New Iowa Law Revises Construction Defects Statute of Repose
September 07, 2017 —
David Suggs – Bert L. Howe & Associates, Inc.Starting July 1st of this year, Iowa homeowners now have only ten years to file a claim against the builder instead of the fifteen years that was allowed previously, reported WZAD 8 News. Furthermore, commercial property owners will only have eight years to file their suits.
Scott Webster, Vice President of the Quad Cities Builders and Re-modelers Association, told WZAD 8 News that insurance companies played a part in the change: “[I]nsurance companies were saying, Iowa is at such a long period of time for any kind of defect, that may be hard to prove whether the builder even did it or the homeowner modified the house.”
However, Tom Miller, Iowa Attorney General, disagreed with the change in policy: “We think that it’s unfair to consumers, the defects in buildings and commercial buildings too, can show up very easily between eight and fifteen years out.”
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Texas contractual liability exclusion
May 18, 2011 —
CDCoverage.comIn Ewing Construction Co., Inc. v. Amerisure Ins. Co., No. C-10-256 (S.D. Tex. April 28, 2011), insured Ewing was the general contractor for an athletic facility constructed for a school district. The school district sued Ewing alleging defective construction of the project. The underlying complaint included contract and negligence causes of action, and sought damages for the repair of the damages and loss of the use of the project. The complaint did not allege damage to any property other than the project itself. Ewing tendered its defense to its CGL insurer Amerisure. Amerisure denied a defense and Ewing filed suit against Amerisure. The federal district trial court entered summary judgment for Amerisure. Applying Texas law, the court held that all of the damages fell within the “contractual liability†exclusion precluding any duty to defend or indemnify.
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Reprinted courtesy of CDCoverage.com
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Housing Advocacy Group Moved to Dissolve New Jersey's Council on Affordable Housing
November 05, 2014 —
Beverley BevenFlorez-CDJ STAFFThe New Jersey Law Journal reported that "[a]n affordable housing advocacy group in New Jersey is asking the state Supreme Court to remove from the administration of Gov. Chris Christie the authority to determine municipalities’ obligations for low- and moderate-income housing and to instead place that responsibility in the hands of trial judges."
New Jersey's state constitution mandates affordable housing obligations (referred to as the Mount Laurel decisions).
“It is no longer possible to trust that COAH can or will faithfully implement the Mount Laurel doctrine,” wrote the center’s associate director, Kevin Walsh, in the motion to enforce litigants’ rights, as quoted by the New Jersey Law Journal. “This should be the end; there should be no more extensions, no further last chances.”
Municipalities are protected from being sued by developers, however, last year the court stated "that it would consider lifting that protection if COAH failed to adopt new regulations that passed constitutional muster," according to the New Jersey Law Journal.
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Be Sure to Bring Up Any Mechanic’s Lien Defenses Early and Often
November 27, 2023 —
Christopher G. Hill - Construction Law MusingsAs those of you who regularly read Musings are aware, mechanic’s liens are a big part of my law practice and a big issue here at this construction law blog. I’ve discussed the picky requirements of the mechanic’s lien statutes in Virginia and how the 90 and 150-day rules are strictly enforced. However, a recent case out of the City of Norfolk Virginia Circuit Court cautions that while failure to meet these strict requirements may invalidate a lien, it only does so if the owner or general contractor seeking to invalidate the lien argues the invalidity and/or presents evidence of that invalidity either pretrial or during trial.
In Premier Restoration LLC v. Barnes, the Court considered the following facts. The defendant homeowners had a house fire and the resulting damage was the subject of an insurance claim that was paid and checks sent to the homeowners. Premier filed a mechanic’s lien in response to Barnes’s failure to pay for Premier’s restoration construction services after Barnes’s home was destroyed by fire. Premier seeks a decree to enforce the lien, asking the court to order the sale of Barnes’s property to recover its damages or, alternatively, a judgment in its favor. With the Complaint seeking enforcement of the lien and damages for breach of contract, and this is a key point, Premier provided a copy of the mechanic’s lien along with the affidavit that is part of the statutory form swearing that the Owner was justly indebted to Premiere. The homeowners filed a counterclaim for unfinished work, including unfinished punch list work. After a trial during which no evidence regarding either the timeliness of the lien recording or whether any of the work sought to be encompassed in the lien was performed outside of the statutory 150-day window was presented by either side, the defendants filed a post-trial motion seeking to invalidate the lien as including sums for work outside of the 150-day window.
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The Law Office of Christopher G. HillMr. Hill may be contacted at
chrisghill@constructionlawva.com
Gillotti v. Stewart (2017) 2017 WL 1488711 Rejects Liberty Mutual, Holding Once Again that the Right to Repair Act is the Exclusive Remedy for Construction Defect Claims
June 05, 2017 —
Richard H. Glucksman, Esq. & Chelsea L. Zwart, Esq. - Chapman Glucksman Dean Roeb & Barger BulletinBackground
In Gillotti v. Stewart (April 26, 2017) 2017 WL 1488711, which was ordered to be published on May 18, 2017, the defendant grading subcontractor added soil over tree roots to level the driveway on the plaintiff homeowner’s sloped lot. The homeowner sued the grading subcontractor under the California Right to Repair Act (Civil Code §§ 895, et seq.) claiming that the subcontractor’s work damaged the trees.
After the jury found the subcontractor was not negligent, the trial court entered judgment in favor of the subcontractor. The homeowner appealed, arguing that the trial court improperly construed the Right to Repair Act as barring a common law negligence theory against the subcontractor and erred in failing to follow Liberty Mutual Insurance Co. v. Brookfield Crystal Cove LLC (2013) 219 Cal.App.4th 98. The Third District Court of Appeal disagreed and affirmed the trial court’s judgment in favor of the subcontractor.
Impact
This is the second time the Third District Court of Appeal has held that Liberty Mutual (discussed below) was wrongly decided and held that the Right to Repair Act is the exclusive remedy for construction defect claims. The decision follows its holding in Elliott Homes, Inc. v. Superior Court (Hicks) (2016) 6 Cal.App.5th 333, in which the Court of Appeal held that the Right to Repair Act’s pre-litigation procedures apply when homeowners plead construction defect claims based on common law causes of action, as opposed to violations of the building standards set forth in the Right to Repair Act. Elliott is currently on hold at the California Supreme Court, pending the decision in McMillin Albany, LLC v. Superior Court (2015) 239 Cal.App.4th 1132, wherein Liberty Mutual was rejected for the first time by the Fifth District. CGDRB continues to follow developments regarding the much anticipated McMillin decision closely, as well as all related matters.
Discussion
The Right to Repair Act makes contractors and subcontractors not involved in home sales liable for construction defects only if the homeowner proves they negligently cause the violation in whole or part (Civil Code §§ 911(b), 936). As such, the trial court in Gillotti instructed the jury on negligence with respect to the grading subcontractor. The jury found that while the construction did violate some of the Right to Repair’s building standards alleged by the homeowner, the subcontractor was not negligent in anyway. After the jury verdict, the trial court found in favor of the grading subcontractor.
The homeowner moved for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict or a new trial on the grounds that the trial court improperly barred a common law negligence theory against the grading subcontractor. The trial court denied the motions on the grounds that “[t]he Right to Repair Act specifically provides that no other causes of action are allowed. See Civil Code § 943.” The trial court specifically noted that its decision conflicted with Liberty Mutual, in which the Fourth District Court of Appeal held that the Right to Repair Act does not eliminate common law rights and remedies where actual damage has occurred, stating that Liberty Mutual was wrongly decided and that the Liberty Mutual court was naïve in its assumptions regarding the legislative history of the Right to Repair Act.
In Gillotti, the Third District Court of Appeal stated that the Liberty Mutual court failed to analyze the language of Civil Code § 896, which “clearly and unequivocally expresses the legislative intent that the Act apply to all action seeking recovery of damages arising out of, or related to deficiencies in, residential construction, except as specifically set forth in the Act. The Act does not specifically except actions arising from actual damages. To the contrary, it authorizes recovery of damages, e.g., for ‘the reasonable cost of repairing and rectifying any damages resulting from the failure of the home to meet the standards....’ ([Civil Code] § 944).”
The Court also disagreed with Liberty Mutual’s view that because Civil Code §§ 931 and 943 acknowledge exceptions to the Right to Repair Act’s statutory remedies, the Act does not preclude common law claims for damages due to defects identified in the Act. The Court stated: “Neither list of exceptions, in section 943 or in section 931, includes common law causes of action such as negligence. If the Legislature had intended to make such a wide-ranging exception to the restrictive language of the first sentence of section 943, we would have expected it to do so expressly.”
Additionally, the Court of Appeal rejected the argument that Civil Code § 897 preserves a common law negligence claims for violation of standards not listed in Civil Code § 986. It explained that the section of Civil Code § 897, which provides, “The standards set forth in this chapter are intended to address every function or component of a structure,” expresses the legislative intent that the Right to Repair Act be all-encompassing. Anything inadvertently omitted is actionable under the Act if it causes damage. Any exceptions to the Act are made expressly through Civil Code §§ 931 and 934. The Court concluded in no uncertain terms that the Right to Repair Act precludes common law claims in cases for damages covered by the Act.
The homeowner further argued that she was not precluded from bringing a common law claim because a tree is not a “structure,” and therefore the alleged tree damage did not fall within the realm of the Right to Repair. The Court of Appeal also rejected this argument, holding that while the tree damage itself was not expressly covered, the act of adding soil to make the driveway level (which caused the damage) implicated the standards covered by the Right to Repair Act. The Court explained that since under the Act a “structure” includes “improvement located upon a lot or within a common area” (Civil Code § 895(a)), as the driveway was an improvement upon the lot, the claim was within the purview of the Right to Repair Act. As the soil, a component of the driveway, caused damage (to the trees), it was actionable under the Act.
Reprinted courtesy of
Richard H. Glucksman, Chapman Glucksman Dean Roeb & Barger and
Chelsea L. Zwart, Chapman Glucksman Dean Roeb & Barger
Mr. Glucksman may be contacted at rglucksman@cgdrblaw.com
Ms. Zwart may be contacted at czwart@cgdrblaw.com
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Insurance Law Alert: Incorporation of Defective Work Does Not Result in Covered Property Damage in California Construction Claims
June 18, 2014 —
Valerie A. Moore and Chris Kendrick - Haight Brown & Bonesteel LLPIn Regional Steel Corp. v. Liberty Surplus Ins. (No. B245961, filed 5/16/14, ord. pub. 6/13/14), a California appeals court held that the insured's use of the wrong steel seismic reinforcement hooks in construction of a mixed-use building was not an occurrence, and did not result in covered property damage.
Regional Steel was the structural steel subcontractor on a 14-story mixed-use project in North Hollywood, California. Regional supplied plans which were approved by the developer and its structural engineers for installation of steel reinforcements, including seismic reinforcement hooks, to be encased in concrete. During construction, City inspectors determined that the plans called for the wrong hooks, necessitating repairs to finished portions of the work and delays in further construction. This ultimately resulted in a lawsuit between the developer, Regional Steel, the concrete subcontractor, the structural engineer and a quality assurance inspector.
The project was insured under a wrap policy issued to the developer, with Regional named as an additional insured. The court rejected an argument that the wrap endorsement fundamentally changed the insurance, and the issue boiled down to whether incorporation of the wrong hooks, the damage caused by tearing out concrete to replace the hooks, or the resulting loss of use, triggered coverage. Liberty asserted that no damage to property was alleged and the purely economic losses caused by the need to reopen the poured concrete to correct the tie hook problem did not constitute "property damage" within the meaning of the policy. Liberty further posited that the tie hook problem did not constitute an “occurrence” within the meaning of the policy because the alleged damage was not caused by an accident.
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Valerie A. Moore, Haight Brown & Bonesteel LLP and
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Yes, Indeedy. Competitive Bidding Not Required for School District Lease-Leasebacks
October 01, 2014 —
Garret Murai – California Construction Law BlogRemember when you discovered that the tooth fairy wasn’t real?
It was kind of a bummer on one hand learning that it wasn’t a fairy that magically appeared to swap your tooth for cold hard cash, but rather your mom or, visual horrors, dad.
At the same time, it was, to your nearly-halfway-to-a-decade-on-this-planet-wizened-six-year-old mind, confirmation of what you had a sneaking suspicion was the case in any event.
And, so it is with the next case.
Lease-Leasebacks
In California, most public school construction projects are built using the traditional design-bid-build project delivery method in which a design professional designs the project, the project is put out for competitive bid and the selected contractor builds the project.
But not all school construction projects are built this way.
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Garret Murai, Kronick Moskovitz Tiedemann & GirardMr. Murai may be contacted at
gmurai@kmtg.com
Arizona Court of Appeals Awards Attorneys’ Fees in Quiet-Title Action
September 20, 2017 —
Kevin Walton - Snell & Wilmer Real Estate Litigation BlogIn Arizona, a party successfully quieting title to property may recover its attorneys’ fees if it satisfies three requirements: (1) the party requests a quitclaim deed from the party adversely claiming title twenty days before bringing the quiet-title action; (2) the party tenders five dollars for the execution and delivery of the deed; and (3) the adverse party fails to comply. Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 12-1103(B). Recently, in McCleary v. Tripodi, No. 2 CA-CV 2016-0145, 2017 WL 3723472 (Ariz. Ct. App. Aug. 29, 2017), the Arizona Court of Appeals awarded attorneys’ fees to the prevailing party under this statute.
In McCleary v. Tripodi, Mrs. Tripodi, who became the administrator of her husband’s estate upon his death, wrongfully recorded three deeds purporting to transfer property to herself. After unsuccessfully attempting to get Mrs. Tripodi to quitclaim the property, the plaintiffs filed a quiet-title action. The trial court agreed that the plaintiffs were the legal and rightful owners, granted summary judgment in plaintiffs’ favor, and awarded attorneys’ fees to the plaintiffs.
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Kevin Walton, Snell & Wilmer
