SEATTLE WASHINGTON BUILDING EXPERT
DIRECTORY AND CAPABILITIES

Government’s Termination of Contractor for Default for Failure-To-Make Progress

July 10, 2023 — David Adelstein - Florida Construction Legal Updates
Whenever you elect to terminate the other party for cause or for default, you need to JUSTIFY the basis of the cause or default. The reason being is that a termination for default or cause is the harshest contractual remedy. This is why the other party will typically either (i) convert the termination for default into one for convenience, or (ii) if there is no termination for convenience provision in the contract, argue the terminating party breached the contract by terminating the contract without rightful justification. The key is if you are going to terminate a party for cause of default, make sure you have memorialized the persuasive reasons for exercising the termination, and can otherwise reasonably support the justification. Do not, and I repeat, do not haphazardly exercise a termination for default and think you do not have to justify the basis for the termination. Read the court decision
Read the full story...
Reprinted courtesy of David Adelstein, Kirwin Norris, P.A.
Mr. Adelstein may be contacted at dma@kirwinnorris.com

---

Arkansas Federal Court Fans the Product Liability Flames Utilizing the Malfunction Theory

September 14, 2020 — Michael J. Ciamaichelo - The Subrogation Strategist
To establish a product liability claim in Arkansas, the plaintiff must prove that the product was supplied in a defective condition, which rendered it unreasonably dangerous and that the defective condition was the proximate cause of the claimed damage or injury. Ordinarily, a plaintiff relies upon direct evidence of a product defect to establish its product liability claim. However, in some cases, the product sustains so much damage that it is impossible for a plaintiff to obtain direct evidence of a defect. The malfunction theory allows a plaintiff in a product liability action to establish a defect through circumstantial evidence, when direct evidence of a defect no longer exists. In order to utilize the malfunction theory, a plaintiff must present evidence that an unspecified product defect was the most likely cause of the damage/accident and rule out all other possible causes of the damage/accident. In Am. Nat’l Prop. & Cas. Co. v. Broan-Nutone, No. 5:18-CV-5250, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 117116, the United States District Court for the Western District of Arkansas ruled that the plaintiff offered sufficient evidence under “the malfunction theory” to defeat a summary judgment motion in a product liability action involving a bathroom fan that was destroyed in a fire. Read the court decision
Read the full story...
Reprinted courtesy of Michael J. Ciamaichelo, White and Williams LLP
Mr. Ciamaichelo may be contacted at ciamaichelom@whiteandwilliams.com

---

Appellate Team Secures Victory in North Carolina Governmental Immunity Personal Injury Matter

January 23, 2023 — Sam Friedman & Christopher Meeks - Lewis Brisbois
Atlanta, Ga. (January 12, 2023) - Atlanta Appellate Partners Seth M. Friedman and Christopher Meeks obtained a significant appellate win on behalf of a city in North Carolina when the North Carolina Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s denial of the city’s motion for summary judgment. In the underlying case, Lewis Brisbois’ client was sued for injuries that occurred during the construction of a dog park. The city moved for summary judgment on the grounds that it was immune from suit under the doctrine of governmental immunity. The trial court denied the motion and held that the city waived its governmental immunity through the purchase of a liability insurance policy. Lewis Brisbois was subsequently retained to handle the appeal. Before the North Carolina Court of Appeals, Lewis Brisbois argued, on behalf of its client, that well-established North Carolina law, along with a particular provision in the city’s insurance policy, rendered the city immune from the plaintiff’s claims. The appellate court agreed, holding that the city was immune from all liability and entitled to summary judgment on all of the plaintiff’s claims. The court's full opinion can be read here. Reprinted courtesy of Sam Friedman, Lewis Brisbois and Christopher Meeks, Lewis Brisbois Mr. Friedman may be contacted at Seth.Friedman@lewisbrisbois.com Mr. Meeks may be contacted at Christopher.Meeks@lewisbrisbois.com Read the court decision
Read the full story...
Reprinted courtesy of

---

BIOHM Seeks to Turn Plastic Waste into Insulation Material with Mushrooms

July 27, 2020 — Aarni Heiskanen - AEC Business
BIOHM is a research and development led UK start-up that aims to revolutionize the construction industry with its bio-based materials. Among their products are insulation panels made from mycelium, the root formations of fungi. Recently, the company discovered that certain fungal species can consume plastic as a food source. This invention could bring about new construction materials that originate from plastic waste. “Evolving from eating leaf matter and the odd bit of tree bark, to eating plastic might seem like a huge jump, but for certain fungi, it can actually happen very quickly. The inhabitants of the microbial world are far more genetically flexible than humans, able to evolve and adapt to their environment within a generation, constantly modifying and improving upon their genome to maximize their productivity,” says Samantha G.R. Jenkins, Lead Biotechnology Engineer. Read the court decision
Read the full story...
Reprinted courtesy of Aarni Heiskanen, AEC Business
Mr. Heiskanen may be contacted at aec-business@aepartners.fi

---

Duty to Defend Broadly Applies to Entire Action; Insured Need Not Apportion Defense Costs, Says Maryland Appeals Court

January 27, 2020 — Michael S. Levine & Kevin V. Small - Hunton Insurance Recovery Blog
In a recent decision, the Maryland Court of Special Appeals reiterated that the duty to defend broadly requires a liability insurer to defend an entire lawsuit against its insured, even where only some of the allegations are potentially covered. The court further held that the insured has no obligation to apportion defense costs among multiple implicated policies. The decision, Selective Way Insurance Company v. Nationwide Property and Casualty Insurance Company, et al., can be found here. The coverage litigation arose out of a construction defect case against a general contractor. The general contractor tendered the action to its insurer, Nationwide, which, in turn, filed a declaratory judgment action against the various insurers of construction project subcontractors that had named the general contractor as an additional insured. Ultimately, the court granted a summary judgment motion declaring that all of the subcontractors’ insurers had a duty to defend the general contractor “because the allegations in the underlying lawsuit raised claims that potentially arose from the [s]ubcontractors’ work at the [construction site].” All of the subcontractors’ insurers settled with Nationwide except for one, Selective Way; and the parties proceeded to a jury trial on various issues. The jury found for Nationwide on all issues. Selective Way appealed. Selective Way argued on appeal that even if some of the allegations were covered under its policy, it had no obligation to defend the general contractor because its insureds, the subcontractors, could not have been responsible for all of the losses given the nature of their work. Further, Selective Way contended that if it was responsible for defending the general contractor, it was not responsible for the entire defense, and the general contractor was responsible for apportioning the costs among the various subcontractors. The panel disagreed on both points. Reprinted courtesy of Michael S. Levine, Hunton Andrews Kurth and Kevin V. Small, Hunton Andrews Kurth Mr. Levine may be contacted at mlevine@HuntonAK.com Mr. Small may be contacted at ksmall@HuntonAK.com Read the court decision
Read the full story...
Reprinted courtesy of

---

Not in My Kitchen – California Supreme Court Decertifies Golden State Boring Case

November 26, 2014 — Roger Hughes – California Construction Law Blog
On November 11, 2014, the California Supreme Court rejected the recent California Court of Appeals decision Golden State Boring & Pipe Jacking, Inc. v Eastern Municipal Water District, 228 Cal.App.4th 273 (2014) which we wrote about earlier by “decertifying” it (meaning that lawyers cannot cite to the case as legal precedent) The decertification removed a decision that added substantially to the confusion as to when an action on a payment bond is timely filed. Even though the decision was determined in accordance with pre-2014 statutes, the case was relevant precedent for construction attorneys when determining time deadlines for filing a claim on a bond. Background In July of this year, the California Court of Appeals for the Fourth Appellate District upheld a trial court’s granting of summary judgment against a project subcontractor Golden State Boring & Pipe Jacking, Inc. (GSB) who sued Safeco Insurance Company (Safeco) for unpaid contract amounts on a project payment bond issued by Safeco. Both at the trial level and on appeal Safeco successfully argued that GSB’s action on its payment bond claim was time barred by former California Civil Code Sections 3249 (now Section 9558), because it was filed more than six month after the period in which stop notices may be filed as provided by California’s Civil Code Section 3184 (now Section 9558). Read the court decision
Read the full story...
Reprinted courtesy of Roger Hughes, Wendel Rosen Black & Dean LLP
Mr. Hughes may be contacted at rhughes@wendel.com

---

Colorado Adopts Twombly-Iqbal “Plausibility” Standard

July 14, 2016 — Jesse Howard Witt – The Witt Law Firm Blog, Acerbic Witt
Last week, the Colorado Supreme Court announced a dramatic shift in its rules of pleading, adopting the federal courts’ requirement that a claim must be “plausible on its face” to survive a motion to dismiss. Although seemingly subtle, this change transfers much more power to district court judges and weakens the right to a jury in civil actions. For decades in Colorado, courts have held that a plaintiff’s complaint need merely provide a defendant with notice of the transaction that caused an alleged injury. Judges would not dismiss the complaint unless it appeared “beyond doubt” that the plaintiff could prove “no set of facts” which would entitle him or her to relief. See Davidson v. Dill, 180 Colo. 123, 131, 503 P.2d 157, 162 (1972), quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957). This was rooted in the notion that the civil jury was the ultimate arbiter of disputed facts in American jurisprudence. Every party was entitled to have his or her “day in court” and present claims to a group of jurors selected from the community, rather than a judge appointed by the governor. Reprinted courtesy of Jesse Howard Witt, Acerbic Witt Mr. Witt welcomes comments at www.witt.law Read the full story... Read the court decision
Read the full story...
Reprinted courtesy of

---

Insurers' Motion to Knock Out Bad Faith, Negligent Misrepresentation Claims in Construction Defect Case Denied

August 27, 2013 — Tred Eyerly - Insurance Law Hawaii
Having previously decided that construction defect claims did not arise from an occurrence and were consequently not covered under Hawaii law, the Hawaii Federal District Court refused to dismiss the insured's second amended counterclaim alleging various claims for relief. Ill. Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Nordic PCL Construc., Inc., 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 108932 (D. Haw. July 31, 2013). In earlier proceedings, the court determined that the Nordic's allegedly deficient performance on construction contracts was not an "occurrence." The court also rejected Nordic's argument that the Hawaii legislature's Act 83 required the court to deviate from the Ninth Circuit's opinion in Burlington Ins. Co. v. Oceanic Design & Constr., Inc., 383 F.3d 940 (9th Cir. 2004) or the Hawaii Intermediate Court of Appeals' decision in Group Builders, Inc. v. Admiral Ins. Co., 123 Haw. 142, 231 P.3d 67 (Haw. Ct. App. 2010). Admiral now moved for summary judgment on its complaint and for dismissal of Nordic's second amended counterclaim, alleging bad faith and negligent misrepresentation, among other counts. Summary judgment as to the Safeway claim was denied. Read the court decision
Read the full story...
Reprinted courtesy of Tred Eyerly
Tred Eyerly can be contacted at te@hawaiilawyer.com

---