English v. RKK- There is Even More to the Story
May 17, 2021 —
Christopher G. Hill - Construction Law MusingsJust when you thought that the litigation between W. C. English and RKK had no more to give (after all, there have been posts with wisdom from this case
here,
here, and
here), it keeps on giving. A
relatively recent opinion from this litigation involved, among other pre-trial motions, motions by English to exclude expert witness testimony. English sought to exclude Defendant CDM Smith, Inc’s expert testimony relating to CDM’s standard of care, the replacement of the bridge deck, English’s failure to fire CDM, and additional contributing factors regarding the spacing of the reinforcing steel. English sought to exclude RKK’s expert opinion regarding English’s owed standard of care vis a vis VDOT.
In evaluating these motions, the Court applied the following standard:
An expert qualified “by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify “as to scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge if it will assist the trier of fact. However, such testimony is only admissible if (1) “the testimony is based upon sufficient facts or data,” (2) “the testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods,” and (3) “the expert has reliably applied the principles and methods to the facts of the case.” [citations excluded here but stated in the opinion]
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The Law Office of Christopher G. HillMr. Hill may be contacted at
chrisghill@constructionlawva.com
Rent Increases During the Coronavirus Emergency Part II: Avoiding Violations Under California’s Anti-Price Gouging Statute
April 06, 2020 —
Dan Schneider - Newmeyer DillionIn my earlier article, Profiting From Fear: What You Need to Know About Price Gouging During the Coronavirus Emergency, I discuss price gouging and how the anti-price gouging statute, California Penal Code 396 (“CPC 396”), protects buyers of goods and services deemed vital and necessary for the health, safety and welfare of consumers. Part II of the article provides guidance to landlords on the parameters applicable to acceptable price increases and focuses attention on the application of CPC 396 to rental housing and related issues.
California Penal Code 396
As it pertains to housing, defined as “any rental housing with an initial lease term of no longer than one year,” price gouging occurs when a landlord increases the rent of an existing or prospective tenant by more than 10 percent of the previously charged or advertised price following an emergency or disaster declaration for a period of 30 days.2 A residential landlord is only allowed to increase rent in excess of 10 percent if “the increase is directly attributable to additional costs for repairs or additions beyond normal maintenance that were amortized over the rental term that caused the rent to be increased greater than 10 percent or that an increase was contractually agreed to by the tenant prior to the proclamation or declaration” (CPC 396(e).) Further, landlords are prohibited from evicting a tenant and then re-renting the property at a rate that the landlord would have been prohibited from charging the evicted tenant under the statute (CPC 396(f).)3
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Dan Schneider, Newmeyer DillionMr. Schneider may be contacted at
daniel.schneider@ndlf.com
Impasse Over Corruption Charges Costs SNC $3.7 Billion, CEO Says
January 08, 2019 —
Frederic Tomesco - BloombergCanada’s failure to reach a negotiated settlement with SNC-Lavalin Group Inc. over past corruption charges has probably cost the company more than C$5 billion ($3.7 billion) in lost revenue and continues to damage its reputation internationally, Chief Executive Officer Neil Bruce said.
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Frederic Tomesco, Bloomberg
Pollution Created by Business Does Not Deprive Insured of Coverage
November 26, 2014 —
Tred R. Eyerly – Insurance Law HawaiiThe federal district court determined that coverage was properly denied under the pollution exclusion of the policies. Headwaters Resources, Inc. v. Illinois Union Ins. Co., 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 20060 (10th Cir. Oct. 20, 2014).
Over 400 residents of Chesapeake, Virginia, filed two lawsuits against the insured, Headwaters, alleged property damage and bodily injury due to pollution generated in connection with the development of a golf course. The complaints alleged that between 2002 and 2007, the defendants used 1.5 million tons of toxic fly ash during construction of a golf course. The insured allegedly transported the fly ash to an open pit adjacent to residential neighborhoods. The chemicals from the fly ash leached into the ground water, damaging the private wells. The fly ash pit also released airborne contaminants that produced a strong smell of ammonia. As a result of the alleged contamination, the property values of plaintiffs' homes depreciated and members of the community faced increased risk of serious bodily injuries caused by exposure to the fly ash.
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Tred R. Eyerly, Insurance Law HawaiiMr. Eyerly may be contacted at
te@hawaiilawyer.com
Court of Appeal: Privette Doctrine Does Not Apply to Landlord-Tenant Relationships
March 20, 2023 —
Garret Murai - California Construction Law BlogWe’ve talked a fair bit about the Privette doctrine which provides for a rebuttable presumption that a hirer is not liable for workplace injuries sustained by employees of hired parties.
We’ve also talked about its two exceptions: (1) The Hooker exception which provides for liability if the hirer retained control over the work being performed, negligently exercised that control, and its negligent exercise of that control contributed to an employee’s injury; and (2) the Kinsman exception which provides for liability if the hirer knew or should have known of a concealed hazard, that the hired party did not know of and could not have reasonably discovered, and the hirer failed to warn the hired party of the hazard.
The Privette doctrine is not the end all be all of landowner liability, however, as discussed in
Ramirez v. PK 1 Plaza 580 SC LP, 85 Cal.App.5th 252 (2022).
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Garret Murai, Nomos LLPMr. Murai may be contacted at
gmurai@nomosllp.com
Do Not File a Miller Act Payment Bond Lawsuit After the One-Year Statute of Limitations
November 01, 2022 —
David Adelstein - Florida Construction Legal UpdatesUnder the Miller Act, a claim against a Miller Act payment bond must be commenced “no later than one year after the date on which the last of the labor was performed or material was supplied by the person bringing the action.” 40 U.S.C. s. 3133(b)(4). Stated another way, a claimant must file its lawsuit against the Miller Act payment bond within one year from its final furnishing on the project.
Filing a lawsuit too late, i.e., outside of the one-year statute of limitations, will be fatal to a Miller Act payment bond claim. This was the outcome in Diamond Services Corp. v. Travelers Casualty & Surety Company of America, 2022 WL 4990416 (5th Cir. 2022) where a claimant filed a Miller Act payment bond lawsuit four days late. That four days proved to be fatal to its Miller Act payment bond claim and lawsuit. Do not let this happen to you!
In Diamond Services Corp., the claimant submitted a claim to the Miller Act payment bond surety. The surety issued a claim form to the claimant that requested additional information. The claimant returned the surety’s claim form. The surety denied the claim a year and a couple of days after the claimant’s final furnishing. The claimant immediately filed its payment bond lawsuit four days after the year expired. The claimant argued that the surety should be equitably estopped from asserting the statute of limitations in light of the surety’s letter requesting additional information. (The claimant was basically arguing that the statute of limitations should be equitably tolled.) The trial court dismissed the Miller Act payment bond claim finding it was barred by the one-year statute of limitations and that equitable estoppel did not apply.
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David Adelstein, Kirwin Norris, P.A.Mr. Adelstein may be contacted at
dma@kirwinnorris.com
No Coverage for Hurricane Sandy Damage
August 02, 2017 —
Tred R. Eyerly - Insurance Law HawaiiThe magistrate recommended that summary judgment be entered in favor of the insurer, thereby eliminating coverage for property damage incurred during Hurricane Sandy. Madelaine Chocolate Novelties, Inc. v. Great Northern Ins. Co., 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 103015 (E.D. N.Y. June 30, 2017).
Madelaine Chocolate owned a facility three blocks form the Atlantic Ocean and one block from the Jamaica Bay section of Long Island Sound. Hurricane Sandy arrived October 29, 2012. Madeline Chocolate's facility sustained significant damage to its inventory, production machinery and premises, as storm surge from both bodies of water hit the property. Operations ceased during the 2012 holiday season and beyond, resulting in millions of dollars in lost income.
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Tred R. Eyerly - Insurance Law HawaiiMr. Eyerly may be contacted at
te@hawaiilawyer.com
Appraisers May Determine Causation
January 21, 2015 —
Tred R. Eyerly – Insurance Law HawaiiIn a case of first impression, the Iowa Court of Appeals held that an appraisal may determine issues of causation. North Glenn Homeowners Association v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 854 N.W. 2d 67 (Iowa Ct. App. 2014).
On July 15, 2009, North Glenn Homeowners Association submitted a claim to State Farm for hail damage on the roof. The claim was paid. North Glenn did not repair all of the damage, instead deciding to use some of the money to make other repairs to the property.
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Tred R. Eyerly, Insurance Law HawaiiMr. Eyerly may be contacted at
te@hawaiilawyer.com