Hawaii State Senate Requires CGL Carriers to Submit Premium Information To State Legislature
March 20, 2011 —
CDJ STAFFIn light of the decision in Hawaii’s Intermediate Court of Appeals in Group Builders, Inc.,v. Admiral Insurance Company, 231 P.3d 67(2010), Hawaii’s state senate is requesting that "every domestic and foreign insurance company that has ever issued commercial general liability policies in the State is requested to submit information to the Legislature on the total premiums received for their commercial general liability policies during the past ten years"
Read Full Text of Hawaii State Senate Resolution
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Will Future Megacities Be a Marvel or a Mess? Look at New Delhi
November 14, 2018 —
Jill Ward - BloombergThe effects of unbridled urbanization are inescapable in India’s capital city. Smog blankets landmarks like India Gate in winter, delaying flights at the airport due to poor visibility. Traffic jams are part of the daily routine and slums abut New Delhi’s luxury hotels and private mansions, testifying to a growing wealth divide and chronic housing shortage.
And every day, the problem gets bigger. More than 27 million people live in and around Delhi with about 700,000 more joining them each year, according to research firm Demographia. The United Nations forecasts that by 2028 the population could outstrip Tokyo’s to make Delhi the world’s biggest megacity.
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Jill Ward, Bloomberg
UPDATE - McMillin Albany LLC v. Superior Court
June 05, 2017 —
Richard H. Glucksman, Glenn T. Barger, & David A. Napper - CGDRB News & PublicationsThe matter has been fully briefed since last year and the construction industry anxiously awaits the California Supreme Court's highly anticipated decision regarding McMillin Albany LLC v. Superior Court (2015) 239 Cal.App.4th 1132. Numerous amicus briefs have also been filed including one by the Association of Southern California Defense Counsel, with the immediate past president of the organization, CGDRB's Glenn T. Barger, Esq., listed as the attorney of record. The Supreme Court will consider the issue of whether the Right to Repair Act (SB800) is the exclusive remedy for all defect claims arising out of new residential construction sold on or after January 1, 2003, thereby resolving the split of authority presented by the Fifth Appellate District's holding in McMillin Albany, which outright rejected the Fourth Appellate District's holding in Liberty Mutual Insurance Co. v. Brookfield Crystal Cove LLC (2013) 219 Cal.App.4th 98, on this particular issue. Oral argument is still pending and CGDRB will continue to closely monitor the progress of this case. Stay tuned.
Reprinted courtesy of Chapman Glucksman Dean Roeb & Barger attorneys
Richard H. Glucksman,
Glenn T. Barger and
David A. Napper
Mr. Glucksman may be contacted at rglucksman@cgdrblaw.com
Mr. Barger may be contacted at gbarger@cgdrblaw.com
Mr. Napper may be contacted at dnapper@cgdrblaw.com
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California Contractor Spills Coffee on Himself by Failing to Stay Mechanics Lien Action While Pursuing Arbitration
August 14, 2018 —
Garret Murai - California Construction Law BlogIt bugs the Mrs. that I have a habit of reading the directions. “Just plug the darn thing in!” said the Mrs. when we got a new coffee maker to replace our old one which we’ve had since I think before we were married (Life Lesson No. 347: Get a coffee maker you really, really like because they last forever). “But . . . the directions?,” I said.
By the time I had finished reading the instruction manual I could smell the coffee brewing in the kitchen. Granted, the Mrs. is more practical than I am in many ways (e.g., “You know, you didn’t need to buy 10 cans of corn to get the 10 for $10 discount. I guess you’re going to be eating a lot of corn”). But still. What might have happened if there was a serious coffee mishap?
And worrier as I may be mishaps can happen if you don’t read the directions. James Zenovic didn’t read the directions, and here’s his story . . .
Von Becelaere Ventures, LLC v. Zenovic
In Von Becelaere Ventures, LLC v. Zenovic, Case No. D072620 (June 6, 2018), James Zeonovic doing business as James Zeonovic Construction entered into a construction contract to build a single-family house for Von Becelaere Ventures, LLC in Laguna Beach, California. The construction contract included an arbitration provision that stated:
If any dispute arises concerning this Contract or the interpretation thereof, of concerning construction of the Improvements, or the Limited Warranty, customer service, defects, damages, or obligations therewith (a “Construction Dispute”), such Construction Dispute will be settled by binding arbitration. Read the court decisionRead the full story...Reprinted courtesy of
Garret Murai, Wendel, Rosen, Black & Dean LLPMr. Murai may be contacted at
gmurai@wendel.com
Property Owner Entitled to Rely on Zoning Administrator Advice
May 16, 2018 —
Kevin J. Parker - Snell & Wilmer Real Estate Litigation BlogIn the recent case of In Re Langlois/Novicki Variance Denial, 175 A.3d 1222, 2017 VT 76 (2017), the Vermont court addressed the question of whether a property owner could enforce – by equitable estoppel principles – a representation by a town zoning administrator that no permit or variance was needed for the property owner’s proposed construction. In that case, a landowner wanted to add a pergola to an existing concrete patio on his land. During a social visit at the property, the property owner asked the town zoning administrator if he needed a permit. The town zoning administrator told the property owner that no permit was needed. The property owner thereafter showed the zoning administrator a sketch of the planned construction, and again asked if a permit was required. The town zoning administrator looked at the sketch and repeated his prior advice that no permit was needed. The property owner then spent $33,000 to build the pergola. After incurring the expense, the property owner was advised that the structure violated zoning regulations. The property owner requested a variance, which the zoning board denied. The Court held that the town was estopped from requiring removal of the pergola.
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Kevin J. Parker, Snell & WilmerMr. Parker may be contacted at
kparker@swlaw.com
Proximity Trace Used to Monitor, Maintain Social Distancing on $1.9-Billion KCI Airport Project
September 07, 2020 —
Jeff Yoders - Engineering News-RecordIn order to maintain social distancing on site, steel erector National Steel City of Plymouth, Mich., is using the Proximity Trace wearable sensor from Triax Technologies on the $1.9-billion Kansas City International Airport (KCI) single-terminal reconstruction project.
Jeff Yoders, Engineering News-Record
Mr. Yoders may be contacted at yodersj@enr.com
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Arizona Court of Appeals Decision in $8.475 Million Construction Defect Class Action Suit
May 09, 2011 —
CDJ STAFFIn the case of Leflet v. Fire (Ariz. App., 2011), which involved an $8.475 million settlement in a construction defect class action suit, the question put forth to the Appeals court was “whether an insured and an insurer can join in a Morris agreement that avoids the primary insurer’s obligation to pay policy limits and passes liability in excess of those limits on to other insurers.” The Appeals court provided several reasons for their decision to affirm the validity of the settlement agreement as to the Non-Participatory Insurers (NPIs) and to vacate and remand the attorney fee awards.
First, the Appeals court stated, “The settlement agreement is not a compliant Morris agreement and provides no basis for claims against the NPIs.” They conclude, “Appellants attempt to avoid the doctrinal underpinnings of Morris by arguing that ‘the cooperation clause did not prohibit Hancock from assigning its rights to anyone, including Appellants.’ This narrow reading of the cooperation clause ignores the fact that Hancock did not merely assign its rights — it assigned its rights after stipulating to an $8.475 million judgment that neither it nor its Direct Insurers could ever be liable to pay. Neither Morris nor any other case defines such conduct as actual ‘cooperation’—rather, Morris simply defines limited circumstances in which an insured is relieved of its duty to cooperate. Because Morris agreements are fraught with risk of abuse, a settlement that mimics Morris in form but does not find support in the legal and economic realities that gave rise to that decision is both unenforceable and offensive to the policy’s cooperation clause.”
The Appeals court further concluded that “even if the agreement had qualified under Morris, plaintiffs did not provide the required notice to the NPIs.” The court continued, “Because an insurer who defends under a reservation of rights is always aware of the possibility of a Morris agreement, the mere threat of Morris in the course of settlement negotiations does not constitute sufficient notice. Instead, the insurer must be made aware that it may waive its reservation of rights and provide an unqualified defense, or defend solely on coverage and reasonableness grounds against the judgment resulting from the Morris agreement. The NPIs were not given the protections of this choice before the agreement was entered, and therefore can face no liability for the resulting stipulated judgment.”
Next, the Appeals court declared that “the trial court abused its discretion in awarding attorney’s fees under A.R.S § 12-341.” The Appeals court reasoned, “In this case, the NPIs prevailed in their attack on the settlement. But the litigation did not test the merits of their coverage defenses or the reasonableness of the settlement amount. And Plaintiffs never sued the NPIs, either in their own right or as the assignees of Hancock. Rather, the NPIs intervened to test the conceptual validity of the settlement agreement (to which they were not parties) before such an action could commence. In these circumstances, though it might be appropriate to offset a fee award against some future recovery by the Plaintiff Leflet v. Fire (Ariz. App., 2011) class, the purposes of A.R.S. § 12-341.01 would not be served by an award of fees against them jointly and severally. We therefore conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in awarding fees against Plaintiffs ‘jointly and severally.’”
The Appeals court made the following conclusion: “we affirm the judgment of the trial court concerning the validity of the settlement agreement as to the NPIs. We vacate and remand the award of attorney’s fees. In our discretion, we decline to award the NPIs the attorney’s fees they have requested on appeal pursuant to A.R.S. § 12-341.01(A).”
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Georgia Local Government Drainage Liability: Nuisance and Trespass
November 29, 2021 —
David R. Cook Jr. - Autry, Hall & Cook, LLPA long-running dispute between a landowner and a municipality has escalated to the Georgia Court of Appeals and in the federal court for the Northern District of Georgia.[1] The municipality maintained a stormwater system that discharged on property uphill from the landowner’s property. The uphill property was used as an illegal dump, and debris washed downhill from the dump to the landowner’s property. The debris clogged the landowner’s surface water drainage system, which caused flooding of the property and a building.
State Case
The landowner sued for trespass, nuisance, takings, and inverse condemnation. While the other claims were barred by the four-year statute of limitations, the court addressed the plaintiff-landowner’s claim for continuing nuisance.
Municipalities may be liable when they negligently construct or maintain a sewer or drainage system that causes repeated flooding of property, such that it results in a continuing, abatable nuisance.[2] For a municipality to be liable for maintenance of a nuisance:
the municipality must be chargeable with performing a continuous or regularly repetitious act, or creating a continuous or regularly repetitious condition, which causes the hurt, inconvenience or injury; the municipality must have knowledge or be chargeable with notice of the dangerous condition; and, if the municipality did not perform an act creating the dangerous condition, . . . the failure of the municipality to rectify the dangerous condition must be in violation of a duty to act.[3]
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David R. Cook Jr., Autry, Hall & Cook, LLPMr. Cook may be contacted at
cook@ahclaw.com
