New York Regulator Issues Cyber Insurance Guidelines
March 29, 2021 —
Anne Kelley - Newmeyer DillionFrom the rise of ransomware attacks to the recent SolarWinds-based cyber espionage campaign that struck at the very heart of the U.S. Government, it is apparent that cybersecurity is more critical than ever. COVID-19 and the remote workplace has only served to embolden cyber criminals, and cyber risk now permeates nearly every aspect of modern life from health care data to national security.
Cyber insurance plays a critical role in managing cyber risk, and businesses increasingly rely on such coverage to minimize cyber losses. Because of surging cybercrime, it is estimated that the cyber insurance market will increase from $3.15 billion in 2019 to $20 billion by 2025. Having a robust cyber insurance market and ample available coverage is vital to U.S. businesses.
In recognition of this reality, the New York Department of Financial Services recently issued the first guidance by a U.S. regulator on cyber insurance—a Cyber Insurance Risk Framework. A key premise of the Framework is to drive improved cybersecurity and cyber risk management, thereby reducing cyberattacks and ensuring that cyber insurance premiums do not spiral out of control. The Framework recognizes the importance of ensuring a healthy cyber insurance market, and applies to all property/casualty insurers that write cyber insurance.
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Anne Kelley, Newmeyer DillionMs. Kelley may be contacted at
anne.kelley@ndlf.com
South Carolina Contractors Regain General Liability Coverage
May 20, 2011 —
CDJ STAFFPR Newswire reports that the Carolinas Associated General Contractors (CAGC) have successfully persuaded the South Carolina legislature to pass a bill restoring commercial general liability (CGL) coverage. Governor Nikki Hartley signed the legislation on May 17.
A South Carolina Supreme Court decision given on January 7, 2011, had ended commercial general liability coverage in the state. Senate Bill 431 addressed this decision, restoring the ability of home builders to obtain CGL coverage.
PR Newswire quotes South Carolina homebuilder, Allen Amsler: “We have seen a lot of legislation with substantial impact to our business over the years. However, I would place this in the same level of importance with the original tort reform legislation. The effects of the Supreme Court’s ruling could have been catastrophic to our industry in South Carolina had it not been for this bill. Thanks to all those in the House, Senate and the Governor’s office who assisted us.”
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Client Alert: Court of Appeal Applies Common Interest Privilege Doctrine to HOA Litigation Meetings
March 19, 2014 —
David W. Evans, Steven M. Cvitanovic, and Michael C. Parme - Haight Brown & Bonesteel LLPIn Seahaus La Jolla Owners Assoc. v. Superior Court (No. D064567, March 12, 2014), the California Court of Appeal held a homeowners association’s (“HOA”) litigation meetings related to the HOA’s construction defect lawsuit were subject to protection under the attorney-client privilege. Specifically, the court concluded the common interest doctrine applied to the subject litigation meetings, thereby barring the defendants in the HOA’s lawsuit from seeking discovery related to the content and disclosures made during those meetings.
The plaintiff HOA initiated a construction defect lawsuit against a residential developer and builder, seeking damages for construction defects related to common areas. The defendants took the depositions of individual homeowners and inquired regarding the communications and disclosures made at informational litigation update meetings. The meetings were conducted by the HOA’s counsel with groups of homeowners, some of whom had filed their own, separate lawsuits against the same defendants. Motions to compel were filed after attorney-client privilege objections were asserted by counsel for the HOA. After the court-appointed discovery referee opined that the common interest doctrine applied and that the communications presented at the meetings were subject to the attorney-client privilege, the trial court rejected this recommendation and overruled the HOA’s privilege objections. The HOA filed a petition for a writ of mandate.
The defendants argued the privilege had been waived based on the presence of persons who were not the clients of the HOA’s attorney, that the subject communications were not “confidential communications” and that the individual homeowners and the HOA did not share common interests at the time. After setting forth a comprehensive discussion of the statutory principles underlying the attorney-client privilege and the bases for waiver, as provided in California Evidence Code §§ 912 and 952, and summarizing applicable decisional law, the court specifically analyzed the question of whether the common interest doctrine applied in the context of the disputed HOA litigation meetings. The common interest doctrine protects confidential communications made by counsel to third parties if the third parties are present to further the interest of the client or are those to whom disclosure is reasonably necessary for the transmission of the information or the accomplishment of the purpose for which the lawyer was consulted.
Reprinted courtesy of
David W. Evans,
Steven M. Cvitanovic, and
Michael C. Parme of Haight Brown & Bonesteel LLP
Mr. Evans may be contacted at devans@hbblaw.com, Mr. Cvitanovic may be contacted at scvitanovic@hbblaw.com, and Mr. Parme may be contacted at mparme@hbblaw.com
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Nevada Senate Bill 435 is Now in Effect
February 24, 2020 —
Bremer Whyte Brown & O'Meara LLPATTENTION: Nevada liability departments and auto insurance carriers! Nevada Senate Bill No. 435 was recently signed into law and there are two key points to be aware of: Disclosure of Policy Limits Demand and Voiding Releases. These both deal with pre-litigation situations.
1) Nevada law now requires a motor vehicle insurer to disclose the limits of the policy if the claimant provides a HIPAA authorization which allows the carrier to “receive all medical reports, records and bills related to the claim from the providers of health care.” This is a change from the previous Nevada statute which required the disclosure of policy limits only after litigation was commenced.
However, it appears from the language of the statute that there are limits to this new mandate. Section 4 of the new law is written in such a way to allow the argument that the new law applies only to accidents that occurred after 10/1/19, and that the insurance company has to request the HIPAA waiver from the claimant in order for the disclosure requirement to apply.
The plaintiff’s bar is already attempting to address this language in the legislature. As written, subsection (4) is governed by subsection (1) which states that the insurance company “may require the claimant … to provide … a written authorization.” The following subparts all appear to be triggered only by the act of the insurance company requesting a HIPAA waiver. The plaintiff’s bar is pushing for clarifying language that would make it clear that once the claimant sent a HIPAA waiver, irrespective of whether the document was requested by the insurance company or not, the insurance company is required to disclose policy limits. This is not how the law reads on its face, and the change would make a significant difference from a practical perspective.
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The Rubber Hits the Ramp: A Maryland Personal Injury Case
September 17, 2014 —
Beverley BevenFlorez-CDJ STAFFAn elderly woman filed suit against the Town of Ocean City, Maryland, “after allegedly falling from her wheelchair because of a defective rubber warning mat on a resort street corner,” according to The Dispatch.
The accident occurred when the woman’s wheelchair “struck one of the hard rubber warning mats on the handicap-accessible street corners.”
The plaintiff is seeking “$750,000 in damages on three counts including negligence, strict liability and a violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA).” However, The Dispatch reported that it is not clear who is liable, since the sidewalk is owned and maintained by the town, but the State Highway Administration installed the rubber warning mats.
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Ruling Closes the Loop on Restrictive Additional Insured Endorsement – Reasonable Expectations of Insured Builder Prevails Over Intent of Insurer
July 31, 2019 —
Theodore L. Senet, Esq., Jason M. Adams, Esq. and Clayton Calvin - Gibbs GiddenOn June 5, 2019, the Court of Appeal in
McMillin Homes Construction, Inc. v. National Fire & Marine Insurance Company, 35 Cal. App. 5th 1042 (Cal. Ct. App. 2019) issued an important opinion on the scope of additional insured insurance coverage for developers and general contractors in California. Specifically, the “care, custody and control” (“CCC”) exclusion will be read to only exclude coverage for additional insureds who exercised exclusive control over the damaged property. Thus, general contractors who share control of the property with their subcontractors, as is typical on most projects, will not be denied coverage under this exclusion.
I. Facts & Procedural History
McMillin Homes Construction, Inc. was a Southern California developer and general contractor. In 2014, homeowners sued McMillin for roofing defects in a case called
Galvan v. McMillin Auburn Lane II, LLC. Pursuant to a subcontract, the roofer, Martin Roofing Company, Inc., provided McMillin with additional insured coverage under Martin’s general liability insurance policy. The insurer, National Fire and Marine Insurance Company, covered McMillin under an ISO Form CG 20 09 03 97 Additional Insured (“AI”) endorsement. After McMillin tendered its defense of the Galvan lawsuit under the AI endorsement, National Fire declined to provide McMillin with a defense to the homeowners’ lawsuit, relying on a CCC exclusion contained in the AI endorsement for property in the care, custody or control of the additional insured. McMillin then sued National Fire for breach of the policy, bad faith and declaratory relief in
McMillin Homes Construction, Inc. v. National Fire & Marine Insurance Company.
In
McMillin Homes, the trial court found the CCC exclusion in the AI endorsement applied and held in favor of the insurer, National Fire. The trial court found the exclusion for damage to property in McMillin’s “care, custody, or control” precluded coverage for the roofing defect claims, as well as any duty on the part of the insurer to defend the home builder, McMillin. McMillin filed an appeal from the trial court’s ruling.
II. Case Holding
The Court of Appeal reversed to hold in favor of McMillin, interpreting the CCC exclusion narrowly and finding a duty on the part of the insurer to defend the general contractor pursuant to the AI endorsement on the roofer’s insurance policy. It held that for the CCC exclusion to attach, it would require the general contractor’s exclusive control over the damaged property, but here, the general contractor shared control with the roofer. The Court of Appeal noted that where there is ambiguity as to whether a duty to defend exists, the court favors the reasonable belief of the insured over the intent of the insurer. Here, that reasonable belief was that the coverage applied and the exclusion was narrow.
The Court of Appeal relied upon
Home Indemnity Co. v. Leo L. Davis, Inc., 79 Cal. App. 3d 863 (Ct. App. 1978) (“Davis”), as a judicial interpretation of the CCC exclusion. That case synthesized a string of case law into a single conclusion: that courts may hold the exclusion inapplicable where the insured’s control is not exclusive. In the opinion in McMillin Homes, coverage turned upon whether control was exclusive: “[t]he exclusion is inapplicable where the facts at best suggest shared control.” The Court of Appeal stated the “need for painstaking evaluation of the specific facts of each case. Here, McMillin coordinated the project’s scheduling, but Martin furnished the materials and labor and oversaw the work; they therefore shared control.
Even if the rule in Davis did not apply and the exclusion was found to be ambiguous, the court stated that “control” requires a higher threshold than merely acting as a general contractor. Liability policies are presumed to include defense duties and exclusions must be “conspicuous, plain, and clear.” Furthermore, because “construction defect litigation is typically complex and expensive, a key motivation [for the endorsement] is to offset the cost of defending lawsuits where the general contractor’s liability is claimed to be derivative.” This is especially true because the duty to defend is triggered by a mere potential of coverage. Under the insurer’s construction of the exclusion, coverage would be so restrictive under the AI endorsement that it was nearly worthless to the additional insured.
III. Reasonable Expectation of the Insured Prevails over the Intent of the Insurer
Like most commercial general liability policies, National Fire’s policy excluded coverage for property damage Martin was contractually obliged to pay, with an exception for “insured contracts.” Typically, “insured contracts” include prospective indemnification agreements for third party claims. The National Fire policy contained a form CG 21 39 Contractual Liability Limitation endorsement, which deleted indemnity agreements from the definition of “insured contracts” to effectively preclude coverage for the indemnity provision between McMillin and Martin. National Fire argued that this endorsement demonstrated its intent to exclude coverage to McMillin for the homeowners’ defect lawsuit. The Court of Appeal stated that the insurer’s intent is not controlling and that the insureds reasonable expectation under the AI endorsement would control. As a result of its ruling, the Court also dealt a significant blow to the argument that the CG 21 39 endorsement is effective as a total bar to additional insured coverage for all construction defect claims.
IV. Conclusion
The decision is good news for developers and general contractors who rely on subcontractors to provide additional insured coverage. Unless the general contractor exercises exclusive control over a given project, the CCC exclusion in the CG 20 09 03 97 additional insured endorsement may not preclude the duty to defend. Demonstrating that a general contractor exercised exclusive control over the project would be extremely difficult to show under normal project circumstances because the any subcontractor participation appears to eliminate the general contractor’s exclusive control.
The case also highlights the need for construction professionals to regularly review their insurance programs with their risk management team (lawyers, brokers, and risk managers). As is often the case, a basic insurance policy review at the outset of the McMillin project could likely have avoided the entire dispute. For owners and general contractors, CG 20 10 (ongoing operations) and CG 20 37 (completed operations) additional insured forms are preferable to the CG 20 09 form at issue in the McMillin case because they do not contain the CCC exclusion. The CG 20 10 and 20 37 forms are readily available in the marketplace and are commonly added to most policies upon request. Had those forms been added, AI coverage likely would have been extended to McMillin without the need for litigation. Similarly, carriers will routinely delete the CG 21 39 Contractual Liability Limitation endorsement upon request. Deletion of the CG 21 39 would have circumvented National Fire’s second argument in its entirety.
Additionally, insurance policies, endorsements, and exclusions are subject to revision and are not always issued on standard forms. As a result, it is incumbent upon developers, contractors, and subcontractors to specify the precise overage requirements for construction projects and to review all endorsements, certificates, and policies carefully. Due to the difficulty in monitoring compliance with insurance requirements, project owners and general contractors are finding that it is better to insure projects under project specific wrap-up insurance programs which eliminate many of the issues pertaining to additional insured coverage. Wrap-up programs vary greatly as to their terms and conditions, so however a project is insured, insurance requirements and evidence of coverage should be carefully reviewed by experienced and qualified risk managers, brokers, and legal counsel to assure that projects and parties are sufficiently covered.
Gibbs Giden is nationally and locally recognized by U. S. News and Best Lawyers as among the “Best Law Firms” in both Construction Law and Construction Litigation. Chambers USA Directory of Leading Lawyers has consistently recognized Gibbs Giden as among California’s elite construction law firms. The authors can be reached at tsenet@gibbsgiden.com (Theodore Senet); jadams@gibbsgiden.com (Jason Adams) and ccalvin@gibbsgiden.com (Clayton Calvin). Read the court decisionRead the full story...Reprinted courtesy of
Ninth Circuit Rules Supreme Court’s Two-Part Test of Implied Certification under the False Claims Act Mandatory
May 13, 2019 —
Meredith Thielbahr - Gordon & Rees Construction Law BlogFor those contractors in the government arena, read on.
The False Claims Act (“FCA”) was enacted to deter knowingly fraudulent actions by contractors which resulted in a loss of property to the Government. Intent to defraud with resulting financial hardship was required. Contrary to popular misconception, the statute was not designed to punish all false submissions to the Government simply because those submissions, or claims, are later found to be false. The statute’s inclusion of the requisite element of knowledge is consistent with this notion:
- A defendant must submit a claim for payment to the Government;
- the claim must be false or fraudulent;
- the defendant must have known the claim was fraudulent when it was submitted (also known as scienter); and
- the claim must have caused the Government to pay out money.
See 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a).
Despite these explicit elements (in addition to common law elements of fraud), over the last two decades, contractors have seen ever-expanding theories of FCA recovery presented by qui tam plaintiffs and the Government. For example, under the FCA, the false “claim” evolved over time: the claim no longer needs to be an express false claim (i.e. the truthfulness of the claim is a direct condition of payment); the claim can be “implied” misrepresentation or “half-truth”.
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Meredith Thielbahr, Gordon & Rees Scully MansukhaniMs. Thielbahr may be contacted at
mthielbahr@grsm.com
Does the Implied Warranty of Habitability Extend to Subsequent Purchasers? Depends on the State
October 08, 2014 —
Beverley BevenFlorez-CDJ STAFFAttorneys for Traub Liberman Straus & Shrewsberry LLP (in JD Supra Business Advisor), discussed how state courts have come to different conclusions as to “whether a subsequent purchaser of a previously inhabited residence can recover contract damages from a builder or general contractor for breach of the implied warranty of habitability.”
Recently, a Pennsylvania “sided with the builder, holding that the implied warranty of habitability was grounded in contract law. Thus, the Court reasoned that an action for breach of the implied warranty of habitability required a showing of contractual privity between the parties. Because there was no contractual privity between the Conways and the builder, the Conways could not pursue an action against the builder based on a breach of the implied warranty of habitability.”
However, other state courts have made other conclusions. “Iowa permits an action for breach of the implied warranty of workmanlike construction by subsequent purchasers and does not require a showing of contractual privity. Rhode Island also does not require contractual privity, but limits liability to latent defects discovered within 10 years of construction.” Vermont and Connecticut, however, require contract privity.
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