COVID-19 Response: Key Legal Considerations for Event Cancellations
March 30, 2020 —
Michael G. Platner, Solomon B. Zoberman, & Jane C. Luxton - Lewis BrisboisEvery passing day brings stark new reports of novel coronavirus (COVID-19) cases and increasing numbers of cancelled conventions, concerts, and other major events. Both the hospitality and travel industry on the one hand, and organizations that are canceling events on the other, are scrambling to understand the legal consequences of these costly terminations. Cancellation fees can be breathtaking, and affected parties are quickly learning that there are no simple answers as to whether a disease outbreak of this scope and scale falls within force majeure (or Act of God) clauses that either do not explicitly list, or arguably may never have contemplated, circumstances of this type.
Generally, force majeure clauses excuse parties’ performance under a contract when circumstances that are beyond their control arise and prevent them from fulfilling their obligations. The party electing to enforce its rights under the force majeure clause must show that the triggering event qualifies as a force majeure event, and that the event has rendered the party’s performance impossible or impracticable.
Reprinted courtesy of Lewis Brisbois attorneys
Michael G. Platner,
Solomon B. Zoberman and
Jane C. Luxton
Mr. Platner may be contacted at Michael.Platner@lewisbrisbois.com
Mr. Zoberman may be contacted at Solomon.Zoberman@lewisbrisbois.com
Ms. Luxton may be contacted at Jane.Luxton@lewisbrisbois.com
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Warranty of Workmanship and Habitability Cannot Be Disclaimed or Waived Under Any Circumstance
May 01, 2023 —
Jason Feld & Stephanie Wilson - Kahana & Feld LLPArizona residential construction and single-family home production is growing at a rapid pace. And just as fast as the homes are sold, homeowners are constantly seeking warranty repairs from their homebuilders. Despite having strong purchase documents with express warranty language, the Arizona Supreme Court in
Zambrano v. M & RC, II LLC, 254 Ariz. 53 (2022) adopted a bright line rule that regardless of the contract, the implied warranty of workmanship and habitability (“implied warranty”) cannot be disclaimed or waived under any circumstance. The Arizona Supreme Court opinion provides clear guidance of the law in this area on the scope of the implied warranty in contracts between homebuyers and builder/vendors, specifically on the issue of whether an express warranty can negate and effectively waive the common law implied warranty – which is a definitive violation of public policy.
The Zambrano decision involved a licensed real estate broker who bought a new single family home for herself in a newly constructed master planned community in Surprise, AZ. Zambrano entered into a valid sales contract with Scott Homes (homebuilder) which contained a stand-alone 45-page pre-printed form express warranty. The express warranty was to be the “only warranty applicable to the home.” The contract further clarified that the buyer was expressly disclaiming (and, thus, waiving) the implied warranty. The sales documents and express warranty were signed and authorized by Zambrano. A short time later, the home developed alleged “design and construction defects” that were “either time barred or outside the coverage” of the express warranty. Zambrano filed suit for the alleged defects based on the implied warranty. Scott Homes filed summary judgment based on the Zambrano’s waiver and disclaimer of the implied warranty in the purchase agreement. The trial court granted summary judgment and the matter was appealed up to the Arizona Supreme Court.
Reprinted courtesy of
Jason Feld, Kahana & Feld LLP and
Stephanie Wilson, Kahana & Feld LLP
Mr. Feld may be contacted at jfeld@kahanafeld.com
Ms. Wilson may be contacted at swilson@kahanafeld.com
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Recording a Lis Pendens Is Crucial
January 04, 2023 —
David Adelstein - Florida Construction Legal UpdatesIf you are in a construction dispute where you are pursuing a construction lien foreclosure action, recording a lis pendens is crucial. Did I say crucial? “[O]ne purpose of a notice of lis pendens is to alert all others that title to the property is involved in litigation and that ‘future purchasers or encumbrancers of that property’ are at risk of being bound by an adverse judgment.” Henry v. AIM Industries, LLC, 47 Fla.L.Weekly D653b (Fla. 2d DCA 2022). There really is never a reason not to record a
lis pendens when pursing a construction lien foreclosure. Please remember that – don’t forget to record the lis pendens!
There are times a lis pendens is recorded when the lis pendens is NOT based on a duly recorded instrument (e.g., construction lien or mortgage). A
lis pendens, however, is recorded because the dispute is tied to the property in which the lis pendens is being recorded. The lis pendens is recorded to best safeguard the plaintiff’s interest in the real property without fear that the real property will be sold impacting the purpose (and, of course, security) of the lawsuit.
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David Adelstein, Kirwin Norris, P.A.Mr. Adelstein may be contacted at
dma@kirwinnorris.com
Crews Tested By Rocky Ground, Utility Challenges
September 03, 2019 —
Louise Poirier - Engineering News-RecordProblematic utility locations and difficult ground conditions required the project team to develop innovative solutions on the University of Texas at San Antonio’s $95-million Science and Engineering Building.
Reprinted courtesy of
Louise Poirier, Engineering News-Record
Ms. Poirier may be contacted at poirierl@enr.com
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HOA Has No Claim to Extend Statute of Limitations in Construction Defect Case
October 28, 2011 —
CDJ STAFFThe California Court of Appeals ruled on September 20, 2011 in the case of Arundel Homeowners Association v. Arundel Green Partners, a construction defect case involving a condominium conversion in San Francisco. Eight years after the Notice of Completion was filed, the homeowners association filed a lawsuit alleging a number of construction defects, including “defective cabinets, waterproofing membranes, wall-cladding, plumbing, electrical wiring, roofing (including slope, drainage and flashings), fire-rated ceilings, and chimney flues.” Three years of settlement negotiations followed.
Negotiations ended in the eleventh year with the homeowners association filing a lawsuit. Arundel Green argued that the suit should be thrown out as California’s ten-year statute of limitations had passed. The court granted judgment to Arundel Green.
The homeowners then filed for a new trial and to amend its complaint, arguing that the statute of limitations should not apply due to the doctrine of equitable estoppel as Arundel Green’s actions had lead them to believe the issues could be solved without a lawsuit. “The HOA claimed that it was not until after the statute of limitations ran that the HOA realized Arundel Green would not keep its promises; and after this realization, the HOA promptly brought its lawsuit.” The trial court denied the homeowners association’s motions, which the homeowners association appealed.
In reviewing the case, the Appeals Court compared Arundel to an earlier California Supreme Court case, Lantzy. (The homeowners also cited Lantzy as the basis of their appeal.) In Lantzy, the California Supreme Court set up a four-part test as to whether estoppel could be applied. The court applied these tests and found, as was the case in Lantzy, that there were no grounds for estoppel.
In Arundel, the court noted that “there are simply no allegations that Arundel Green made any affirmative statement or promise that would lull the HOA into a reasonable belief that its claims would be resolved without filing a lawsuit.” The court also cited Lesko v. Superior Court which included a recommendation that the plaintiffs “send a stipulation?Ķextending time.” This did not happen and the court upheld the dismissal.
Read the court’s decision…
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Shutdowns? What A Covid-19-Safe Construction Site Looks Like
April 20, 2020 —
ENR Editors - Engineering News-RecordThere’s no end to published opinions about construction project shutdowns where the widely different types of jobsites are reduced to a single Dickensian nightmare crying out to be closed during this COVID-19 pandemic.
ENR Editors
ENR may be contacted at ENR.com@bnpmedia.com
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U.S. Supreme Court Weighs in on Construction Case
January 13, 2014 —
Beverley BevenFlorez-CDJ STAFFThe U.S. Supreme Court weighed in on a construction case (Atlantic Marine Construction Co. v United States District Court for the Western District of Texas)—an occurrence newsworthy of itself, according to The California Construction Law Blog. Large general contractors may benefit by the court’s decision regarding “the enforceability of forum selection clauses.”
According to the blog, the U. S. Supreme Court set three standards, “which, together, strongly support the enforceability of forum selection clauses: (1) The party defying a forum selection clause bears the burden of proof…. (2) The inconvenience to the party defying a forum selection clause bears no weight…. [and] (3) The law of the selected forum applies when determining whether to transfer a case.”
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Gillotti v. Stewart (2017) 2017 WL 1488711 Rejects Liberty Mutual, Holding Once Again that the Right to Repair Act is the Exclusive Remedy for Construction Defect Claims
June 05, 2017 —
Richard H. Glucksman, Esq. & Chelsea L. Zwart, Esq. - Chapman Glucksman Dean Roeb & Barger BulletinBackground
In Gillotti v. Stewart (April 26, 2017) 2017 WL 1488711, which was ordered to be published on May 18, 2017, the defendant grading subcontractor added soil over tree roots to level the driveway on the plaintiff homeowner’s sloped lot. The homeowner sued the grading subcontractor under the California Right to Repair Act (Civil Code §§ 895, et seq.) claiming that the subcontractor’s work damaged the trees.
After the jury found the subcontractor was not negligent, the trial court entered judgment in favor of the subcontractor. The homeowner appealed, arguing that the trial court improperly construed the Right to Repair Act as barring a common law negligence theory against the subcontractor and erred in failing to follow Liberty Mutual Insurance Co. v. Brookfield Crystal Cove LLC (2013) 219 Cal.App.4th 98. The Third District Court of Appeal disagreed and affirmed the trial court’s judgment in favor of the subcontractor.
Impact
This is the second time the Third District Court of Appeal has held that Liberty Mutual (discussed below) was wrongly decided and held that the Right to Repair Act is the exclusive remedy for construction defect claims. The decision follows its holding in Elliott Homes, Inc. v. Superior Court (Hicks) (2016) 6 Cal.App.5th 333, in which the Court of Appeal held that the Right to Repair Act’s pre-litigation procedures apply when homeowners plead construction defect claims based on common law causes of action, as opposed to violations of the building standards set forth in the Right to Repair Act. Elliott is currently on hold at the California Supreme Court, pending the decision in McMillin Albany, LLC v. Superior Court (2015) 239 Cal.App.4th 1132, wherein Liberty Mutual was rejected for the first time by the Fifth District. CGDRB continues to follow developments regarding the much anticipated McMillin decision closely, as well as all related matters.
Discussion
The Right to Repair Act makes contractors and subcontractors not involved in home sales liable for construction defects only if the homeowner proves they negligently cause the violation in whole or part (Civil Code §§ 911(b), 936). As such, the trial court in Gillotti instructed the jury on negligence with respect to the grading subcontractor. The jury found that while the construction did violate some of the Right to Repair’s building standards alleged by the homeowner, the subcontractor was not negligent in anyway. After the jury verdict, the trial court found in favor of the grading subcontractor.
The homeowner moved for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict or a new trial on the grounds that the trial court improperly barred a common law negligence theory against the grading subcontractor. The trial court denied the motions on the grounds that “[t]he Right to Repair Act specifically provides that no other causes of action are allowed. See Civil Code § 943.” The trial court specifically noted that its decision conflicted with Liberty Mutual, in which the Fourth District Court of Appeal held that the Right to Repair Act does not eliminate common law rights and remedies where actual damage has occurred, stating that Liberty Mutual was wrongly decided and that the Liberty Mutual court was naïve in its assumptions regarding the legislative history of the Right to Repair Act.
In Gillotti, the Third District Court of Appeal stated that the Liberty Mutual court failed to analyze the language of Civil Code § 896, which “clearly and unequivocally expresses the legislative intent that the Act apply to all action seeking recovery of damages arising out of, or related to deficiencies in, residential construction, except as specifically set forth in the Act. The Act does not specifically except actions arising from actual damages. To the contrary, it authorizes recovery of damages, e.g., for ‘the reasonable cost of repairing and rectifying any damages resulting from the failure of the home to meet the standards....’ ([Civil Code] § 944).”
The Court also disagreed with Liberty Mutual’s view that because Civil Code §§ 931 and 943 acknowledge exceptions to the Right to Repair Act’s statutory remedies, the Act does not preclude common law claims for damages due to defects identified in the Act. The Court stated: “Neither list of exceptions, in section 943 or in section 931, includes common law causes of action such as negligence. If the Legislature had intended to make such a wide-ranging exception to the restrictive language of the first sentence of section 943, we would have expected it to do so expressly.”
Additionally, the Court of Appeal rejected the argument that Civil Code § 897 preserves a common law negligence claims for violation of standards not listed in Civil Code § 986. It explained that the section of Civil Code § 897, which provides, “The standards set forth in this chapter are intended to address every function or component of a structure,” expresses the legislative intent that the Right to Repair Act be all-encompassing. Anything inadvertently omitted is actionable under the Act if it causes damage. Any exceptions to the Act are made expressly through Civil Code §§ 931 and 934. The Court concluded in no uncertain terms that the Right to Repair Act precludes common law claims in cases for damages covered by the Act.
The homeowner further argued that she was not precluded from bringing a common law claim because a tree is not a “structure,” and therefore the alleged tree damage did not fall within the realm of the Right to Repair. The Court of Appeal also rejected this argument, holding that while the tree damage itself was not expressly covered, the act of adding soil to make the driveway level (which caused the damage) implicated the standards covered by the Right to Repair Act. The Court explained that since under the Act a “structure” includes “improvement located upon a lot or within a common area” (Civil Code § 895(a)), as the driveway was an improvement upon the lot, the claim was within the purview of the Right to Repair Act. As the soil, a component of the driveway, caused damage (to the trees), it was actionable under the Act.
Reprinted courtesy of
Richard H. Glucksman, Chapman Glucksman Dean Roeb & Barger and
Chelsea L. Zwart, Chapman Glucksman Dean Roeb & Barger
Mr. Glucksman may be contacted at rglucksman@cgdrblaw.com
Ms. Zwart may be contacted at czwart@cgdrblaw.com
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