A Landlord’s Guide to California’s New Statewide Rent Control Laws
May 18, 2020 —
Colton Addy - Snell & Wilmer Real Estate Litigation BlogApplicability of California’s Rent Control Laws: California Civil Code Sections 1946.2 and 1947.12 took effect on January 1, 2020, and implement statewide rent control in California for most residential properties. The rent control laws, however, do not apply to a rental property that was issued a certificate of occupancy in the last 15 years. (Civ. Code §§ 1947.12(d)(4), 1946.2(e)(7)). The statutes also do not apply to most single-family residences, provided that (a) the owner is not a real estate investment trust, a corporation, or a limited liability company where one of the members is a corporation, and (b) the required statutory language is included in the lease agreement for tenancies commencing or renewing on or after July 1, 2020. (Civ. Code §§ 1947.12(d)(5), 1946.2(e)(8)).
Annual Increases Permitted Under California’s Rent Control Laws: Commencing on January 1, 2020, unless otherwise permitted by California law, a Landlord cannot increase the gross rental rate for a rental unit over a continuous 12-month period more than the change in the regional cost of living index where the property is located plus 5%, and gross rental rate increases are subject to a maximum cap of 10% over a continuous 12-month period regardless of the change in the cost of living index. (Civ. Code § 1947.12(a)(1)). The gross rental rate is determined using the lowest rental amount charged in any month in the immediately preceding 12 months. (Id.) Any incentives, discounts, concessions, or credits are not taken into account. (Id.) Even if a rent increase does not exceed the amount permitted under the statute, a Landlord is prohibited from increasing rent more than twice in any continuous 12-month period. (Civ. Code § 1947.12(a)(2)).
Retroactive Applicability of Restrictions on Rent Increases: Although the statute took effect on January 1, 2020, the statute retroactively applies to all rent increases that occurred on or after March 15, 2019. (Civ. Code § 1947.12(h)(1)). If a landlord increased the rent amount more than the amount permitted under California Civil Code Section 1947.12(a)(1) after March 15, 2019, and prior to January 1, 2020, the rent amount on January 1, 2020, is reduced to the amount of the rent on March 15, 2019, plus the maximum permissible increase under California Civil Code Section 1947.12(a)(1). (Civ. Code § 1947.12(h)(2)). The Landlord does not have to refund the tenant any rent payments that were in excess of the permissible rent increase that the tenant made prior to January 1, 2020. (Id.)
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Colton Addy, Snell & WilmerMr. Addy may be contacted at
caddy@swlaw.com
Insurer Must Defend Claims of Alleged Willful Coal Removal
June 21, 2017 —
Tred R. Eyerly - Insurance Law HawaiiThe court found that the insured was entitled to a defense against claims for its alleged willful removal of coal from third parties' land. Liberty Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Bizzack Constr, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 70285 (W.D. Va. April 27, 2017).
The Virginia Department of Transportation (VDOT) contracted with Bizzack to perform work in widening U.S. Route 460. VDOT notified coal owners that it had been "necessary to remove certain coal" from their land during the construction of Route 460. Some of the coal owners sued Bizzack, seeking compensation for lost coal. They alleged Bizzack had illegally removed and sold their coal, and "damaged the remaining coal in place on the property."
Bizzack sought coverage from Liberty Mutual. Liberty Mutual filed suit seeking a declaration that it had no duty to defend or indemnify Bizzack. Cross-motions for summary judgment were filed. Liberty Mutual argued: (1) there was no "occurrence"; (2) exclusion j (5) applied; and (3) the "expected or intended injury" exclusion applied.
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Tred R. Eyerly - Insurance Law HawaiiMr. Eyerly may be contacted at
te@hawaiilawyer.com
New York Appellate Team Obtains Affirmance of Dismissal of Would-Be Labor Law Action Against Municipal Entities
August 12, 2024 —
Lewis Brisbois NewsroomNew York, N.Y. (July 11, 2024) - In Charlot v. City of New York, ___ A.D.3d ___, 2024 NY Slip Op 03161 (2d Dep’t 2024), New York Associate Dean Pillarella, a member of the Appellate Practice, recently obtained an affirmance of the lower court’s dismissal of the plaintiff’s action against the City of New York (“the City”) for failure to timely serve a notice of claim. New York Partner Meghan Cavalieri, a member of the Construction Practice, and her team authored and argued the initial motion to dismiss.
The plaintiff alleged to have sustained injuries as a result of a construction-site accident on December 8, 2020, on City-owned property in the course of the construction of a school by the New York City School Construction Authority. N.Y. General Municipal Law (“GML”) § 50-e(1)(a), requires service of a notice of claim within 90 days after the claim arises as a condition precedent to the commencement of a tort action. The plaintiff served no notice of claim until June 2021 and commenced an action in January 2022, alleging violations of N.Y. Labor Law §§ 240(1), 241(6), and 200. Given the plaintiff’s failure to comply with GML § 50-e(1)(a), Meghan and her team rejected the notices of claim as untimely. The plaintiff then moved for leave to deem the notices of claim timely served nunc pro tunc. In response, Meghan and her team opposed the motion and cross-moved to dismiss the action.
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Lewis Brisbois
Leftover Equipment and Materials When a Contractor Is Abruptly Terminated
November 06, 2023 —
Brian Perlberg - ConsensusDocsTermination for cause is costly and adversarial and has been covered in this
article. But can a terminating party use equipment and tools left behind on the worksite (i.e., a crane)? The answer depends on what is in your contract.
Under
ConsensusDocs, a constructor must give its permission to use any equipment or supplies left at the worksite, such as a crane.
[i] Moreover, the owner must indemnify the constructor for using their equipment. This makes sense because even if a constructor were appropriately terminated for cause, using their equipment and materials they no longer possess or control unfairly creates additional liability exposure. At a minimum, the owner should take on the risk of using the equipment and materials since they benefit from such use.
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Brian Perlberg, ConsensusDocs CoalitionMr. Perlberg may be contacted at
bperlberg@ConsensusDocs.org
More Reminders that the Specific Contract Terms Matter
January 24, 2022 —
Christopher G. Hill - Construction Law MusingsIf there is a theme I have pounded upon here at Construction Law Musings in the over 13 years of posting, it is that the specific terms of your construction contracts will make a huge difference. While there have been reminders galore, a case from the Eastern District of Virginia presented another wrinkle on this theme. The wrinkle? A factoring company.
In CJM Financial, Inc. v. Leebcor Services, LLC et. al., the Court examined this scenario (though it went into more detail than I will here): Leebcorp hired a subcontractor, Maston Creek Services to provide certain construction services under two separate contracts. Maston then hired CJM, a factoring company, and assigned CJM its receivables and the right to collect those receivables. We wouldn’t be discussing this case if all had worked out as planned, so you likely anticipate at least some of what came next. The short story is that Matson failed to pay some of its suppliers and Leebcorp exercised its termination rights under those contracts when Matson refused to cure. In the interim, CJM had paid part of certain payment applications to Matson in compliance with the factoring agreement. When Leebcorp failed to pay CJM for Matson’s work, CJM exercised its assigned rights to collect the receivables and sued Leebcorp for breach of contract. In response, Leebcorp counterclaimed for, among other counts including civil conspiracy, breach of contract based on Matson’s failure to perform. CJM moved to dismiss the counterclaims.
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The Law Office of Christopher G. HillMr. Hill may be contacted at
chrisghill@constructionlawva.com
Dear Engineer: Has your insurer issued a “Reservation of Rights” letter? (law note)
April 20, 2017 —
Melissa Dewey Brumback - Construction Law in North CarolinaIn my previous post, I made reference to getting a “Reservation of Rights” letter. I noted that the carrier may decide to defend you under a Reservation of Rights (i.e., hire your lawyer) but may not, necessarily, accept the responsibility for paying the claim. Does this mean that the insurance company has denied your claim, or will never pay? No.
Reservation of Rights (ROR) letters are sent for a variety of reasons- most notably, when some portion of the construction lawsuit against you is not covered under your E&O policy. The letter must state the reason(s) that the ROR is being issued.
With the ROR, the insurance company is telling you that it reserves the right to withdraw from your defense and/or deny payment of damages at a later date, depending upon how facts in the case develop. The notice is intended to let you know that there *may* be issues later, and to put you notice that you have the right to hire your own lawyer (at your own expense) to protect yourself from that future potential risk.
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Melissa Dewey Brumback, Ragsdale Liggett PLLCMs. Brumback may be contacted at
mbrumback@rl-law.com
NTSB Sheds Light on Fatal Baltimore Work Zone Crash
April 25, 2023 —
Justin Rice - Engineering News-RecordThe National Transportation Safety Board recently released conclusions of a preliminary investigation into a March 22
crash that killed six construction workers when an errant car sped through a work zone along the Interstate-695 Beltway in Baltimore.
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Justin Rice, Engineering News-Record
Mr. Rice may be contacted at ricej@enr.com
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Understanding the California Consumer Privacy Act
March 02, 2020 —
Kevin Bonsignore - Wilke FleuryThe recently enacted California Consumer Privacy Act (“CCPA” or the “Act”) goes into effect on January 1, 2020 and with it comes enhanced consumer protections for California residents against businesses that collect their personal information. Generally speaking, the CCPA requires that businesses provide consumers with information relating to the business’ access to and sharing of personal information. Accordingly, businesses should determine whether the CCPA will apply to them and, if so, what policies and procedures they should implement to comply with this new law.
Application of the CCPA
Importantly, the CCPA does not apply to all California business. The requirements of the CCPA only apply where a for-profit entity collects Consumers’ Personal Information, does business in the State of California, and satisfies one or more of the following: (1) has annual gross revenues in excess of twenty-five million dollars ($25,000,000); (2) receives for the business’s commercial purposes, sells, or shares for commercial purposes the personal information of 50,000 or more consumers, households, or devices; or (3) derives 50 percent or more of its annual revenues from selling consumers’ personal information. (California Code of Civil Procedure § 1798.140(c)(1)(A)-(C).) Thus, as a practical matter, small “mom and pop” operations will likely not be subject to the CCPA, but most mid-size and large companies should review their own books or consult with an accountant to determine whether the CCPA applies to their business.
Rights Granted to Consumers
“Consumers,” as the term is used in the CCPA, means “any natural person who is a California resident…” (California Code of Civil Procedure § 1798.140(g).) This broad definition makes no carve-outs or exclusions for a business’s employees and, despite the traditional definition of the term “consumer,” does not seem to require that the resident purchase any goods or services. This definition seems intentional and was likely designed to prevent businesses from attempting to circumvent the requirements of the CCPA by arguing that the personal information they collect does not belong to “consumers” under the traditional meaning of the word.
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Kevin Bonsignore, Wilke FleuryMr. Bonsignore may be contacted at
kbonsignore@wilkefleury.com
