Recording “Un-Neighborly” Documents
April 03, 2019 —
Bob Henry - Snell & Wilmer Real Estate Litigation BlogIn September 2018, in Baumgartner v. Timmins, 245 Ariz. 334, 429 P.3d 567, the Arizona Court of Appeals provided further clarification on what constitutes an “encumbrance” on a property for purposes of Arizona’s statutory scheme prohibiting the recording of “false documents.” The statute, A.R.S. § 33-420, prohibits the recording of documents that a person knows to be forged, are groundless, or that contain material misstatements (or false claims). A person who claims an “interest in, or a lien or encumbrance against” real property who records such documents can be held liable for $5,000 or treble the actual damages caused by the recording (whichever is greater), A.R.S. § 33-420(A), and perhaps even be found guilty of a class 1 misdemeanor, A.R.S. § 33-420(E).
At issue in Baumgartner were neighbors fighting about CC&Rs—a typical neighborhood fight. In 2015, some of the neighbors filed suit against the Timminses for violating the CC&Rs. The Timminses did not contest the lawsuit, resulting in a default judgment. In what the Court of Appeals characterized as a lawsuit filed by the Timminses “in apparent response to the [first] lawsuit and resulting default judgment,” the Timminses created, signed, and recorded affidavits contending that the Plaintiffs in the original lawsuit were themselves “in violation of several provisions of the CC&Rs.” The Plaintiffs then filed suit again against the Timminses, this time contending that the Timminses had violated A.R.S. § 33-420 by recording the affidavits because the affidavits, the Plaintiffs contended, created encumbrances on their properties. The Apache County Superior Court agreed, and issued a final judgment nullifying the recorded documents and awarding the Timminses damages, along with their attorneys’ fees and costs.
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Bob Henry, Snell & WilmerMr. Henry may be contacted at
bhenry@swlaw.com
What Happens When Dave Chappelle Buys Up Your Town
June 05, 2023 —
Tyler J. Kelley - BloombergAmerica’s most reclusive comedian isn’t hard to find. Dave Chappelle hangs around downtown, buys coffee and shops like any other resident of Yellow Springs, Ohio. He smokes cigarettes and chats with passersby. He knows people, and they know him.
Yellow Springs is a special place. “Growing up here, literally on any given Saturday or Sunday, in any house that you walked into, there was going to be someone who was Jewish, someone who was an atheist, someone from a different country, somebody who was a person of color,” says Carmen Brown, a Black village council member whose family has lived in the town for 150 years. “There was going to be a clown, an astrophysicist, a janitor and a doctor—all hanging out.” Chappelle is a product of this environment, this culture of “discourse without discord,” she says.
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Bloomberg
Attorney-Client Privilege in the Age of Cyber Breaches
October 18, 2021 —
Shaia Araghi - Newmeyer DillionInvestigations and forensic reports relating to a cybersecurity breach may not always be protected by the attorney-client privilege or work product protection. Companies seeking such reports after a data breach must take caution to protect them from a possible waiver of privilege in the event of subsequent litigation relating to a data breach. The following recent cases highlight the potential waiver of privilege in light of the preparation of a forensic report.
- In re Capital One Consumer Data Security Breach Litigation, 2020 WL 3470261 (E.D. Va. June 25, 2020)
- After a data breach occurred, Capital One retained a law firm that later entered into an agreement with Mandiant for various cyber-related services (including incident remediation), which required that Mandiant provide deliverables to the firm, rather than to Capitol One. In re Capital One Consumer Data Security Breach Litigation, 2020 WL 2731238, at *1 (E.D. Va. June 25, 2020). Plaintiffs sought release of the report created by Mandiant (regarding the factors leading to the breach), arguing that it was prepared for business and regulatory purposes and therefore was not privileged, while Capital One argued that the report was privileged because it was prepared in anticipation of litigation. Ibid. The Court determined that Capital One did not carry its burden of establishing that the report was protected by the attorney work-product doctrine and ordered that Capital One produce the report. Id. at *7. In its reasoning, the Court stated that the fact that there is litigation does not, by itself, provide prepared materials with work-product protection. Ibid. The work-product protection applies when a party faces a claim following an event that may result in litigation, and the work product would not have been prepared in a substantially similar form but for the prospect of that litigation. Ibid.
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Shaia Araghi, Newmeyer DillionMs. Araghi may be contacted at
shaia.araghi@ndlf.com
New Jersey Supreme Court Upholds $400 Million Award for Superstorm Sandy Damages
February 22, 2021 —
Kerianne E. Kane - Saxe Doernberger & Vita In New Jersey Transit Corp. v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s London,1 New Jersey’s highest court upheld an appellate decision2 finding that New Jersey Transit Corporation (“NJT”) was entitled to full coverage under its property insurance policy for damages caused by Superstorm Sandy.
In July 2012, NJT secured a multi-layered “all risks” property insurance program from eleven insurers for the policy period of July 1, 2012, to July 1, 2013. The policies covered all perils and damage to NJT’s property unless specifically excluded. The primary layer, issued by Lexington Insurance Company, provided the first $50 million of coverage. The second layer provided coverage up to $100 million, the third layer provided an additional $175 million, and the fourth layer provided coverage of $125 million, for a total of $400 million in coverage.
The excess layer insurers included Certain Underwriters At Lloyd’s, London, Torus Specialty Insurance Company, and several other carriers. All participating insurers’ policies included a standard policy form and separate endorsements, some of which were included in all policies and some of which were unique to specific insurers.
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Kerianne E. Kane, Saxe Doernberger & VitaMs. Kane may be contacted at
kkane@sdvlaw.com
Federal Miller Act Payment Bond Claim: Who Gets Paid and Who Does Not? What Are the Deadlines?
September 16, 2019 —
William L. Porter - Porter Law GroupWhen working on federal public works construction projects there are no Stop Payment Notice or Mechanics Lien remedies available to protect subcontractors’ and suppliers’ right to payment. Instead, unpaid subcontractors and suppliers must resort to making a claim for payment under a federal law known as the AMiller Act@ (40 USCS 3131 et seq.). Many claimants however, do not realize that the right to make a Miller Act claim is not available to all subcontractors and suppliers. Before committing to performing work on a federal project it is important for subcontractors and suppliers to understand whether or not a Miller Act claim will be available. For those who have no Miller Act rights, careful consideration must be given to whether it is worth the risk to take on the project. For those who have valid Miller Act claim rights, important deadlines must be considered.
Who Gets Paid Under a Miller Act and Who Does Not
For federal projects in excess of $100,000, contractors who have a contract directly with the Federal Government must obtain Miller Act Payment Bond intended for the protection of Subcontractors, laborers and material suppliers to the project.
As a general rule, every subcontractor, laborer, or material supplier who deals directly with the prime contractor and is unpaid may bring a lawsuit for payment against the Miller Act Payment Bond. Further, every unpaid subcontractor, laborer, or material supplier who has a direct contractual relationship with a first-tier subcontractor may bring such an action. The deadlines for these claims are described below.
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William L. Porter, Porter Law GroupMr. Porter may be contacted at
bporter@porterlaw.com
Governor Signs AB5 Into Law — Reshaping California's Independent Contractor Classification Landscape
December 02, 2019 —
Eric C. Sohlgren & Matthew C. Lewis - Payne & Fears Legal AlertToday, Governor Gavin Newsom signed California Assembly Bill 5 (“AB5”), controversial legislation which will have a substantial impact on California employers when it goes into effect on January 1, 2020.
AB5 enacts into a statute last year’s California Supreme Court decision in Dynamex Operations West, Inc. v. Superior Court, 4 Cal. 5th 903 (2018), and the Court’s three-part standard (the “ABC test”) for determining whether a worker may be classified as an employee or an independent contractor.
Under the ABC test established in Dynamex and now under AB5, a worker may be properly considered an independent contractor only if the hiring entity establishes all three of the following: (A) that the worker is free from the control and direction of the hirer in connection with the performance of the work, both under the contract for the performance of such work and in fact; (B) that the worker performs work that is outside the usual course of the hiring entity’s business; and (C) that the worker is customarily engaged in an independently established trade, occupation, or business of the same nature as the work performed for the hiring entity.
Reprinted courtesy of
Eric C. Sohlgren, Payne & Fears and
Matthew C. Lewis, Payne & Fears
Mr. Sohlgren may be contacted at ecs@paynefears.com
Mr. Lewis may be contacted at mcl@paynefears.com
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New York Appellate Court Addresses “Trigger of Coverage” for Asbestos Claims and Other Coverage Issues
November 30, 2020 —
Paul A. Briganti - Complex Insurance Coverage ReporterOn October 9, 2020, the New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Fourth Department, decided an appeal from a trial court’s 2018 summary judgment ruling on a number of coverage issues arising out of asbestos-related bodily injury claims against plaintiffs Carrier Corporation (Carrier) and Elliott Company (Elliott). See Carrier Corp. v. Allstate Ins. Co., No. 396 CA 18-02292, Mem. & Order (N.Y. Sup. Ct. App. Div. 4th Dep’t Oct. 9, 2020).
The Fourth Department reversed the trial court’s ruling that, under New York’s “injury in fact trigger of coverage,” injury occurs from the first date of exposure to asbestos through death or the filing of suit as a matter of law. The parties agreed that, because the policy language at issue required personal injury to take place “during the policy period,” “the applicable test in determining what event constitutes personal injury sufficient to trigger coverage is injury-in-fact, ‘which rests on when the injury, sickness, disease or disability actually began.’” Id. at 3 (quoting Cont’l Cas. Co. v. Rapid-American Corp., 609 N.E.2d 506, 511 (N.Y. 1993)). The Fourth Department concluded that, in resolving the issue, the trial court erred by relying on inapposite decisions in other cases where: (1) the parties had stipulated or otherwise not disputed that first exposure triggered coverage[1]; or (2) the issue had not been resolved on summary judgment, but rather at trial based on expert medical evidence[2]. The Fourth Department further explained that, even if plaintiffs here had met their initial burden on summary judgment by submitting admissible evidence that asbestos-related injury actually begins upon first exposure, the defendant-insurer’s opposition – which included affidavits of medical experts contradicting that evidence and averring instead that “harm occurs only when a threshold level of asbestos fiber or particle burden is reached that overtakes the body’s defense mechanisms” – raised a triable issue of fact. Id. at 4. The Fourth Department also rejected plaintiffs’ argument that the defendant-insurer was collaterally estopped on the “trigger” issue by a California appellate court’s decision in Armstrong World Industries, Inc. v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 52 Cal. Rptr. 2d 690 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996). The Fourth Department reasoned that the issues litigated in the two cases were not identical because, among other things, California and New York “apply different substantive law in determining when asbestos-related injury occurs.” Carrier, Mem. & Order at 4.
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Paul A. Briganti, White and Williams LLPMr. Briganti may be contacted at
brigantip@whiteandwilliams.com
MTA Implements Revised Contractors Debarment Regulations
July 06, 2020 —
Steven M. Charney, Gregory H. Chertoff & Paul Monte - Peckar & Abramson, P.C.On June 3, 2020, the Metropolitan Transit Authority (“MTA”) published and implemented revised regulations pertaining to the debarment of contractors. The revised regulations address many of the deep concerns raised by the contracting community.
Under relevant administrative procedure, the MTA publication of the revised regulations starts a 45 day notice period before the regulations can be adopted as final.
The prior regulations essentially required that debarment occur upon a purely formulaic calculation establishing that a contractor: 1) was more than 10% late, or 2) had submitted invalid claims that exceeded the adjusted contract price by a measure of 10%.
The revised regulations represent improvements over the prior regulations.
Critically, the revised regulations address the primary concern raised by the contracting community, that being the mandate of purely formulaic debarment. Instead, the revised regulations establish a process that includes greater flexibility and discretion before debarment may ensue.
Reprinted courtesy of Peckar & Abramson, P.C. attorneys
Steven M. Charney,
Gregory H. Chertoff and
Paul Monte
Mr. Charney may be contacted at scharney@pecklaw.com
Mr. Chertoff may be contacted at gchertoff@pecklaw.com
Mr. Monte may be contacted at pmonte@pecklaw.com
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