The Double-Breasted Dilemma
July 18, 2022 —
Lauren E. Rankins & Saloni Shah - ConsensusDocsWhat Is A Double-Breasted Operation?
A double-breasted operation is when a firm has two entities, and one entity performs work under collective bargaining agreements and the other does not. While this type of operation is not outright prohibited, it is often subject to a variety of challenges and scrutiny. To legally run a double-breasted operation, the two companies must remain separate and distinct. If the companies are not sufficiently separate and distinct from one another, the National Labor Relations Board (“NLRB”) or a court may find that the two companies are operating as a single entity or that the non-union company, or also known as the open shop, is merely an alter ego of the union company and, therefore, bound by the terms of the collective bargaining agreement.
In order to determine whether the companies are sufficiently separate and distinct, the two entities must pass either the single employer test or the alter ego test depending on the nature of the double-breasted operation. Typically, the single employer test is used when the two entities run parallel operations, and the alter ego test is used when the open shop replaces the union company. Under the single employer test, the NLRB or courts will generally consider four factors: (1) the interrelation of operations; (2) common management; (3) common control of labor relations; and (4) common ownership. The alter ego test does not require a finding that the companies are a single bargaining unit, but analyzes to what extent the two entities have substantially identical management, business operation and purpose, business equipment, customers, and ownership. While common ownership is a factor considered under both the single employer and alter ego tests, common ownership alone is not dispositive of whether the companies are sufficiently separate and distinct. In other words, the NLRB and courts do not simply look for common ownership to determine whether the double-breasted operation is lawful. It is merely one of many factors to consider.
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Lauren E. Rankins, Watt, Tieder, Hoffar & Fitzgerald, LLP (ConsensusDocs)Ms. Rankins may be contacted at
lrankins@watttieder.com
Is Construction Defect Litigation a Cause for Lack of Condos in Minneapolis?
September 17, 2015 —
Beverley BevenFlorez-CDJ STAFFAccording to Peter Callaghan writing for the Minn Post, while multi-family residential real estate is “hot” right now, most developers are building apartments rather than condos. Four developers spoke on the topic during Minneapolis City Council Member Lisa Goodman’s monthly “Lunch with Lisa” program. The developers stated that financing is more difficult for condos than it is for apartments, and millennials and baby boomers seem to prefer renting over buying. However, some developers stated that “the 10-year liability exposure for construction defects” was another reason to avoid condo building.
However, not all developers avoid condo building in Minneapolis. Jim Stanton, owner of Shamrock Development, said that he still is building condos. Stanton declared that he “has a good relationship with his lender,” and “he hasn’t been sued a lot and has never had a suit reach court.”
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Ten Firm Members Recognized as Super Lawyers or Rising Stars
July 13, 2017 —
Ceslie Blass - Ahlers & Cressman PLLCWhile we avoid using this blog as a platform for self-promotion, we recently received share-worthy distinctions, which both flatter and humble us. We invite you, our loyal readers, to celebrate in our success, which in great measure is due to you.
John P. Ahlers, one of the firm's founding partners, was ranked third overall across all practicing industries in Washington 2017 Super Lawyers and founding partner Paul R. Cressman, Jr. was ranked in the Top 100. The following other firm members were also recognized as Super Lawyers: Founding partner Scott R. Sleight, Bruce A. Cohen (Partner), Brett M. Hill (Partner), and Lawrence Glosser (Partner). In addition, Ryan W. Sternoff (Partner), James R. Lynch (Partner), Tymon Berger (Associate), and Lindsay (Taft) Watkins (Associate) were selected as Super Lawyers Rising Stars. Over half of the firm's lawyers received Super Lawyers distinction.
Super Lawyers selects attorneys using a patented multiphase selection process. Peer nominations and evaluations are combined with third party research. Each attorney candidate is evaluated on 12 indicators of peer recognition and professional achievement. Only five percent of the total lawyers in Washington State are selected for the honor of Super Lawyers and no more than 2.5 percent are selected for the honor of Super Lawyers Rising Stars.
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Ceslie Blass, Ahlers & Cressman PLLCMs. Blass may be contacted at
cblass@ac-lawyers.com
Limiting Plaintiffs’ Claims to a Cause of Action for Violation of SB-800
November 18, 2011 —
Samir R. Patel, Esq., Lorber, Greenfield, & Polito, LLPThere has been a fair share of publicity about the SB-800 amendments to the Civil Code (Civil Code section 896, et seq.) that codified construction defect litigation in 2002. Most of the publicity is geared toward the pre-litigation standards allowing a builder the right to repair before litigation is commenced by a homeowner. Less focus and attention has been given to the fact that violation of the SB-800 performance standards is being used by plaintiff’s counsel as an additional tool in the plaintiff’s pleading tool box against builders. Closer scrutiny to SB-800 reveals that those provisions should in fact act as a limitation to the pleading tools available to plaintiffs and an additional tool for builders in the defense of cases governed by SB-800.
The typical construction defect complaint contains the boiler plate versions of numerous causes of action. These causes of action include Strict Liability, Negligence, Negligence Per Se, Breach of Contract, Breach of Contract – Third-Party Beneficiary, Breach of Express Warranties, Breach of Implied Warranties, among others. The wide array of causes of action leave a defendant “pinned to the wall” because they require a complex defense on a multitude of contract and tort related causes of action. Furthermore, the statutes of limitations as to these claims widely differ depending upon if the particular defect is considered latent or patent. The truth of the matter remains, no matter what the circumstances, if a construction defect matter ultimately goes to trial, it is inevitable that plaintiffs will obtain a judgment on at least one of these causes of action.
On its own, the Strict Liability cause of action can be a thorn in a defendant’s side. A builder is obviously placing a product into the stream of commerce and strict liability is a tough standard to defend against, particularly when it concerns intricate homes comprised of multiple components that originally sold for hundreds of thousands of dollars. A Negligence cause of action can also be difficult to defend because the duty of care for a builder is what a “reasonable” builder would have done under the circumstances. An interpretation of this duty of care can easily sway a jury that will almost always consist of sympathetic homeowners. A Negligence Per Se cause of action can also leave a defendant vulnerable to accusations that a builder violated the Uniform Building Code or a multitude of other obscure municipal construction-related code provisions during the construction of the home. Lastly, the Breach of Contract cause of action leaves a builder relying on dense and intricate purchase and sale agreements with dozens of addenda which leave the skeptical jurors turned off by what they view as one-side, boilerplate provisions. Ultimately, when a matter is about to go to trial, the complexity of these complaints can benefit a plaintiff and increase a plaintiff’s bargaining power against a defendant who is attempting to avoid a potentially large judgment.
Enter the SB-800 statutes. The SB-800 statutes apply to all homes sold after January 1, 2003. Civil Code section 938 specifically states that “[t]his title applies only to new residential units where the purchase agreements with the buyer was signed by the seller on or after January 1, 2003.” (Civil Code §, 938.) As time progresses, more residential construction defect cases will exclusively fall under the purview of SB-800. Slowly but surely more SB-800 governed litigation is being filed, and its exclusive application is looming on the horizon.
On its surface, this “right to repair” regime has left builders with a lot to be desired despite the fact that it is supposed to allow the builder the opportunity to cure any deficiencies in their product before litigation can be filed by potential plaintiffs. However, the application of the time line for repair has shown to be impractical for anything but the most minor problems involving only small numbers of residential units. Moreover, the fact that the fruits of the builder’s investigation into the claimed defects in the pre-litigation context can freely be used as evidence against it in litigation makes builders proceed with trepidation in responding with a repair. For these reasons, more SB-800 litigation can be expected to result due to the shortcomings of the pre-litigation procedures, and savvy defense counsel should anticipate the issues to be dealt with in presenting the defense of such cases at trial.
This fact should not necessarily be met with fear or disdain. Within the SB-800 statutes, the legislature made it clear that they were creating a new cause of action for construction defect claims, but it further made it clear that this cause of action is a plaintiff’s exclusive remedy. The legislature giveth, but at the same time, the legislature taketh away. Throughout numerous provisions within the SB-800 statutes, the Civil Code states that claims for construction defects as to residential construction are exclusively governed by the Civil Code, and that the Civil Code governs any and all litigation arising under breaches of these provisions. Civil Code section 896 specifically states:
In any action seeking recovery of damages arising out of, or related to deficiencies in, the residential construction … the claimant’s claims or causes of action shall be limited to violation of, the following standards, except as specifically set forth in this title. (Civil Code §, 896.)
Civil Code section 896 then provides approximately fifty-plus standards by which a construction defect claim is assessed under that provision. Civil Code section 896 covers everything from plumbing to windows, and from foundations to decks, and in several instances expressly dictates statutes of limitations as to specific areas of construction that severely truncate the 10-year latent damage limitations period. As for any construction deficiencies that are not enumerated within Civil Code section 896, Civil Code section 897 explicitly defines the intent of the standards and provides a method to assess deficiencies that are not addressed in Civil Code section 896. Civil Code section 897 states:
Intent of Standards
The standards set forth in this chapter are intended to address every function or component of a structure. To the extent that a function or component of a structure is not addressed by these standards, it shall be actionable if it causes damage. (Civil Code §, 897.)
Therefore, Civil Code section 897 acts as a catch-all by which defects that are not covered within Civil Code section 896 can be evaluated on a damage standard mirroring the Aas case (damages must be present and actual). The result of sections 896 and 897 being read in combination is a comprehensive, all-inclusive set of performance standards by which any defect raised by Plaintiffs can be evaluated and resolved under a single SB-800 based cause of action.
Civil Code section 943 makes clear that a cause of action for violation of SB-800 performance standards is a plaintiff’s sole remedy for a residential construction defect action. Specifically, Civil Code section 943 states:
Except as provided in this title, no other cause of action for a claim covered by this title or for damages recoverable under 944 is allowed. In addition to the rights under this title, this title does not apply to any action by a claimant to enforce a contract or express contractual provision, or any action for fraud, personal injury, or violation of a statute. (Civil Code §, 943.)
Civil Code section 944 provides the method for computing damages within a construction defect action, as follows:
If a claim for damages is made under this title, the homeowner is only entitled to damages for the reasonable value of repairing any violation of the standards set forth in this title, [and] the reasonable cost of repairing any damages caused by the repair efforts… . (Civil Code §, 944.)
A cursory review of these statutes yields the conclusion that the legislature was attempting to create an exclusive cause of action that trumps all other causes of action where SB-800 applies. The remedy available to plaintiffs is limited to that allowed by the Civil Code. As noted above, “[n]o other cause of action for a claim covered by this title…is allowed.” (Civil Code §, 943.) Therefore, Civil Code sections 896, 897, 943, and 944 specifically prohibit the contract-based and tort-based causes of action typically pled by plaintiffs.
Plaintiff’s counsel has seized upon the language of section 943 to advance the argument that SB-800 still allows a plaintiff to advance typical contract and tort based causes of action. On the surface, this argument may seem compelling, but a minimum of scrutiny of the express language of section 943 dispels this notion. Section 943 says that it provides rights “[i]n addition” to those under the SB-800 Civil Code provisions. Clearly, the language in section 943 is intended to expressly underscore the fact that a plaintiff is not precluded from seeking relief in addition to that allowed under SB-800 for damages not arising from a breach of the SB-800 standards or for damages in addition to those recoverable under Section 944. This language does not provide an unfettered license to bring a Strict Liability, Negligence or other cause of action against a builder where SB-800 applies.
In fact, this language only keeps the door open for plaintiffs to pursue such causes of action not arising from a breach of the SB-800 standards should there be such supporting allegations. For example, if a plaintiff alleges that a builder breached an “express contractual provision” related to the timing of the completion of the home and close of escrow, and the contract specifies damages in this regard, a plaintiff may have a viable separate cause of action for Breach of Contract for recovery of those damages precisely because that is not an issue expressly dealt with in SB-800 in the performance standards under sections 896 and 897, or in the damage recovery terms under 944. As it stands, the vast majority of complaints are seeking redress for violation of the same primary right; that is, defects specifically outlined in Section 896 and 897 or which result in damages as stated in Section 944.
So, how does a builder defend against a complaint that contains multiple causes of action regarding construction defects for a home sold after January 1, 2003? There are numerous ways to approach this. First and foremost, these superfluous and improper causes of action can be attacked by demurrer seeking dismissal of all causes of action other than the cause of action alleging violation of SB-800. If the the time period within which to file a demurrer has passed already, a motion for judgment on the pleadings can be utilized to attack the improper causes of action in the same way as a demurrer can be used for this purpose.
The limitation to a demurrer or motion for judgment on the pleadings is that the judge is restricted to viewing only the four corners of the pleading when making a ruling. It is typical for plaintiffs’ counsel to cleverly (or one might even say, disingenuously) leave the complaint purposely vague to avoid a successful defense attack on the pleadings by not including the original date the residence was sold. In that instance, a motion for summary adjudication can be used to attack a plaintiff’s complaint. By simply providing evidence that the homes were originally sold after January 1, 2003, the improper causes of action should be subject to dismissal by summary adjudication. If the plaintiff is a subsequent purchaser, the builder still has recourse to enforce the pleading limitations under SB-800. Civil Code section 945 states that “[t]he provisions, standards, rights, and obligations set forth in this title are binding upon all original purchasers and their successors-in-interest.” (Civil Code §, 945.)
Attacking a plaintiff’s complaint to eliminate multiple causes of action can have numerous benefits. The practical result is that a plaintiff will only have one viable cause of action. The advantage is that the SB-800 performance standards include the defined performance standards and shortened statutes of limitations periods with regard to specific issues. Furthermore, as to defects which are not specifically provided for in Civil Code section 896, Civil Code section 897 requires a proof of actual damages. Therefore, a plaintiff must provide evidence of current damages and not simply conditions that may potentially cause damage in the future.
The Appellate Courts have yet to directly address and interpret these SB-800 provisions. The time for that is undoubtedly drawing near. For now, however, plaintiffs will have to find ways to accurately plead construction defect claims within the confines of one cause of action for breach of the performance standards enumerated within the Civil Code.
Printed courtesy of Lorber, Greenfield & Polito, LLP. Mr. Patel can be contacted at spatel@lorberlaw.com and Mr. Verbick at tverbick@lorberlaw.com.
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PA Superior Court Provides Clarification on Definition of CGL “Occurrence” When Property Damage Is Caused by Faulty Building Conditions
September 30, 2019 —
Anthony L. Miscioscia & Konrad R. Krebs - White and Williams LLPThe standard for an “occurrence” under a commercial general liability (CGL) insurance policy has been addressed on several occasions by Pennsylvania courts when an insured has allegedly performed faulty workmanship on a construction project. Specifically, in Pennsylvania, a claim for damages arising from an insured’s performance of faulty workmanship pursuant to a construction contract, where the only damage is to property supplied by the insured or worked on by the insured, does not constitute an “occurrence” under the standard commercial general liability insurance policy definition. But what about the circumstance when the insured has failed to perform contractual duties where the claim is for property damage to property not supplied by the insured or unrelated to the service the insured contracted to provide? The Pennsylvania Superior Court recently addressed this question in Pennsylvania Manufacturers Indemnity Co. v. Pottstown Industrial Complex LP, No. 3489 EDA 2018, 2019 Pa. Super. 223, 2019 Pa. Super. LEXIS 729* (Pa. Super. 2019).
Pottstown Industrial Complex arose out of an underlying dispute between a landlord and a commercial tenant who had leased space to store its product inventory. The tenant alleged that the landlord was responsible under the lease for keeping the roof “in serviceable condition in repair.” Notwithstanding this responsibility, the tenant alleged that the landlord failed to properly maintain and repair the roof, resulting in leaks and flooding during four separate rainstorms, destroying over $700,000 in inventory. The tenant specifically alleged that the floods were caused by poor caulking of the roof, gaps and separations in the roofing membrane, undersized drain openings, and accumulated debris and clogged drains.
The insurer filed a declaratory judgment action, seeking a determination that there was no coverage under a commercial general liability policy issued to the landlord. Following a motion for judgment on the pleadings, the trial court entered an order in favor of the insurer, holding that allegations of inadequate roof repairs were claims for faulty workmanship and were not covered under Kvaerner Metals Division of Kvaerner U.S., Inc. v. Commercial Union Insurance Co., 908 A.2d 888 (Pa. 2006) and Millers Capital Insurance Co. v. Gambone Brothers Development Co., 941 A.2d 706 (Pa. Super. 2007).
Reprinted courtesy of
Anthony Miscioscia, White and Williams LLP and
Konrad Krebs, White and Williams LLP
Mr. Miscioscia may be contacted at misciosciaa@whiteandwilliams.com
Mr. Krebs may be contacted at krebsk@whiteandwilliams.com
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Tallest U.S. Skyscraper Dream Kept Alive by Irish Builder
May 01, 2014 —
Brian Louis – BloombergGarrett Kelleher, the Irish developer trying to restore Chicago’s status as home to the tallest building in the U.S., has one last chance to keep his dream alive.
The planned lakefront skyscraper is nothing more than a hole in the ground six years after the financial crisis derailed Kelleher’s ambitions. To salvage the project, he must line up money to get out of bankruptcy, then obtain financing for the 2,000-foot (610-meter), Santiago Calatrava-designed Chicago Spire condominium tower, which would surpass New York’s 1 World Trade Center by 224 feet.
“I never understood how that project was going to work, frankly,” said Alan Lev, chief executive officer of Belgravia Group Ltd., a Chicago-based housing developer uninvolved in the project. “It’s a real eyesore sitting in the ground, so I hope somebody does something with it.”
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Brian Louis, BloombergMr. Louis may be contacted at
blouis1@bloomberg.net
Texas Legislature Puts a Spear in Doctrine Making Contractor Warrantor of Owner Furnished Plans and Specifications
May 31, 2021 —
Paulo Flores, Timothy D. Matheny & Jackson Mabry - Peckar & Abramson, P.C.The Texas Legislature has just sent Senate Bill 219 (“S.B. 219”) to the Governor for signature; if this legislation is signed by the Governor, it will further erode the Texas legal doctrine that makes the contractor the warrantor of owner-furnished plans and specifications unless the prime contract specifically places this burden on the owner.
Background
49 states follow what is known as the Spearin doctrine (named after the U.S. Supreme Court case of United States v. Spearin) in which owners warrant the accuracy and sufficiency of owner-furnished plans and specifications. Texas, on the other hand, follows the Texas Supreme Court created Lonergan doctrine, which has been an unfortunate presence in Texas construction law since 1907. In its “purest form,” as stated by the Texas Supreme Court, the Lonergan doctrine prevents a contractor from successfully asserting a claim for “breach of contract based on defective plans and specifications” unless the contract contains language that “shows an intent to shift the burden of risk to the owner.” Essentially, this then translates into the contractor warranting the sufficiency and accuracy of owner-furnished plans and specifications, unless the contract between them expressly places this burden on the owner. Over the years some Texas courts of appeal had ameliorated this harsh doctrine, but in 2012, the Texas Supreme Court indicated Lonergan was still the law in Texas, in the case of El Paso v. Mastec. In 2019, the Texas Legislature took the first step toward hopefully abrogating the Lonergan doctrine by implementing a new Chapter 473 to the Texas Transportation Code with respect to certain projects undertaken by the Texas Department of Transportation, and Texas political subdivisions acting under the authority of Chapters 284, 366, 370 or 431 of the Transportation Code, adopting, as it were, the Spearin Doctrine in these limited, transportation projects. Now, the legislature has further chipped away at the Lonergan doctrine with the passage of S.B. 219.
Reprinted courtesy of
Paulo Flores, Peckar & Abramson, P.C.,
Timothy D. Matheny, Peckar & Abramson, P.C. and
Jackson Mabry, Peckar & Abramson, P.C.
Mr. Flores may be contacted at PFlores@Pecklaw.com
Mr. Matheny may be contacted at tmatheny@pecklaw.com
Mr. Mabry may be contacted at jmabry@pecklaw.com
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Las Vegas HOA Conspiracy & Fraud Case Delayed Again
September 17, 2014 —
Beverley BevenFlorez-CDJ STAFFAccording to the Las Vegas Review-Journal, “[T]he federal trial of former construction company boss Leon Benzer and five others in a massive scheme to take over Las Vegas-area homeowners associations” has been delayed to February 2015 by U.S. District Judge James Mahan.
Defense attorneys “argued they needed more time to review thousands of pages of new documents provided by prosecutors.” The prosecutors did not object to the delay.
Benzer and the other defendants face conspiracy and fraud charges in an HOA takeover scheme that allegedly occurred between 2003 and 2009.
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