Reminder: Always Order a Title Search for Your Mechanic’s Lien
June 02, 2016 —
Christopher G. Hill – Construction Law MusingsMechanic’s liens are close to my heart as a construction attorney. These powerful tools for collection have been (and likely will be) discussed often here at Construction Law Musings. In fact, they rated their own page here at this little construction blog.
While the form for a mechanic’s lien that is found in the Virginia Code looks simple enough, what goes into that form is key to getting past the initial stage of the mere recording of the lien and moving on to where a lien claimant wishes to go: Payment. Everything from the proper amount of the lien to the timing of filing, the parties named, type of work performed and who signs the lien can trip you up even before you get a chance to have a judge examine your payment claim. In short, this simple form has many pitfalls.
On final item that is not often discussed is the description of the property and who the owner is on a project. A mistake on either of these fronts can be fatal as well. Often the “Owner” listed on the construction documents (the contracts, etc.) is not the same as the owner of the real estate to which your lien would attach. Sometimes a company may hire the general contractor as owner and either be a tenant of the property or could be the operating entity, but not the land holder. In either of these scenarios, merely naming the contract “owner” can be a mistake that could cost you your lien. The owner for lien purposes must be the land owner or there will be a problem.
Read the court decisionRead the full story...Reprinted courtesy of
Christopher G. Hill, Law Office of Christopher G. Hill, PCMr. Hill may be contacted at
chrisghill@constructionlawva.com
Affirmed: Insureds Bear the Burden of Allocating Covered Versus Uncovered Losses
September 28, 2017 —
C. Lily Schurra & K. Alexandra Byrd – Saxe Doernberger & Vita, P.C.The Second Circuit recently affirmed a district court decision that an insured bears the burden of establishing what portion of a jury verdict constitutes covered damages1.
The case arose out of claims for property damage resulting from construction defects in a homebuilding project. The homeowners fired the construction manager, J. Barrows, Inc. (“JBI”), who then sued the homeowners in state court for unpaid fees (the “Underlying Action”). The homeowners counterclaimed, alleging breach of contract and negligence. JBI’s commercial general liability insurer, Harleysville Worcester Insurance Company (“Harleysville”), agreed to defend JBI under a reservation of rights.
Reprinted courtesy of
C. Lily Schurra, Saxe Doernberger & Vita, P.C. and
K. Alexandra Byrd, Saxe Doernberger & Vita, P.C.
Ms. Schurra may be contacted at cls@sdvlaw.com
Ms. Byrd may be contacted at kab@sdvlaw.com
Read the court decisionRead the full story...Reprinted courtesy of
The ABCs of PFAS: What You Need to Know About Liabilities for the “Forever Chemical”
February 22, 2021 —
Robert F. Walsh, Gregory S. Capps & R. Victoria Fuller - Complex Insurance Coverage ReporterThis article is based on a presentation the authors made at White and Williams LLP’s Virtual Coverage College® on October 22, 2020. Every year, hundreds of insurance professionals come to Philadelphia—this year via our online platform—to participate in a full day of lectures and interactive presentations by White and Williams lawyers and guest panelists about the latest issues and challenges involved in claim handling and insurance litigation. Visit coveragecollege.com for more information and stay tuned for Coverage College® 2021.
Perfluoroalkyl and polyfluoroalkyl substances, commonly referred to as PFAS or PFOS, have been a key ingredient in numerous industrial and consumer products for decades. These man-made chemicals are prevalent and are also known for their longevity in the environment. More recently, PFAS have been the focus of thousands of lawsuits alleging personal injury and property damage. Some insurers have already questioned whether PFAS could rival asbestos in scope and bottom-line impacts. It is a legacy that confronts manufacturers and other defendants and insurers today.
This article provides a primer on PFAS, including the current regulatory framework and litigation landscape. We also identify some key emerging coverage issues insurers should be aware of when dealing with PFAS claims under liability and first-party property policies.
Reprinted courtesy of
Robert F. Walsh, White and Williams LLP and
Gregory S. Capps, White and Williams LLP
Mr. Walsh may be contacted at walshr@whiteandwilliams.com
Mr. Capps may be contacted at cappsg@whiteandwilliams.com
Read the court decisionRead the full story...Reprinted courtesy of
The Ever-Growing Thicket Of California Civil Code Section 2782
January 06, 2012 —
Michael D. Worthing, Borton PetriniCalifornia Civil Code section 2782 imposes limits on indemnity and defense provisions in construction contracts. Since the initial adoption of S.B. 8001 in 2002 (eff. January 1, 2003) section 27822 has been revised several times, and legislative history suggests that interest groups representing builders, developers and sub-contractors, as well as the insurance industry, have seen legislative action on these indemnity and defense issues as part of the overall response to the same economic pressures resulting from construction defect litigation that gave rise to S.B. 800. Amendments in 2005, 2007, 2008 and 2011 (each effective January 1 of the following year) have increasingly entangled the provisions of Section 2782 with various provisions of S.B. 800. The application of section 2782 to construction contracts, and in particular contracts between developer-builders and subcontractors, executed after January 1, 2006, will require a concurrent reading and understanding of S.B. 800, the application of which is itself still in flux.
The time a construction contract was executed will likely determine which version of section 2782, read in connection with provisions of S.B.800, is applicable. Because of the nature of construction defect litigation, the determination of relative rights and liabilities of developer-builders vis-à-vis subcontractors under construction contracts does not become the subject of litigation, and legal and judicial interpretation, until years after the contracts were entered and work performed. As of the date this article is submitted, there has been no case law interpreting or applying any of the post S.B. 800 amendments, in part, and perhaps primarily, because litigation arising from construction contracts executed after January 1, 2006, has not yet reached the appellate courts.
SECTION 2782 AT THE TIME S.B. 800 WAS ENACTED
Section 2782 was originally enacted in 1967 and amended several times to the version in effect when S.B. 800 became law, at which time the section was relatively simple and straightforward. It then consisted of two subdivisions, which have essentially remained unchanged until the most recent amendment during the 2011 legislative session.
Section 2782 (a) prohibited, and still prohibits, provisions in construction contracts that “purport to indemnify the promisee against liability for damages for death or bodily injury to persons, injury to property, or any other loss, damage or expense arising from the sole negligence or willful misconduct of the promise.” This provision essentially prohibits what had been referred to as so-called Type I or “specific” indemnity provisions. In such agreements, the indemnitor [the promisor, that is, the person or entity indemnifying] will indemnify the indemnitee [the promisee, that is, the person or entity being protected by the indemnity] for the indemnitee’s own negligence, whether active or passive, whether the indemnitee is solely negligent or concurrently negligent with the indemnitor. (See, MacDonald & Kruse, Inc. v. San Jose Steel Co. (1972) 29 Cal.App.3d 413, 419.)3 Section 2782 (a) has remained essentially intact since the enactment of S.B. 800. It still must be considered and applied to interpret a construction contract. Generally, it will apply to contracts not involving a public agency; the next part of section 2782 specifically governs such contracts.
The second subdivision prohibits provisions in any construction contract with a public agency which purport to impose on the contractor, or relieve the public agency from, liability for the active negligence of the public agency. Subdivision (b) has been revised by the 2011 amendment, discussed below. If a construction contract with the public agency is for residential construction, the standards of S.B. 800 likely apply.4
This was the extent of section 2782 on January 1, 2003, when S.B. 800 went into effect, and remained so until January 1, 2006. This version will govern interpretation and application of indemnity and defense provisions in construction contracts executed before January 1, 2006.5
2005 AMENDMENT
The first “post S.B. 800” change to Section 2782 was in enacted in 2005, effective January 1, 2006, and added two new sections. Subdivision (c) stated (in somewhat greater detail than paraphrased here) that for residential construction contracts, or amendments thereto, entered into after January 1, 2006, a subcontractor cannot be required to indemnify (including the cost to defend) a builder for construction defects that arise out of negligence or design defects of the builder or other independent contractors, or that do not arise out of the scope of the subcontractor=s scope of work. The term “residential construction” was defined by reference to S.B.800 generally, and the term “builder” was defined by reference to section 911 (a part of S.B. 800), for the first time expressly connecting provisions of section 2782 to S.B. 800. Contractual provisions not expressly prohibited were reserved to the agreement of the parties.
What subdivision (c) took away was partially given back by subdivision (d). It stated that “subdivision (c) does not prohibit a subcontractor and builder from mutually agreeing to the timing or immediacy of the defense and provisions for reimbursement of defense fees and costs, so long as that agreement, upon final resolution of the claims, does not waive or modify the provisions of subdivision (c).”6 In addition, it stated that this subdivision (c) did not affect the obligations of an insurance carrier under Presley Homes, Inc. v. American States Insurance Company (2001) 90 Cal.App.4th 571, which holds that where an insurer has a duty to defend a developer pursuant to an additional insured endorsement obtained under a subcontractor’s policy, that duty generally applies to the entire action, even if the suit involves both covered and uncovered claims, or a single claim only partially covered by the policy. Finally, subdivision (d) stated that the amendment did not affect the builder’s or subcontractor’s obligations under S.B. 800. Both of these latter provisions, relating to the Presley Homes case, and obligations under S.B. 800, have been carried forward essentially intact in subsequent amendments of section 2782.
This version of section 2782 will be applicable to any contract between a builder as defined by section 911 (see fn. 4, above) and a subcontractor executed between January 1, 2006, and December 31, 2008. Thus, a general contractor, etc., who is not a builder is not subject to the provisions added by the 2005 amendment; this changed with the next amendment.
It is not clear whether this version would apply to a contract entered before January 1, 2006, but amended after that date. Subdivision (c) applies to “all construction contracts, and amendments thereto, entered into after January 1, 2006, for residential construction.” It would seem that the clearest and most logical construction would apply it only to contracts originally made after January 1, 2006, and thereafter amended, but there has been no judicial determination of this issue.
In addition, logically it would seem that this version of section 2782 should be applicable to construction contracts for residential construction between a builder and a subcontractor, entered between January 1, 2006, and December 31, 2008; however, legislative history relating to the 2008 amendment discussed below suggests a different result might occur.
2007 AMENDMENT
The second “post S.B. 800” amendment in 2007 (effective January 1, 2008), added subdivisions (e)(1) and (e)(2).
Subdivision (e)(1) added general contractors and subcontractors not affiliated with the builder and imposed essentially the same restrictions on provisions to indemnify, including the cost to defend, them as had been imposed on the “builder” by the 2005 amendment. The amendment refers to section 911 (b), again part of S.B. 800, to define general contractors, etc., not affiliated with the builder.
Subdivision (e)(1) essentially repeated the provisions of subdivision (d) permitting agreement to the timing and immediacy of the defense, the reference to the Presley Homes case, and the general contractor’s or subcontractor’s obligations under S.B. 800.
It appears this amendment was an attempt to harmonize the new restrictions on indemnity and defense provisions with S.B. 800. The 2005 amendment, whether by oversight or intent, covered only builders and not general contractors, although both classes are subject to the provisions of S.B. 800; the 2007 amendment added non-builder-affiliated general contractors.
Again, logically, it would seem that this version of section 2782 should be applicable to construction contracts for residential construction between a general contractor or contractor not affiliated with a builder and a subcontractor, entered between January 1 and December 31, 2008; however, legislative history relating to the 2008 amendment discussed below suggests a different result might occur. The same potential uncertainty regarding applicability to a contract entered before January 1, 2008, but amended after that date, exists for this provision as for the prior amendment, discussed above.
2008 AMENDMENT
The third “post S.B. 800” amendment in 2008 (effective January 1, 2009), reorganized the language relating to prohibited indemnity provisions, added a reference to insurance in that same prohibition, extensively rewrote the provisions governing agreements relating to the timing or immediacy of defense, added language preserving equitable indemnity claims, and added language defining “construction defect” by reference to the standards set forth in S.B. 800.
Subdivisions (a) and (b) remained unchanged.
Subdivision (c) now made a combined reference to builders (again by reference to section 911), as well as general contractors or contractors not affiliated with the builder (again by reference to section 911 (b)), rather than dealing with the two groups in separate but nearly identical subdivisions as previously. It otherwise restated the same limitations that were previously set forth separately in subdivisions (c) and (e), as well as the reference to the Presley Homes case, and the general contractor’s or subcontractor’s obligations under S.B. 800, but with one important addition. The word “insure” was added to the description of prohibited provisions, to-wit: “provisions? that purport to insure or indemnify, including the cost to defend, the builder, [etc.]? are unenforceable” to the extent they arise out of claims of the type previously described.
It is unclear what impact the addition of this single word “insure” will have; and, it will have to be read in light of the preservation of the language that it shall not affect the obligations of an insurance carrier under the holding of the Presley Homes case. Suppose a carrier had issued an additional insured endorsement under which it would otherwise be required to defend a builder or general contractor consistent with the Presley Homes rule: would this newly added single word (restricting the construction contract, to which the carrier is not a party) give the carrier a basis for denying coverage under the insurance contract? Or would the continued inclusion of the express language that it does not affect the obligations of an insurance carrier under Presley Homes control? That is surely an issue that will have to be worked out by the courts.
The new subdivision (d) addressed defense obligations. Again it permitted parties to agree to the timing and immediacy of the defense and provision for reimbursement of defense fees and costs, but imposed a very detailed scheme that appears to limit the extent of such agreement. A subcontractor owes no defense or indemnity obligation until the builder or general contractor provides a written tender of the claim, which has the same force and effect as notice of commencement of a legal proceeding. Upon that tender the subcontractor shall elect to follow one of two ways of performing: subdivision (d) (1) permits the subcontractor to defend with counsel of its choice and to control the defense, if the subcontractor gives written notice of this election within a reasonable time after receipt of the written tender and in no event later than 90 days following that receipt; subdivision (d) (2) provides an alternative by which the subcontractor pays a reasonable allocated share of the builder’s or general contractor’s defense fees and costs within 30 days of receipt of an invoice, subject to reallocation upon final resolution of the claim by settlement or judgment. Subdivision (e) sets forth remedies available to the builder or general contractor if a subcontractor fails to timely and adequately perform its obligations under either of the two alternatives in subdivision (d), including compensatory and consequential damages, reasonable attorneys’ fees in connection with the first alternative, and interest on defense and indemnity costs in connection with the second alternative. Subdivision (e) ends with provisions relating to reallocation of defense costs, and damages for failure to reallocate.
Application of these requirements in actual litigation is likely to be cumbersome and potentially fraught with conflicts. If retained pursuant to subdivision (d) (1) does the attorney represent the builder, the subcontractor, or both? To whom does the attorney owe his or her fiduciary duty? Can an appropriate informed written consent be formulated, for example, under Rule 3-310 of the California Rules of Professional Conduct, or Rule 1.7, ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct? Could an attorney retained by a subcontractor blame the subcontractor if that is in the developer’s best interests? If multiple subcontractors elect to defend directly, how would the defense be coordinated among the potentially multiple attorneys so retained? Would an attorney retained by one subcontractor be able, or inclined, to blame another subcontractor who also chose to defend directly, in other words, what would prevent inconsistent defense positions amongst the various counsel retained by subcontractors for the developer? There may be solutions to such practical and professional considerations but it seems an ethical thicket awaits any attorney involved in such circumstances.
Subdivision (e) and (f) preserve equitable indemnity claims for the builder, general contractor or subcontractor, the first in general, the second as against any supplier, design profession, or product manufacturer. Finally, the 2008 amendment added for the first time, in subdivision (h), language defining "construction defect" as used in section 2782 as a violation of standards set forth in S.B. 800.
The inclusion of these last three subsections would seem to work against simplification of litigation. A builder or general contractor is likely to allege a claim for equitable indemnity against any and all subcontractors in addition to claims for contractual indemnity and defense (however limited by the other provisions of section 2782). Nothing in the section suggests the subcontractor should, or even can, somehow take on the representation of the builder, etc., in connection with a claim of equitable indemnity back against the subcontractor.
And the limited definition of “construction defect” in subdivision (h) appears to raise an issue of the applicability of the limitations set forth in subdivision (c). Although there is a school of thought that section 941 limits residential construction defect claims only to breach of the performance standards under S.B. 800, it is still common for CD complaints to plead other legal theories, e.g., breach of contract, breach of warranty, negligence, etc., in addition to violation of S.B. 800 standards. With the addition of subdivision (h) it is arguable that the restrictions on indemnity and defense provisions spelled out in subdivisions (c) and (d), both of which relate to claims for residential construction defects, are applicable only to claims for violation of S.B. 800 standards, and not other residential construction defect claims. In other words, a developer might conceivably still be entitled to a broader scope of indemnity and concomitant defense for other types of claims, such as breach of contract, breach of warranty, negligence, etc., so long as the indemnity does not violate the limitation of subdivision (a) against Type I indemnity, which as noted above, has remained intact through these revisions.
Finally, it would seem that this version of section 2782 should be applicable to contracts executed between builders, general contractors, etc., on the one hand and subcontractors on the other hand on and after January 1, 2009. And, as noted above in connection with the 2005 and 2007 amendments, logic would suggest that those versions would ordinarily apply to contracts executed during the time periods mentioned above. But, the Legislative Counsel’s Digest for the 2008 amendment as it finally was enacted into law includes the following statements:
This bill would delete the provisions applicable to construction contracts entered into on or after January 1, 2008, that purport to indemnify the general contractor or contractor not affiliated with the builder. The bill would revise the provisions applicable to contracts entered into after January 1, 2006, to instead apply to contracts entered into after January 1, 2009, and to apply to agreements that purport to insure or indemnify the builder or the general contractor or contractor not affiliated with the builder, as described.
Although it seems a startling result, this legislative history suggests an argument can be made that the 2008 amendment retroactively nullified the effect of the 2005 and 2007 amendments, so that contracts executed from January 1, 2006, as to builders or January 1, 2008, for general contractors, etc., through December 31, 2008, are still governed by the provisions of section 2782 as it was on the books prior to the first post-S.B. 800 amendment in 2005.
2011 AMENDMENT
Section 2782 has been amended yet again in the 2011 session of the California Legislature, effective January 1, 2012; however, the substantive changes affect certain contracts entered on or after January 1, 2013. All of the provisions contained in the 2008 amendment have been carried forward in the most recent amendment, although re-numbered: (c) became (d), etc., through (h) becoming (i). So, the law governing construction contracts entered into after January 1, 2009, for residential construction, as between a builder, or a general contractor, etc., not affiliated with a builder, and regarding insurance, indemnity or defense relating to claims for construction defects, remains the same as in the 2008 amendment.
As noted above the substantive changes to section 2782 all affect contracts entered into on or after January 1, 2013. Subdivision (b) has been amended such that any provision in a contract with a public agency that purports to impose on any contractor, etc., or relieve the public agency from, liability for the active negligence of the public agency will be void and unenforceable. A new subdivision (c) has been added that imposes a similar restriction on construction contracts with the owner of privately owned real property to be improved and as to which the owner is not acting as a contractor or supplier of materials or equipment to the work. This new restriction in subdivision (c) does not apply to a homeowner performing a home improvement project on his or her own single family dwelling.
The 2011 bill amending section 2782 also added a new section 2782.05, which will make void and unenforceable any provision in any construction contract (again, entered on or after January 1, 2013) that purports to insure or indemnify, including the cost to defend, a general contractor, construction manager, or other subcontractor, by a subcontractor for claims that arise out of the active negligence or willful misconduct of the general contractor, etc., or other independent contractors, etc., or to the extent the claims do not arise out of the scope of work of the subcontractor. However, the section also includes a long list of situations to which it does not apply, including all of those covered by section 2782 (residential construction subject to S.B. 800, public agency contracts subject to section 2782 (b), and direct contracts with private property owners subject to the new section 2782 (c)) as well as eight other categories. This apparently is intended to serve as a “catch-all” to extend a limitation on indemnity agreements to all construction contracts not previously swept into this widening legislative scheme, although the exact phrasing is slightly different.7
The new section 2782.05 then permits a mutual agreement to the timing or immediacy of a defense under a scheme essentially identical to that imposed in the 2008 amendment to section 2782: defend with counsel of choice, and maintain control of the defense; or, pay a reasonable allocated share of defense fees and costs. The same logistical and ethical difficulties presented by the 2008 scheme discussed above would likely be present in cases that fall under the new section 2782.05.
CONCLUSION
The California Legislature has been revising section 2782 since shortly after the adoption of S.B. 800. Each revision has been more complicated than the last, and each has tied certain provisions of section 2782 more closely to S.B. 800. In particular, with regard to construction defect claims relating to residential dwellings which are subject to S.B. 800, the Legislature has apparently attempted to exercise more and more control over the scope of allowable indemnity and dictated a very narrow scheme to govern how the defense obligation arising from a contractual indemnity is to be implemented. It seems likely that any attempt to manage the defense of a construction defect case under the options that allow a subcontractor to defend directly and control the defense will create a logistical problem and an ethical difficulty for any attorney attempting to defend a developer at the behest and direction of a subcontractor. Finally, as set forth in the current version of section 2782 relating to contractual indemnity and defense of S.B. 800 type cases (subdivisions (c) through (h) in the 2008 version, now subdivisions (d) through (i) in the 2011 amendment), the Legislature has apparently narrowed the application to only claims of violation of S.B. 800 standards. This may have, in essence, removed the restrictions on indemnity and defense provisions as they relate to other theories pleaded against developers in construction defense cases, e.g., breach of contract, breach of warranty, negligence, and the like. It is not at all clear that the Legislature has accomplished what it set out do accomplish. Rather, the law may have come full circle back to where it began, except for one legal theory, i.e. violation of S.B. 800 standards, currently being used in residential construction defect cases. For any other legal theory the limitation of section 2782 (a) may be solely controlling.
- California Civil Code section 43.99, and sections 895 to 945.5.
- All statutory references in this article are to the California Civil Code unless otherwise specified.
- Type I or specific indemnity does not exactly match the scope of proscribed indemnity as described in section 2782 (a) but it is the closest. More recent case law in California has eschewed a mechanical application of the MacDonald & Kruse typology in favor of examining the precise text of the actual contract (See, e.g., St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co. v. Frontier Pacific Ins. Co. (2003) 111 Cal.App.4th 1234, 1246, n. 6) but some recent cases still use the Type I, II and II classifications. And, an understanding of that “historical” typology is useful as an aid to evaluating and understanding express indemnity in general.
- The provisions of S.B. 800 other than the prelitigation procedures of sections 910 through 938 apply to general contractors, subcontractors, etc., pursuant to section 936. The prelitigation procedures generally involve a “builder,” which is specifically defined in section 911 (a) by reference to entities or individuals in the business of selling residential units to the public or of building, developing, or constructing residential units for public purchase. Pursuant to section 911 (b) the term builder does not include general contractors, etc., not affiliated with the builder. Thus, a general contractor who constructs residential housing pursuant to a contract with a public agency is still subject to claims for violation of the standards set forth in sections 896 and 897, resulting from its negligent act or omission or breach of contract, pursuant to section 936.
- As noted above, there has been no case law yet interpreting any of the “post S.B. 800” changes to Section 2782. One of the most important legal decisions relating to express indemnity and defense obligations and rights between developer-builders and sub-contractors was published after two of the amendments but based upon contracts executed and the language of section 2782 prior to January 1, 2006. (See, Crawford v. Weather Shield Mfg., Inc. (2008) 44 Cal.4th 541, 547, 566-67, fn. 14).
- Subcontractor dissatisfaction with the perceived inadequacy of protection afforded by this provision apparently became the impetus for a 2008 amendment to section 2782, discussed below, at least based upon the numerous (form) letters submitted to legislators in connection therewith.
- Section 2782 (a), where we started, and which has continued without change, prohibits indemnity for claims arising out of the sole negligence or willful misconduct of the promisee; sole negligence can be either active or passive. The various versions relating to residential construction prohibit indemnity for the negligence of the builder, etc., suggesting there is no express contractual indemnity for the negligence of the subcontractor if the builder, etc., is at all negligent. This is tempered a bit by the preservation of the right to equitable indemnity, which will now be found in section 2782 (g) and (h).
Courtesy of Michael D. Worthing of Borton Petrini, LLP. Mr. Worthing can be contacted at mworthing@bortonpetrini.com.
Read the court decisionRead the full story...Reprinted courtesy of
Infrastructure Money Comes With Labor Law Strings Attached
July 25, 2022 —
Cheryl Behymer, Patrick M. Dalin & Collin Cook - Construction ExecutiveThe federal government has committed to spending $1 trillion under the Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act on nationwide construction, alteration and repair projects. Billions of dollars have already been deployed on projects to improve highways, bridges, airports, electrical infrastructure and drinking water distribution, and the government is poised to spend the remaining funds on a massive infrastructure build-out over the next five years. While federal government contracts may provide a lucrative and reliable stream of revenue for construction companies, contractors must be prepared to comply with special requirements, particularly under the labor and employment laws enforced by the U.S. Department of Labor (USDOL).
1. The Davis Bacon Act Requires Payment of Prevailing Wages and Fringe Benefits
The Davis Bacon Act (DBA) applies to most federally funded and federally assisted projects for construction, alteration or repair work. This law requires all contractors and subcontractors on a covered project to pay all “laborers or mechanics” the wages and fringe benefits that “prevail” in the locality where the work is being performed. The USDOL determines what the prevailing wages and fringe benefits are for each trade and publishes them in wage determinations that should be issued to all contractors on the project.
Reprinted courtesy of
Cheryl Behymer, Patrick M. Dalin & Collin Cook, Construction Executive, a publication of Associated Builders and Contractors. All rights reserved.
Read the court decisionRead the full story...Reprinted courtesy of
Disappointment on an Olympian Scale After Rio 2016 Summer Games
February 23, 2017 —
Augusto Diniz, O Empreiteiro - Engineering News-RecordThe single word to describe the sports infrastructure created for the Rio 2016 Olympic Games is abandonment. Uncertainty over the future of the dilapidated sports stadiums and arenas threatens the legacy of the Olympics, which ended five months ago.
Read the court decisionRead the full story...Reprinted courtesy of
Augusto Diniz, O Empreiteiro, ENRENR may be contacted at
ENR.com@bnpmedia.com
The Evolution of Construction Defect Trends at West Coast Casualty Seminar
May 24, 2018 —
Don MacGregor – Bert L. Howe & Associates, Inc.Twenty-five years ago. 1993. On January 23rd, Bill Clinton was sworn in as the 42nd President of the United States. The average cost of a gallon of gasoline was $1.16, a movie ticket cost $4.00, and the average cost of a new home was $113,200.00.
1993 also marked the first of what would be a quarter century of annual seminars hosted by West Coast Casualty Service, and provided to the combined professionals within the Construction Defect Community. As the seminar has grown both in attendance and prominence within this community under the watchful stewardship of David and Coral Stern, much has changed both with regard to the content of the seminar and the climate within which it was presented. A quick look at the topics addressed over the past 25 years of the Construction Defect Seminar provides one with a veritable history of construction defect litigation and insurance coverage trends across the United States and beyond.
While the first seminar was hosted in 1993, my first attendance didn’t occur until 1999, and the first time I was honored to be a panelist would have to wait until 2007. In the subsequent years, I’ve had the opportunity to sit on panels an additional three times, and each one I gained rare and valuable insights into the Construction Defect Community, its willingness to challenge itself, and the amazing professionals we all have the distinct pleasure of working with every day (and whom we sometimes take too much for granted).
In the mid to late 90’s, topics at the seminar included such subjects as the Montrose Chemical Corp v. Superior Court decision (Montrose) regarding a carrier’s duty to defend and the subsequent Stonewall Insurance case that examined the duty to indemnify in the context of construction defect claims. The California Calderon Act of 1997, laying out the roadmap for HOA’s filing construction defect lawsuits was also a topic of discussion and debate within the West Coast “arena.”
The new millennium saw the landmark Aas v. William Lyon decision, which disallowed negligence claims for construction defects in the absence of actual resultant damage. This was followed by Presley Homes v. American States Insurance wherein the court ruled that a duty to defend applies where there is mere potential for coverage and the duty to defend applies to the entire action. Each of these bellwether decisions was addressed contemporaneously by panels at the West Coast seminar, contemporaneously bringing additional dialog to the CD community, from within the community.
2002 brought what has become the defining legislation in California regarding construction defect litigation and a builder’s right to repair. Senate Bill 800 (SB800), and its subsequent codification as Title 7, Part 2 of Division 2 of the California Civil Code, Sections 895 through 945.5 would become the defining framework for similar legislation across the United States. During the course of its drafting, movement through the legislature, and final adoption in January of 1993, many of the questions raised and debated in committees in Sacramento, had already been and were continuing to be addressed by panelists at the West Coast Seminar. How does SB800 work with Calderon? How does it affect the prior Aas decision? What now constitutes a defect, and what are timeframes established within the complex pre-litigation process? Open the pages of the 2002 – 2004 Seminar invitations and you’ll see panels comprised of the finest members of the insurance law and coverage communities addressing those very questions (and more)!
As the first decade of the new century drew to a close, a brief review of the WCC invitations from that period suggests a trend towards programmatic analyses of key themes selected for the seminar. In 2008, my second opportunity as a guest speaker, topics included a review of the state of construction defect litigation in a post-SB 800 environment. Panelists offered retrospective insight into the state of right to repair statutes in multiple states, while others offered a glimpse at where the industry might be headed, as similar legislation was enacted across the country. As always, pertinent court decisions bearing on construction defect, both in California, and elsewhere were given unique perspective and additional clarity by multiple panels of gifted speakers. In 2009, claims and coverage were examined from multiple unique perspectives, including that of plaintiff, the policyholder, and the insurer. Wrap policies and the gaps in due to self-insured retention obligations were examined.
As we rapidly approach the end of the second decade of the 21st Century, West Coast Casualty’s Construction Defect Seminar continues to lead the Construction Defect Community as the premier source for information and peer dialog on all matters relating to construction law, coverage, and emerging trends. In 2017, the Seminar tackled such broad subjects as the role of women in the construction industry, claims management, and risk management, challenges raised by wrap versus non-wrap litigation, and the emergent trend of apartment to condo conversions (and the attendant coverage challenges).
On May 16th at the Disneyland Resort, in Anaheim California, America’s largest Construction Defect event kicked off its 25th Anniversary celebration. As has been every year since 1993, the Seminar provided insurance, legal, and industry professionals an exciting and informative array of salient and timely panel topics, as well as a stellar faculty of gifted panelists. This year’s West Coast Casualty’s Construction Defect Seminar, like the past 25 years, was not only informative and educational, but also a promise for another 25 years of peerless service to the Construction Defect Community.
Read the court decisionRead the full story...Reprinted courtesy of
Additional Dismissals of COVID Business Interruption, Civil Authority Claims
December 29, 2020 —
Tred R. Eyerly - Insurance Law HawaiiAmong the recent decisions dismissing complaints for business interruption and civil authority coverage due to closures caused by COVID-19 are Pappy's Barber Shops, Inc. v. Farmers Group, Inc., 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 166808 (S.D. Calif. Sept. 11, 2020) and Sandy Point Dental v. Cincinnati Insurance Co., 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 171979 (E.D. Ill. Sept. 21, 2020). The difficulty in proving "direct physical loss" was the downfall of both cases.
In Pappy's, claims were made for business income losses insured as a result of local and state closure orders. The policy required "direct physical loss of or damage to property at the described premises." Plaintiffs argued that "direct physical loss of" did not require a tangible damage or alteration to property and that the loss of the ability to continue operating their businesses as a result of the government orders met this requirement.
The court relied upon a prior decision, 10E, LLC v. Travelers Indem. Co. of Connecticut, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 165252 (C.D. Calif. Sept. 2, 2020) [post here], where the court noted that under California law, losses from inability to use property did not amount to "direct physical loss" within the meaning of the policy.
Read the court decisionRead the full story...Reprinted courtesy of
Tred R. Eyerly, Damon Key Leong Kupchak HastertMr. Eyerly may be contacted at
te@hawaiilawyer.com
