FAIRFIELD CONNECTICUT BUILDING EXPERT
DIRECTORY AND CAPABILITIES

Proposed Legislation for Losses from COVID-19 and Limitations on the Retroactive Impairment of Contracts

July 27, 2020 — Shaia Araghi - Newmeyer Dillion
The COVID-19 pandemic has caused most businesses to temporarily close and, as a result, sustain significant losses. Various states are contemplating the passage of legislation to require carriers to cover claims arising from COVID-19, but case law regarding the constitutionality of such legislation is conflicting. Depending on the facts surrounding retroactive legislation, states may be able to pass an enforceable law leading to coverage. Pennsylvania’s Proposed Legislation for Business Interruption Losses Pennsylvania is one of many states that has proposed legislation to override language in business interruption policies and require coverage from insurance carriers. Pennsylvania House Bill 2372 proposes that any insurance policy that covers loss or property damage, including loss of use and business interruption, must cover the policyholder’s losses from the COVID-19 pandemic.1 It applies to insureds with fewer than 100 employees.2 To enhance its chances to pass constitutional challenges, the House Bill also provides for potential relief and reimbursement through the state’s commissioner.3 Pennsylvania Senate Bill 1127 is broader than House Bill 2372 and most bills proposed in other states and would require indemnification for nearly all insureds.4 The Senate Bill makes important legislative findings and notes that insurance is a regulated industry.5 It essentially provides that an insurance policy insuring against a loss relating to property damage, including business interruption, shall be construed to cover loss or property damage due to COVID-19 or due to a civil authority order resulting from COVID-19.1 The proposed bill redefines “property damage” to include: (1) the presence of a person positively identified as having been infected with COVID-19; (2) the presence of at least one person positively identified as having been infected with COVID-19 in the same municipality where the property is located; or (3) the presence of COVID-19 having otherwise been detected in Pennsylvania. Read the court decision
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Reprinted courtesy of Shaia Araghi, Newmeyer Dillion
Ms. Araghi may be contacted at shaia.araghi@ndlf.com

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Common Construction Contract Provisions: Indemnity Provisions

January 19, 2017 — David R. Cook Jr. - Autry, Hanrahan, Hall & Cook, LLP Blog
Upcoming blog posts will focus on common contract provisions found in construction contracts. Such provisions are not solely limited to construction contracts and can be found in many other types of business contracts as well. This post will highlight indemnity clauses. An indemnity clause is a common contract provision used to allocate risk between parties to a contract. The clause obligates one party (the Indemnitor) to protect the other party (the Indemnitee) from certain losses, typically arising from claims of third parties. It may require the Indemnitor to reimburse the Indemnitee for losses or expenses, or satisfy judgments, or even defend the Indemnitee in a lawsuit. Read the court decision
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Reprinted courtesy of David R. Cook Jr., Autry, Hanrahan, Hall & Cook, LLP
Mr. Cook may be contacted at cook@ahclaw.com

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CA Supreme Court Permits Insurers to Bring Direct Actions Seeking Reimbursement of Excessive Fees Against Cumis Counsel Under Limited Circumstances

August 19, 2015 — David W. Evans & Valerie A. Moore – Haight Brown & Bonesteel LLP
The California Supreme Court held in Hartford Casualty Insurance Company v. J.R. Marketing, L.L.C. (Squire Sanders) (8/10/2015 - #S211645) that if Cumis counsel, operating under a court order which such counsel drafted and which expressly provided that the insurer would be able to recover excessive fees, sought and received fee payments from the insurer that were fraudulent or otherwise manifestly and objectively useless and wasteful when incurred, Cumis counsel have been unjustly enriched at the insurer’s expense and the insurer will be permitted under such limited circumstances to seek reimbursement directly from Cumis counsel. Certain Hartford insureds who had been issued commercial general liability policies were sued in multiple proceedings for a variety of claims, including unfair competition, defamation and intentional misrepresentation. Hartford disclaimed a duty to defend or to indemnify the defendants on the grounds that the acts complained of occurred prior to Hartford’s policy, and that some of the defendants were not Hartford insureds. A coverage action was filed by some of the insureds against Hartford; they were represented by the Squire Sanders law firm. Although Hartford subsequently agreed to defend several of the defendants subject to a reservation of rights, it declined to pay defense expenses incurred prior to the date of such agreement. Some months later, the trial court entered a summary adjudication order, finding that Hartford had a duty to have defended the liability action on the date it was originally tendered; the order required Hartford to fund the insured’s defense with independent counsel (i.e., so-called “Cumis” counsel; see San Diego Federal Credit Union v. Cumis Insurance Society, Inc. (1984) 162 Cal.App.3d 358). The insureds retained Squire Sanders as their Cumis counsel. Reprinted courtesy of David W. Evans, Haight Brown & Bonesteel LLP and Valerie A. Moore, Haight Brown & Bonesteel LLP Mr. Evans may be contacted at devans@hbblaw.com Ms. Moore may be contacted at vmoore@hbblaw.com Read the court decision
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New York Appellate Court Holds Insurers May Suffer Consequences of Delayed Payment of Energy Company Property and Business Interruption Claims

March 16, 2020 — Syed S. Ahmad & Geoffrey B. Fehling - Hunton Andrews Kurth
A New York appellate court recently held that renewable bio-diesel fuel manufacturer BioEnergy Development Group LLC may pursue tens of millions of dollars in damages from its insurers under two all-risk insurance policies, including amounts in excess of the policy limits, where the insurers refused to pay claims in a timely manner. BioEnergy purchased two all-risk property policies from Lloyd’s to provide coverage for its manufacturing plant in Memphis, Tennessee. A fire destroyed the Memphis plant in March 2016, eliminating BioEnergy’s production capacity and sole source of revenue. BioEnergy made claims under the policies and sought to rebuild its plant. The insurers acknowledged coverage and eventually made approximately $8 million in interim payments, but the parties disagreed over the value of the total property damage claim, which BioEnergy contended was in excess of $24 million. The disputed claim was submitted to appraisal, which resulted in the insurers agreeing to pay the full business interruption limit of $15.1 million. The insurers filed a declaratory judgment lawsuit, however, seeking to limit BioEnergy’s recovery to the policy limits of $15.1 million. BioEnergy alleged that the insurers failed to make interim payments in a timely manner after the fire and, as a result, the company suffered increased losses because it could not rebuild without the insurance proceeds. BioEnergy sought actual and consequential damages, plus attorneys’ fees, arising from the delayed payments, including payment of its business interruption losses in excess of the policy limits. Reprinted courtesy of Syed S. Ahmad, Hunton Andrews Kurth and Geoffrey B. Fehling, Hunton Andrews Kurth Mr. Ahmad may be contacted at sahmad@HuntonAK.com Mr. Fehling may be contacted at gfehling@HuntonAK.com Read the court decision
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Excess-Escape Other Insurance Provision Unenforceable to Avoid Defense Cost Contribution Despite Placement in Policy’s Coverage Grant

April 20, 2016 — Christopher Kendrick & Valerie A. Moore - Haight Brown & Bonesteel, LLP
In Certain Underwriters at Lloyds, London v. Arch Specialty Ins. Co. (No. C072500; filed 4/11/16), a California appeals court found an “other insurance” provision unenforceable to excuse defense contribution between successive primary insurers, regardless of the fact that the limiting language was contained in the policy’s coverage grant. Certain Underwriters and Arch each insured Framecon over successive policy periods. Framecon was sued by a developer in a series of construction defect actions, and tendered to both insurers. Underwriters agreed to defend under a reservation of rights but Arch declined, citing the wording of its insuring agreement, which stated: Reprinted courtesy of Christopher Kendrick, Haight Brown & Bonesteel LLP and Valerie A. Moore, Haight Brown & Bonesteel LLP Mr. Kendrick may be contacted at ckendrick@hbblaw.com Ms. Moore may be contacted at vmoore@hbblaw.com Read the court decision
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Construction Law Alert: Appellate Court Lets Broad General Release Stand in SB 800 Case

February 26, 2015 — Steven M. Cvitanovic and Colin T. Murphy – Haight Brown & Bonesteel LLP
Under California's SB 800 "Right to Repair Act," a builder may obtain a "reasonable release" to resolve a construction defect claim in exchange for a cash payment. So, what's a "reasonable release" under SB 800? This question was answered by the Second Appellate District in the case of Belasco v. Wells (filed 2/17/2015, No. B254525). Plaintiff David Belasco ("Plaintiff") purchased a newly constructed residence in 2004 from the builder defendant Gary Loren Wells ("Wells"). In 2006, Plaintiff filed a complaint against Wells with the Contractors' State License Board (the "Board") regarding certain alleged construction defects. The parties settled the 2006 action through written agreement that required Wells to pay Plaintiff $25,000 in consideration for Plaintiff executing a release and a Civil Code §1524 waiver of all known or unknown claims. In 2012, Plaintiff filed a subsequent action against Wells and Wells’ surety, American Contractors Indemnity Company ("American Contractors") (collectively "Defendants"), alleging a defect in the roof that was discovered by Plaintiff in 2011. Reprinted courtesy of Steven M. Cvitanovic, Haight Brown & Bonesteel LLP and Colin T. Murphy, Haight Brown & Bonesteel LLP Mr. Cvitanovic may be contacted at scvitanovic@hbblaw.com Mr. Murphy may be contacted at cmurphy@hbblaw.com Read the court decision
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Proving Contractor Licensure in California. The Tribe Has Spoken

October 21, 2015 — Garret Murai – California Construction Law Blog
As I mentioned in an earlier post, in California you must “prove” you’re a licensed contractor in a construction case. But in whose hands are you entitled to place your fate – the judge or the jury? Well, the tribe has spoken. Jeff Tracy, Inc. v. City of Pico Rivera In Jeff Tracy, Inc. v. City of Pico Rivera, Case Nos. B258563 and B258648, California Court of Appeals for the Second District (September 15, 2015), general contractor Jeff Tracy, Inc. doing business as Land Forms Construction (“Land Forms”) was walloped with a nearly $5.5 million judgment for being improperly licensed on a park project owned by the City of Pico Rivera (“City”). The judgment followed a bench trial over Land Form’s objection that it was entitled to a jury trial. Read the court decision
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Reprinted courtesy of Garret Murai, Wendel Rosen Black & Dean LLP
Mr. Murai may be contacted at gmurai@wendel.com

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Iconic Seattle Center Arena Roof the Only Piece to Stay in $900-Million Rebuild

July 09, 2019 — Tim Newcomb - Engineering News-Record
The roof covering the under-construction Seattle Center Arena will remain. And it won’t move, even as contractors remake the entire arena beneath it. OVG-Seattle has started the task of remaking the city-owned structure—and the only major arena within a park in North America—into the home for the expansion NHL Seattle franchise and the start of the 2021 NHL season. Read the court decision
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Reprinted courtesy of Tim Newcomb, ENR
Mr. Newcomb may be contacted at

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