Fairfield Connecticut Building Expert Directory

When is a Residential Subcontractor not Subject to the VCPA? Read to Find Out

December 01, 2017 — Christopher G. Hill - Construction Law Musings
The Virginia Consumer Protection Act (VCPA) can and often does apply to residential construction. The transaction between a residential contractor and an homeowner has been held to fall under the consumer transaction language of the VCPA and on occasion been used to avoid the issues with the economic loss doctrine in Virginia. However, there are limits to how far down the contractual chain the VCPA applies, particularly in the case where a supplier or subcontractor does not provide the services or materials for a personal, consumer purpose. An example of this fact is found in the case of Johnston v. Stephan. In that case, a couple hired a general contractor to build a home and the general contractor hired Cole Roofing System, Inc. to provide the roof of the home. The first couple subsequently sold the home and the second homeowners sought further work on the roof from Cole Roofing. After Cole Roofing refused further work, the homeowners brought an action seeking to enforce a warranty and for a violation of the VCPA. For the warranty claim, the homeowners relied on the contract between them and the prior homeowners that referenced a 10 year warranty on the roof and the subcontract between the homebuilder and Cole Roofing. Cole Roofing sought dismissal of the VCPA and warranty claims by demurrer and further sought by demurrer to have the matter dismissed as being filed after the running of the statute of limitations. Read the court decision
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Reprinted courtesy of Christopher G. Hill, The Law Office of Christopher G. Hill
Mr. Hill may be contacted at chrisghill@constructionlawva.com

The Colorado Supreme Court affirms Woodbridge II’s “Adverse Use” Distinction

December 20, 2021 — Luke Mecklenburg - Snell & Wilmer Real Estate Litigation Blog
Last year, I posted regarding the Colorado Court of Appeals’ decision in Woodbridge II, which concluded that the “adverse use” element for prescriptive easement claims only requires the claimant to “show a nonpermissive or otherwise unauthorized use of property that interfered with the owner’s property interests.” Viento Blanco, LLC, 2020 COA 34 (Woodbridge II), ¶ 2. Thus, Woodbridge II concluded, the claimants acknowledgement or recognition of an owner’s title alone is insufficient to defeat “adverse use” in the prescriptive easement context. Id. That decision was up for review by the Colorado Supreme Court at the time of my prior post. It has now been affirmed, thereby settling an arguable appellate decision split created by Woodbridge II. See Lo Viento Blanco, LLC v. Woodbridge Condo. Ass’n, Inc., 2021 CO 56 (“Woodbridge”). “Like the division below, and for much the same reasons,” the Colorado Supreme Court affirmed in Woodbridge “that under Colorado law, a claimant’s acknowledgement or recognition of the owner’s title during the claimant’s asserted prescriptive period does not interrupt the prescriptive use or undermine the claimant’s adverse use.” Woodbridge, ¶ 2. Writing for a unanimous court, Justice Gabriel’s opinion agreed with the Court of Appeals’ reasoning “that although Woodbridge recognized that it did not hold title, no evidence indicated that it had acted in subordination to the owner’s title.” Id. ¶ at 13. The Court further agreed with Woodbridge II’srejection of Lo Viento’s “permissive use” argument because “the permission offered … was conditional and Woodbridge never agreed to any of the conditions set forth therein.” Id. On that basis, Woodbridge confirmed that “a claimant seeking to establish a prescriptive easement need not show that it asserted exclusive ownership of the property during the prescriptive period,” but only “that its use was without permission or otherwise unauthorized and that it interfered with the owner’s property interests.” Id. at ¶ 23. Read the court decision
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Reprinted courtesy of Luke Mecklenburg, Snell & Wilmer
Mr. Mecklenburg may be contacted at lmecklenburg@swlaw.com

Federal Arbitration Act Preempts Pennsylvania Payment Act

June 15, 2020 — Wally Zimolong - Supplemental Conditions
I am back. It feels like an entirety since I last posted. But a hellacious trial schedule got me off the blogosphere for some time. Plus, there was nothing to write about. But I am back with a bang thanks to a decision from the Eastern District of Pennsylvania concerning the interplay of a forum selection clause appearing in an arbitration clause in a construction contract and the Pennsylvania Contractor and Subcontractor Payment Act. In Bauguess Electrical Services, Inc. v. Hospitality Builders, Inc., the federal court (Judge Joyner) ruled that the federal arbitration act preempted the Payment Act’s prohibition on forum selection clauses and held that an arbitration must proceed in South Dakota even though the construction project were the work was performed was located in Pennsylvania. The Payment Act applies to all commercial construction projects performed in Pennsylvania. As some you might know, Section 514 of the Payment Act, 73 P.S. 514, prohibits choice of law and forum selection clauses. It states “[m]aking a contract subject to the laws of another state or requiring that any litigation, arbitration or other dispute resolution process on the contract occur in another state, shall be unenforceable.” Therefore, if a construction contract is for a project located in Pennsylvania, Pennsylvania law must apply and all disputes must be adjudicated in Pennsylvania. Read the court decision
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Reprinted courtesy of Wally Zimolong, Zimolong LLC
Mr. Zimolong may be contacted at wally@zimolonglaw.com

Higgins, Hopkins, McLain & Roswell, LLC Announces Leadership Changes and New Vision for Growth

January 21, 2025 — David McLain - Higgins, Hopkins, McLain & Roswell, LLC
Higgins, Hopkins, McLain & Roswell, LLC (“HHMR”) is excited to announce several significant developments as the firm transitions into an exciting new chapter of growth and innovation. Sheri Roswell, one of the firm’s founding members, is stepping out of ownership to serve as “Of Counsel,” continuing her vital work with clients and strengthening relationships that have been the cornerstone of HHMR’s success. Her tireless contributions since the firm’s inception have helped establish HHMR as a leader in Colorado’s construction law landscape. “Sheri has been a pillar of HHMR since day one. Her commitment to our clients and her unwavering dedication to the firm’s success have left an indelible mark. We are excited for her to continue contributing her expertise and leadership in this new capacity,” said David McLain at the firm’s recent holiday celebration. Read the court decision
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Reprinted courtesy of David McLain, Higgins, Hopkins, McLain & Roswell, LLC
Mr. McLain may be contacted at mclain@hhmrlaw.com

Does Your 998 Offer to Compromise Include Attorneys’ Fees and Costs?

June 15, 2017 — Anthony J. Carucci - Snell & Wilmer Real Estate Litigation Blog
In California, the “prevailing party” in litigation is generally entitled to recover its costs as a matter of law. See Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 1032. But under California Code of Civil Procedure section 998, a party may make a so-called “offer to compromise,” which can reverse the parties’ entitlement to costs after the date of the offer, depending on the outcome of the litigation. Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 998. The potential payoff of a 998 offer to compromise is explained in section 998(c)(1):

If an offer made by a defendant is not accepted and the plaintiff fails to obtain a more favorable judgment or award, the plaintiff shall not recover his or her postoffer costs and shall pay the defendant’s costs from the time of the offer.

Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 998(c)(1) (emphasis added). The Basic Requirements for a Valid 998 Offer Pursuant to section 998(b), a 998 offer must satisfy three principal conditions: (1) it must be contained in a writing; (2) it must state the terms and conditions of the proposed judgment or award; and (3) it must contain a provision allowing the offeree to accept the offer by signing a statement to that effect. Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 998(b). Read the court decision
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Reprinted courtesy of Anthony J. Carucci, Snell & Wilmer
Mr. Carucci may be contacted at acarucci@swlaw.com

Maria Latest Threat to Puerto Rico After $1 Billion Irma Hit

September 20, 2017 — Brian K. Sullivan & Ezra Fieser - Bloomberg
Hurricane Maria was on course to hit Puerto Rico just two weeks after Irma caused as much as $1 billion in damages on the bankrupt island. Maria’s top winds were at 155 miles (250 kilometers) an hour, the National Hurricane Center said in a notice around 6 a.m. New York time. At Category 5, the strongest classification on the five-step Saffir-Simpson scale, Maria was about 35 miles southeast of San Juan in Puerto Rico. Reprinted courtesy of Brian K. Sullivan, Bloomberg and Ezra Fieser, Bloomberg Read the court decision
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The Enforceability of “Pay-If-Paid” Provisions Affirmed in New Jersey

January 04, 2023 — Levi W. Barrett, Michael S. Zicherman & Brian Glicos - Peckar & Abramson, P.C.
On December 7, 2022, the Appellate Division affirmed the New Jersey Superior Court decision in Jersey Precast v. Tricon Enterprises, Inc. et al., finding that the “pay-if-paid” clause in a material supplier’s purchase order with a general contractor was binding and enforceable. While clauses conditioning a general contractor’s obligation to pay its subcontractors on the general contractor’s receipt of payment from the project owner are not unique – this is the first time that a court in New Jersey has affirmed this practice in a published opinion. [1] Background The general contractor, Tricon, sent Jersey Precast its standard form purchase order for the supply of prestressed box beams to fulfill a public improvement contract with Union County. The reverse side of the form purchase order contained standard terms and conditions, and included a pay-if-paid clause drafted by Michael Zicherman, a partner of Peckar & Abramson, P.C. While Jersey Precast provided some draft revisions to the terms and conditions, Tricon never signed the purchase order and the proposed revisions were never accepted. Significantly, Jersey Precast did not attempt to modify the pay-if-paid provision. It later developed that the construction of the project became impossible, and the beams fabricated by Jersey Precast were not used. Tricon invoiced Union County for the cost of the beams, but the County failed to make payment and refused to accept delivery of the beams. Reprinted courtesy of Levi W. Barrett, Peckar & Abramson, P.C., Michael S. Zicherman, Peckar & Abramson, P.C. and Brian Glicos, Peckar & Abramson, P.C. Mr. Barrett may be contacted at lbarrett@pecklaw.com Mr. Zicherman may be contacted at mzicherman@pecklaw.com Mr. Glicos may be contacted at bglicos@pecklaw.com Read the court decision
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Erector Tops Out 850-Foot-Tall Rainier Square Tower in Only 10 Months

September 23, 2019 — Nadine M. Post - Engineering News-Record
As predicted, the Erection Co. topped out Seattle’s 850-ft-tall Rainier Square Tower, with its radical composite steel frame dubbed “speed core,” in only 10 months. Steel erection began last October in the lowest basement. Reprinted courtesy of Nadine M. Post, Engineering News-Record Ms. Post may be contacted at postn@enr.com Read the court decision
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