Chicago Makes First Major Update to City's Building Code in 70 Years
August 06, 2019 —
Engineering News-RecordThe City Council recently voted to adopt a major update to the Chicago Building Code, its first in 70 years, that will better align it with the International Code Council’s International Building Code. Mayor Rahm Emanuel (D) said the new code will spur and enhance building projects by adding more flexibility and options for construction materials.
Engineering News-Record
Read the full story... Read the court decisionRead the full story...Reprinted courtesy of
Montana Supreme Court Tackles Decade-Old Coverage Dispute Concerning Asbestos Mineworker Claims
December 20, 2021 —
Patricia B. Santelle & Paul A. Briganti - White and WilliamsOn November 23, 2021, the Montana Supreme Court issued an almost unanimous decision in National Indemnity Company v. State of Montana, a ten-year-old coverage dispute arising from claims against the State of Montana alleging it had failed to warn of asbestos dust conditions at vermiculite mining and milling operations in and around Libby, Montana (the Libby Mine) run by W.R. Grace & Company and its predecessors. Affirming in part and reversing in part rulings by the trial court that culminated in a $98 million judgment against the State’s CGL insurer from 1973 to 1975, the court addressed issues including the duty to defend/estoppel, the number of occurrences, “trigger of coverage,” and, in a case of first impression, allocation under Montana law.
Whether the Insurer Breached the Duty to Defend Depended Upon the Timeframe
The court looked at whether (1) the insured provided sufficient information to bring the claims within the possibility of coverage under the subject policy and (2) the insurer gave “the necessary substance to” fulfilling its duty to defend at four points in the relevant timeframe:
- The insurer did not breach its duty at the time the State initially tendered the Libby Mine claims because the State defended the claims through its self-insurance program, hired its own counsel, managed the litigation, made its own defense decisions, and took the position with the insurer that the matter was “under control” and “nothing was left to be done[.]”
Reprinted courtesy of
Patricia B. Santelle, White and Williams and
Paul A. Briganti, White and Williams
Ms. Santelle may be contacted at santellep@whiteandwilliams.com
Mr. Briganti may be contacted at brigantip@whiteandwilliams.com
Read the court decisionRead the full story...Reprinted courtesy of
Insurer's Motion to Dismiss Allegations of Collapse Rejected
August 08, 2018 —
Tred R. Eyerly - Insurance Law HawaiiIn yet another of the collapse cases being litigated in state and federal courts in Connecticut, the federal district court denied the insurer's motion to dismiss. Rosenberger v. Amica Mut. Ins. Co., 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 95345 (D. Conn. June 6, 2018).
The insureds had policies with Amica since 1989. Policies before December 18, 2006, covered collapse caused by hidden decay or other specified causes. "Collapse" was not defined by the policy. These policies did not include any provisions explicitly excluding coverage for a chemical reaction.
The post-2006 policies held by the insureds covered collapse, but under a significantly modified definition. The newer policy language stated that "collapse applies only to an abrupt collapse." Further, collapse was defined as "an abrupt falling down or caving in of a building or any part of a building with the result that the building or part of the building cannot be occupied for its intended purpose."
Read the court decisionRead the full story...Reprinted courtesy of
Tred R. Eyerly, Damon Key Leong Kupchak HastertMr. Eyerly may be contacted at
te@hawaiilawyer.com
Banks Loosening U.S. Mortgage Standards: Chart of the Day
August 13, 2014 —
Jody Shenn – BloombergPerhaps more U.S. banks than at any time in two decades are making it easier to qualify for a mortgage.
The CHART OF THE DAY shows the net share of banks telling the Federal Reserve that they’re tightening standards in the home-loan market. In the central bank’s July survey of senior loan officers released last week, the net percentage for prime mortgages was negative 18.3 percent, by far the most loosening since it started asking the question by loan-quality category in 2007. It was also greater than the highest net share of banks easing in “all” mortgages in the 1990s or 2000s.
Still, lenders have a long way to go before they unwind the restrictions they imposed in the wake of the global financial crisis that risky home loans helped to create. The current trend is mainly about “small tweaks around the edges,” according to JPMorgan Chase & Co. mortgage-bond analysts.
Read the court decisionRead the full story...Reprinted courtesy of
Jody Shenn, BloombergMs. Shenn may be contacted at
jshenn@bloomberg.net
Woodbridge II and the Nuanced Meaning of “Adverse Use” in Hostile Property Rights Cases in Colorado
November 23, 2020 —
Luke Mecklenburg - Snell & Wilmer Real Estate Litigation BlogEarlier this year, the Colorado Court of Appeals issued an opinion addressing at length “whether the requirement that the use be ‘adverse’ in the adverse possession context is coextensive with adverse use in the prescriptive easement context.” See Woodbridge Condo. Ass’n, Inc. v. Lo Viento Blanco, LLC, 2020 COA 34 (Woodbridge II), ¶ 2, cert. granted, No. 20SC292, 2020 WL 5405376 (Colo. Sept. 8, 2020). As detailed below, the Woodbridge II court concluded that the meanings of “adverse” in these two contexts are not coextensive—while “hostility” in the adverse possession context requires a claim of exclusive ownership of the property, a party claiming a prescriptive easement is only required to “show a nonpermissive or otherwise unauthorized use of property that interfered with the owner’s property interests.” Thus, the Woodbridge II court reasoned a claimants’ acknowledgement or recognition of an owner’s title alone is insufficient to defeat “adverse use” in the prescriptive easement context.
This significant ruling is at odds with a prior division’s broad statement, while considering a prescriptive easement claim, that “[i]n general, when an adverse occupier acknowledges or recognizes the title of the owner during the occupant’s claimed prescriptive period, the occupant interrupts the prescriptive use.” See Trask v. Nozisko, 134 P.3d 544, 553 (Colo. App. 2006). Perhaps for that reason, Woodbridge II is currently pending certiorari review before the Colorado Supreme Court in a case that should provide some much-needed clarity on what constitutes “adverse use” in the context of a prescriptive easement. As we await the Colorado Supreme Court’s decision, I thought it worthwhile to provide a brief analysis of the Woodbridge II court’s deep dive into the nuances of “adverse use” in this field of Colorado law.
Read the court decisionRead the full story...Reprinted courtesy of
Luke Mecklenburg, Snell & WilmerMr. Mecklenburg may be contacted at
lmecklenburg@swlaw.com
Appeals Court Rules that Vertical and Not Horizontal Exhaustion Applies to Primary and First-Layer Excess Insurance
August 31, 2020 —
Christopher Kendrick & Valerie A. Moore – Haight Brown & Bonesteel LLPIn Santa Fe Braun v. Ins. Co. of North America (No. A151428, filed 7/13/20), a California appeals court relied on Montrose Chemical Corp. of California v. Superior Court (2020) 9 Cal.5th 215 (Montrose III), to hold that absent express policy wording to the contrary, horizontal exhaustion of all primary insurance is not required in order to trigger first-layer excess coverage.
Beginning in 1992, Braun was sued for asbestos injuries from refineries it constructed and maintained. Braun had primary coverage and multiple layers of excess coverage for the relevant time period. After defending for years, the primary insurers reached a settlement under which they paid their limits into a trust which would fund the ongoing defense and settlements. Certain of the excess insurers settled and also contributed to the trust.
Reprinted courtesy of
Christopher Kendrick, Haight Brown & Bonesteel LLP and
Valerie A. Moore, Haight Brown & Bonesteel LLP
Mr. Kendrick may be contacted at ckendrick@hbblaw.com
Ms. Moore may be contacted at vmoore@hbblaw.com
Read the court decisionRead the full story...Reprinted courtesy of
Homeowner’s Claims Defeated Because “Gravamen” of Complaint was Fraud, not Breach of Contract
September 29, 2021 —
Garret Murai - California Construction Law BlogBe careful what you wish for or, as in the next case, what you plead. In Vera v. REL-BC, LLC, Case Nos. A155807, A156823, and A159141 (June 30, 2021) 1st District Court of Appeal, a the buyer of a remodeled home who asserted breach of contract and fraud claims against a developer discovered that her claims, including her breach of written contract claim, was subject to a shorter 3 year statute of limitations because the “gravamen” of her complaint was fraud.
The REL-BC Case
Homeowner Adriana Vera purchased a remodeled home in Oakland, California from developers REL-BC, LLC and SNL Real Estate Solutions, LLC. The developers had purchased the home in July 2011, remodeled it, and sold it to Vera in November 2011.
As is typical in such transactions, the purchase agreement for the house required that the sellers disclose known material facts and defects affecting the property. In their disclosure, the sellers stated that they were not aware of any significant defects or malfunctions with respect to the property. The disclosure also stated that the sellers were not aware of any water intrusion issues with respect to the property.
Read the court decisionRead the full story...Reprinted courtesy of
Garret Murai, Nomos LLPMr. Murai may be contacted at
gmurai@nomosllp.com
Contractor’s Claim for Interest on Subcontractor’s Defective Work Claim Gains Mixed Results
April 27, 2020 —
John J. Gazzola, Associate, Pepper Hamilton LLP - ConsensusDocsThis case concerns calculation of a damages award to a general contractor, Skanska USA Building, Inc., on its claim for breach of contract against its masonry subcontractor, J.D. Long Masonry, Inc., arising from Long’s faulty construction of a masonry façade at a medical research facility in Baltimore. When the façade collapsed and Long failed to repair it, Skanska hired a replacement subcontractor, C.A. Lindman, to remediate Long’s defective work and filed suit against Long to recover the resulting damages. After the court granted Skanska’s motion for summary judgment as to liability, Skanska moved for summary judgment on the issue of damages, relying on the indemnification provision of the subcontract to seek compensatory damages, pre- and post-judgment interest, and litigation fees. In the subcontract, Long agreed to indemnify and hold Skanska harmless from all claims, losses, costs and expenses, including attorneys’ fees, arising before or after completion of Long’s work, caused by, arising out of, resulting from, or occurring in connection with Long’s performance of the work or breach of the subcontract.
The court first applied the terms of this provision to award Skanska compensatory damages, holding that Skanska was, as a matter of law, entitled to recover the amount of the Lindman subcontract and general conditions incurred to supervise remediation of Long’s work. The court, however, denied Skanska’s claim for pre-judgment interest on the entirety of these damages. Skanska asserted that it was entitled to pre-judgment interest on the full award, calculated from the date on which it first paid Lindman. The court disagreed, explaining that, under Maryland law, a claimant is entitled to an award of pre-judgment interest as of right only when the amount due is certain, definite and liquidated by a specific date prior to judgment. The court reasoned that, because much of the Lindman subcontract value was composed of later-executed change orders, an award of pre-judgment interest could not be uniformly calculated back to the date of Skanska’s first payment to Lindman. And moreover, because Skanska continued to withhold sums due to Lindman pending resolution of certain issues, awarding Skanska pre-judgment interest on amounts it had not yet paid would result in a “windfall” to Skanska because there was no “use of income” loss to be compensated.
Read the court decisionRead the full story...Reprinted courtesy of
John J. Gazzola, Pepper Hamilton LLPMr. Gazzola may be contacted at
gazzolaj@pepperlaw.com