SEATTLE WASHINGTON BUILDING EXPERT
DIRECTORY AND CAPABILITIES

Can an Owner Preemptively Avoid a Mechanics Lien?

May 25, 2020 — William L. Porter - Porter Law Group
Various sections of the California Civil Code, beginning with section 8000, protect the right of contractors, subcontractors and suppliers in the construction industry to obtain payment for work performed and materials supplied to construction projects. Under these statutes, unpaid claimants are entitled to use mechanics liens, stop payment notices and other methods to protect their right to payment. Mechanics liens allow unpaid claimants to sell the property where the work was performed in order to obtain payment. Stop payment notices force the owner or the bank to set money aside to pay unpaid claimants. Article XIV of our California Constitution even elevates the mechanics lien remedy to a “constitutional right”. The system generally works well, and claimants are paid. As someone who practices and teaches construction law, I have noticed a seldom used statutory tool that seems to provide a mechanism for property owners under certain circumstances to prevent subcontractors and suppliers from imposing enforceable mechanics lien on property where work was performed. Under California Civil Code section 8520, it appears that all that an owner of property need do to avoid a mechanics lien on its property is to give a proper notice (per Civil Code section 8100 et seq.) to a person who has a mechanics lien right (a subcontractor or supplier) that the owner is invoking Civil Code section 8520 and that if the claimant is unpaid for work performed or materials supplied to the owner’s property that the claimant must either provide the owner with a stop payment notice or forfeit the right to a mechanics lien on the owner’s property. This would allow an owner to avoid a mechanics lien on its property if the claimant failed to send a stop payment notice to the owner. Providing the “notice” under Civil Code section 8100 appears to be easy. It can be sent by “registered or certified mail or by express mail or by overnight delivery by an express service carrier”. It can even be by “hand delivery”. As far as the notice itself, it would seem that it can be very simple and easily performed under the process described below, which can be implemented within the office of any owner or developer. Read the court decision
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Reprinted courtesy of William L. Porter, Porter Law Group
Mr. Porter may be contacted at bporter@porterlaw.com

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New Standard Addresses Wind Turbine Construction Safety Requirements and Identifies Hazards

October 09, 2018 — Christopher Daniels - Construction Executive
American Society of Safety Professionals’ industry consensus standard, ANSI/ASSP A10.21 – 2018 Safety Requirements for Safe Construction and Demolition of Wind Generation/Turbine Facilities, is the first standard to identify and address hazards specific to wind turbine construction. It includes nearly a dozen appendices that provide additional consideration and guidance for hazards that vary between projects, turbines and geographical areas. The new A10.21 standard starts by requiring a site hazard identification prior to construction commencing. It establishes the general contractor as the responsible party for site hazard identification assessment. This is because the general contractor is usually one of the first entities on site able to assess the various challenges/concerns such as: geography, utilities, environmental, etc. This assessment is usually done by driving the project site and identifying GPS coordinates of specific challenges. Reprinted courtesy of Christopher Daniels, Construction Executive, a publication of Associated Builders and Contractors. All rights reserved. Read the court decision
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Mr. Daniels may be contacted at chris.daniels@mortenson.com

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Connecticut Court Clarifies a Limit on Payment Bond Claims for Public Projects

May 15, 2023 — Bill Wilson - Construction Law Zone
In All Seasons Landscaping, Inc. v. Travelers Casualty & Surety Co., No. DBD-CV21-6039074-S, 2022 WL 1135703 (Conn. Super. Ct. April 4, 2022) the plaintiff, a subcontractor on a state project, commenced a lawsuit against the surety who issued a payment bond on the project two years after the subcontractor last performed any original contract work on the project. The defendant surety moved to dismiss the action based on the one-year statute of limitation in Connecticut General Statute § 49-42. The plaintiff countered that it complied with that deadline because it also performed warranty inspection work after the contract was completed and within the limitation period in section 49-42. The issue of whether warranty work or minor corrective work can extend the limitations period in section 49-42 had not previously been addressed by a Connecticut court. Section 49-42(b) governs the limitation period on payment bond claims on public projects. It provides in relevant part that “no … suit may be commenced after the expiration of one year after the last date that materials were supplied or any work was performed by the claimant.” Section 49-42 provides no guidance on what “materials were supplied or any work was performed” by the claimant means, nor is there any direct appellate-level authority in Connecticut on this issue. What is clear under well-established law in Connecticut is that the time limit within which suit on a payment bond must be commenced under Section 49-42 is not only a statute of limitation but a jurisdictional requirement establishing a condition precedent to maintenance of the action and such limit is strictly enforced. If a plaintiff cannot prove its suit was initiated within this time constraint, the matter will be dismissed by the court as untimely. Read the court decision
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Reprinted courtesy of Bill Wilson, Robinson & Cole LLP
Mr. Wilson may be contacted at wwilson@rc.com

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Quick Note: Subcontractor Payment Bond = Common Law Payment Bond

February 16, 2017 — David Adelstein – Florida Construction Legal Updates
What is a common law payment bond? A common law payment bond is a bond not required or governed by a statute. For example, if a prime contractor provides the owner a payment bond, that bond will be a statutory payment bond. On the other hand, if a subcontractor provides the general contractor with a payment bond, that bond will be a common law payment bond. Why? Because there is not a statute that specifically governs the requirements of a subcontractor’s payment bond given to a general contractor. The subcontractor’s payment bond is aimed at protecting the general contractor (and the general contractor’s payment bond) in the event the subcontractor fails to pay its own subcontractors and suppliers. The subcontractor’s payment bond will generally identify that claimants, as defined by the bond, are those subcontractors and suppliers the subcontractor has failed to pay. This common law payment bond is not recorded in the public records so sometimes it can be challenging for a claimant (anyone unpaid working under the subcontractor that furnished the bond) to obtain a copy of the bond. With that said, an unpaid claimant should consider pursuing a copy of this bond in certain situations, particularly if it may not have preserved a claim against the general contractor’s statutory payment bond. Read the court decision
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Reprinted courtesy of David Adelstein, Florida Construction Legal Updates
Mr. Adelstein may be contacted at dadelstein@gmail.com

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State-Fed Fight Heats Up Over Building Private Nuclear Disposal Sites

August 03, 2022 — Mary B. Powers & Debra K. Rubin - Engineering News-Record
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission and Interim Storage Partners, a joint venture that gained a federal license last year to build an interim storage facility for spent commercial nuclear fuel at a Texas site, have until Aug. 3 to answer a federal lawsuit claim by state officials that a new U.S. Supreme Court decision eliminates the federal agency’s licensing authority. Reprinted courtesy of Mary B. Powers, Engineering News-Record and Debra K. Rubin, Engineering News-Record Ms. Rubin may be contacted at rubind@enr.com Read the full story... Read the court decision
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South Dakota Supreme Court Holds That Faulty Workmanship Constitutes an “Occurrence”

September 14, 2017 — Samantha Martino - Saxe Doernberger & Vita, P.C.
The South Dakota Supreme Court recently determined that damage resulting from a subcontractor’s failure to test soil compaction before constructing a home constituted an “accident” and was therefore an “occurrence” under a commercial general liability (CGL) policy. In Owners Ins. Co. v. Tibke Construction, Inc., the homeowners hired Tibke Construction, Inc. to build a new house, and Tibke Construction hired subcontractor Jerry’s Excavating to perform excavation work. The homeowners contended that Jerry’s Excavating failed to do soil compaction testing before commencing construction, which resulted in the home being built on highly expansive soils, leading to damage including excessive settlement, cracking and structural unsoundness. Read the court decision
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Reprinted courtesy of Samantha Martino, Saxe Doernberger & Vita, P.C.
Ms. Martino may be contacted at smm@sdvlaw.com

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Insurance for Large Construction Equipment Such as a Crane

July 30, 2018 — David Adelstein - Florida Construction Legal Updates
Many, many projects require the use of a crane. The skyline is oftentimes filled with the sight of cranes—one after the other. Most of the time, the cranes are leased from an equipment supplier. What happens if the crane (or any large, leased equipment) gets damaged? I wrote an article regarding a builder’s risk carrier NOT covering damage to a crane from a storm based on a common exclusion. Another case, Ajax Bldg. Corp. v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 358 F.3d 795 (11th Cir. 2004), had a similar result. In this case, a prime contractor leased a crane from an equipment supplier. The crane was used by the structural concrete subcontractor. The crane collapsed during the subcontractor’s work. The supplier sued both the contractor and subcontractor. The prime contractor was defended under a contractor’s equipment liability policy and the subcontractor was defended under a general liability policy it procured for its work on the project. Ultimately, a settlement was reached where the subcontractor’s liability insurer paid a bulk of the damage. Read the court decision
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Reprinted courtesy of David Adelstein, Kirwin Norris
Mr. Adelstein may be contacted at dma@kirwinnorris.com

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NY Appellate Court Holds Common Interest Privilege Applies to Parties to a Merger

January 07, 2015 — Jay Shapiro, Lori S. Smith and Brittney Edwards – White and Williams LLP
The common interest privilege is a doctrine that operates to maintain the confidentiality of communications between parties and counsel that have aligned interests. It is designed to encourage the free flow of information between these parties, and has historically been utilized primarily in the context of litigation. However, in Ambac Assurance Corp., et al. v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., et al., the New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division, First Department recently expanded the common interest privilege by holding that it is applicable in transactional contexts. 2014 WL 6803006, No. 651612/10 (1st Dep’t 2014). The Ambac court defined the common interest doctrine as “a limited exception to waiver of the attorney-client privilege” when a third party is present during a communication between an attorney and his or her client. The doctrine shields such communications from disclosure when they are (1) protected by the attorney client privilege and (2) “made for the purpose of furthering a legal interest or strategy common to the parties.” Until Ambac, New York courts touched on, but never squarely addressed, whether a third requirement must be satisfied before the common interest doctrine can be invoked: “that the communication must affect pending or reasonably anticipated litigation.” The Ambac court addressed and rejected this purported third requirement while reversing the decision of the trial court which found that defendant Bank of America failed “to cite any New York case that applied the common-interest doctrine outside of either joint-representation of two parties by one attorney, or where parties reasonably anticipated litigation.” Reprinted courtesy of Haight Brown & Bonesteel LLP attorneys Jay Shapiro, Lori S. Smith and Brittney Edwards Mr. Shapiro may be contacted at shapiroj@whiteandwilliams.com Ms. Smith may be contacted at smithl@whiteandwilliams.com Ms. Edwards may be contacted at edwardsb@whiteandwilliams.com Read the court decision
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