North Carolina Supreme Court Addresses “Trigger of Coverage,” Allocation and Exhaustion-Related Issues Arising Out of Benzene-Related Claims
January 04, 2023 —
White and Williams LLPOn December 16, 2022, the North Carolina Supreme Court decided Radiator Specialty Co. v. Arrowood Indem. Co., 2022 N.C. LEXIS 1122 (Dec. 16, 2022), in which it addressed coverage issues arising out of claims by individuals alleging injury from exposure to benzene contained in the insured’s products. Affirming in part and reversing in part the intermediate appellate court’s decision, the court held: (1) an “exposure trigger” applied; (2) defense and indemnity costs were subject to pro-rata allocation; and (3) vertical exhaustion applied to the duty to defend under certain umbrella policies. Two justices concurred in part and dissented in part.
I. Background
In Radiator Specialty, the insured (RSC) was named in hundreds of underlying suits arising from individual plaintiffs’ alleged exposure to benzene contained in its products. Between 1971 and 2012, RSC was insured under primary, umbrella and excess liability policies issued by various insurers. In 2013, RSC sued the insurers in North Carolina state court, seeking coverage for approximately $45 million in defense and indemnity costs incurred for the underlying claims. In 2016, the trial court decided motions for summary judgment on a number of coverage issues. Following a bench trial in 2018, the trial court entered final judgment, which required the insurers to reimburse $1.8 million of RSC’s past costs. The rulings were appealed to the North Carolina Court of Appeals, which issued a decision in 2020. In 2021, the North Carolina Supreme Court granted RSC’s and certain insurers’ petitions for discretionary review of the Court of Appeals’ decision.
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Life After McMillin: Do Negligence and Strict Liability Causes of Action for Construction Defects Still Exist?
January 24, 2018 —
Thomas Balestreri and Amanda Crawley - Balestreri, Potocki, & HolmesThe ruling is in but the battle will likely continue over the practical application of SB 800. On January 18, 2018 the California Supreme Court issued its decision in
McMillin Albany, LLC v. Superior Court (Van Tassel) (January 18, 2018, S229762) __ Cal.4th __, holding that the statutory prelitigation scheme in The Right to Repair Act (“the Act”) that provides for notice and an opportunity for the Builder to repair defects applies to all claims for construction defects in residential construction sold on or after January 1, 2003, regardless whether the claim is founded on a violation of the Act’s performance standards or a common law claim for negligence or strict liability. (
McMillin Albany, LLC v. Superior Court (Van Tassel) (January 18, 2018, S229762) __ Cal.4th __.) With this holding, has the Court ruled that common law causes of action for construction defect still survive? If so, what will they look like and what standards will be applied?
The short answer is that it appears that common law causes of action still survive, at least for now, but it is not clear from this decision what they will look like and what standards will apply.
Portions of the decision seem to suggest that the Act is the sole and exclusive remedy for construction defect claims: “…even in some areas where the common law had supplied a remedy for construction defects resulting in property damage but not personal injury, the text and legislative history [of the statute] reflect a
clear and unequivocal intent to supplant common law negligence and strict product liability actions under the Act.” (
McMillin (January 18, 2018, S229762) __Cal.4th.__ [p. 6].) (Italics added for emphasis) However, at the end of the decision, the Court seems to be saying that there may still be a place for common law claims for negligence and strict liability alongside the Act but that these causes of action may be subject to the performance standards in the Act.
The
McMillin case went up to the Supreme Court on a procedural issue: whether a common law action alleging construction defects resulting in both economic loss and property damage is subject to the Act’s prelitigation notice and cure procedures. The Van Tassels had dismissed their claims under the Act opting to proceed solely on their common law claims including negligence and strict liability. McMillin sought a stay to force the Van Tassels to comply with the Act’s prelitigation procedures. The Supreme Court held that the Van Tassels must comply with the statutory procedures and affirmed the stay issued by the trial court. But the question remained: now that the Van Tassels were left only with common law claims, how would they proceed under the Act?
To understand how the Court dealt with this question, one must first understand how the Court dealt with the narrow procedural question presented by the case. The Court provides a very detailed, clear explanation of the reasons why it felt the Legislature intended for all construction defect claims involving residential construction must comply with the prelitigation requirements of the Act. In summing up its conclusions the Court makes three definitive holdings.
First, for claims involving economic loss only—the kind of claims involved in
Aas—the Court holds that the Legislature intended to supersede
Aas and provide a statutory basis for recovery. (
McMillin (January 18, 2018, S229762) __Cal.4th.__ [p. 10].) In other words, the Court clearly agrees that the Act was meant to allow recovery of damages based solely on economic damages. No surprise there. Second, the Court held for personal injuries, the Legislature made no changes to existing law that provides common law remedies for the injured party. (Id.) Nobody has ever contested that. Finally, the Court held that for construction defect claims involving property damage and not just economic loss “the Legislature replaced the common law
methods of recovery with the new statutory scheme.” (
Id.,) (Italics added for emphasis.)
In other words, the Court is not saying that negligence and strict liability are not permitted causes of action. The Court is merely stating that these causes of action must comply with the Act’s statutory scheme just as the same as a claim for economic loss. Here the Court is focusing on the procedure that must be followed. “The Act, in effect, provides that construction defect claims not involving personal injury will be treated the same procedurally going forward whether or not the underlying claims gave rise to any property damage.” (
Id.)
Having laid out its fundamental premise, the Court then deals with Plaintiff’s arguments regarding the intent of the Legislature and makes light work of them all. In the process, the Court disapproves
Liberty Mutual Ins. Co. v. Brookfield Crystal Cove LLC (2013) 219 Cal. App. 4th 98, and
Burch v. Superior Court (2014) 223 Cal. App. 4th 1411, to the extent they are inconsistent with the views expressed in the
McMillin opinion.
This is where the decision gets interesting. The Court reminds us that the Van Tassels had dismissed their statutory causes of action for violation of the performance standards under Section 896. One would think at that point that Plaintiffs had to be wondering if they had any claims left given that the Court had ruled that the Act was the sole means of recovery for construction defects. Not so fast. The Court points out that the complaint still rests on allegations of defective construction and that the suit remains an “ ‘action seeking recovery of damages arising out of, or related to deficiencies in, the residential construction’ of the plaintiffs’ homes (§896)
and McMillin’s liability under the Van Tassels’ negligence and strict liability claims depends on the extent to which it [McMillin] violated the standards of sections 896 and 897.” (
McMillin (January 18, 2018, S229762) __Cal.4th.__ [p. 19].) (Emphasis added.) WHAT DID THE COURT JUST SAY? Did the Court just say that a plaintiff could bring a common law cause of action for negligence or strict liability based on a violation of the performance standards under Section 896? What exactly would that claim look like? What would be the elements of such a cause of action?
To answer these questions, the Court states in the very next paragraph, which also happens to be the last paragraph in the decision: “In holding that claims seeking recovery for construction defect damages are subject to the Act’s prelitigation procedures regardless of how they are pleaded,
we have no occasion to address the extent to which a party might rely upon common law principles in pursuing liability under the Act.” (
McMillin (January 18, 2018, S229762) __Cal.4th.__ [p. 19].) (Italics added for emphasis) Is the Court answering “No” to the questions posed above? Probably not. It is simply following the age old rule that an appellate court will
not rule on an issue that is not specifically presented by an appeal, leaving that question for another day.
All we know for sure from
McMillin is that every claim for construction defects falling within the scope of the Act must follow the prelitigation procedure. There are no hall passes for negligence and strict liability. The larger question posed by the last two paragraphs in the decision, is whether the law recognizes a cause of action for negligence and strict liability for construction defects based on the standards in Section 896. The answer will have to be worked out by judges and trial attorneys in courtrooms across the State! The parameters of this hybrid cause of action that the Court seems to have posited will need more careful consideration than can be offered on first reading of
McMillin v. Superior Court.
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California Court of Appeal: Inserting The Phrase “Ongoing Operations” In An Additional Endorsement Is Not Enough to Preclude Coverage for Completed Operations
September 14, 2017 —
Gary Barrera - California Construction Law BlogIn a victory for additional insureds, a California appeals court held, in Pulte Home Corp. v. American Safety Indemnity Co., Cal.Ct.App. (4th Dist.), Docket No. D070478 (filed 8/30/17), that an insurer’s denial of coverage for completed operations based on the inclusion of the phrase “ongoing operations” in an additional insured endorsement, was improper. Additionally, an insurer wishing to limit coverage under an additional insured endorsement to ongoing operations must do so via clear and explicit language.
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Gary Barrera, Wendel Rosen Black & Dean LLPMr. Barrera may be contacted at
gbarrera@wendel.com
The Importance of a Notice of Completion to Contractors, Subcontractors and Suppliers
August 12, 2024 —
William L. Porter - Porter Law GroupThe recording of a valid “Notice of Completion” with the County Recorder is an event of significance to owners, contractors, subcontractors and suppliers alike. The recording of a Notice of Completion is one of several methods used to trigger the time period for the recording of mechanics liens and service of stop payment notices. Although the recording of a Notice of Completion is not absolutely required on any given project, all those working in the construction industry should understand its significance.
When a valid Notice of Completion has not been recorded in relation to a construction project, a contractor, subcontractor, or supplier might from ninety to one hundred fifty days after completion of the project to record a mechanics lien or serve a stop payment notice to secure payment for their services on the project, depending on the facts. However, if a valid Notice of Completion is recorded, then the deadline under most circumstances accelerates and subcontractors and suppliers must record a mechanics lien or serve a stop payment notice within only thirty days thereafter. Under the same circumstances, a prime contractor has only sixty days after the recording of a valid Notice of Completion to record a mechanics’ lien. Failure to meet these deadlines often results in loss of the right to a mechanics lien or stop payment notice. There are limited exceptions to these general deadlines, depending on the facts. If you believe you may have missed an important deadline to seek collection of a construction debt, you should consult with a construction attorney immediately to secure your avenues of collection, including the mechanics lien and stop payment notice remedies, if still available.
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William L. Porter, Porter Law GroupMr. Porter may be contacted at
bporter@porterlaw.com
Boston Water Main Break Floods Trench and Kills Two Workers
October 27, 2016 —
Justin Rice – Engineering News-RecordTwo workers died in Boston on Friday afternoon after a water main break flooded the trench where they were working, according to the Boston Fire Dept.
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Justin Rice, Engineering News-RecordMr. Rice may be contacted at
enrmidatlanticeditor@enr.com
Thank You to Virginia Super Lawyers
July 13, 2017 —
Christopher G. Hill - Construction Law MusingsThank you to all of my peers and those at Virginia Super Lawyers for nominating and electing me to the
Virginia Super Lawyers Rising Stars for 2011. I am particularly honored because this puts me in a group of only 2.5% of lawyers in Virginia. I am truly honored to be a part of this list. Add this honor to my
election to the Virginia Business Legal Elite in Construction Law and 2010 has been a great year for my new firm!
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Christopher G. Hill, The Law Office of Christopher G. HillMr. Hill may be contacted at
chrisghill@constructionlawva.com
Update Regarding McMillin Albany LLC v. Super Ct.
April 28, 2016 —
Richard H. Glucksman and David A. Napper – Chapman Glucksman Dean Roeb & Barger In FocusThe construction industry continues to await the California Supreme Court's highly anticipated decision regarding McMillin Albany LLC v. Super Ct. 2015 F069370 (Cal.App.5 Dist.). The Supreme Court will attempt to resolve the conflict presented by the Fourth Appellate District Court's holding in Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Brookfield Crystal Cove LLC (2013) 219 Cal.App.4th 98 and rejection of the same by the Fifth Appellate District Court in McMillin Albany. The issue is whether the Right to Repair Act (SB800) is the exclusive remedy for all defect claims arising out of new residential construction sold on or after January 1, 2013. CGDRB has been closely monitoring the progress of the case and understands that the real parties in interest have submitted their opening brief on the merits. The Court granted Petitioners a further and final extension to file the answer brief on the merits. The answer deadline is Monday April 25, 2016. Stay tuned.
Reprinted courtesy of
Richard H. Glucksman, Chapman Glucksman Dean Roeb & Barger and
David A. Napper, Chapman Glucksman Dean Roeb & Barger
Mr. Glucksman may be contacted at rglucksman@cgdrblaw.com
Mr. Napper may be contacted at dnapper@cgdrblaw.com
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Mixing Concrete, Like Baking a Cake, is Fraught with Problems When the Recipe is Not Followed
February 26, 2015 —
Garret Murai – California Construction Law Blog“Mixing concrete, like baking a cake, is fraught with problems when the recipe is not followed.” – Justice Kenneth Yegan, State Ready Mix, Inc. v. Moffatt & Nichol, California Court of Appeal for the Second District, Case No. B253421 (January 8, 2015).
I love jurists who aren’t afraid to mix in a little humour in their opinions.
But “[t]he law,” as a framed needlepoint in one of my colleague’s offices says, “is serious business.” And the State Ready Mix case involved one of the thorniest problems in construction litigation:
What to do when you’re sued and you think someone else is to blame.
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Garret Murai, Wendel Rosen Black & Dean LLPMr. Murai may be contacted at
gmurai@wendel.com
