Bad Faith Claim for Inadequate Investigation Does Not Survive Summary Judgment
May 20, 2015 —
Tred R. Eyerly – Insurance Law HawaiiThe insured's claim for bad faith investigation regarding their hail damage claim did not survive the insurer's motion for summary judgment. Amarillo Hospitality Tenant, LLC v. Mass. Bay Ins. Co., 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 56228 (N. D. Tex. April 29, 2015).
A hailstorm caused damage to the Courtyard Marriot. The day after the storm, the insured inspected the roof of the hotel and observed damage to a sign and some aluminum vent tubes. No damage to the roof itself was observed. Subsequently, leaks were found on the tenth floor of the hotel. A public adjuster concluded that the roof had sustained damage during the hailstorm.
The insured filed a claim with Massachusetts Bay Insurance Company. The insurer paid for the cost of repairing the damaged sign. To determine whether the damage to the roof was caused by the hailstorm, the insurer hired Donna Engineering, who conducted two inspections of the roof. Both inspections concluded that the hailstorm did not cause damage to the roof. Consequently, the claim was denied.
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Tred R. Eyerly, Insurance Law HawaiiMr. Eyerly may be contacted at
te@hawaiilawyer.com
Arezoo Jamshidi Selected to the 2023 San Diego Super Lawyers List
April 03, 2023 —
Arezoo Jamshidi - Haight Brown & Bonesteel LLPCongratulations to Arezoo Jamshidi who has been selected to the 2023 San Diego Super Lawyers list. Each year, no more than five percent of the lawyers in the state are selected by the research team at Super Lawyers to receive this honor. Super Lawyers, part of Thomson Reuters, is a rating service of outstanding lawyers from more than 70 practice areas who have attained a high degree of peer recognition and professional achievement. The annual selections are made using a patented multiphase process that includes a statewide survey of lawyers, an independent research evaluation of candidates and peer reviews by practice area. The result is a credible, comprehensive and diverse listing of exceptional attorneys. The Super Lawyers lists are published nationwide in Super Lawyers magazines and in leading city and regional magazines and newspapers across the country. Super Lawyers magazines also feature editorial profiles of attorneys who embody excellence in the practice of law.
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Arezoo Jamshidi, Haight Brown & Bonesteel LLPMs. Jamshidi may be contacted at
ajamshidi@hbblaw.com
When is a Residential Subcontractor not Subject to the VCPA? Read to Find Out
December 01, 2017 —
Christopher G. Hill - Construction Law MusingsThe Virginia Consumer Protection Act (VCPA) can and often does apply to residential construction. The transaction between a residential contractor and an homeowner has been held to fall under the consumer transaction language of the VCPA and on occasion been used to avoid the issues with the economic loss doctrine in Virginia. However, there are limits to how far down the contractual chain the VCPA applies, particularly in the case where a supplier or subcontractor does not provide the services or materials for a personal, consumer purpose.
An example of this fact is found in the case of Johnston v. Stephan. In that case, a couple hired a general contractor to build a home and the general contractor hired Cole Roofing System, Inc. to provide the roof of the home. The first couple subsequently sold the home and the second homeowners sought further work on the roof from Cole Roofing. After Cole Roofing refused further work, the homeowners brought an action seeking to enforce a warranty and for a violation of the VCPA. For the warranty claim, the homeowners relied on the contract between them and the prior homeowners that referenced a 10 year warranty on the roof and the subcontract between the homebuilder and Cole Roofing. Cole Roofing sought dismissal of the VCPA and warranty claims by demurrer and further sought by demurrer to have the matter dismissed as being filed after the running of the statute of limitations.
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Christopher G. Hill, The Law Office of Christopher G. HillMr. Hill may be contacted at
chrisghill@constructionlawva.com
Remodel Gets Pricey for Town
December 30, 2013 —
CDJ STAFFUsually when home gets remodeled, it’s the homeowners who encounter unexpected expenses, but in Clearwater, Florida, it’s the town. Clearview has spent about $40,000 trying to determine if changes to a home are a “substantial improvement,” and the bill could get bigger, according to TBNweekly.com.
The home in question, that of David and Aileen Blair, is in a flood zone, and city rules would require the alterations to comply with flood drainage-resistance provisions, but only if it is a “substantial improvement.” The Blairs applied for the remodel permit in April 2001, and it was granted more than 10 years later, in July 2011. Work started soon after until the city put a stop to it.
The Blairs sued, claiming that as the city issued the permit, they assumed the plans were approved, and that the partially-completed renovation now diminishes the value of their home. The city has approved an additional $160,000 in outside legal counsel to respond to the Blair’s lawsuit.
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Medical Center Builder Sues Contracting Agent, Citing Costly Delays
March 19, 2014 —
Beverley BevenFlorez-CDJ STAFFThe Pennsylvania firm Bedwell Co. “has sued the Camden County Improvement Authority, saying it is owed $4.6 million for construction of [the Cooper Medical School of Rowan University]” in Camden, New Jersey, according to the Courier-Post. The Bedwell Co. alleges that its expenses exceeded fifty million, “but that it has been paid only $46 million.”
The lawsuit states, as quoted by the Courier-Post, “From its inception, the project was plagued by delays due to defects in the design document and other circumstances that were beyond Bedwell’s control.” Furthermore, there were “an abnormally large quantity of design changes, schedule disputes, schedule disruptions and work-activity interference.”
“Representatives of the CCIA and HDR could not be reached for comment Wednesday,” according to the Courier-Post. “Bedwell declined to comment on the allegations in the suit.”
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Colorado Supreme Court Weighs in on Timeliness of Claims Against Subcontractors in Construction Defect Actions
March 16, 2017 —
Jean Meyer - Colorado Construction LitigationOn February 27, 2017, the Colorado Supreme Court announced its decision in the Goodman v. Heritage Builders, No. 16SA193, 2017 CO 13 (Colo. February 27, 2017) case. In ten short pages, the Colorado Supreme Court completely reshuffled Colorado construction law with respect to application of the statutes of limitation and repose on third-party claims in construction defect cases. Specifically, the Colorado Supreme Court overruled a series of earlier Court of Appeals' decisions that found C.R.S. § 13-80-104(1)(b)(II) (“104(1)(b)(II)”) had no effect on the six-year statute of repose. For context, 104(1)(b)(II) permitted third-party actions for indemnity and contribution to toll until ninety days after the claims in the underlying action were resolved by settlement or judgment. In the construction context, 104(1)(b)(II) was intended to allow a general contractor’s claims against liable subcontractors to toll for the statutorily defined period. This allowed the general contractor to first focus its attention on defending the claims against and thereafter to pursue its claims against the subcontractors.
However, beginning in 2008, in the Thermo Dev., Inc. v. Cent. Masonry Corp., 195 P.3d 1166 (Colo. App. 2008) case, the Colorado Court of Appeals began chipping away at the force of 104(1)(b)(II). This trend continued in the Shaw Constr., LLC v. United Builder Servs., Inc., 2012 COA 24, 296 P.3d 145 decision, the Sierra Pac. Indus., v. Bradbury, 2016 COA 132, _ P.3d_ decision, and culminating in the Sopris Lodging, LLC v. Schofield Excavation, Inc., 2016 COA 158, reh'g denied (Nov. 23, 2016) decision. Effectively, in these decisions, the Colorado Court of Appeals determined that third-party claims could not be brought beyond Colorado’s six-year statute of repose, regardless if they were brought within the ninety day tolling provision set forth in 104(1)(b)(II).
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Jean Meyer, Higgins, Hopkins, McLain & Roswell, LLCMr. Meyer may be contacted at
meyer@hhmrlaw.com
DHS Awards Contracts for Border Wall Prototypes
September 20, 2017 —
Engineering News-RecordThe Dept. of Homeland Security has awarded eight contracts to companies to develop prototypes for the Trump administration’s proposed wall along sections of the nearly 2,000-mile U.S.-Mexico border. The contracts are divided evenly between concrete and nonconcrete options. DHS’s Customs and Border Protection agency didn’t specify what sort of materials would be used in the nonconcrete barriers.
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Engineering News-RecordENR staff may be contacted at
ENR.com@bnpmedia.com
California Appeals Court Remands Fine in Late Completion Case
November 18, 2011 —
CDJ STAFFThe California Court of Appeals in Stanislaus County has reversed the decision of the lower court in Greg Opinski Construction Inc. v. City of Oakdale. The earlier court had awarded the city of judgment of $54,000 for late completion, $3,266 for repair of construction defects and interest, and $97,775 in attorneys’ fees. The late completion of the project was due to actions by the City of Oakdale, however, the court rejected Opinski’s argument that the California Supreme Court decision in Kiewit did not allow this, as his contract with the city established a procedure for claiming extensions.
The appeals court noted that the Kiewit decision has been “criticized as an unwarranted interference in the power of contracting parties to shift the risk of delays caused by one party onto the other party by forcing the second party to give the first notice of any intention to claim an extension of time based on delays caused by first.” They cited Sweet, a professor at Boalt Hall, UC Berkeley’s law school, that Kiewit “gutted” the “provision that conditions the contractor’s right to claim an extension of time for delays beyond his control.”
Further changes in California law in response to the Kiewit decision lead to the current situation which the court characterized as “if the contractor wished to claim it needed an extension of time because of delays caused by the city, the contractor was required to obtain a written change order by mutual consent or submit a claim in writing requesting a formal decision by the engineer.”
Opinski also argued that the lower court misinterpreted the contract. The Appeals court replied that “Opinski is mistaken.” He cited parts of the contract regarding the increase of time, but the court rejected these, noting that “an inability to agree is not the same as an express rejection.”
The court also rejects Opinski’s appeal that “the evidence the project was complete earlier than September 30, 2005, is weightier than the evidence to the contrary,” which they describe as “not a winning appellate argument.” The court points out that the role of an appeals court is not to reweigh the evidence, but to determine “whether the record contains substantial evidence in support of the judgment.”
The court did side with Opinski on one question of the escrow account. They rejected most of his arguments, repeating the line “Opinski is mistaken” several times. They decided that he was mistaken on the timing of the setoff decision and on whether the city was the prevailing party. However, the appeals court did find that Opinski was not liable for interest on the judgment.
The appeals court rejected the awarding of prejudgment interest to the city as the funds from which the judgment was drawn was held in an escrow account. The court noted that the city had access to the funds and could “access the funds when it determined that Opinski had breached the contract.” The appeals court noted that the judgment exhausted the escrow balance and remanded the case to the lower court to determine the amount own to Opinski.
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