Attorney's Erroneous Conclusion that Limitations Period Had Not Expired Was Not Grounds For Relief Under C.C.P. § 473(b)
February 27, 2019 —
David W. Evans & Stephen J. SquillarioIn Jackson v. Kaiser Foundation Hospitals, Inc. (2/8/19 No. A150833), the First District Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court’s denial of a motion for relief from a voluntary dismissal, without prejudice, filed by the plaintiff based on the erroneous conclusion of an attorney who she had consulted (but who had not yet appeared as counsel in her case) that the applicable statute of limitations had not yet expired. In reality, the limitations period had expired on the same date plaintiff had filed her complaint in propria persona. The plaintiff later retained the attorney on a limited basis to present the motion for relief pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure § 473(b) based on the attorney’s affidavit of fault. Therein, the attorney testified that he had advised the plaintiff to dismiss her action voluntarily based on a misinterpretation of the applicable limitations period, which the attorney characterized as having been based on his “mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or neglect.”
Section 473 provides two distinct provisions for relief from default or dismissal – one is discretionary, while the other is mandatory. Discretionary relief is available in the case of an attorney’s mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect. In contrast, mandatory relief is available where the resulting dismissal was caused by an attorney’s mistake, whether or not excusable. In denying the plaintiff’s motion, the trial court reasoned that the plaintiff could not rely upon Section 473(b) because (1) the attorney did not represent the plaintiff at the time and (2) this provision did not apply to the voluntary dismissal of an action without prejudice.
Reprinted courtesy of
David W. Evans, Haight Brown & Bonesteel LLP and
Stephen J. Squillario, Haight Brown & Bonesteel LLP
Mr. Evans may be contacted at devans@hbblaw.com
Mr. Squillario may be contacted at ssquillario@hbblaw.com
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Repairing One’s Own Work and the one Year Statute of Limitations to Sue a Miller Act Payment Bond
April 11, 2018 —
David Adelstein - Florida Construction Legal UpdatesWhen it comes to Miller Act payment bond claims, repairing one’s own work does NOT extend the one year statute of limitations to file suit on a Miler Act payment bond. Belonger Corp., Inc. v. BW Contracting Services, Inc., 2018 WL 704379, *3 (E.D. Wisconsin 2018) (“The courts that have considered this question tend to agree that, once a subcontractor completes its work under the subcontract, repairs or corrections to that work do not fall within the meaning of ‘labor’ or ‘materials’ and, as such, do not extend the Miller Act’s one-year statute of limitations.”).
Well, what if the subcontractor was repairing its own work due to an issue caused by another subcontractor?
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David Adelstein, Florida Construction Legal UpdatesMr. Adelstein may be contacted at
dadelstein@gmail.com
Determination That Title Insurer Did Not Act in Bad Faith Vacated and Remanded
March 30, 2016 —
Tred R. Eyerly – Insurance Law HawaiiIn an important decision regarding bad faith and the application of the work product doctrine to work performed by an insurer's in-house counsel, the Hawaii Supreme Court vacated the Intermediate Court of Appeals's upholding the trial court's award of summary judgment to a title insurer on the issue of bad faith. Anastasi v. Fid. Nat'l Title Ins. Co., 2016 Haw. LEXIS 30 (Feb. 4. 2016).
Llyod Anastasi loaned Alajos Nagy $2.4 million. The loan was secured by a mortgage on property. After Nagy executed the $2.4 million mortgage, a warranty deed was signed by Paul Stickney and purported to deed the property from Stickney to Nagy in exchange for $10 in consideration. Fidelity issued Anastasi a title insurance policy on the property in the amount of $2.4 million. The policy promised to provide a defense where a third party asserted a claims adverse to the interest of the insured.
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Tred R. Eyerly, Insurance Law HawaiiMr. Eyerly may be contacted at
te@hawaiilawyer.com
Judge Who Oversees Mass. Asbestos Docket Takes New Role As Chief Justice of Superior Court
January 02, 2024 —
Lewis Brisbois NewsroomBoston, Mass. (December 13, 2023) - Judge Michael Ricciuti, who presides over the Massachusetts state asbestos litigation docket, has been appointed to a new role as Chief Justice of Massachusetts Superior Court, effective December 22, 2023. The appointment is expected to result in the end of his tenure overseeing the state asbestos litigation.
Judge Ricciuti was appointed by Governor Charlie Baker to the Superior Court in 2017. He has served in five counties and serves six-month rotations in the Business Litigation Session, in addition to his role overseeing the Massachusetts Asbestos Litigation docket. His current committee participation includes serving on the Superior Court Judicial Education Committee and the Supreme Judicial Court Advisory Committee on Massachusetts Evidence Law. He also serves as a judicial mentor.
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Lewis Brisbois
California Supreme Court Holds “Notice-Prejudice” Rule is “Fundamental Public Policy” of California, May Override Choice of Law Provisions in Policies
November 12, 2019 —
Anthony L. Miscioscia & Timothy A. Carroll - White and Williams LLPOn August 29, 2019, in Pitzer College v. Indian Harbor Insurance Company, 2019 Cal. LEXIS 6240, the California Supreme Court held that, in the insurance context, the common law “notice-prejudice” rule is a “fundamental public policy” of the State of California for purposes of choice of law analysis. Thus, even though the policy in Pitzer had a choice of law provision requiring application of New York law – which does not require an insurer to prove prejudice for late notice of claims under policies delivered outside of New York – that provision can be overridden by California’s public policy of requiring insurers to prove prejudice after late notice of a claim. The Supreme Court in Pitzer also held that the notice-prejudice rule “generally applies to consent provisions in the context of first party liability policy coverage,” but not to consent provisions in the third-party liability policy context.
The Pitzer case arose from a discovery of polluted soil at Pitzer College during a dormitory construction project. Facing pressure to finish the project by the start of the next school term, Pitzer officials took steps to remediate the polluted soil at a cost of $2 million. When Pitzer notified its insurer of the remediation, and made a claim for the attendant costs, the insurer “denied coverage based on Pitzer’s failure to give notice as soon as practicable and its failure to obtain [the insurer’s] consent before commencing the remediation process.” The Supreme Court observed that Pitzer did not inform its insurer of the remediation until “three months after it completed remediation and six months after it discovered the darkened soils.” In response to the denial of coverage, Pitzer sued the insurer in California state court, the insurer removed the action to federal court and the insurer moved for summary judgment “claiming that it had no obligation to indemnify Pitzer for remediation costs because Pitzer had violated the Policy’s notice and consent provisions.”
Reprinted courtesy of
Timothy Carroll, White and Williams and
Anthony Miscioscia, White and Williams
Mr. Carroll may be contacted at carrollt@whiteandwilliams.com
Mr. Miscioscia may be contacted at misciosciaa@whiteandwilliams.com
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Wilke Fleury Attorneys Featured in 2021 Best Lawyers in America and Best Lawyers: Ones To Watch!
September 28, 2020 —
Wilke Fleury LLPWilke Fleury congratulates attorneys
David Frenznick,
Adriana Cervantes and
Dan Egan on their inclusion in the 2021 Edition of Best Lawyers in America!
Since it was first published in 1983, Best Lawyers® has become universally regarded as the definitive guide to legal excellence. Best Lawyers lists are compiled based on an exhaustive peer-review evaluation. Almost 108,000 industry leading lawyers are eligible to vote (from around the world), and they have received over 13 million evaluations on the legal abilities of other lawyers based on their specific practice areas around the world. For the 2021 Edition of The Best Lawyers in America©, 9.4 million votes were analyzed.
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Wilke Fleury
The Oregon Tort Claims Act (“OTCA”) Applies When a Duty Arises from Statute or Common Law and is Independent from The Terms of a Specific Contract. (OR)
February 25, 2014 —
Natasha Khachatourians – Scheer & Zehnder LLP Liability NewsletterCase: Jenkins v. Portland Housing Authority, 260 Or.App. 26, 316 P.3d 369 (2013).
Issue: Do tort claims arising from a rental agreement fall within the exemption from the definition of a tort under the OTCA? NO.
Facts: Plaintiff rented an apartment in a public housing complex operated by the Portland Housing Authority (“PHA”). While walking in the hallway of the building, Plaintiff slipped on a puddle of water that had leaked from a broken washing machine in a nearby laundry room. Plaintiff fell and was injured. The trial court granted summary judgment to PHA, finding that the PHA was considered a public body under the OTCA and, as a result, enjoyed discretionary immunity from liability.
The issue before the court was whether the OTCA applied to a claim under the Oregon Residential Landlord Tenant Act (“ORLTA”) since an ORLTA claim generally arises out of a rental agreement. Plaintiff did not plead breach of a specific provision of the rental agreement, and she conceded that she had alleged a breach of a legal duty resulting in injuries. Plaintiff argued, however, that her claim involved a duty arising from the rental agreement. As such, she contended her claim fell within the exception of the definition of a “tort” under OTCA, and thus the OTCA should not apply to give PHA discretionary immunity.
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Natasha Khachatourians, Scheer & Zehnder LLP Ms. Khachatourians may be contacted at
natashak@scheerlaw.com
Design and Construction Defects Not a Breach of Contract
February 14, 2013 —
CDJ STAFFThe California Court of Appeals tossed out a breach of contract award in Altman v. John Mourier Construction. The decision, which was issued on January 10, 2013, sent the construction defect case back to a lower court to calculate damages based on the conclusions of the appeals court.
The case involved both design issues and construction issues. According to the plaintiffs’ expert, the design plans did not make the buildings sufficiently stiff to resist the wind, and that the framing was improperly constructed, further weakening the structures, and leading to the stucco cracking. Additionally, it was alleged that the roofs were improperly installed, leading to water intrusion. The contractor’s expert “agreed the roofs needed repair, but disputed what needed to be done to repair the roofs and the cost.”
The jury rejected the plaintiffs’ claims of product liability and breach of warranty, but found in their favor on the claims of breach of contract and negligence. The plaintiffs were awarded differing amounts based on the jury’s conclusions about their particular properties.
Both sides sought new trials. JMC, the contractor, claimed that the jury’s verdicts were “inconsistent in that the relieved JMC of liability for strict products liability and breach of warranty, but found JMC liable for breach of contract and negligence.” The plaintiffs “opposed the setoff motion on the ground that the jury heard evidence only of damages not covered by the settlements.” Both motions were denied. After this, the plaintiffs sought and received investigative costs as damages. JMC appealed this amended judgment.
The appeals court rejected JMC’s claims that evidence was improperly excluded. JMC sought to introduce evidence concerning errors made by the stucco subcontractor. Earlier in the trial, JMC had insisted that the plaintiffs not be allowed to present evidence concerning the stucco, as that had been separately settled. When they wished to introduce it themselves, they noted that the settlement only precluded the plaintiffs from introducing stucco evidence, but the trial court did not find this persuasive, and the appeals court upheld the actions of the trial court. Nor did the appeals court find grounds for reversal based on claims that the jury saw excluded evidence, as JMC did not establish that the evidence went into the jury room. Further, this did not reach, according to the court, a “miscarriage of justice.”
The court rejected two more of JMC’s arguments, concluding that the negligence award did not violate the economic loss rule. The court also noted that JMC failed to prove its contention that the plaintiffs were awarded damages for items that were covered in settlements with the subcontractors.
The appeals court did accept JMC’s argument that the award for breach of contract was not supported by evidence. As the ruling notes, “plaintiffs did not submit the contracts into evidence or justify their absence; nor did plaintiffs provide any evidence regarding contract terms allegedly breached.”
The court also did not allow the plaintiffs to claim the full amount of the investigative costs. Noting that the trial court had rational grounds for its decision, the appeals court noted that “the jury rejected most of the damages claimed by plaintiffs, and the trial court found that more than $86,000 of the costs itemized in plaintiffs’ invoices ‘appear questionable’ as ‘investigation’ costs/damages and appeared to the trial court to be litigation costs nonrecoverable under section 1033.5.”
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