Exception to Watercraft Exclusion Does Not Apply
September 24, 2014 —
Tred R. Eyerly – Insurance Law HawaiiThe court determined that an additional insured was not entitled to coverage despite an exception to the watercraft exclusion. Holden v. U.S. United Ocean Serv., LLC, 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 15954 (5th Cir. Aug. 19, 2014).
United entered a contract with Buck Kreihs Company, Inc. under which Buck Kreihs would perform ship-repair work for United. Under the contract, Buck Kreihs would indemnify United for all liabilities arising out of the work or services performed by Buck Kreihs for United. The contract further provided that Buck Kreihs was to procure general liability coverage and name United as an additional insured. Buck Kreihs did so under a policy issued by St. Paul.
Holden, an employee of Buck Kreihs, was injured while preparing to remove a gangway that led from a dock at Buck Kreihs's facility to a barge owned by United. Holden sued United, which tendered to St. Paul as an additional insured. St. Paul denied coverage under the policy's watercraft exclusion. Holden and United settled. United pursued its third party suit against St. Paul. The district court granted summary judgment to St. Paul.
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Tred R. Eyerly, Insurance Law HawaiiMr. Eyerly may be contacted at
te@hawaiilawyer.com
Surviving a Tornado – How to Navigate Insurance Claims in the Wake of the Recent Connecticut Storm
May 24, 2018 —
Geoffrey Miller - Saxe Doernberger & Vita, P.C.Five minutes after I parked my car, a tree fell on it.
On Tuesday, May 15th I pulled into my driveway, in my small Connecticut neighborhood, under a grey sky. As soon as I walked in the house, the lights flickered. And then suddenly there was a loud “Crack!” and “Crash!” and the sound of breaking glass. I looked out the window and trees were bent 90 degrees, then snapping, and then flying up instead of falling down.
As quickly as it came, it passed. When I stepped outside, my first thought was that my car has seen better days.
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Geoffrey Miller, Saxe Doernberger & Vita, P.C.Mr. Miller may be contacted at
gjm@sdvlaw.com
Construction Litigation Roundup: “Sudden Death”
October 17, 2023 —
Daniel Lund III - LexologyIt’s not football, though. Rather, just when you thought it was safe in Louisiana to wait to file a garden-variety construction contract payment claim, an appellate court slams the door on it – applying a statute of “repose” to your claim.
“Personal actions” – such as an action on contract – are generally subject in Louisiana to a 10-year “liberative prescription,” the applicable statute of limitations pursuant to Louisiana Civil Code article 3499.
Like some other states, Louisiana has a statute of “repose” – imposing “peremption” rather than prescription for claims having to do with construction projects – limiting those claims (generally speaking) to five years post-completion. Like other statutes of “repose,” Louisiana Revised Statute 9:2772 provides that claims on construction projects may not be filed after five years, a duration which is not subject to interruption or extension.
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Daniel Lund III, PhelpsMr. Lund may be contacted at
daniel.lund@phelps.com
General Contractors Can Be Sued by a Subcontractor’s Injured Employee
November 05, 2014 —
Craig Martin - Construction Contractor AdvisorGeneral contractors that exercise control over the worksite can be sued by a subcontractor’s injured employee. The Nebraska Supreme Court’s recent opinion, Gaytan v. Wal-Mart, should serve as a reminder that general contractors may be responsible for the safety of all workers on a job site.
In this case, a roofing subcontractor’s employee died after falling through the roof of the under-construction Wal-Mart. The deceased employee’s estate sued Wal-Mart and Gram Construction, the general contractor, alleging that they were negligent in maintaining a safe worksite.
The court initially acknowledged that an owner, the employer of an independent contractor, does not typically owe a subcontractor’s employee a duty because the owner typically has no control over the manner in which the work is to be done by the contractor. This general rule, however, has exceptions, such as where the owner retains control over the contractor’s work. But, for the exception to apply, the owner must have (1) supervised the work that caused the injury, (2) actual or constructive knowledge of the danger that caused the injury, and (3) the opportunity to prevent the injury.
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Craig Martin, Lamson, Dugan and Murray, LLPMr. Martin may be contacted at
cmartin@ldmlaw.com
Brown Paint Doesn’t Cover Up Construction Defects
April 25, 2012 —
CDJ STAFFIn a decision that describes the case as illustrating “the perils that real estate brokers and their agents assume when acting as a dual listing agent to both the buyers and sellers of the same house,” the California Court of Appeals has issued a decision in William L. Lyon & Associates v. The Superior Court of Placer County. Lyon & Associates sought summary judgment to dismiss the claims of the Henleys who bought a home in a transaction where a Lyon agent represented both sides.
The prior owners of the home, the Costas, had used a Lyon agent in purchasing their home. When they later sought to sell it, that agent “became aware of some of the house’s defects and problems.” In response, the Costas sought the help of another agent, Connie Gidal, also of Lyons & Associates. Photos taken in the presence of Ms. Gidal show defects of the paint and stucco. The Costas also took the step of painting the house dark brown. During the sale process, “rain caused many of the painted-over defects to reappear.” The Costas “purchased more dark brown paint and covered up the newly visible damage prior to inspection by the Henleys.”
With the damage concealed, the Henleys bought the home in May 2006. The agreement with Lyons & Associates noted that “a dual agent is obligated to disclose known facts materially affecting the value or desirability of the property to both parties.” Escrow closed on May 9, 2006. The contract with the broker included a two-year limit on the time to bring legal action.
The Henleys moved in during June 2006, and “began to discover construction defects that had been concealed by the Costas.” In addition to the painted-over stucco problems, the Henleys found that the Costas had “installed quartzite stone overlays on the backyard steps in a manner that caused water intrusion on the house’s stucco walls.”
In May 2009, the Henleys sued the Costas, Ron McKim Construction, Lyons & Associates, and Ms. Gidal. Their complaint alleged that Lyons & Associates had committed breach of contact, negligence, fraud, breach of fiduciary duty, and negligent nondisclosure in connection with the construction defects. The Costas named Lyons in a cross complaint. Lyons moved for summary judgments on the grounds that the two-year statute of limitations had expired before the complaint and cross-complaint were filed. Both the Henleys and the Costas opposed this claim. The court denied the motion and Lyons appealed.
The appeals court upheld the denial, noting that the both California Supreme Court decision and later action by the legislature compels real estate brokers and salespersons “to conduct a reasonably competent and diligent visual inspection of the property offered for sale.” The court noted that under California law, brokers have responsibilities to both sellers and buyers. The section of law cited by Lyons applies to seller’s agents. The court rejected the contention by Lyons that they were “cooperating brokers.” The Henleys were “not constrained by the two-year statute of limitations.”
Lyons contended that even if California’s statute did not apply, there was a contractual limit of two years. The court also rejected this, agreeing with the Henleys that “the two-year limitation period must be extended by the discovery rule.”
The court noted that “Lyon & Associates may not reap the benefit of a shortened contractual limitation period when its own alleged malfeasance contributed to the delay in the discovery of the buyer’s injury.” The court found that the Henleys could proceed with their breach of contract claim, because, “when a breach of contract is committed in secret, such as the intentional nondisclosure of a real estate broker regarding a previously visible construction defect, the contractual limitations period is properly held subject to the discovery rule.” The court felt that the interpretation favored by the California Association of Realtors would “halve the applicable statute of limitations period.”
In addition to rejecting Lyon request for summary judgment on the claims made by the Henleys, the court also rejected the request of summary judgment on the claims made by the Costas, concluding that neither claim is time-barred. Costs were awarded to both the Henleys and Costas.
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Wells Fargo Shuns Peers’ Settlement in U.S in Mortgage
May 13, 2014 —
Andrew Zajac – BloombergFollowing two years in which its big-bank peers paid almost $2 billion to resolve fraud accusations by the Federal Housing Administration, Wells Fargo & Co. (WFC) has decided it isn’t giving up so easily.
Wells Fargo was one of five banks that agreed in 2012 to a nationwide, $25 billion settlement with the Justice Department over mortgage wrongdoing that included botched foreclosures. The FHA then took additional action against four of the banks, including Wells Fargo, for related housing-crisis wrongdoing. Bank of America Corp., Citigroup Inc. and JPMorgan Chase & Co. decided to settle those matters. San Francisco-based Wells Fargo, which argued the nationwide settlement should have blocked the new FHA claims against it, chose to fight.
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Andrew Zajac, BloombergMr. Zajac may be contacted at
azajac@bloomberg.net
Unions Win Prevailing Wage Challenge Brought By Charter Cities: Next Stop The Supreme Court?
April 06, 2016 —
Steven M. Cvitanovic & Sarah A. Marsey – Haight Brown & Bonesteel LLPIn City Of El Centro v. David Lanier (State Building And Construction Trades Council Of California, AFL-CIO), the 4th appellate district upheld by a 2-1 majority the constitutionality of Labor Code section 1782, which prohibits a charter city from receiving or using state funding or financial assistance for a public construction project if the city has a charter provision or ordinance that authorizes a contractor to not comply with the state prevailing wage laws.
As we wrote on this topic back in 2012 (See alert here), charter cities are governed by a municipal constitution and may make and enforce its own ordinances and regulations with respect to municipal affairs (i.e., the ‘home rule’ doctrine), as opposed to general law cities, which must comply with the state laws such as the Public Wage Rate Act (requiring municipalities to pay prevailing wages).
The California Supreme Court previously held in State Building and Construction Trade Council of California, AFL-CIO v. City of Vista that the ‘home rule’ rule permits charter cities not to pay prevailing wages to its contract workers on locally funded public works because such determination is a municipal affair and not a statewide concern.
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Steven M. Cvitanovic, Haight Brown & Bonesteel LLP and
Sarah A. Marsey, Haight Brown & Bonesteel LLP
Mr. Cvitanovic may be contacted at scvitanovic@hbblaw.com
Ms. Marsey may be contacted at smarsey@hbblaw.com
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Damron Agreement Questioned in Colorado Casualty Insurance v Safety Control Company, et al.
February 10, 2012 —
CDJ STAFFSafety Control and EMC appealed the judgment in Colorado Casualty Insurance Company versus Safety Control Company, Inc., et al. (Ariz. App., 2012). The Superior Court in Maricopa County addressed “the validity and effect of a Damron agreement a contractor and its excess insurer entered into that assigned their rights to sue the primary insurer.” Judge Johnsen stated, “We hold the agreement is enforceable but remand for a determination of whether the stipulated judgment falls within the primary insurer’s policy.”
The Opinion provides some facts and procedural history regarding the claim. “The Arizona Department of Transportation (“ADOT”) hired DBA Construction Company (“DBA”) to perform a road-improvement project on the Loop 101 freeway. Safety Control Company, Inc. was one of DBA’s subcontractors. As required by the subcontract, Safety Control purchased from Employer’s Mutual Casualty Company (“EMC”) a certificate of insurance identifying DBA as an additional insured on a policy providing primary coverage for liability arising out of Safety Control’s work.”
A collision occurred on site, injuring Hugo Roman. Roman then sued ADT and DBA for damages. “Colorado Casualty tendered DBA’s defense to the subcontractors, including Safety Control. Safety Control and EMC rejected the tender. Roman eventually settled his claims against DBA and ADOT. DBA and ADOT stipulated with Roman for entry of judgment of $750,000; Roman received $75,000 from DBA (paid by Colorado Casualty) and $20,000 from ADOT, and agreed not to execute on the stipulated judgment. Finally, DBA, ADOT and Colorado Casualty assigned to Roman their rights against the subcontractors and other insurers.”
Colorado Casualty attempted to recover what “it had paid to defend DBA and ADOT and settle with Roman. However, Roman intervened, and argued that “Colorado Casualty had assigned its subrogation rights to him as part of the settlement agreement.” The suit was not dismissed, but the Superior Court allowed Roman to intervene. “Roman then filed a counterclaim against Colorado Casualty and a cross-claim against the subcontractors.”
All claims were settled against all of the defendants except Safety Control and EMC. “The superior court ruled on summary judgment that EMC breached a duty to defend DBA and that as a result, ‘DBA was entitled to settle with Roman without EMC’s consent as long as the settlement was not collusive or fraudulent.’ After more briefing, the court held the stipulated judgment was neither collusive nor procured by fraud and that EMC therefore was liable to Roman on the stipulated judgment and for his attorney’s fees. The court also held Safety Control breached its subcontract with DBA by failing to procure completed-operations insurance coverage and would be liable for damages to the extent that EMC did not satisfy what remained (after the other settlements) of the stipulated judgment and awards of attorney’s fees.” Safety Control and EMC appealed the judgment.
Four reasons were given for the decision of the ruling. First, “the disagreement between Roman and Colorado Casualty does not preclude them from pursuing their claims against EMC and Safety Control.” Second, “the settlement agreement is not otherwise invalid.” Third, “issues of fact remain about whether the judgment falls within the EMC policy.” Finally, “Safety Control breached the subcontract by failing to procure ‘Completed Operations’ coverage for DBA.”
In conclusion, the Superior Court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded . “Although, as stated above, we have affirmed several rulings of the superior court, we reverse the judgment against EMC and remand for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion to determine whether the stipulated judgment was a liability that arose out of Safety Control’s operations. In addition, we affirm the superior court’s declaratory judgment against Safety Control but remand so that the court may clarify the circumstances under which Safety Control may be liable for damages and may conduct whatever further proceedings it deems appropriate to ascertain the amount of those damages. We decline all parties’ requests for attorney’s fees pursuant to A.R.S. § 12-341.01 without prejudice to a request for fees incurred in this appeal to be filed by the prevailing party on remand before the superior court.”
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