VOSH Jumps Into the Employee Misclassification Pool
February 23, 2016 —
Christopher G. Hill – Construction Law MusingsThe proper classification of workers by construction companies has been on the radar of the Department of Labor for both the US and Virginia governments for quite a while. While most of the misclassification is innocent and not done to create issues, there have been enough instances of purposeful misclassification of certain workers as independent contractors (thus avoiding workers comp and other payroll expenses) that innocent contractors have born the brunt of these issues through increased payroll costs over those that misclassify (in the form of necessarily higher bids, higher overhead, etc.).
As an additional deterrent to improper classification of workers, the Virginia Department of Labor and Industry has issued guidelines for what will occur in Virginia Department of Safety and Health (VOSH) cases.
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Christopher G. Hill, Law Office of Christopher G. Hill, PCMr. Hill may be contacted at
chrisghill@constructionlawva.com
New York Assembly Reconsiders ‘Bad Faith’ Bill
May 17, 2021 —
Copernicus T. Gaza, Adam Krauss, Robert S. Nobel, Craig Rokuson & Eric D. Suben - Traub LiebermanThe New York State Assembly is considering A07285, which creates a private right of action for bad faith “if the insurer unreasonably refuses to pay or unreasonably delays payment without substantial justification.” The bill was first introduced in 2013 but was reintroduced on May 3, 2021 and has received some recent attention. According to the bill, an insurer acts unreasonably when it (among other things):
- Fails to provide the claimant with accurate information regarding policy provisions relating to the coverage at issue; or
- Fails to effectuate in good faith a prompt, fair, and equitable settlement of a claim or portion of a claim and where the insurer failed to reasonably accord at least equal or more favorable consideration to its insured's interests as it did to its own interests, and thereby exposed the insured to a judgment in excess of the policy limits or caused other damage to a claimant; or
- Fails to provide a timely written denial of a claimant's claim, or portion thereof, with a full and complete explanation of such denial, including references to specific policy provisions wherever possible; or
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Copernicus T. Gaza, Traub Lieberman,
Adam Krauss, Traub Lieberman,
Robert S. Nobel, Traub Lieberman,
Craig Rokuson, Traub Lieberman and
Eric D. Suben, Traub Lieberman
Mr. Gaza may be contacted at cgaza@tlsslaw.com
Mr. Krauss may be contacted at akrauss@tlsslaw.com
Mr. Nobel may be contacted at rnobel@tlsslaw.com
Mr. Rokuson may be contacted at crokuson@tlsslaw.com
Mr Suben may be contacted at esuben@tlsslaw.com
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Insurers Subrogating in Arkansas Must Expend Energy to Prove That Their Insureds Have Been Made Whole
July 30, 2019 —
Michael J. Ciamaichelo - The Subrogation StrategistArkansas employs the “made whole” doctrine, which requires an insured to be fully compensated for damages (i.e., to be “made whole”) before the insurer is entitled to recover in subrogation.[1] As the Riley court established, an insurer cannot unilaterally determine that its insured has been made whole (in order to establish a right of subrogation). Rather, in Arkansas, an insurer must establish that the insured has been made whole in one of two ways. First, the insurer and insured can reach an agreement that the insured has been made whole. Second, if the insurer and insured disagree on the issue, the insurer can ask a court to make a legal determination that the insured has been made whole.[2] If an insured has been made whole, the insurer is the real party in interest and must file the subrogation action in its own name.[3] However, when both the insured and an insurer have claims against the same tortfeasor (i.e., when there are both uninsured damages and subrogation damages), the insured is the real party in interest.[4]
In EMC Ins. Cos. v. Entergy Ark., Inc., 2019 U.S. App. LEXIS 14251 (8th Cir. May 14, 2019), EMC Insurance Companies (EMC) filed a subrogation action in the District Court for the Western District of Arkansas alleging that its insureds’ home was damaged by a fire caused by an electric company’s equipment. EMC never obtained an agreement from the insureds or a judicial determination that its insureds had been made whole. In addition, EMC did not allege in the complaint that its insureds had been made whole and did not present any evidence or testimony at trial that its insureds had been made whole. After EMC presented its case-in-chief, the District Court ruled that EMC lacked standing to pursue its subrogation claim because “EMC failed to obtain a legal determination that its insureds had been made whole . . . prior to initiating this subrogation action.” Thus, the District Court granted Entergy Ark., Inc.’s motion for judgment as a matter of law and EMC appealed the decision.
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Michael J. Ciamaichelo, White and Williams LLPMr. Ciamaichelo may be contacted at
ciamaichelom@whiteandwilliams.com
Hudson River PCB Cleanup Lands Back in Court
September 03, 2019 —
Mary B. Powers - Engineering News-RecordAs it previously had warned, New York state on Aug. 21 filed a federal lawsuit against the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency seeking to reverse its certification that General Electric Co.'s removal of PCBs from the Hudson River was complete, despite the agency’s five-year review finding that the cleanup was not adequate to protect human health and the environment.
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Mary B. Powers, ENRENR may be contacted at
ENR.com@bnpmedia.com
TLSS Partner Burks Smith and Associate Katie Keller Win Summary Judgment on Late Reported Water Seepage Case in South Florida
November 18, 2019 —
Burks A. Smith, III & Kathryn Keller - Traub LiebermanOn July 9, 2019, Traub Lieberman Straus & Shrewsberry LLP Partner, Burks A. Smith, III and Associate, Kathryn A. Keller, secured Summary Judgment on behalf of a major homeowners’ insurer in a breach of contract action in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida. See Lehrfield v. Liberty Mutual Fire Insurance Company, 2019 WL2994270 (S.D. Fla. 2019). The underlying claim involved a water loss at the Plaintiffs’ residence allegedly resulting in $91,147.32 worth of damage to their home. The claim was reported eight (8) months after the alleged date of loss, and during the inspection, the adjuster observed rot, decay, mold, and warping wood, prompting the carrier to deny the claim based on the Seepage Endorsement. The Plaintiffs filed a breach of contract action alleging that the insurer breached the Policy by denying the claim.
Mr. Smith and Ms. Keller argued that Plaintiffs’ Policy with the insurer imposes a duty on the Plaintiffs to comply with the Duties After Loss conditions of the Policy, including the requirement to provide prompt notice of the loss and show the damaged property. As mentioned above, the Plaintiffs provided notice of the claim eight (8) months late, and performed various repairs prior to notifying the insurer of the claim. After the close of discovery, Mr. Smith and Ms. Keller filed a Motion for Summary Judgment on behalf of the insurer based on the late reporting, and further argued that the Plaintiffs had the burden of proving direct physical loss to property within the first 13 days of the loss, given the recent decision of Hicks v. American Integrity Insurance Company of Florida, 241 So.3d 925 (Fla. 3d DCA 1018). In Florida, when an insured fails to comply with their Duties After Loss, a presumption of prejudice to the insurer arises. Bankers Ins. Co. v. Macias, 475 So. 2d 1216, 1218 (Fla. 1985)). In order to recover, the Plaintiffs bear the burden of overcoming the presumption, and must prove that no prejudice existed. Id. Mr. Smith and Ms. Keller’s comprehensive arguments successfully proved to the Court that the Plaintiffs’ failure to timely report the claim prejudiced the insurer by prohibiting the insurer from being able to independently validate the loss, or distinguish between multiple causes of loss. Mr. Smith and Ms. Keller further argued that Plaintiffs did not meet their burden to prove that the insurer was not prejudiced by the Plaintiffs’ failure to comply with the Duties After Loss provision of the Policy. The Motion cited numerous cases and extensive analysis supporting the insurer’s position.
Reprinted courtesy of
Burks A. Smith, III, Traub Lieberman and
Kathryn Keller, Traub Lieberman
Mr. Smith, may be contacted at bsmith@tlsslaw.com
Ms. Keller may be contacted at kkeller@tlsslaw.com
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Ohio Court of Appeals Affirms Judgment in Landis v. Fannin Builders
April 20, 2011 —
Beverley BevenFlorez CDJ STAFFThe Ohio Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment in Landis v. William Fannin Builders. Landis contracted Fannin Builders to build their home. The case involved staining problems on the T1-11 siding chosen by the plaintiffs.
After a year and a half of discussion on how to resolve the problem of uneven staining on the siding, Landis filed suit “against Fannin Builders, alleging claims for breach of contract, breach of the express limited warranty, and violation of the Ohio Consumer Sales Practices Act (“OCSPA”). Fannin Builders, in turn, filed a third-party complaint against 84 Lumber, alleging claims for breach of contract and indemnification. With the trial court’s leave, Fannin Builders also later amended its answer to add a counterclaim against appellees for breach of contract and unjust enrichment. In the counterclaim, Fannin Builders alleged that appellees still owed it $3,908.98 for the construction of appellees’ home.”
“In its decision, the trial court found in appellees’ favor on their breach of contract claim and against appellees on their claims for breach of the express limited warranty and violation of the OCSPA. Additionally, the trial court found in Fannin Builders’ favor on its counterclaim for breach of contract and against Fannin Builders on its third-party claims for breach of contract and indemnity. The trial court determined that appellees’ damages amounted to $66,906.24, and after setting off the $3,908.98 that appellees owed Fannin Builders under the construction contract, the trial court awarded appellees $62,997.26. The trial court reduced its decision to judgment on May 18, 2010.”
Fannin Builders appealed this judgment and assigned the following errors:
[1.] The Trial Court Erred as a Matter of Law by Concluding that Appellant Breached its Contract with Appellees when it provided a Semi-Transparent Oil-Based Stain that Simply did not Meet their Approval.
[a.] The Contract does not Contain a Satisfaction Clause.
[b.] Even if the Court Implies a Satisfaction Clause, the Court Should Apply an Objective Standard.
[2.] The Trial Court Erred as a Matter of Law by Failing to Consider Appellant’s Right to Cure.
[3.] The Trial Court committed Reversible Error by not Assessing Damages Using “Diminished Value Standard,” and by Creating a Remedy that Constitutes Economic Waste.
[4.] The Trial Court Erred as a Matter of Law by Concluding that Appellant is Barred from Seeking Indemnification When 84 [Lumber] Never Fulfilled its Obligations Pursuant to the Settlement Agreement Entered on August 2, 2005.
In response to the first assigned error, the Court of Appeals stated: “Because the failure to provide siding of a uniform color, not appellees’ displeasure, breached the contract, we reject Fannin Builders’ contention that the trial court implied a satisfaction clause into the contract and found a breach of that clause. Accordingly, we overrule Fannin Builders’ first assignment of error.”
The Court of Appeals overruled the second assignment of error and provided the following reasoning: “Although Fannin Builders depends upon a term of the limited warranty for its right to cure, the trial court concluded that no breach of the limited warranty occurred. Fannin Builders breached the duty of workmanlike conduct implicit in the construction contract, not the limited warranty requiring it to satisfy the BIA’s Quality Standards. Consequently, the limited warranty does not apply to this case, and thus, it does not prevent appellees’ recovery of damages.”
The Appeals Court found “the trial court’s award of damages” was “both reasonable and supported by competent, credible evidence,” and therefore concluded “that the trial court did not err in setting appellees’ damages at $62,997.26.” The Fannin Builders third assignment of error was overruled.
The fourth and final assignment of error was also overruled by the Court of Appeals. “While Fannin Builders correctly asserts that 84 Lumber never installed the replacement siding, it ignores the fact that it ordered 84 Lumber to remove the replacement siding from appellees’ property. Thus, Fannin Builders precluded 84 Lumber from completely performing under the August 2, 2005 letter agreement. […] Consequently, Fannin Builders cannot now claim that the letter agreement is unenforceable or that it is entitled to indemnification from 84 Lumber. Because Fannin Builders assumed all liability for the defective siding in the letter agreement, it is responsible for appellees’ damages.”
James A. Zitesman, Columbus, Ohio Business Attorney, compared the case to Jones v. Centex (Ohio App. 2010), which had a different verdict:
“The common thread is the implied warranty of good workmanship. In the Jones case, the Court found that the buyers had in fact waived all implied warranties, including the implied warranty of good workmanship. In the contract between Jones and Centex, the builder stated that it “…would not sell the property to Purchasers without this waiver.” Probably should have been a sign to the buyers.
In the Landis case, the Court stated, “Contracts for the future construction of a residence include a duty, implied by law, that the builder must perform its work in a workmanlike manner.” The Court gave significant weight to the concept of the implied warranty of good workmanship. The builder relied upon the BIA Warranty which limits builders’ liability and exposure to legal issues. The trial court concluded there was no breach of the limited warranty, rather the builder “breached the duty of workmanlike conduct implicit in the construction contract, not the limited warranty requiring it to satisfy the BIAs Quality Standards.”
The Supreme Court of Ohio has accepted the Jones v. Centex Homes case for review.
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Waive It Goodbye: Despite Evidence to the Contrary, Delaware Upholds an AIA Waiver of Subrogation Clause
April 19, 2022 —
Lian Skaf - The Subrogation StrategistSubrogation professionals have always been looking for ways to defeat onerous waiver of subrogation provisions in contracts signed by insureds. However, even when contracts are unsigned, if there is intent when the contract is made – usually long before a loss occurs – a waiver of subrogation can doom what otherwise may have been a strong case. The Superior Court of Delaware considered such a scenario to determine whether a waiver of subrogation provision applied to a multimillion-dollar subrogation case.
In State of Delaware Insurance Coverage Office and Factory Mutual Insurance Co., both as subrogee of the University of Delaware v. DiSabatino Construction Co., Schlosser & Associates Mechanical Contractors, Inc. and V.E. Guerrazzi, Inc., C.A. No. N19C-08-080, 2022 Del. Super. LEXIS 108 (March 17, 2022), the court granted the defendants’ motions for summary judgment, holding that the plaintiffs’ claims were barred by a waiver of subrogation provision in the underlying contract. Thus, the court held that the plaintiffs could not pursue the defendants in their suit to recover damages as a result of a fire. The court specifically denied the plaintiffs’ argument that since the contract was not signed and another “short form” version was later used the waiver of subrogation provision should not apply.
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Lian Skaf, White and Williams LLPMr. Skaf may be contacted at
skafl@whiteandwilliams.com
Stair Collapse Points to Need for Structural Inspections
November 27, 2013 —
CDJ STAFFThe exterior stairways at the Nutmeg Woods apartments in New London, Connecticut have lead to injuries three times in the last three years, with the most recent failure causing fatal injuries. Despite the annual injuries, the city has not been inspecting the stairways on an annual basis. Calvin Darrow, New London’s fire marshal, told The Day, a New London newspaper, that these inspections are supposed to occur annually, but tend to come about once every five years. Mr. Darrow ascribed the matter to staffing issues.
The stairways have now received a preliminary inspection by a structural engineer, and building and fire officials. Kirk Kripas told the paper that the Building Department was still attempting to determine when the stairs were built.
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