Illinois Supreme Court Announces Time Standards for Closing Out Cases
April 11, 2022 —
Zachary Shelton - Lewis Brisbois(April 4, 2022) - Beginning July 1, 2022, Illinois trial courts will begin imposing new time standards for closing out pending cases. This change follows the Illinois Supreme Court’s March 25, 2022 announcement setting new time standards for case closure in trial courts. This announcement will apply to all cases filed in the State of Illinois on or after January 1, 2022.
According to the recent announcement, the purpose of the new Time Standards Order (the Order) is to assist Illinois circuit courts with “meeting their fundamental obligation to resolve disputes fully, fairly, and promptly” by establishing a uniform, statewide expectation for parties, attorneys, and judges regarding the status of cases that will require each court to evaluate its actual performance compared to a statewide expectation.
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Zachary Shelton, Lewis BrisboisMr. Shelton may be contacted at
Zachary.Shelton@lewisbrisbois.com
Is The Enforceability Of A No-Damage-For-Delay Provision Inappropriate For Summary Judgment
February 24, 2020 —
David Adelstein - Florida Construction Legal UpdatesIs the enforceability of a no-damage-for-delay provision inappropriate for resolution on a summary judgment? The recent decision in U.S. f/u/b/o Kingston Environmental Services, Inc. v. David Boland, Inc., 2019 WL 6178676 (D. Hawaii 2019), dealing with Florida law, suggests that it is inappropriate for a summary judgment resolution, particularly when there is a right to a jury trial.
In this case, a prime contractor was hired on a federal construction project in Hawaii. The prime contractor hired a subcontractor and the subcontractor sued the prime contractor and its surety under the Miller Act. Of interest, the subcontractor was seeking to recover for the costs it incurred due to construction delays. The prime contractor moved for summary judgment as to the no-damage-for-delay provision in the subcontract. The no-damages-for-delay provision read as follows (and it is a well-written no-damage-for-delay provision):
The Subcontractor expressly agrees that the Contractor shall not be liable to the Subcontractor for any damages or additional costs, whether foreseeable or unforeseeable, resulting in whole or in part from a delay, hindrance, suspension, or acceleration of the commencement or execution of the Work, caused in whole or in part by the acts or omissions, whether negligent or not, of the Contractor including other subcontractors or material suppliers to the Project, its agents, employees, or third parties acting on behalf of the Contractor. The Subcontractor’s sole remedy for any such delay, hindrance, suspension, or acceleration shall be a noncompensable time extension.
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David Adelstein, Kirwin Norris, P.A.Mr. Adelstein may be contacted at
dma@kirwinnorris.com
Avoiding Lender Liability for Credit-Related Actions in California
October 27, 2016 —
Anthony J. Carucci – Snell & Wilmer Real Estate Litigation BlogAside from general statutory prohibitions on lender discrimination, there are certain circumstances under California law in which lenders may be held liable for credit-related actions, such as negotiating or denying credit. See generally 11 Cal. Real Est. § 35:3 (explaining that the business of lending money is subject to the Unruh Civil Rights Act, Cal. Civ. Code § 51 et seq., the Fair Employment and Housing Act, Cal. Gov. Code § 12900 et seq., the Federal Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. § 3601 et seq., and the Equal Credit Opportunity Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1691, et seq.). Specifically, lenders have been held liable for credit-related actions where, among other things, the lender (1) breached a loan commitment; (2) committed fraud; or (3) breached a fiduciary duty owed to the borrower.
The Lender-Borrower Relationship
As a general rule, a lender does not owe a duty of care to a borrower when the lender’s involvement in a transaction does not exceed the scope of its conventional role as a lender of money. Oaks Management Corp. v. Superior Court (2006) 145 Cal.App.4th 453, 466 (“[I]t is established that absent special circumstances . . . a loan transaction is at arms-length and there is no fiduciary relationship between the borrower and lender.”); Nymark v. Heart Fed. Savings & Loan Assn. (1991) 231 Cal.App.3d 1089, 1096 (holding lender owed no duty of care to a borrower in preparing an appraisal of the real property that was security for the loan when the purpose of the appraisal is to protect the lender by satisfying it that the collateral provided adequate security for the loan, and noting that “as a general rule, a financial institution owes no duty of care to a borrower when the institution’s involvement in the loan transaction does not exceed the scope of its conventional role as a mere lender of money”).
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Anthony J. Carucci, Snell & WilmerMr. Carucci may be contacted at
acarucci@swlaw.com
Construction Law Alert: Unlicensed Contractors On Federal Projects Entitled To Payment Under The Miller Act
May 07, 2014 —
Steven M. Cvitanovic and Jessica M. Lassere Ryland - Haight Brown & Bonesteel, LLPAs a matter of first impression, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in Technica LLC ex rel. U.S. v. Carolina Cas. Ins. Co., 12-56539, 2014 WL 1674108 (9th Cir. Apr. 29, 2014), allowed an unlicensed subcontractor to recover from a prime contractor for unpaid services relating to a federal construction project under a federal Miller Act claim. California law otherwise prevents unlicensed contractors from recovering for unpaid work on non-federal projects as a penal measure intended to encourage contractors to maintain a valid license at all times.
Technica LLC (“Technica”) worked as a sub-subcontractor on a large federal fence replacement project (the “Project”). Over the course of a year, Technica supplied nearly a million dollars worth of labor, materials, and services for the Project. However, Technica received only $287,861.81 in partial payments for its work. Technica proceeded to file suit in district court against the prime contractor Candelaria Corporation (“Candelaria”) and its payment surety Carolina Casualty Insurance Company (“CCIC”) under the Miller Act to recover amounts owed to it on the subcontract against the payment bond.
Reprinted courtesy of
Steven M. Cvitanovic, Haight Brown & Bonesteel, LLP and
Jessica M. Lassere Ryland, Haight Brown & Bonesteel, LLP
Mr. Cvitanovic may be contacted at scvitanovic@hbblaw.com; Ms. Lassere Ryland may be contacted at jlassere@hbblaw.com
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2016 Updates to CEB’s Mechanics Liens and Retail Leasing Practice Books Now Available
November 10, 2016 —
Garret Murai – California Construction Law BlogFor a number of years we have been honored to be asked by California’s Continuing Education of the Bar (“CEB”) to serve as update authors for several of their well-regarded construction and real estate practice books. Updates to two of those books were published in October and November:
- The 2016 Update to the CEB’s California Mechanics Liens and Related Construction Remedies was published in October. Covering both private and public works, the practice guide details the statutory payment remedies for unpaid work, including, mechanics liens, stop payment notices and construction bonds. Wendel Rosen served as update author for Chapters 2 and 3 which covers private works projects.
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Reprinted courtesy of Garret Murai, Wendel Rosen Black & Dean LLP
Mr. Murai may be contacted at gmurai@wendel.com
Battle of Experts Cannot Be Decided on Summary Judgment
June 13, 2018 — Tred R. Eyerly - Insurance Law Hawaii
When two competing experts disagreed on the cause of the loss, the trial court erred in granting summary judgment to the insurer. Garcia v. Firs Community Ins. Co., Fla. App. LEXIS 4237 (Fla. Ct. App. March 28, 2018).
Garcia, the homeowner, discovered water damage in his home, allegedly due to a roof leak. Garcia notified his insurer, First Community Insurance Company. A forensic engineer, Ivette Acosta, was retained by First Community to inspect the property. After the inspection, coverage was denied.
The homeowner's policy covered direct loss to property only if the loss was a physical loss. Loss caused by ""rain snow, sleet, sand or dust to the interior of a building was excluded unless a covered peril first damaged the building causing an opening in a roof or wall and the rain, snow, sleet, sand or dust enters through this opening." Loss caused by wear and tear, marring, or deterioration was also excluded. Read the court decision
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Reprinted courtesy of Tred R. Eyerly, Insurance Law Hawaii
Mr. Eyerly may be contacted at te@hawaiilawyer.com
I’m Sorry Ms. Jackson, I [Sovereign Immunity] am For Real
June 08, 2020 — Greggory Jacobs - Florida Construction Law News Blog
The Supreme Court of Florida issued its opinion in Florida Highway Patrol v. Jackson, 2020 Fla. LEXIS 108 (Fla. Jan 23, 2020), which answered the following certified question of great public importance:
Does rule 9.130 [(A)(3)(C)(XI)] permit an appeal of a non-final order denying immunity if the record shows that the defendant is entitled to immunity as a matter of law but the trial court did not explicitly preclude it as a defense?
The Court’s answer to this question was “no.” But this opinion stands for much more than just a negative answer to a certified question. Indeed, this opinion has significant implications upon procedural and substantive areas of construction law, which may affect agents of the state of Florida, including Construction Engineering and Inspection professionals and consultants (“CEI”).
Procedurally, the Court recognizes that Fla. R. App. P. 9.130 insufficiently protects the public and governmental interests as “it leaves too great a risk that erroneous denials of operational sovereign immunity will go unreviewed until it is too late.” Id. at * 19. By extension of this risk, the Jackson Court announced that “courts should determine entitlement to sovereign immunity as early as the record permits.” Id. at * 18. In fact, on that basis, courts can address a motion for summary judgment asserting entitlement to sovereign immunity even if there are outstanding disputes as to, say, the existence of a duty of care. Id. at 17-18. Accordingly, and in an effort to remedy the risk of erroneous denials going unreviewed until it is too late, the Court amended Fla. R. App. P. 9.130 to expand appellate review of nonfinal orders denying sovereign immunity. Jackson, 2020 Fla. LEXIS 108 at * 19; In re Amendments to Fla. Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.130, No. SC19-1734 (Fla. Jan. 23, 2020). The new form of Fla. R. App. P. 9.130 cements the policy mentioned above because it allows an appeal of a nonfinal order denying a motion for summary judgment due to entitlement to sovereign immunity. Meanwhile, under the old rule, the order was only appealable if the trial court order determined – as a matter of law – that a party was not entitled to sovereign immunity. As such, the new rule focuses on what was argued in the motion as opposed to what was written in the order. Read the court decision
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Reprinted courtesy of Greggory Jacobs, Cole, Scott & Kissane, P.A.
Mr. Jacobs may be contacted at greggory.jacobs@csklegal.com
Liability Coverage For Construction Claims May Turn On Narrow Factual Distinctions
March 25, 2024 — Scott S. Thomas - Payne & Fears
In a recent trial court decision, a Montana federal court reminds us how fragile insurance coverage can be for construction-related insurance claims. Specifically, this case illustrates how seemingly small factual nuances can make or break coverage. The case turned on the application of policy provisions familiar to all who deal with these kinds of cases. (See Nautilus Ins. Co. v. Farrens, No. CV 22-193-M-DWM, 2024 WL 885109 (D. Mont. Mar. 1, 2024))
First, the court rebuffed the insurer’s argument that damage resulting from defective workmanship (in this case, the flawed design and installation of an elaborate floating-floor pool system) is not “caused by an occurrence.” The court correctly applied the test followed by most states: if either act causing injury is unintentional or the resulting injury is unexpected or unintended, the “occurrence” requirement is met. Fortunately, the court distinguished sloppy language from earlier Montana federal court decisions suggesting otherwise. Read the court decision
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Reprinted courtesy of Scott S. Thomas, Payne & Fears
Mr. Thomas may be contacted at sst@paynefears.com