Picketing Threats
July 09, 2019 —
Jerry Morales - Snell & Wilmer Under ConstructionLetters from unions to owners, general contractors and other contractors informing them of the union’s dispute with one or more of the subcontractors, working at a common construction project site (or common situs), and of the union’s plans to engage in “public informational campaigns” at the site, in furtherance of the dispute, may constitute unlawful threats of secondary boycott.
Unions often send letters to various employers that share a common construction project site, informing them that the union has a dispute with one or more of the subcontractors working or scheduled to work at the same site. In labor law, the employers that do not have a dispute with the union are referred to as “neutral employers,” in contrast with the employers with which the union has the dispute, referred to as “primary employers.”
In the letters, the unions typically describe the reason for the labor dispute (e.g., alleged failure to pay “area standards”), request that the neutrals use their “managerial discretion” not to allow the primary employers to perform work at the project site until the dispute is resolved, and inform that the union will engage in public information campaigns against the primary employer at the common situs. The “public information campaign” is described in the union’s letter as including banner displays, distribution of handbills, picketing and other demonstration activity.
Read the court decisionRead the full story...Reprinted courtesy of
Jerry Morales, Snell & WilmerMr. Morales may be contacted at
jmorales@swlaw.com
Professional Liability Client Alert: Law Firms Should Consider Hiring Outside Counsel Before Suing Clients For Unpaid Fees
March 31, 2014 —
David W. Evans and Blythe Golay - Haight Brown & Bonesteel LLPLaw firms seeking to recover attorney’s fees as the prevailing party in fee dispute litigation with their former client should hire outside counsel in order to avoid waiving any entitlement to such fees. Evaluating any potential exposure for a professional negligence claim or cross-claim before filing suit should also be considered. In Soni v. Wellmike Enterprise Company, Ltd., et al., No. B242288 (filed March 26, 2014) the California Court of Appeal for the Second District held that a law firm, represented by its own employees and associates, was not entitled to recover attorney fees as the prevailing party, pursuant to the attorney’s fee provision in the retainer agreement. The Soni decision is the latest addition to the general prohibition enunciated by Trope v. Katz (1995) 11 Cal.4th 274 (“Trope”) and its progeny that law firms are precluded from recovering attorney’s fees for self-representation.
In Soni, the law firm obtained a $28,384 judgment for delinquent legal fees against a former client. The firm then filed a motion for attorney’s fees, seeking $120,912 as the fees it incurred as the prevailing party under the retainer agreement. The trial court denied the motion based on the general rule set forth in the Trope line of cases that fees are not recoverable where the firm is represented by attorneys employed by the firm, despite the presence in the applicable retainer agreement of a clause notifying the client that fees the law firm would seek if it prevailed would include those for its in-house personnel.
Reprinted courtesy of
David W. Evans, Haight Brown & Bonesteel LLP and
Blythe Golay, Haight Brown & Bonesteel LLP
Mr. Evans may be contacted at devans@hbblaw.com; Ms. Golay may be contacted at bgolay@hbblaw.com
Read the court decisionRead the full story...Reprinted courtesy of
Back Posting with Thoughts on Lien Waivers
May 20, 2015 —
Christopher G. Hill – Construction Law MusingsAfter a week of being unable to post due to the rigors of my solo construction practice, I’m back on the blogging train. For those of you that missed my new musings this past week, I hope that you had a chance to look through some of the past Guest Post Friday posts for some good stuff to read.
During the course of my busy week last week, a question came up regarding the mechanic’s lien waivers that commercial construction companies routinely execute as part of the payment process. The waiver forms vary, but each essentially states that in exchange for payment the payee, whether a subcontractor or supplier (or even general contractor) waives its future rights to record a mechanic’s lien for the work that is covered by the payment received. Most if not all of these forms further require a certification that the funds paid will either be used to pay suppliers or that suppliers have already been paid. This general description is not the reason for this post.
As is always the case in the Commonwealth of Virginia where the contract is king and a court is unlikely to reinterpret any written contractual document, the devil is in how that waiver is worded. Some waivers are worded in such a way that they essentially require a payee to certify receipt of the funds prior to payment being received. These same forms require the same pre-payment certification that all suppliers and subcontractors of the payee have already been paid. In short they require a payee to both place complete trust in the payor that the check will be paid and that the check will not bounce while in many cases (often with an unstated “wink and nod”) claiming payment was already made when all know the likelihood is that it has not.
Read the court decisionRead the full story...Reprinted courtesy of
Christopher G. Hill, Law Office of Christopher G. Hill, PCMr. Hill may be contacted at
chrisghill@constructionlawva.com
Does a No-Damage-for-Delay Clause Also Preclude Acceleration Damages?
January 27, 2020 —
Ted R. Gropman & Christine Z. Fan - ConsensusDocsConstruction contracts often include a “no damage for delay” clause that denies a contractor the right to recover delay-related costs and limits the contractor’s remedy to an extension of time for noncontractor-caused delays to a project’s completion date. Depending on the nature of the delay and the jurisdiction where the project is located, the contractual prohibition against delay damages may well be enforceable. This article will explore whether an enforceable no-damage-for-delay clause is also a bar to recovery of “acceleration” damages, i.e., the costs incurred by the contractor in its attempt to overcome delays to the project’s completion date.
Courts are split as to whether damages for a contractor’s “acceleration” efforts are distinguishable from “delay” damages such that they may be recovered under an enforceable no-damage-for-delay clause. See, e.g., Siefford v. Hous. Auth. of Humboldt, 223 N.W.2d 816 (Neb. 1974) (disallowing the recovery of acceleration damages under a no-damage-for-delay clause); but see Watson Elec. Constr. Co. v. Winston-Salem, 109 N.C. App. 194 (1993) (allowing the recovery of acceleration damages despite a no-damage-for-delay clause). The scope and effect of a no-damage-for-delay clause depend on the specific laws of the jurisdiction and the factual circumstances involved.
There are a few ways for a contractor to circumvent an enforceable no-damage-for-delay clause to recover acceleration damages. First, the contractor may invoke one of the state’s enumerated exceptions to the enforceability of the clause. It is helpful to keep in mind that most jurisdictions strictly construe a no-damage-for-delay clause to limit its application. This means that, regardless of delay or acceleration, courts will nonetheless permit the contractor to recover damages if the delay is, for example, of a kind not contemplated by the parties, due to an unreasonable delay, or a result of the owner’s fraud, bad faith, gross negligence, active interference or abandonment of the contract. See Tricon Kent Co. v. Lafarge N. Am., Inc., 186 P.3d 155, 160 (Colo. App. 2008); United States Steel Corp. v. Mo. P. R. Co., 668 F.2d 435, 438 (8th Cir. 1982); Peter Kiewit Sons’ Co. v. Iowa S. Utils. Co., 355 F. Supp. 376, 396 (S.D. Iowa 1973).
Reprinted courtesy of
Ted R. Gropman, Pepper Hamilton LLP and Christine Z. Fan, Pepper Hamilton LLP
Mr. Gropman may be contacted at gropmant@pepperlaw.com
Read the court decisionRead the full story...Reprinted courtesy of
Quick Note: Attorney’s Fees and the Significant Issues Test
November 03, 2016 —
David Adelstein – Florida Construction Legal UpdatesAttorney’s fees become a component of damages that parties seek to recover whenever there is a contractual or statutory basis for them to recover their fees. Parties want to be able to recover all or substantially most of the attorney’s fees they incurred in pursuing their claim. (In my experience, recovering all of the fees incurred is very challenging.) But, to be entitled to attorney’s fees, a party has to be deemed the
prevailing party. There is the sentiment that as long as you recover a positive net judgment (even if it is for $100 when your claim was for $50,000) then you will be able to recover your attorney’s fees which will likely exceed the amount that was ever in dispute.
Read the court decisionRead the full story...Reprinted courtesy of
David Adelstein, Katz, Barron, Squitero, Faust, Friedberg, English & Allen, P.A.Mr. Adelstein may be contacted at
dma@katzbarron.com
New Safety Standards Issued by ASSE and ANSI
March 28, 2012 —
Melissa Brumback, Construction Law in North CarolinaThe American National Standards Institute (ANSI) and the American Society of Safety Engineers (ASSE) have recently announced their approval of two new safety standards to enhance construction site safety.
The two new standards, which are set to take effect during June 2012, are the ANSI/ASSE A10.1-2011 Pre-Project and Pre-Task Safety and Health Planning for Construction and Demolition Operations, and the ANSI/ASSE A10.26-2011 Emergency Procedures for Construction and Demolition Sites.
The new A10.1-2011 standard was designed to assist construction owners, contractors, and designers by ensuring that safety and health planning were standard parts of their pre-construction planning. It is also intended to help owners of construction sites to establish a process for evaluating constructor candidates with regard to their safety and health performance planning.
The A10.26 standard applies to emergency situations, including fires, collapses, and hazardous spills. The standard deals with emergency rescue, evacuation, and transportation of injured workers, and also plans for coordinating with emergency medical facilities ahead of potential disasters.
Read the full story…
Reprinted courtesy of Melissa Dewey Brumback of Ragsdale Liggett PLLC. Ms. Brumback can be contacted at mbrumback@rl-law.com.
Read the court decisionRead the full story...Reprinted courtesy of
Hiring Subcontractors with Workers Compensation Insurance
January 10, 2018 —
David Adelstein - Florida Construction Legal UpdatesYou want to hear more on the POWER of
statutory workers compensation immunity? Well, here it is, because as I have mentioned in the past,
workers compensation immunity is powerful reinforcing the importance for contractors to ensure the subcontractors they hire absolutely have workers compensation insurance. Likewise, subcontractors want to ensure the subcontractors they hire also have workers compensation insurance.
Read the court decisionRead the full story...Reprinted courtesy of
David Adelstein, Florida Construction Legal UpdatesMr. Adelstein may be contacted at
dadelstein@gmail.com
Massachusetts Court Holds Statute of Repose Bars Certain Asbestos-Related Construction Claims
April 17, 2019 —
Timothy J. Keough & Rochelle Gumapac - White and Williams LLPIn Stearns v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Company, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court (SJC) addressed whether the six-year statute of repose for improvements to real property applies to long-tail tort claims, such as those caused by exposure to asbestos. Reasoning that the language of § 2B is clear, unambiguous and unequivocal, the SJC held that Mass. Gen. Laws. c. 260 § 2B does in fact bar all tort claims arising out of a deficiency or neglect in the design, planning, construction or general administration of an improvement to real property filed after the expiration of the six-year repose period. Additionally, the court affirmed that the time limitations imposed by the statute of repose may not be tolled for any reason six years after either the opening of the improvement for use or the owner taking possession of the improvement for occupation upon substantial completion, whichever may occur first.
Reprinted courtesy of
Timothy J. Keough, White and Williams LLP and
Rochelle Gumapac, White and Williams LLP
Mr. Keough may be contacted at keought@whiteandwilliams.com
Ms. Gumapac may be contacted at gumapacr@whiteandwilliams.com
Read the court decisionRead the full story...Reprinted courtesy of
