Seattle Washington Building Expert Directory

Delay In Noticing Insurer of Loss is Not Prejudicial

April 28, 2014 — Tred R. Eyerly – Insurance Law Hawaii
The Tenth Circuit reversed a district court's determination that untimely notice of the loss was prejudicial, eliminating the insurer's coverage obligations. B.S.C. Holding, Inc. v. Lexington Ins. Co., 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 4492 (10th Cir. March 11, 2014). In January 2008, the insured's employees detected an inflow of water in a salt mine and feared dissolution of the salt or structural problems. The insured tried to devise a solution. Two and a half million dollars were spent to find the cause of the water inflow and to identify a solution. In April 2010, the insured determined the inflow was caused by an improperly sealed oil well. In July 2010, the insured notified Lexington of the water inflow. The ultimate proof of loss was for $7.5 million, which included remediation measures that the insured had performed before notifying Lexington. Lexington's all-risk policy required the insured to notify the company in writing as soon as practicable. Read the court decision
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Reprinted courtesy of Tred R. Eyerly, Insurance Law Hawaii
Mr. Eyerly may be contacted at te@hawaiilawyer.com

Second Circuit Finds Potential Ambiguity in Competing “Anti-Concurrent Cause” Provisions in Hurricane Sandy Property Loss

November 28, 2018 — CDJ STAFF
The Second Circuit recently held that competing “anti-concurrent cause” provisions in a commercial property policy present a potential ambiguity that could result in favor of coverage for losses sustained by Madelaine Chocolate after storm surge from Hurricane Sandy combined to cause substantial damage to Madelaine’s property and a resulting loss of income. Madelaine was insured under an all-risk insurance policy issued by Chubb subsidiary Great Northern Insurance Company. By endorsement, Madelaine’s policy added “windstorm” as a covered peril and defined “windstorm” as “wind… regardless of any other cause or event that directly or indirectly contributes concurrently to, or contributed in any sequence to, the loss or damage.” The policy also included a common flood exclusion that removed coverage for loss or damage caused by or resulting from waves, tidal water, or tidal waves, or the rising, overflowing, or breaking of any natural harbors, oceans, or any other body of water, whether driven by wind or not. Like the windstorm endorsement, the flood exclusion contained concurrency language that broadened the exclusion to any loss to which flood contributed, regardless of any other cause or event that directly or indirectly contributed to the loss. Reprinted courtesy of Michael S. Levine, Hunton Andrews Kurth and Tae Andrews, Hunton Andrews Kurth Mr. Levine may be contacted at mlevine@HuntonAK.com Mr. Andrews may be contacted at tandrews@HuntonAK.com Read the court decision
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Hunton Insurance Partner Among Top 250 Women in Litigation

October 05, 2020 — Hunton Insurance Recovery Blog
Benchmark Litigation recently identified the Top 250 Women in Litigation. The list is based on an extensive research process, feedback from clients, and one-on-one interviews. Benchmark has identified the litigators who have participated “in some of the most impactful litigation matters in recent history” and have earned “hard-won respect of their peers and clients.” Lorelie S. Masters was included in the list for the seventh time. Reprinted courtesy of Hunton Andrews Kurth LLP Read the full story... Read the court decision
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Amazon Can be Liable in Louisiana

August 05, 2024 — Michael J. Ciamaichelo - The Subrogation Strategist
In June 2024, the Supreme Court of Louisiana held that: (1) Amazon can be considered a “seller” of defective products sold by third parties on its website; and (2) Amazon can be liable under a theory of negligent undertaking for third-party products. In Pickard v. Amazon.com, Inc., No. 2023-CQ-01596, 2024 La. LEXIS 1112, a Louisiana man, Archie Pickard, died from burns sustained in a house fire allegedly caused by a defective battery charger purchased on Amazon from a third-party seller located in China. Mr. Pickard’s family filed a lawsuit against Amazon in the United States District Court for the Western District of Louisiana alleging claims under the Louisiana Products Liability Act (LPLA) and for negligent undertaking. Amazon filed a motion for summary judgment, which prompted the federal court to certify questions to the Supreme Court of Louisiana regarding these two claims. Amazon Can be a “Seller” Under the Louisiana Products Liability Act Amazon does not neatly fit within the definition of “seller” under the LPLA because the LPLA was drafted in 1988, before the internet existed. The LPLA defines a “seller” as a person or entity (who is not the manufacturer) who conveys title or possession of the product to another for something of value. La R.S. 9.2800.53(s) (emphasis added). The Supreme Court of Louisiana determined that Amazon was a “seller” because it conveyed “possession” of the charger to Mr. Pickard through the “Fulfillment by Amazon” (FBA) program, which provides storage, delivery, customer service, and returns of third-party products sold on Amazon. Most products on Amazon are sold by third parties, rather than Amazon. Many third-party sellers are small or medium-size companies, and some are individuals seeking to make supplemental income. Amazon offers the FBA program to handle storage and logistics to third-party sellers. When a product is sold through the FBA program, the seller sends the product to Amazon’s warehouses, where it is stored until it is purchased. When an FBA-product is purchased, Amazon collects payment, delivers the product (often in an Amazon van), and handles the potential return of the product. The Supreme Court of Louisiana determined that Amazon was a “seller” of the battery charger even though Amazon did not pass title to Mr. Pickard because: (1) Amazon had physical custody of the charger while stored in the warehouse; and (2) Amazon controlled the transaction and logistics through its FBA program. Read the court decision
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Reprinted courtesy of Michael J. Ciamaichelo, White and Williams
Mr. Ciamaichelo may be contacted at ciamaichelom@whiteandwilliams.com

California Court Forces Insurer to Play Ball in COVID-19 Insurance Coverage Suit

December 13, 2022 — Latosha M. Ellis & Yosef Itkin - Hunton Insurance Recovery Blog
One of the threshold issues in COVID-19 insurance coverage cases that have been brought across the country is whether the policyholder’s allegations meet the applicable pleading standard in alleging that the virus caused physical loss or damage. In many cases, the courts have gotten it wrong, effectively holding policyholders to a higher standard than required. But recently, a California federal judge righted those wrongs by acknowledging the correct pleading standard in that case, which is whether the allegations state a plausible claim for relief. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009). The Court, here, correctly recognized that the policyholder, the Los Angeles Lakers, met that pleading standard when it alleged that the COVID-19 virus can cause physical loss or damage by physically altering property. In its complaint, the Los Angeles Lakers alleged that the virus physically altered its property by changing its chemical and physical property conditions, creating viral vectors that required remedial measures before the property was safe again. Los Angeles Lakers, Inc. v. Fed. Ins. Co., 591 F. Supp. 3d 672 (C.D. Cal. 2022), adhered to on reconsideration, 2022 WL 16571193 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 26, 2022). The Court agreed that these allegations by the Lakers adequately pled physical alteration to support a claim for property damage. The insurer requested reconsideration of the decision, and the Court emphatically affirmed its prior decision, explaining its rationale as follows: The Court lacks the scientific expertise necessary to conclude, based solely on the allegations in the FAC . . . that it is not plausible for the Lakers’ property to have been physically altered by the Virus, which the Lakers adequately alleged. Consequently, the Court, in the March 17 Order, concluded that the Lakers’ theory was plausible. Whether the Lakers can actually prove its theory will be determined at summary judgment or trial. Reprinted courtesy of Latosha M. Ellis, Hunton Andrews Kurth and Yosef Itkin, Hunton Andrews Kurth Ms. Ellis may be contacted at lellis@HuntonAK.com Mr. Itkin may be contacted at yitkin@HuntonAK.com Read the court decision
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Texas Supreme Court: Breach of Contract Not Required to Prevail on Statutory Bad Faith Claim

June 06, 2018 — Bethany L. Barrese - Saxe Doernberger & Vita, P.C.
In USAA Texas Lloyds Company v. Menchaca, the Supreme Court of Texas clarified long-standing confusion regarding whether damages for bad faith are recoverable in the absence of a breach of contract under Texas law. The Menchaca case takes an in-depth dive into decades’ worth of Texas precedent and concludes that, under certain circumstances, an insured can recover policy benefits as damages for bad faith without finding that the insurer was in breach of contract. The story of this case begins with Hurricane Ike in September 2008. Homeowner Gail Menchaca contacted her homeowner’s insurance company, USAA Texas Llloyds Company (“USAA”) to report that the storm had damaged her home. USAA sent an adjuster to investigate the claim, and USAA determined that although the policy covered some of the damage, no benefits would be paid under the policy because the repair estimate did not exceed the policy deductible. Five months later, at Ms. Menchaca’s request, another USAA adjuster inspected the property and reached the same conclusion. Read the court decision
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Reprinted courtesy of Bethany L. Barrese, Saxe Doernberger & Vita, P.C.
Ms. Barrese may be contacted at blb@sdvlaw.com

A License to Sue: Appellate Court Upholds Condition of Statute that a Contracting Party Must Hold a Valid Contractor’s License to Pursue Action for Recovery of Payment for Contracting Services

June 21, 2017 — Omar Parra & Jesse M. Sullivan - Haight Brown & Bonesteel LLP
California Business & Professions Code section 7031(a) requires a party to have contractor’s license in order to maintain an action for compensation for services performed for which a contractor’s license is needed. In Phoenix Mechanical Pipeline, Inc. v. Space Exploration Technologies Corp., No. B269186 (2017 WL 2544856) (Cal. Ct. App. June 13, 2017), the Court of Appeal for the Second Appellate District considered the scope of this statute in denying, in part, Phoenix Mechanical Pipeline, Inc.’s (“Phoenix Pipeline”) appeal of a trial court ruling granting Space Exploration Technologies Corporation’s (“SpaceX”) demurrer to Phoenix Pipeline’s second amended complaint, without leave to amend. Phoenix Pipeline filed the underlying lawsuit for, among other claims, breach of contract and breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing arising from an agreement with SpaceX for Phoenix Pipeline to perform various plumbing, concrete removal and electrical services. Phoenix Pipeline alleged SpaceX paid for such services from 2010 to October 2013, but failed to pay Phoenix for services performed from October 2013 to August 2014, totaling just over $1,000,000. According to Phoenix Pipeline, this work was performed pursuant to a series of invoices, which constituted individual agreements between SpaceX and Phoenix Pipeline. Reprinted courtesy of Omar Parra, Haight Brown & Bonesteel LLP and Jesse M. Sullivan, Haight Brown & Bonesteel LLP Mr. Parra may be contacted at oparra@hbblaw.com Mr. Sullivan may be contacted at jsullivan@hbblaw.com Read the court decision
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The Comcast Project is Not Likely to Be Shut Down Too Long

July 13, 2017 — Wally Zimolong - Supplemental Conditions
Jan Von Bergen at the Philadelphia Inquirer reported that work on Comcast’s new tower came to a halt this morning when striking members of Local 542 picketed the Comcast tower project and other union trades refused to cross the picket line. However, this show of solidarity (during the afternoon on the Friday before the Fourth of July) is unlikely to last past the long weekend. Why? Because any conduct by Local 542 aimed at encouraging a work stoppage by other union members is illegal and the companies that employ the sympathetic union members are in breach of contract if they do not work on Tuesday. Any actions by Local 542 to encourage members of a different trade unions to honor their picket line is a secondary boycott. The National Labor Relations Act prohibits secondary boycotts. Specifically, the NLRA prohibits a union for inducing employees of an employer not subject to a labor dispute to refuse to work. Read the court decision
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Reprinted courtesy of Wally Zimolong, Zimolong LLC
Mr. Zimolong may be contacted at wally@zimolonglaw.com

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