Kushners Abandon Property Bid as Pressures Mount Over Conflicts
May 10, 2017 —
David Kocieniewski & Caleb Melby - BloombergA company owned by the family of Jared Kushner, President Donald Trump’s son-in-law, has abandoned plans to buy a sprawling industrial site in New Jersey from Honeywell International Inc., a major federal contractor, and develop it into a residential community.
Kushner Cos. had been the leading bidder for the 95-acre formerly contaminated site known as Bayfront, which is co-owned by Honeywell and Jersey City, city officials said. The company had submitted plans to build as many as 8,100 housing units to be marketed to Orthodox Jewish residents of the Williamsburg section of Brooklyn who are being priced out of that neighborhood.
Last fall, the Kushners bid about $150 million, tens of millions higher than competitors, according to people involved in the negotiations. Honeywell heard from others who would only make an offer once the environmental approvals for the cleaned-up site were final. So the bidding is scheduled to reopen later this year and Kushner Cos. had been expected to continue in the process, the people said.
But on Tuesday, when Bloomberg News asked about Bayfront, company spokesman James Yolles said the Kushners are no longer pursuing the project. He wouldn’t elaborate or explain.
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David Kocieniewski, Bloomberg and
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The Riskiest Housing Markets in the U.S.
June 26, 2014 —
Ben Steverman – BloombergThe real estate rollercoaster ride for U.S. homeowners isn't new. Some markets had even rockier rides in the early 1980s or '90s.
When so much wealth is tied up in one asset, the risk -- or stability -- of a local market can mean a lot to a homeowner. (See “The Hidden Risks in Your Housing Market” for more on this.)
Bloomberg.com asked real estate website Zillow.com to help us figure out which U.S. markets have been the riskiest over the last 35 years.
Our measure of risk: Assuming buyers held on to their homes for five years before selling, what was their chance of suffering a loss? As a secondary criterion, we compared the worst annual losses homeowners in these markets have experienced since 1979.
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Ben Steverman, BloombergMr. Steverman may be contacted at
bsteverman@bloomberg.net
Liquidating Agreements—Bridging the Privity Gap for Subcontractors
September 03, 2015 —
Craig Martin – Construction Contractor AdvisorWhat is a subcontractor to do when the owner has demanded additional work, but has refused to pay for it? Typically, a subcontractor cannot sue the owner because the subcontractor doesn’t have a contract with the owner. Perhaps the subcontractor and general contractor should enter into a liquidating agreement through which the general contractor can pursue the claim on behalf of the subcontractor.
Liquidating agreements bridge the privity gap between owners and subcontractors who sustain damages because of the others actions. Liquidating agreements or pass-through agreements grant the general contractor a release of its liability to the subcontractor after the general contractor prosecutes the subcontractor’s pass-through claim against the owner and gives the subcontractor any recovery.
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Craig Martin, Lamson, Dugan and Murray, LLPMr. Martin may be contacted at
cmartin@ldmlaw.com
Arizona Court of Appeals Decision in $8.475 Million Construction Defect Class Action Suit
May 09, 2011 —
CDJ STAFFIn the case of Leflet v. Fire (Ariz. App., 2011), which involved an $8.475 million settlement in a construction defect class action suit, the question put forth to the Appeals court was “whether an insured and an insurer can join in a Morris agreement that avoids the primary insurer’s obligation to pay policy limits and passes liability in excess of those limits on to other insurers.” The Appeals court provided several reasons for their decision to affirm the validity of the settlement agreement as to the Non-Participatory Insurers (NPIs) and to vacate and remand the attorney fee awards.
First, the Appeals court stated, “The settlement agreement is not a compliant Morris agreement and provides no basis for claims against the NPIs.” They conclude, “Appellants attempt to avoid the doctrinal underpinnings of Morris by arguing that ‘the cooperation clause did not prohibit Hancock from assigning its rights to anyone, including Appellants.’ This narrow reading of the cooperation clause ignores the fact that Hancock did not merely assign its rights — it assigned its rights after stipulating to an $8.475 million judgment that neither it nor its Direct Insurers could ever be liable to pay. Neither Morris nor any other case defines such conduct as actual ‘cooperation’—rather, Morris simply defines limited circumstances in which an insured is relieved of its duty to cooperate. Because Morris agreements are fraught with risk of abuse, a settlement that mimics Morris in form but does not find support in the legal and economic realities that gave rise to that decision is both unenforceable and offensive to the policy’s cooperation clause.”
The Appeals court further concluded that “even if the agreement had qualified under Morris, plaintiffs did not provide the required notice to the NPIs.” The court continued, “Because an insurer who defends under a reservation of rights is always aware of the possibility of a Morris agreement, the mere threat of Morris in the course of settlement negotiations does not constitute sufficient notice. Instead, the insurer must be made aware that it may waive its reservation of rights and provide an unqualified defense, or defend solely on coverage and reasonableness grounds against the judgment resulting from the Morris agreement. The NPIs were not given the protections of this choice before the agreement was entered, and therefore can face no liability for the resulting stipulated judgment.”
Next, the Appeals court declared that “the trial court abused its discretion in awarding attorney’s fees under A.R.S § 12-341.” The Appeals court reasoned, “In this case, the NPIs prevailed in their attack on the settlement. But the litigation did not test the merits of their coverage defenses or the reasonableness of the settlement amount. And Plaintiffs never sued the NPIs, either in their own right or as the assignees of Hancock. Rather, the NPIs intervened to test the conceptual validity of the settlement agreement (to which they were not parties) before such an action could commence. In these circumstances, though it might be appropriate to offset a fee award against some future recovery by the Plaintiff Leflet v. Fire (Ariz. App., 2011) class, the purposes of A.R.S. § 12-341.01 would not be served by an award of fees against them jointly and severally. We therefore conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in awarding fees against Plaintiffs ‘jointly and severally.’”
The Appeals court made the following conclusion: “we affirm the judgment of the trial court concerning the validity of the settlement agreement as to the NPIs. We vacate and remand the award of attorney’s fees. In our discretion, we decline to award the NPIs the attorney’s fees they have requested on appeal pursuant to A.R.S. § 12-341.01(A).”
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Safety Versus a False Sense of Security: Challenges to the Use of Construction Cranes
March 18, 2019 —
Christopher Machut - Construction ExecutiveThe history of safety is, in part, the history of resistance to safety. From transportation and travel to sports and entertainment, the safeguards taken for granted were once too allegedly controversial or costly for companies to grant to consumers. Imagine driving a car without a seatbelt or being a passenger in a minivan without side-impact airbags or anti-lock brakes, or playing football without a helmet or riding a roller coaster without a shoulder harness. Imagine, too, pulling out of parking space without a rear-view camera, unable to see passing cars or pedestrians.
Cameras are now as common among compact cars as on the most uncommonly expensive sports cars and sedans.
And yet, the technology that earns drivers a discount on car insurance is the same or mostly similar technology that insurers refuse to cover elsewhere. The technologies that makes parallel parking easier or easing a car into traffic a cinch is considered an extravagance on construction equipment, despite the dangers crane operators face but cannot see, despite what workers on the ground can see but not forecast, despite what cameras can record and capture.
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Christopher Machut, Construction Executive, a publication of Associated Builders and Contractors. All rights reserved.
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Massachusetts SJC Clarifies “Strict Compliance” Standard in Construction Contracts
January 02, 2019 —
Jacob Goodelman - Gordon & Rees Construction Law BlogIn Massachusetts, it is well established that a contractor cannot recover damages from a construction contract without first showing that the contractor completely and strictly performed on all of the contract’s terms. Recently, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court narrowed the rule by concluding that complete and strict performance is only required for contract terms relating to the design and construction itself. The high Court explained that non-design / non-construction contract terms are governing by “ordinary contract principles, including the traditional Massachusetts materiality rule.”
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Jacob Goodelman, Gordon Rees Scully MansukhaniMr. Goodelman may be contacted at
jgoodelman@grsm.com
Motion to Dismiss Denied Regarding Insureds' Claim For Collapse
October 29, 2014 —
Tred R. Eyerly – Insurance Law HawaiiThe federal district court denied the insurer's motion to dismiss claims for loss due to the imminent collapse of the insureds' basement walls. Belz v. Peerless Ins. Co., 2014 WL 4364914 (D. Conn. Sept. 2, 2014).
The insureds noticed cracks throughout their basement walls. It was discovered that the condition was the result of a chemical compound used in the concrete of certain basement walls in the late 1980s and early 1990s. The insureds contended that due to the cracking, the basement walls suffered a substantial impairment to their structural integrity making it only a matter of time until the walls collapsed.
The insureds notified their insurer, Peerless. An engineer hired by Peerless determined the walls' condition was caused by poor workmanship and defective materials. On this basis, Peerless denied coverage.
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Tred R. Eyerly, Insurance Law HawaiiMr. Eyerly may be contacted at
te@hawaiilawyer.com
Bad Faith and a Partial Summary Judgment in Seattle Construction Defect Case
February 10, 2012 —
CDJ STAFFThe US District Court of Washington has issued a ruling in the case of Ledcor Industries v. Virginia Surety Company, Inc. Ledcor was the builder of a mixed-use real estate project in Seattle called the Adelaide Project. Ledcor purchased an insurance policy from Virginia Surety covering the project. After the completion of the project, Ledcor received complaints of construction defects from the homeowners, which they forwarded to Virginia Surety.
Virginia Surety denied coverage on several grounds. Absent any lawsuit, Virginia claimed that there was “not yet any duty to defend or indemnify.” Further, as the policy commenced ten days after work on the project was substantially completed, Virginia cited a provision in the policy that excluded coverage for damage that occurred before the policy began. As problems included water intrusion, Virginia noted an exclusion for fungal damage. Finally, Virginia noted that it was not clear whether damage was due to Ledcor’s own actions.
The homeowners sued over the construction defects. Ledcor settled these suits before trial. In this, they were defended by, and settlements were paid by American Home, another of Ledcor’s insurers. Ledcor claims that Virginia Surety acted in bad faith by denying coverage and by its failure to investigate the ongoing nature of the work at the project.
The judge determined that Virginia Surety acted in bad faith when it invoked the fungus exclusion. Virginia noted that fungal damage “‘would have been’ referenced in the list of construction defects,” however, the HOAs claimed only “water stains” and “water damage,” and made no mention of mold or fungus. The court found that Virginia Surety “was not entitled to deny coverage simply because it may have suspected that mold or fungus damage existed.” The court noted that further proceedings would be needed to determine what portion of the settlement Virginia is obligated to pay.
The court found that there were matters of fact to be determined on the further issues in the case. The judge wrote that although Virginia acted in bad faith in invoking the fungus exclusion, it still had to be determined if they were in breach of contract by failing to defend Ledcor. Ledcor still needs to show that the damages claimed by the HOA were due to work actually covered by Virginia Surety.
Ledcor made an additional claim that Virginia Surety violated Washington’s laws concerning the insurance industry. Here, the court noted that the improper exclusion for fungus issues “constitutes a per se unfair trade practice.” Six other claims were made under this law. The court found that Virginia Surety did not misrepresent “pertinent facts or insurance policy provisions.” It also issued its denial letter promptly, satisfying the fifth provision. However, Virginia Surety did violate the second provision, in that it failed “to acknowledge and act reasonably promptly upon communications with respect to claims.” Two other issues could not be determined.
Judge Martinez’s decision granted a summary judgment to Ledcor on the issue of bad faith. An additional summary judgment was granted that Virginia Surety violated Washington’s Insurance Fair Conduct Act. Judge Martinez did not grant summary judgment on any of the other issues Ledcor raised.
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