2024 —
Susana Arce - Saxe Doernberger & Vita, P.C.The construction industry, like many other industries, has experienced an increased reliance on, and implementation of, technology in the past few years. Smart phones and tablets are used on most project sites, computers are an integral part of the planning process, and various software programs are used throughout the construction process. Likewise, much of the machinery and equipment used during construction (e.g., total stations, trucks, tower cranes) is interconnected, and in some cases, operated or monitored remotely.1
With an increase in technology comes a risk of cybersecurity and data-related losses. Many large businesses purchase Commercial General Liability (“CGL”) insurance and assume cybersecurity and data-related losses are covered. Unfortunately, this is generally not the case. CGL policies typically cover three general types of damage: bodily injury, property damage, and advertising injury.
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Susana Arce, Saxe Doernberger & Vita, P.C.Ms. Arce may be contacted at
SArce@sdvlaw.com
Do Engineers Owe a Duty to Third Parties?
June 10, 2015 —
Craig Martin – Construction Contractor AdvisorA Texas Court of Appeals, in USA Walnut Creek, DST v. Terracon Consultants, Inc., recently ruled that an engineer owed a duty to the buyer of an apartment complex, even though the engineer had no contractual relationship with the buyer. This is an expansion of the duty professionals owe on construction projects and could signal a change in the law.
In the case, Walnut Creek purchased a three year old apartment complex. A few years after taking possession, Walnut Creek noticed problems with the apartments, including cracking foundations, walls, breaking windows, and out of square door frames. Walnut Creek sued the developer and general contractor, alleging construction defects. The developer claimed that the engineer, Terracon, was at fault and Walnut Creek added Terracon to the lawsuit, asserting that Terracon was negligent in performing engineering services during construction. Terracon asked the court to dismiss the claim, arguing that it did not owe a duty to Walnut Creek. Walnut Creek in turn argued that engineers do owe a duty to subsequent owners. The trial court dismissed the case against the engineer and Walnut Creek appealed.
The appellate court reversed the trial court, finding that the engineer did owe a duty to subsequent purchasers. The court seemed persuaded by the allegations that the engineer actually created the construction defects which were the basis for the litigation.
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Craig Martin, Lamson, Dugan and Murray, LLPMr. Martin may be contacted at
cmartin@ldmlaw.com
