Prospective Additional Insureds May Be Obligated to Arbitrate Coverage Disputes
September 07, 2020 —
Danielle S. Ward - Balestreri Potocki & HolmesThe Court of Appeal closed out 2019 by ruling that an additional insured can be bound to the arbitration clause in a policy when a coverage dispute arises between that additional insured and the carrier. (Philadelphia Indemnity Ins. Co. v. SMG Holdings, Inc. (2019) 44 Cal. App. 5th 834, 837.)
In 2009, Future Farmers of America (“Future Farmers”) entered into a license agreement with SMG Holdings Incorporated (“SMG”) to use the Fresno Convention Center. As part of the agreement, Future Farmers was required to secure comprehensive general liability (“CGL”) coverage and name SMG and the City of Fresno as additional insureds (“AI”) on its policies.
Future Farmers purchased a general liability policy from Plaintiff Philadelphia Indemnity Insurance Company (“Philadelphia”). Neither SMG nor the City of Fresno were added as AIs, but the policy contained a “deluxe endorsement” which extended coverage to lessors of premises for “liability arising out of the ownership, maintenance or use of that part of the premises leased or rented” to the named insured. The policy also contained an endorsement that extended coverage where required by a written contract for liability due to the negligence of the named insured. Philadelphia’s policy also stated that if the insurance company and insured “do not agree whether coverage is provided . . . for a claim made against the insured, then either party may make a written demand for arbitration.”
A patron to Future Farmer’s event at the Fresno Convention Center was seriously injured after he tripped over a pothole in the parking lot and hit his head. He sued both Fresno and SMG. In turn, Fresno and SMG tendered their defense to Philadelphia. Philadelphia denied coverage finding that the incident did not arise out of Future Farmer’s negligence, and that SMG had the sole responsibility for maintaining the parking lot. Consequently, Philadelphia concluded that neither Fresno nor SMG qualified “as an additional insured under the policy” for the injury in the parking lot.
The coverage dispute continued, and in 2016, Philadelphia issued a demand for arbitration which was rejected by SMG. Philadelphia then petitioned the state court to compel arbitration arguing that SMG could not avoid the burdens of the policy while seeking to obtain policy benefits. SMG used Philadelphia’s conclusion that it did not qualify as an AI under the policy to argue that Philadelphia was “estopped from demanding arbitration”. In other words, SMG argued that it could not be held to the burdens of the policy without being provided with the benefits of the policy.
The trial court sided with SMG finding that there was no arbitration agreement between the parties. The court noted that while third party beneficiaries can be compelled to arbitration there was no evidence that applied here, and Philadelphia could not maintain its inconsistent positions on the policy as its respects SMG.
Disagreeing with the trial court, the Court of Appeal concluded that SMG was a third-party beneficiary of the policy. The AI obligations in the license agreement and the deluxe endorsement in the Philadelphia policy collectively establish an intended beneficiary status. The Court saw SMG’s tender to Philadelphia as an acknowledgement of that status.
Relatedly, the Court found that SMG’s tender to Philadelphia – its demand for policy benefits – equitably estopped them from avoiding the burdens of the policy. The Court stated it defied logic to require a named insured to arbitrate coverage disputes but free an unnamed insured demanding policy coverage from the same requirement. Conversely, the Court found no inconsistency in Philadelphia’s denial of coverage to SMG and its subsequent demand for arbitration. Philadelphia did not outright reject SMG’s status as a potential insured, but rather concluded that there was no coverage because the injury occurred in the parking lot. In other words, the coverage determination turned on the circumstances of the injury not SMG’s status under the policy.
In short, the Court concluded that the potential insured takes the good with the bad. If one seeks to claim coverage as an additional insured, they can be subject to the restrictions of the policy including arbitration clauses even if they did not purchase the policy.
Securing additional insurance has become increasingly more difficult and limited over the years, and this holding presents yet another hurdle to attaining AI coverage. For those seeking coverage, it is important to note that the Court’s ruling may have turned out differently had the carrier outright denied SMG’s AI status, rather than concluding that the injury was not covered.
Your insurance scenario may vary from the case discussed above. Please contact legal counsel before making any decisions. BPH’s attorneys can be reached via email to answer your questions.
Read the court decisionRead the full story...Reprinted courtesy of
Danielle S. Ward, Balestreri Potocki & HolmesMs. Ward may be contacted at
dward@bph-law.com
A License to Sue: Appellate Court Upholds Condition of Statute that a Contracting Party Must Hold a Valid Contractor’s License to Pursue Action for Recovery of Payment for Contracting Services
June 21, 2017 —
Omar Parra & Jesse M. Sullivan - Haight Brown & Bonesteel LLPCalifornia Business & Professions Code section 7031(a) requires a party to have contractor’s license in order to maintain an action for compensation for services performed for which a contractor’s license is needed. In Phoenix Mechanical Pipeline, Inc. v. Space Exploration Technologies Corp., No. B269186 (2017 WL 2544856) (Cal. Ct. App. June 13, 2017), the Court of Appeal for the Second Appellate District considered the scope of this statute in denying, in part, Phoenix Mechanical Pipeline, Inc.’s (“Phoenix Pipeline”) appeal of a trial court ruling granting Space Exploration Technologies Corporation’s (“SpaceX”) demurrer to Phoenix Pipeline’s second amended complaint, without leave to amend.
Phoenix Pipeline filed the underlying lawsuit for, among other claims, breach of contract and breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing arising from an agreement with SpaceX for Phoenix Pipeline to perform various plumbing, concrete removal and electrical services. Phoenix Pipeline alleged SpaceX paid for such services from 2010 to October 2013, but failed to pay Phoenix for services performed from October 2013 to August 2014, totaling just over $1,000,000. According to Phoenix Pipeline, this work was performed pursuant to a series of invoices, which constituted individual agreements between SpaceX and Phoenix Pipeline.
Reprinted courtesy of
Omar Parra, Haight Brown & Bonesteel LLP and
Jesse M. Sullivan, Haight Brown & Bonesteel LLP
Mr. Parra may be contacted at oparra@hbblaw.com
Mr. Sullivan may be contacted at jsullivan@hbblaw.com
Read the court decisionRead the full story...Reprinted courtesy of
The Privacy Shield Is Gone: How Do I Now Move Data from the EU to the US
February 08, 2021 —
Heather Whitehead - Newmeyer DillionFollowing the decision of the Court of Justice of the European Union (EU) in case C-311/18 Data Protection Commissioner v. Facebook Ireland Limited and Maximillian Schrems (known as “Schrems II”), companies in the United States can no longer rely on the Privacy Shield, the framework developed by the US Department of Commerce, and the European Commission and Swiss Administration to promote transatlantic commerce while protecting personal data.
Schrems II Invalidated the Privacy Shield and Creates Uncertainty
Schrems II concluded that the EU-U.S. Privacy Shield Framework is no longer a valid mechanism to comply with EU data protection requirements when transferring personal data from the EU to the United States. Further, in a subsequent decision, the Swiss Federal Data Protection and Information Commissioner concluded that the data protection of the Privacy Shield does not provide an adequate level of protection for data transfer from Switzerland to the US pursuant to their Federal Act on Data Protection.
Read the court decisionRead the full story...Reprinted courtesy of
Heather Whitehead, Newmeyer DillionMs. Whitehead may be contacted at
heather.whitehead@ndlf.com
Prime Contractor & Surety’s Recovery of Attorney’s Fees in Miller Act Lawsuit
February 02, 2017 —
David Adelstein - Florida Construction Legal UpdatesCan a claimant recover attorney’s fees in a Miller Act payment bond dispute even though the Miller Act does not contain a prevailing party attorney’s fee provision? Yes, if the underlying contract that formed the basis of the suit provided for attorney’s fees.
What about a prime contractor and surety—can they recover their attorney’s fees if they prevail in a Miller Act payment bond claim and the underlying contract provides a basis for fees? The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals in U.S.A. f/u/b/o RMP Capital Corp. v. Turner Construction Co., 2017 WL 244066 (11th Cir. 2017) seemingly just answered this question in the affirmative when it reversed a lower court’s ruling that precluded a prime contractor and surety that prevailed in a Miller Act claim from recovering their attorney’s fees[.]
Read the court decisionRead the full story...Reprinted courtesy of
David Adelstein, Florida Construction Legal UpdatesMr. Adelstein may be contacted at
dadelstein@gmail.com
What is a Personal Injury?
September 03, 2019 —
Bremer Whyte Brown & O'Meara LLPEssentially, a personal injury is when an individual is hurt during an accident. Whether driving on the road, walking down the street, or sitting in a chair, accidents happen. When there is an accident, medical treatment may be necessary. Individuals who sustain injuries usually seek compensation for their medical treatment and pain and suffering in the form of a personal injury lawsuit.
Personal injury lawsuits can result from a variety of claims including negligence, strict liability, or intentional torts. Yet, for the most part, personal injury lawsuits tend to arise from a claim of negligence. The individual or entity injured in the accident, “Plaintiff”, files a lawsuit against the individual or entity, “Defendant” who allegedly caused harm. Personal injury lawsuits resulting from claims of negligence tend to have two main components: liability and damages. Yet, in order to prevail in a suit for negligence, a Plaintiff must demonstrate the following: (1) a legal duty to use due care, (2) a breach of that duty, (3) a reasonably close, causal connection between that breach and Plaintiff’s resulting injury, and (4) actual loss or damage to Plaintiff. Wylie v. Gresch (1987) 191 Cal.App.3d 412.
First, a finding of negligence rests upon a determination that the actor has failed to perform a duty of care owed to the injured party. Ronald S. v. County of San Diego (1993) 16 Cal.App.4th 887. This means that an individual or entity must act reasonably to avoid injuring others. When an injury occurs, a Plaintiff will generally argue that an individual or entity breached a duty owed to them.
Read the court decisionRead the full story...Reprinted courtesy of
Bremer Whyte Brown & O'Meara LLP
Repairs to Water Infrastructure Underway After Hurricane Helene
October 07, 2024 —
Derek Lacey - Engineering News-RecordAs transportation officials in Tennessee and North Carolina brace for long rebuilds of heavily damaged interstates in remote and rugged areas of the Appalachian Mountains, local agencies are also at work restoring water and sewer services to residents nearly one week after Hurricane Helene made landfall.
Reprinted courtesy of
Derek Lacey, Engineering News-Record
Mr. Lacey may be contacted at laceyd@enr.com
Read the full story... Read the court decisionRead the full story...Reprinted courtesy of
Condominiums and Homeowners Associations Remain Popular Housing Choices for U-S Homeowners
July 11, 2022 —
Community Associations InstituteFalls Church, Va., July 06, 2022 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) -- Maintenance-free, safety, and cleanliness are top features that make community associations a popular choice and lifestyle for millions of Americans. According to results from the 2022 Homeowner Satisfaction Survey, the overwhelming majority (89%) of homeowners and condominium association residents rate their overall experience of living in a community association as "very good" or "good" (67%), or neutral (22%).
At a time when community matters most, the majority (87%) said they knew their home was part of a community association and nearly half (45%) said the association made them more interested in the home. Eighty-seven percent of respondents believe that their governing board "absolutely" or "for the most part" serves the best interest of the community. More than half of residents (68%) believe that rules in their communities protect and enhance property values.
Results from almost identical national surveys conducted in 2005, 2007, 2009, 2012, 2014, 2016, 2018, 2020, and 2022 are strikingly consistent. The online survey of 1,507 homeowners and condominium association members nationwide with oversampling was conducted in in four states: Illinois, New York, North Carolina and Washington.
About Community Associations Institute
Since 1973, Community Associations Institute (CAI) has been the leading provider of resources and information for homeowners, volunteer board leaders, professional managers, and business professionals in the more than 355,000 homeowners associations, condominiums, and housing cooperatives in the United States and millions of communities worldwide. With more than 43,000 members, CAI works in partnership with 36 legislative action committees and 63 affiliated chapters within the U.S., Canada, South Africa, and the United Arab Emirates as well as with housing leaders in several other countries, including Australia, Spain, and the United Kingdom. A global nonprofit 501(c)(6) organization, CAI is the foremost authority in community association management, governance, education, and advocacy. Our mission is to inspire professionalism, effective leadership, and responsible citizenship—ideals reflected in community associations that are preferred places to call home. Visit us at www.caionline.org, and follow us on Twitter and Facebook @CAISocial.
Read the court decisionRead the full story...Reprinted courtesy of
Contractor’s Assignment of Construction Contract to Newly Formed Company Before Company Was Licensed, Not Subject to B&P 7031
October 04, 2021 —
Garret Murai - California Construction Law BlogAdd one more to the Business and Profession Code section 7031 archives. In Manela v. Stone, Case No. B302660 (July 1, 2021), the 2nd District Court of appeal held that Section 7031 did not apply to a contractor licensed as a sole proprietor who assigned his contract to his newly formed company although at the time of the assignment the contractor’s individual contractor’s license had not yet been reissued to the incorporated company.
The Manela Case
On January 4, 2015, John Stone doing business as Stone Construction Company entered into a home remodeling contract with Yosef and Nomi Manela. At the time, Stone had held a contractor’s license since 1982.
On February 11, 2015, after work on the project had begun, Stone formed JDSS Construction Company, Inc., and filed a fictitious business name using the same name Stone Construction Company. Stone applied to the Contractors State License Board to have his contractor’s license issued from himself personally to his new corporation. On March 15, 2015, while waiting for the CSLB to reissue his contractor’s license, Stone entered into an assignment agreement between himself and his new company assigning the Manela construction contract. The assignment agreement was signed by Stone in his personal capacity and as President of JDSS Construction. The assignment agreement was not signed by the Manelas.
Read the court decisionRead the full story...Reprinted courtesy of
Garret Murai, Nomos LLPMr. Murai may be contacted at
gmurai@nomosllp.com
