Patent or Latent: An Important Question in Construction Defects
October 25, 2013 —
CDJ STAFFPieter M. O’Leary, writing for the site AVVO offers the advice that whether a construction defect is patent or latent could influence whether or not it’s covered in a construction defect claim. He notes that a “patent defect” is “a construction defect that is ‘readily observable or evident,’” while a “latent defect” is “a construction defect that is present but not readily detectable even with reasonable care.” While this may sound like a simple distinction, he notes that “distinguishing between the two can often be difficult and sometimes highly contested by the various parties in a lawsuit.”
The first question is “whether the average consumer, during the course of a reasonable inspection, would discover the defect.” The question arises because “if a defect is hidden and not detectable (latent defect), a longer time period exists for the claimant to file a claim.”
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Contractor Pleads Guilty to Disadvantaged-Business Fraud
November 17, 2016 —
Tom Ichniowski – Engineering News-RecordIn the latest development in a federal small disadvantaged-business case, a construction company executive has pleaded guilty to a charge of conspiring to commit wire fraud.
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Tom Ichniowski, Engineering News-RecordMr. Ichniowski may be contacted at
ichniowskit@enr.com
Could You Be More Specific . . . About My Excess AI Coverage?
February 23, 2017 —
Yas Omidi - California Construction Law BlogAre you a general contractor who is pretty sure that you have additional insured coverage for some stuff under your sub-subcontractor’s excess policy? Advent, Inc. v. National Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, PA, Case No. H041934 (December 6, 2016) warns you to be a little more specific.
Johnson Western Gunite was the shotcrete sub-subcontractor on a job. One of its employees—specifically, Jerry Kielty—tumbled down a stairwell, sustaining severe bodily injury thereby. Kielty filed suit against the general contractor in charge of the job—Advent, Inc.—amongst others. Kielty did not name his employer Johnson in the suit. In terms of insurance:
Advent was insured under a primary insurance policy issued by Landmark American Insurance Company and an excess policy issued by Topa Insurance Company.
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Yas Omidi, Wendel Rosen Black & Dean LLPMs. Omidi may be contacted at
yomidi@wendel.com
Occurrence Definition Trends Analyzed
August 27, 2014 —
Beverley BevenFlorez-CDJ STAFFIn The Legal Intelligencer, Gordon S. Woodward, partner at Schnader Harrison Segal & Lewis, analyzed the changing definition of occurrence in the insurance industry, and more specifically in Pennsylvania.
Woodward begins by going over “the traditional view of occurrence as it relates to coverage for faulty products or defective work,” in which “the existence of a defect in a product or an event in which a defective product injures only itself does not constitute an occurrence.” However, he stated that “there is a growing trend in favor of finding that an occurrence can include the circumstance where defective work results in damage only to the work or product itself (so long as the damage was neither intended nor expected by the insured).” Woodward also explained Pennsylvania developments and legislative changes (such as a South Carolina statute).
These changes need to be monitored, Woodward stated, “as they have the potential to dramatically alter the coverage landscape from one jurisdiction to the next.”
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Preserving your Rights to Secure Payment on Construction Projects (with Examples)
March 22, 2017 —
David Adelstein – Florida Construction Legal UpdatesAll participants across the construction industry should understand what efforts they should take to maximize and collateralize payment. No one wants to work for free and, certainly, no one in the construction industry wants to work without ensuring there is some mechanism to recover payment in the event they remain unpaid. Being proactive and knowledgeable can go a long way when it comes to recovering your money.
Your Contract – It starts with the contract. You should understand those risks that are allocated to you and those that are allocated to another party. And, you should understand the contractual mechanism to resolve claims and disputes and whether your contract has a prevailing party attorney’s fees provision. In addition to contractual rights, there are tools for you to maximize your collection efforts.
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David Adelstein, Florida Construction Legal UpdatesMr. Adelstein may be contacted at
dadelstein@gmail.com
Hawaii Supreme Court Tackles "Other Insurance" Issues
February 25, 2014 —
Tred Eyerly – Insurance Law HawaiiResponding to four certified questions from the Ninth Circuit, the Hawaii Supreme Court addressed various issues raised by competing "other insurance" provisions in two CGL policies. Nautilus Ins. Co. v. Lexington Ins. Co., 2014 Haw. LEXIS 59 (Haw. Feb. 13, 2014).
Coverage for a development on Maui was at issue. The developer, VP & PK (ML) LLC, was insured by Lexington. The other insurance provision in Lexington's policy provided it was excess over "any other primary insurance available to you covering liability for damages arising out of the premises . . . for which you have been added as an additional insured."
Kila Kila Construction was one of VP & PK's subcontractors. Kika Kila was not an additional insured under Lexington's policy. Kila Kila had its own CGL policy with Nautilus. The Nautilus other insurance clause stated the insurance was excess over "any other primary insurance available to you covering liability arising out of the premises or operations for which you ahve been added as an additional insured." An endorsement added VP & PK as an additional insured, but only for liability arising out of Kila Kila's negligence.
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Tred R. Eyerly, Insurance Law HawaiiMr. Eyerly may be contacted at
te@hawaiilawyer.com
The California Legislature Return the Power Back to the People by Passing the California Consumer Privacy Act of 2018
January 02, 2019 —
Richard H. Glucksman, Esq., David A. Napper, Esq., & Lana Halavi – Chapman Glucksman Dean Roeb & BargerIntroduction
Data breaches and social media hacks are becoming increasingly common stories on the news cycle. Meanwhile, companies have made fortunes on unsuspecting individuals by selling information gathered on the user. Every internet user has wondered why a pop-up ad or banner on an unrelated website relates to something you purchased or searched for "that one time. The California legislature has decided to return some power back to the people with the California Consumer Privacy Act of 2018. California is the first state to introduce privacy protection for individuals personal data and could pave the way for other states to follow suit in the near future.
The California Consumer Privacy Act of 2018
On June 28, 2018, California Governor Jerry Brown signed into law the California Consumer Privacy Act of 2018 ("the Act"). The California Legislature eagerly passed the Act, which comes into effect on January 1, 2020, granting broad new privacy rights to "consumers" and enforcing requirements on the protection of their personal data allowing consumers the right to take back control of their personal information.
A "consumer" is defined as a "resident of California as defined by California's personal income tax regulations. "Personal information" pursuant to the Act is defined as "information that identifies, relates to, describes, is capable of being associated with, or could reasonably be linked, directly or indirectly, with a particular consumer or household." Personal information is generally recognized in California as information that can identify a specific individual. The Act also includes information that can be used to identify a household.
Provisions of the Act
Pursuant to the Act, consumers are given the right to know upon request if their personal information is disclosed, and to whom it is disclosed, the right to know what personal information has been collected about them by a business, the right to object to the sale of their personal information, the right to obtain data collected about them, the right to require businesses to obliterate their personal information, and the right to be given equal service and pricing from businesses, including equal prices and quality of goods or services. The Act forbids discrimination by businesses against consumers for exercising their privacy rights pursuant to the Act.
Businesses are, however, permitted to charge different prices or provide different quality of service to consumers if the difference is "reasonably related to the value provided to the consumer by the consumer’s data." Additionally, businesses must allow consumers to exercise their rights by providing to consumers toll-free telephone numbers and/or websites to request such information or privacy. If a consumer sends a verified request for information to a business, the business subsequently has 45 days to give the consumer the requested information from the preceding 12 months with no charge to the consumer.
Who Must Comply with the Act
The Act will apply to for-profit businesses that do business in the State of California, deal with personal information of California residents, and either·(1) have more than $25 million in annual gross revenues, or (2) receive or disclose more than 50,000 California residents' personal information, or(3) derive 50% or greater of California residents' annual revenues from selling their personal information.
Who is Exempted from Compliance with the Act
A for-profit company, a small company, and/or a company that does not derive large amounts of personal information and does not share a brand with an affiliate covered by the Act is exempted from complying with the Act. Additionally, a company is exempted from compliance with the Act "if every aspect of . . . commercial conduct takes place wholly outside of California," meaning: (1) the personal information was collected from the consumer while they were outside California, (2) no sale of their personal information took place in California, and (3) there was no sale of personal information that was collected while the consumer was in California.
Impact
According to 2017 estimates, California's population totaled approximately 39 million people. Clearly the Act will affect an incredibly large amount of people considering it concerns the most populous state in America. The California Consumer Privacy Act of 2018, which is being compared to the EU General Data Protection Regulation for its all-encompassing method and resilient privacy protections is also speculated to have an impact on businesses throughout the nation and around the world. While the costs will likely go up for companies to do business in California, the transparency and trust earned by business and gained by consumers in this new landscape could potential overcome the initial costs to provide these required services. Perhaps most importantly however, is if California consumers decide to take advantage of the new protections, they will no longer have to wonder what for-profit businesses are doing with their data.
Reprinted courtesy of Chapman Glucksman Dean Roeb & Barger attorneys
Richard H. Glucksman,
David A. Napper and
Lana Halavi
Mr. Glucksman may be contacted at rglucksman@cgdrblaw.com
Mr. Napper may be contacted at dnapper@cgdrblaw.com
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Life After McMillin: Do Negligence and Strict Liability Causes of Action for Construction Defects Still Exist?
January 24, 2018 —
Thomas Balestreri and Amanda Crawley - Balestreri, Potocki, & HolmesThe ruling is in but the battle will likely continue over the practical application of SB 800. On January 18, 2018 the California Supreme Court issued its decision in
McMillin Albany, LLC v. Superior Court (Van Tassel) (January 18, 2018, S229762) __ Cal.4th __, holding that the statutory prelitigation scheme in The Right to Repair Act (“the Act”) that provides for notice and an opportunity for the Builder to repair defects applies to all claims for construction defects in residential construction sold on or after January 1, 2003, regardless whether the claim is founded on a violation of the Act’s performance standards or a common law claim for negligence or strict liability. (
McMillin Albany, LLC v. Superior Court (Van Tassel) (January 18, 2018, S229762) __ Cal.4th __.) With this holding, has the Court ruled that common law causes of action for construction defect still survive? If so, what will they look like and what standards will be applied?
The short answer is that it appears that common law causes of action still survive, at least for now, but it is not clear from this decision what they will look like and what standards will apply.
Portions of the decision seem to suggest that the Act is the sole and exclusive remedy for construction defect claims: “…even in some areas where the common law had supplied a remedy for construction defects resulting in property damage but not personal injury, the text and legislative history [of the statute] reflect a
clear and unequivocal intent to supplant common law negligence and strict product liability actions under the Act.” (
McMillin (January 18, 2018, S229762) __Cal.4th.__ [p. 6].) (Italics added for emphasis) However, at the end of the decision, the Court seems to be saying that there may still be a place for common law claims for negligence and strict liability alongside the Act but that these causes of action may be subject to the performance standards in the Act.
The
McMillin case went up to the Supreme Court on a procedural issue: whether a common law action alleging construction defects resulting in both economic loss and property damage is subject to the Act’s prelitigation notice and cure procedures. The Van Tassels had dismissed their claims under the Act opting to proceed solely on their common law claims including negligence and strict liability. McMillin sought a stay to force the Van Tassels to comply with the Act’s prelitigation procedures. The Supreme Court held that the Van Tassels must comply with the statutory procedures and affirmed the stay issued by the trial court. But the question remained: now that the Van Tassels were left only with common law claims, how would they proceed under the Act?
To understand how the Court dealt with this question, one must first understand how the Court dealt with the narrow procedural question presented by the case. The Court provides a very detailed, clear explanation of the reasons why it felt the Legislature intended for all construction defect claims involving residential construction must comply with the prelitigation requirements of the Act. In summing up its conclusions the Court makes three definitive holdings.
First, for claims involving economic loss only—the kind of claims involved in
Aas—the Court holds that the Legislature intended to supersede
Aas and provide a statutory basis for recovery. (
McMillin (January 18, 2018, S229762) __Cal.4th.__ [p. 10].) In other words, the Court clearly agrees that the Act was meant to allow recovery of damages based solely on economic damages. No surprise there. Second, the Court held for personal injuries, the Legislature made no changes to existing law that provides common law remedies for the injured party. (Id.) Nobody has ever contested that. Finally, the Court held that for construction defect claims involving property damage and not just economic loss “the Legislature replaced the common law
methods of recovery with the new statutory scheme.” (
Id.,) (Italics added for emphasis.)
In other words, the Court is not saying that negligence and strict liability are not permitted causes of action. The Court is merely stating that these causes of action must comply with the Act’s statutory scheme just as the same as a claim for economic loss. Here the Court is focusing on the procedure that must be followed. “The Act, in effect, provides that construction defect claims not involving personal injury will be treated the same procedurally going forward whether or not the underlying claims gave rise to any property damage.” (
Id.)
Having laid out its fundamental premise, the Court then deals with Plaintiff’s arguments regarding the intent of the Legislature and makes light work of them all. In the process, the Court disapproves
Liberty Mutual Ins. Co. v. Brookfield Crystal Cove LLC (2013) 219 Cal. App. 4th 98, and
Burch v. Superior Court (2014) 223 Cal. App. 4th 1411, to the extent they are inconsistent with the views expressed in the
McMillin opinion.
This is where the decision gets interesting. The Court reminds us that the Van Tassels had dismissed their statutory causes of action for violation of the performance standards under Section 896. One would think at that point that Plaintiffs had to be wondering if they had any claims left given that the Court had ruled that the Act was the sole means of recovery for construction defects. Not so fast. The Court points out that the complaint still rests on allegations of defective construction and that the suit remains an “ ‘action seeking recovery of damages arising out of, or related to deficiencies in, the residential construction’ of the plaintiffs’ homes (§896)
and McMillin’s liability under the Van Tassels’ negligence and strict liability claims depends on the extent to which it [McMillin] violated the standards of sections 896 and 897.” (
McMillin (January 18, 2018, S229762) __Cal.4th.__ [p. 19].) (Emphasis added.) WHAT DID THE COURT JUST SAY? Did the Court just say that a plaintiff could bring a common law cause of action for negligence or strict liability based on a violation of the performance standards under Section 896? What exactly would that claim look like? What would be the elements of such a cause of action?
To answer these questions, the Court states in the very next paragraph, which also happens to be the last paragraph in the decision: “In holding that claims seeking recovery for construction defect damages are subject to the Act’s prelitigation procedures regardless of how they are pleaded,
we have no occasion to address the extent to which a party might rely upon common law principles in pursuing liability under the Act.” (
McMillin (January 18, 2018, S229762) __Cal.4th.__ [p. 19].) (Italics added for emphasis) Is the Court answering “No” to the questions posed above? Probably not. It is simply following the age old rule that an appellate court will
not rule on an issue that is not specifically presented by an appeal, leaving that question for another day.
All we know for sure from
McMillin is that every claim for construction defects falling within the scope of the Act must follow the prelitigation procedure. There are no hall passes for negligence and strict liability. The larger question posed by the last two paragraphs in the decision, is whether the law recognizes a cause of action for negligence and strict liability for construction defects based on the standards in Section 896. The answer will have to be worked out by judges and trial attorneys in courtrooms across the State! The parameters of this hybrid cause of action that the Court seems to have posited will need more careful consideration than can be offered on first reading of
McMillin v. Superior Court.
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Balestreri, Potocki, & Holmes
