Almost Half of Homes in New York and D.C. Are Now Losing Value
September 03, 2015 —
Prashant Gopal – BloombergAlmost half of single-family houses in the New York and Washington metropolitan areas are losing value, a sign that buyers' tolerance for high prices in many large U.S. cities may be reaching a limit.
The values of 45 percent of houses in both the Washington and New York areas slumped by at least 2 percent in June from a year earlier, according to a new index created by Allan Weiss, co-founder of the Case-Shiller home price indexes. In June 2014, only 15 percent of Washington residences dropped in value, while 20 percent fell in New York. Because the index is of only single-family homes, it doesn't include Manhattan. More properties also were in decline in Los Angeles, Chicago, Phoenix and Miami.
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Prashant Gopal, Bloomberg
Quick Note: Remember to Timely Foreclose Lien Against Lien Transfer Bond
July 09, 2019 —
David Adelstein - Florida Construction Legal UpdatesWhen a construction lien is transferred to a lien transfer bond pursuant to Florida Statute s. 713.24, instead of foreclosing the lien against the real property, you are foreclosing the lien against the lien transfer bond. This is not a bad deal and, oftentimes, is probably ideal. Remember, however, just because a construction lien was transferred to a lien transfer bond (pre-lawsuit) does not mean you get more time to file your lien foreclosure lawsuit. A lawsuit must still be filed within one year (short of that period being specifically shortened under operation of the law).
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David Adelstein, Kirwin Norris, P.A.Mr. Adelstein may be contacted at
dma@kirwinnorris.com
Connecticut Court Clarifies a Limit on Payment Bond Claims for Public Projects
May 15, 2023 —
Bill Wilson - Construction Law ZoneIn All Seasons Landscaping, Inc. v. Travelers Casualty & Surety Co., No. DBD-CV21-6039074-S, 2022 WL 1135703 (Conn. Super. Ct. April 4, 2022) the plaintiff, a subcontractor on a state project, commenced a lawsuit against the surety who issued a payment bond on the project two years after the subcontractor last performed any original contract work on the project. The defendant surety moved to dismiss the action based on the one-year statute of limitation in Connecticut General Statute § 49-42. The plaintiff countered that it complied with that deadline because it also performed warranty inspection work after the contract was completed and within the limitation period in section 49-42. The issue of whether warranty work or minor corrective work can extend the limitations period in section 49-42 had not previously been addressed by a Connecticut court.
Section 49-42(b) governs the limitation period on payment bond claims on public projects. It provides in relevant part that “no … suit may be commenced after the expiration of one year after the last date that materials were supplied or any work was performed by the claimant.” Section 49-42 provides no guidance on what “materials were supplied or any work was performed” by the claimant means, nor is there any direct appellate-level authority in Connecticut on this issue. What is clear under well-established law in Connecticut is that the time limit within which suit on a payment bond must be commenced under Section 49-42 is not only a statute of limitation but a jurisdictional requirement establishing a condition precedent to maintenance of the action and such limit is strictly enforced. If a plaintiff cannot prove its suit was initiated within this time constraint, the matter will be dismissed by the court as untimely.
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Bill Wilson, Robinson & Cole LLPMr. Wilson may be contacted at
wwilson@rc.com
DOI Aims to Modernize its “Inefficient and Inflexible” Type A Natural Resource Damages Assessment Regulations
March 25, 2024 —
Amanda G. Halter, Jillian Marullo & Ashleigh Myers - Gravel2Gavel Construction & Real Estate Law BlogThe U.S. Department of the Interior (DOI) published a
proposed rule aimed at modernizing and streamlining the “Type A” Natural Resource Damage Assessment (NRDA) regulations under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA) and the Clean Water Act (CWA). (The comment deadline was later
extended.) The revisions,
first previewed in a January 2023 Advanced Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (ANPR), are intended to fulfill “the original statutory purpose of providing a streamlined and simplified assessment process” with the overarching goal of facilitating settlements and expediting restoration efforts following injury resulting from pollution in a broader range of cases.
The NRDA regulations provide two paths to assessing natural resource damages (NRD): (1) the more complex, site-specific Type B procedures for detailed NRDAs and (2) what is intended to be the standard, simplified Type A assessment procedures requiring minimal field observation. Particularly, the Type A process is reserved for two specific aquatic environments (coastal and marine areas or Great Lakes environments) when a relatively minor release of a single hazardous substance occurs, resulting in a smaller scale and scope of natural resource injury, and the rebuttal presumption for the Type A procedure is limited to damages of $100,000 or less under the current version of the rule.
Reprinted courtesy of
Amanda G. Halter, Pillsbury,
Jillian Marullo, Pillsbury and
Ashleigh Myers, Pillsbury
Ms. Halter may be contacted at amanda.halter@pillsburylaw.com
Ms. Marullo may be contacted at jillian.marullo@pillsburylaw.com
Ms. Myers may be contacted at ashleigh.myers@pillsburylaw.com
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Ensuing Loss Provision Does Not Salvage Coverage
December 09, 2011 —
Tred R. Eyerly - Insurance Law HawaiiWater intrusion caused by a construction defect was not covered under the all risk policy’s ensuing loss provision. See Friedberg v. Chubb & Son, Inc., 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 123582 (D. Minn. Oct. 25, 2011).
Extensive water damage was discovered in the insureds’ home when a small hole in the exterior wall was being repaired. Chubb’s adjuster and an expert found water intrusion causing rot, mold, and damage to the home’s wood framing and insulation. Chubb denied coverage because water intruded through the roof and wall, resulting in gradual deterioration. The insureds filed suit.
The policy excluded coverage for construction defects, but insured "ensuing covered loss unless another exclusion applies."
The court agreed there was a prima facie case for coverage because the home suffered a physical loss.
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Reprinted courtesy of Tred R. Eyerly, Insurance Law Hawaii. Mr. Eyerly can be contacted at te@hawaiilawyer.com
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Property Owner Entitled to Rely on Zoning Administrator Advice
May 16, 2018 —
Kevin J. Parker - Snell & Wilmer Real Estate Litigation BlogIn the recent case of In Re Langlois/Novicki Variance Denial, 175 A.3d 1222, 2017 VT 76 (2017), the Vermont court addressed the question of whether a property owner could enforce – by equitable estoppel principles – a representation by a town zoning administrator that no permit or variance was needed for the property owner’s proposed construction. In that case, a landowner wanted to add a pergola to an existing concrete patio on his land. During a social visit at the property, the property owner asked the town zoning administrator if he needed a permit. The town zoning administrator told the property owner that no permit was needed. The property owner thereafter showed the zoning administrator a sketch of the planned construction, and again asked if a permit was required. The town zoning administrator looked at the sketch and repeated his prior advice that no permit was needed. The property owner then spent $33,000 to build the pergola. After incurring the expense, the property owner was advised that the structure violated zoning regulations. The property owner requested a variance, which the zoning board denied. The Court held that the town was estopped from requiring removal of the pergola.
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Kevin J. Parker, Snell & WilmerMr. Parker may be contacted at
kparker@swlaw.com
Appreciate The Risks You Are Assuming In Your Contract
February 10, 2020 —
David Adelstein - Florida Construction Legal UpdatesAPPRECIATE THE RISKS YOU ARE ASSUMING IN YOUR CONTRACT. Otherwise, those risks will come back and bite you in the butt. This language is not capitalized for naught. Regardless of the type of contract you are entering into, there are risks you will be assuming. You need to appreciate those risks because there may be insurance you can obtain to cover that risk.
For instance, exculpatory provisions (or get-out-of-jail provisions) in contracts are enforceable if they are unambiguous. “Such provisions are deemed to be unambiguous and enforceable when the language unequivocally demonstrates a clear and understandable intention for the defendant to be relieved from liability such that an ordinary and knowledgeable person will know what he or she is contracting away.” Pillay v. Public Storage, Inc., 44 Fla.L.Weekly D2744c (Fla. 4th DCA 2019).
An example of an exculpatory provision can be found in the public storage rental contract found in Pillay that read:
(1) ALL PERSONAL PROPERTY IS STORED BY OCCUPANT AT OCCUPANT’S SOLE RISK.
(2) Owner and Owner’s agents . . . will not be responsible for, and Tenant releases Owner and Owner’s agents from any responsibility for, any loss, liability, claim, expense, damage to property . . . including without limitation any Loss arising from the active or passive acts, omission or negligence of Owner or Owner’s agents.
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David Adelstein, Kirwin Norris, P.A.Mr. Adelstein may be contacted at
dma@kirwinnorris.com
Construction Defect Case Not Over, Despite Summary Judgment
November 07, 2012 —
CDJ STAFFThe Supreme Court of Oregon has concluded in an en banc decision that a motion to reconsider a summary judgment is not a motion for a new trial. In coming to their conclusion the court overturned an earlier Oregon Supreme Court case, Carter v. U.S. National Bank. Although the decision does not bear on construction defects, the underlying case did. Due to the decision, these claims can now be evaluated in a trial.
The case, Association of Unit Owners of Timbercrest Condominiums v. Warren, came about after an apartment complex was converted into condominium units. The developers hired Big Al’s Construction for some of the remodeling work. The condominium association later sued the developer and the contractor over claims of construction defects. The defendants filed a motion for summary judgment, which the court granted.
But that wasn’t the end of things. The plaintiff soon filed a “motion to reconsider,” noting that the summary judgment seemed to be in conflict with both law and other recent rulings, and additionally, the grounds for the decision were not in the order. The judge then notified the parties that the court had “pulled the trigger too quickly” and had seven questions for the parties to answer.
The court dismissed all claims against the defendants. The defendants filed their responses, objecting that that “‘there is no such thing’ as a motion for reconsideration.” Further, while “the rules do allow for post-judgment review of pre-judgment rulings through a motion for a new trial,” the plaintiffs had not filed for a new trial. But did they need one? They did file an appeal.
The judge in the case admitted that there was no such thing as a motion to reconsider, and felt bad about prematurely signing the judgment. The case was sent to the Court of Appeals to determine if the motion to reconsider was a request for a new trial. The Court of Appeals concurred.
In reviewing the decision, the Oregon Supreme Court concluded that there were a maximum of three questions to address. Was the motion for reconsideration a motion for a new trial? If so, was the later notice of appeal premature? And if so, was the plaintiff required to file a new appeal? The court determined that the answer to the first question was no.
Prior decisions pointed to the conclusion “that a motion for reconsideration of a summary judgment amounts to a motion for a new trial,” but here the court concluded that “our prior cases erred,” and turned to the summary judgment rule for clarification. The court noted that “the rule contemplates that summary judgment and trial are separate and distinct events.” With this conclusion, the Oregon Supreme Court remanded the case to the Court of Appeals for further proceedings.
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