Pollution Exclusion Bars Coverage for Inverse Condemnation Action
June 02, 2016 —
Tred R. Eyerly – Insurance Law HawaiiThe South Carolina Court of Appeals found there was no coverage for an inverse condemnation action based upon the policy's pollution exclusion. South Carolina Ins. Reserve Fund v. E. Richland County Public Service District, 2016 S. C. App. LEXIS 32 (S.C. Ct. App. March 23, 2016).
In 2010, Coley Brown filed a complaint against the East Richland County Public Service District ("District") for inverse condemnation, trespass, and negligence. The complaint alleged that the District had installed a sewage force main line and an air relief valve on Brown's street, and the valve released offensive odors on his property many times a day. The stench caused Brown to buy a new piece of property and move, but he was unable to sell the old property. The district tendered the complaint to the South Carolina Insurance Reserve Fund ("Fund"), but coverage was denied.
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Tred R. Eyerly, Insurance Law HawaiiMr. Eyerly may be contacted at
te@hawaiilawyer.com
Appraisal Appropriate Despite Pending Coverage Issues
August 16, 2021 —
Tred R. Eyerly - Insurance Law HawaiiThe court granted the insured's motion for partial summary judgment, allowing an appraisal to go forward even with outstanding coverage issues in dispute. DC Plastic Products Corp. v. Westchester Surplus Lines Ins. Co., 2021 U,.S. Dist. LEXIS 95908 (D. N.J. May 19, 2021).
DC Plastic's property was damaged by Superstorm Sandy in October 2012. Claims submitted to Westchester resulted in a payment of $951,102.89 to DC Plastic. The parties disagreed on whether further payments were due. In 2017, DC Plastic sued Westchester for additional payments. DC Plastic moved to compel an appraisal for its claims, requesting that the court appoint an umpire for the appraisal process. Westchester cross-moved to dismiss the case in its entirety.
DC Plastic's complaint asked that the court appoint an umpire. The policy stated if the parties could not agree on the amount of loss, each party would select an appraiser, who would then agree upon an umpire. If they could not agree, either party could request the court to appoint the umpire. Therefore, the court was authorised to select the umpire here.
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Tred R. Eyerly, Damon Key Leong Kupchak HastertMr. Eyerly may be contacted at
te@hawaiilawyer.com
Tokyo Tackles Flood Control as Typhoons Swamp Subways
August 20, 2014 —
Jacob Adelman – BloombergBelow the condos and boutiques of Tokyo’s upscale Minato ward -- which includes Roppongi Hills, home to Goldman Sachs Group’s Japan headquarters -- a boring machine has carved out the city’s newest defense against floods.
“There are many buildings, there’s a freeway,” said Satoshi Yamamoto, who’s directing the Tokyo government’s 24.5 billion yen ($240 million) project to build a giant subterranean reservoir -- the city’s second of three -- to handle flood waters from the Furukawa river that winds through the area. “We decided the best approach was to go underground.”
When it’s completed in 2016, the 3.3-kilometer (2-mile) reservoir will be able to handle 135,000 cubic meters of water, enough to fill 54 Olympic-sized swimming pools. Tokyo is becoming increasingly reliant on this solution as more typhoons hit the country each year, a trend that Yamamoto said may be linked to global warming. The flooding is exacerbated by the city’s sprawling concrete footprint that keeps rainwater from seeping safely into the ground.
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Jacob Adelman, BloombergMr. Adelman may be contacted at
jadelman1@bloomberg.net
Settlement Reached on Troubled Harbor Bridge in Corpus Christi, Texas
November 16, 2023 —
Daniel Tyson - Engineering News-RecordA $400-million settlement was reached between the Texas Dept. of Transportation and general contractor Flatiron/Dragados over Corpus Christi’s Harbor Bridge in mid-October. The accord ends all disagreements and damage claims concerning the cable-stayed bridge, a project halted multiple times.
Reprinted courtesy of
Daniel Tyson, Engineering News-Record
Mr. Tyson may be contacted at tysond@enr.com
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Life After McMillin: Do Negligence and Strict Liability Causes of Action for Construction Defects Still Exist?
January 24, 2018 —
Thomas Balestreri and Amanda Crawley - Balestreri, Potocki, & HolmesThe ruling is in but the battle will likely continue over the practical application of SB 800. On January 18, 2018 the California Supreme Court issued its decision in
McMillin Albany, LLC v. Superior Court (Van Tassel) (January 18, 2018, S229762) __ Cal.4th __, holding that the statutory prelitigation scheme in The Right to Repair Act (“the Act”) that provides for notice and an opportunity for the Builder to repair defects applies to all claims for construction defects in residential construction sold on or after January 1, 2003, regardless whether the claim is founded on a violation of the Act’s performance standards or a common law claim for negligence or strict liability. (
McMillin Albany, LLC v. Superior Court (Van Tassel) (January 18, 2018, S229762) __ Cal.4th __.) With this holding, has the Court ruled that common law causes of action for construction defect still survive? If so, what will they look like and what standards will be applied?
The short answer is that it appears that common law causes of action still survive, at least for now, but it is not clear from this decision what they will look like and what standards will apply.
Portions of the decision seem to suggest that the Act is the sole and exclusive remedy for construction defect claims: “…even in some areas where the common law had supplied a remedy for construction defects resulting in property damage but not personal injury, the text and legislative history [of the statute] reflect a
clear and unequivocal intent to supplant common law negligence and strict product liability actions under the Act.” (
McMillin (January 18, 2018, S229762) __Cal.4th.__ [p. 6].) (Italics added for emphasis) However, at the end of the decision, the Court seems to be saying that there may still be a place for common law claims for negligence and strict liability alongside the Act but that these causes of action may be subject to the performance standards in the Act.
The
McMillin case went up to the Supreme Court on a procedural issue: whether a common law action alleging construction defects resulting in both economic loss and property damage is subject to the Act’s prelitigation notice and cure procedures. The Van Tassels had dismissed their claims under the Act opting to proceed solely on their common law claims including negligence and strict liability. McMillin sought a stay to force the Van Tassels to comply with the Act’s prelitigation procedures. The Supreme Court held that the Van Tassels must comply with the statutory procedures and affirmed the stay issued by the trial court. But the question remained: now that the Van Tassels were left only with common law claims, how would they proceed under the Act?
To understand how the Court dealt with this question, one must first understand how the Court dealt with the narrow procedural question presented by the case. The Court provides a very detailed, clear explanation of the reasons why it felt the Legislature intended for all construction defect claims involving residential construction must comply with the prelitigation requirements of the Act. In summing up its conclusions the Court makes three definitive holdings.
First, for claims involving economic loss only—the kind of claims involved in
Aas—the Court holds that the Legislature intended to supersede
Aas and provide a statutory basis for recovery. (
McMillin (January 18, 2018, S229762) __Cal.4th.__ [p. 10].) In other words, the Court clearly agrees that the Act was meant to allow recovery of damages based solely on economic damages. No surprise there. Second, the Court held for personal injuries, the Legislature made no changes to existing law that provides common law remedies for the injured party. (Id.) Nobody has ever contested that. Finally, the Court held that for construction defect claims involving property damage and not just economic loss “the Legislature replaced the common law
methods of recovery with the new statutory scheme.” (
Id.,) (Italics added for emphasis.)
In other words, the Court is not saying that negligence and strict liability are not permitted causes of action. The Court is merely stating that these causes of action must comply with the Act’s statutory scheme just as the same as a claim for economic loss. Here the Court is focusing on the procedure that must be followed. “The Act, in effect, provides that construction defect claims not involving personal injury will be treated the same procedurally going forward whether or not the underlying claims gave rise to any property damage.” (
Id.)
Having laid out its fundamental premise, the Court then deals with Plaintiff’s arguments regarding the intent of the Legislature and makes light work of them all. In the process, the Court disapproves
Liberty Mutual Ins. Co. v. Brookfield Crystal Cove LLC (2013) 219 Cal. App. 4th 98, and
Burch v. Superior Court (2014) 223 Cal. App. 4th 1411, to the extent they are inconsistent with the views expressed in the
McMillin opinion.
This is where the decision gets interesting. The Court reminds us that the Van Tassels had dismissed their statutory causes of action for violation of the performance standards under Section 896. One would think at that point that Plaintiffs had to be wondering if they had any claims left given that the Court had ruled that the Act was the sole means of recovery for construction defects. Not so fast. The Court points out that the complaint still rests on allegations of defective construction and that the suit remains an “ ‘action seeking recovery of damages arising out of, or related to deficiencies in, the residential construction’ of the plaintiffs’ homes (§896)
and McMillin’s liability under the Van Tassels’ negligence and strict liability claims depends on the extent to which it [McMillin] violated the standards of sections 896 and 897.” (
McMillin (January 18, 2018, S229762) __Cal.4th.__ [p. 19].) (Emphasis added.) WHAT DID THE COURT JUST SAY? Did the Court just say that a plaintiff could bring a common law cause of action for negligence or strict liability based on a violation of the performance standards under Section 896? What exactly would that claim look like? What would be the elements of such a cause of action?
To answer these questions, the Court states in the very next paragraph, which also happens to be the last paragraph in the decision: “In holding that claims seeking recovery for construction defect damages are subject to the Act’s prelitigation procedures regardless of how they are pleaded,
we have no occasion to address the extent to which a party might rely upon common law principles in pursuing liability under the Act.” (
McMillin (January 18, 2018, S229762) __Cal.4th.__ [p. 19].) (Italics added for emphasis) Is the Court answering “No” to the questions posed above? Probably not. It is simply following the age old rule that an appellate court will
not rule on an issue that is not specifically presented by an appeal, leaving that question for another day.
All we know for sure from
McMillin is that every claim for construction defects falling within the scope of the Act must follow the prelitigation procedure. There are no hall passes for negligence and strict liability. The larger question posed by the last two paragraphs in the decision, is whether the law recognizes a cause of action for negligence and strict liability for construction defects based on the standards in Section 896. The answer will have to be worked out by judges and trial attorneys in courtrooms across the State! The parameters of this hybrid cause of action that the Court seems to have posited will need more careful consideration than can be offered on first reading of
McMillin v. Superior Court.
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Recent Opinions Clarify Enforceability of Pay-if-Paid Provisions in Construction Contracts
May 29, 2023 —
Patrick McKnight - The Dispute ResolverSeveral recent opinions and legislative actions have brought the controversial nature of pay-if-paid provisions into focus in early 2023. Pay-if-paid provisions are contractual mechanisms designed to shift the risk of non-payment from General Contractors to lower-tier subcontractors. In other words, pay-if-paid provisions generally do not require payment to downstream subs until after the GC or Prime are themselves paid in-full by the owner. Recent developments reflect the differing approaches taken by courts when addressing pay-if-paid provisions, ranging broadly from prohibition to full enforceability. Other jurisdictions fall somewhere in the middle, viewing such provisions with varying amounts of skepticism on the grounds heir impact on smaller downstream subs is disproportionate and unfair.
Pay-if-paid provisions are often contrasted against “pay-when-paid” provisions. Pay-when-paid provisions may require payment within a specified duration but remove the upstream contractor’s payment in-full as a condition precedent. The brief discussion below will not explore pay-when-paid, no damage for delay provisions, or statutory prompt payment acts. Instead, this article serves as a primer on recent legal developments related to pay-if-paid provisions exclusively.
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Patrick McKnight, Fox Rothschild LLPMr. McKnight may be contacted at
pmcknight@foxrothschild.com
Construction Defect Not a RICO Case, Says Court
August 04, 2011 —
CDJ STAFFThe US District Court of North Carolina has rejected an attempt by a homeowner to restart her construction defect claim by turning it into a RICO lawsuit. Linda Sharp, the plaintiff in the case of Sharp v. Town of Kitty Hawk, attempted to amend a claim under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) and argued that her case belonged in the federal courts.
Ms. Sharp sued in November, 2010 claiming construction defects. She sued in federal court, although the court noted that as she and most of the defendants are citizens of North Carolina, the state court would have been the appropriate jurisdiction. Further, the court noted that one federal claim Sharp made was dismissed with prejudice, leaving only the state law claims. These the court dismissed without prejudice, declining to exercise jurisdiction over North Carolina law.
After the dismissal, Ms. Sharp attempted to amend her complaint after the deadline. To do so, according to the court, she would be required to obtain consent from defendants or leave of the court. She did neither.
In his opinion, Judge W. Earl Britt rejected her motion for leave to amend. He also granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss. The clerk was directed to close the case.
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US Court Disputes $1.8B AECOM Damage Award in ‘Remarkable Fraud’ Suit
April 26, 2021 —
Mary B. Powers - Engineering News-RecordA federal appeals court has thrown out a $1.8-billion award granted by a lower court three years ago to an AECOM unit in a bizarre legal battle involving a Nevada company that claimed to have won multiple contracts using the name of Morrison Knudsen—the former well-known Boise-based construction contractor that was sold in 1996, and through acquisitions, became part of design-build giant AECOM in 2014.
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Mary B. Powers, Engineering News-Record
ENR may be contacted at ENR.com@bnpmedia.com
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