Cambridge Massachusetts Building Expert Directory

The Ever-Growing Thicket Of California Civil Code Section 2782

January 06, 2012 — Michael D. Worthing, Borton Petrini

California Civil Code section 2782 imposes limits on indemnity and defense provisions in construction contracts. Since the initial adoption of S.B. 800¹ in 2002 (eff. January 1, 2003) section 2782² has been revised several times, and legislative history suggests that interest groups representing builders, developers and sub-contractors, as well as the insurance industry, have seen legislative action on these indemnity and defense issues as part of the overall response to the same economic pressures resulting from construction defect litigation that gave rise to S.B. 800. Amendments in 2005, 2007, 2008 and 2011 (each effective January 1 of the following year) have increasingly entangled the provisions of Section 2782 with various provisions of S.B. 800. The application of section 2782 to construction contracts, and in particular contracts between developer-builders and subcontractors, executed after January 1, 2006, will require a concurrent reading and understanding of S.B. 800, the application of which is itself still in flux.

The time a construction contract was executed will likely determine which version of section 2782, read in connection with provisions of S.B.800, is applicable. Because of the nature of construction defect litigation, the determination of relative rights and liabilities of developer-builders vis-à-vis subcontractors under construction contracts does not become the subject of litigation, and legal and judicial interpretation, until years after the contracts were entered and work performed. As of the date this article is submitted, there has been no case law interpreting or applying any of the post S.B. 800 amendments, in part, and perhaps primarily, because litigation arising from construction contracts executed after January 1, 2006, has not yet reached the appellate courts.

SECTION 2782 AT THE TIME S.B. 800 WAS ENACTED

Section 2782 was originally enacted in 1967 and amended several times to the version in effect when S.B. 800 became law, at which time the section was relatively simple and straightforward. It then consisted of two subdivisions, which have essentially remained unchanged until the most recent amendment during the 2011 legislative session.

Section 2782 (a) prohibited, and still prohibits, provisions in construction contracts that “purport to indemnify the promisee against liability for damages for death or bodily injury to persons, injury to property, or any other loss, damage or expense arising from the sole negligence or willful misconduct of the promise.” This provision essentially prohibits what had been referred to as so-called Type I or “specific” indemnity provisions. In such agreements, the indemnitor [the promisor, that is, the person or entity indemnifying] will indemnify the indemnitee [the promisee, that is, the person or entity being protected by the indemnity] for the indemnitee’s own negligence, whether active or passive, whether the indemnitee is solely negligent or concurrently negligent with the indemnitor. (See, MacDonald & Kruse, Inc. v. San Jose Steel Co. (1972) 29 Cal.App.3d 413, 419.)³ Section 2782 (a) has remained essentially intact since the enactment of S.B. 800. It still must be considered and applied to interpret a construction contract. Generally, it will apply to contracts not involving a public agency; the next part of section 2782 specifically governs such contracts.

The second subdivision prohibits provisions in any construction contract with a public agency which purport to impose on the contractor, or relieve the public agency from, liability for the active negligence of the public agency. Subdivision (b) has been revised by the 2011 amendment, discussed below. If a construction contract with the public agency is for residential construction, the standards of S.B. 800 likely apply.⁴

This was the extent of section 2782 on January 1, 2003, when S.B. 800 went into effect, and remained so until January 1, 2006. This version will govern interpretation and application of indemnity and defense provisions in construction contracts executed before January 1, 2006.⁵

2005 AMENDMENT

The first “post S.B. 800” change to Section 2782 was in enacted in 2005, effective January 1, 2006, and added two new sections. Subdivision (c) stated (in somewhat greater detail than paraphrased here) that for residential construction contracts, or amendments thereto, entered into after January 1, 2006, a subcontractor cannot be required to indemnify (including the cost to defend) a builder for construction defects that arise out of negligence or design defects of the builder or other independent contractors, or that do not arise out of the scope of the subcontractor=s scope of work. The term “residential construction” was defined by reference to S.B.800 generally, and the term “builder” was defined by reference to section 911 (a part of S.B. 800), for the first time expressly connecting provisions of section 2782 to S.B. 800. Contractual provisions not expressly prohibited were reserved to the agreement of the parties.

What subdivision (c) took away was partially given back by subdivision (d). It stated that “subdivision (c) does not prohibit a subcontractor and builder from mutually agreeing to the timing or immediacy of the defense and provisions for reimbursement of defense fees and costs, so long as that agreement, upon final resolution of the claims, does not waive or modify the provisions of subdivision (c).”⁶ In addition, it stated that this subdivision (c) did not affect the obligations of an insurance carrier under Presley Homes, Inc. v. American States Insurance Company (2001) 90 Cal.App.4th 571, which holds that where an insurer has a duty to defend a developer pursuant to an additional insured endorsement obtained under a subcontractor’s policy, that duty generally applies to the entire action, even if the suit involves both covered and uncovered claims, or a single claim only partially covered by the policy. Finally, subdivision (d) stated that the amendment did not affect the builder’s or subcontractor’s obligations under S.B. 800. Both of these latter provisions, relating to the Presley Homes case, and obligations under S.B. 800, have been carried forward essentially intact in subsequent amendments of section 2782.

This version of section 2782 will be applicable to any contract between a builder as defined by section 911 (see fn. 4, above) and a subcontractor executed between January 1, 2006, and December 31, 2008. Thus, a general contractor, etc., who is not a builder is not subject to the provisions added by the 2005 amendment; this changed with the next amendment.

It is not clear whether this version would apply to a contract entered before January 1, 2006, but amended after that date. Subdivision (c) applies to “all construction contracts, and amendments thereto, entered into after January 1, 2006, for residential construction.” It would seem that the clearest and most logical construction would apply it only to contracts originally made after January 1, 2006, and thereafter amended, but there has been no judicial determination of this issue.

In addition, logically it would seem that this version of section 2782 should be applicable to construction contracts for residential construction between a builder and a subcontractor, entered between January 1, 2006, and December 31, 2008; however, legislative history relating to the 2008 amendment discussed below suggests a different result might occur.

2007 AMENDMENT

The second “post S.B. 800” amendment in 2007 (effective January 1, 2008), added subdivisions (e)(1) and (e)(2).

Subdivision (e)(1) added general contractors and subcontractors not affiliated with the builder and imposed essentially the same restrictions on provisions to indemnify, including the cost to defend, them as had been imposed on the “builder” by the 2005 amendment. The amendment refers to section 911 (b), again part of S.B. 800, to define general contractors, etc., not affiliated with the builder.

Subdivision (e)(1) essentially repeated the provisions of subdivision (d) permitting agreement to the timing and immediacy of the defense, the reference to the Presley Homes case, and the general contractor’s or subcontractor’s obligations under S.B. 800.

It appears this amendment was an attempt to harmonize the new restrictions on indemnity and defense provisions with S.B. 800. The 2005 amendment, whether by oversight or intent, covered only builders and not general contractors, although both classes are subject to the provisions of S.B. 800; the 2007 amendment added non-builder-affiliated general contractors.

Again, logically, it would seem that this version of section 2782 should be applicable to construction contracts for residential construction between a general contractor or contractor not affiliated with a builder and a subcontractor, entered between January 1 and December 31, 2008; however, legislative history relating to the 2008 amendment discussed below suggests a different result might occur. The same potential uncertainty regarding applicability to a contract entered before January 1, 2008, but amended after that date, exists for this provision as for the prior amendment, discussed above.

2008 AMENDMENT

The third “post S.B. 800” amendment in 2008 (effective January 1, 2009), reorganized the language relating to prohibited indemnity provisions, added a reference to insurance in that same prohibition, extensively rewrote the provisions governing agreements relating to the timing or immediacy of defense, added language preserving equitable indemnity claims, and added language defining “construction defect” by reference to the standards set forth in S.B. 800.

Subdivisions (a) and (b) remained unchanged.

Subdivision (c) now made a combined reference to builders (again by reference to section 911), as well as general contractors or contractors not affiliated with the builder (again by reference to section 911 (b)), rather than dealing with the two groups in separate but nearly identical subdivisions as previously. It otherwise restated the same limitations that were previously set forth separately in subdivisions (c) and (e), as well as the reference to the Presley Homes case, and the general contractor’s or subcontractor’s obligations under S.B. 800, but with one important addition. The word “insure” was added to the description of prohibited provisions, to-wit: “provisions? that purport to insure or indemnify, including the cost to defend, the builder, [etc.]? are unenforceable” to the extent they arise out of claims of the type previously described.

It is unclear what impact the addition of this single word “insure” will have; and, it will have to be read in light of the preservation of the language that it shall not affect the obligations of an insurance carrier under the holding of the Presley Homes case. Suppose a carrier had issued an additional insured endorsement under which it would otherwise be required to defend a builder or general contractor consistent with the Presley Homes rule: would this newly added single word (restricting the construction contract, to which the carrier is not a party) give the carrier a basis for denying coverage under the insurance contract? Or would the continued inclusion of the express language that it does not affect the obligations of an insurance carrier under Presley Homes control? That is surely an issue that will have to be worked out by the courts.

The new subdivision (d) addressed defense obligations. Again it permitted parties to agree to the timing and immediacy of the defense and provision for reimbursement of defense fees and costs, but imposed a very detailed scheme that appears to limit the extent of such agreement. A subcontractor owes no defense or indemnity obligation until the builder or general contractor provides a written tender of the claim, which has the same force and effect as notice of commencement of a legal proceeding. Upon that tender the subcontractor shall elect to follow one of two ways of performing: subdivision (d) (1) permits the subcontractor to defend with counsel of its choice and to control the defense, if the subcontractor gives written notice of this election within a reasonable time after receipt of the written tender and in no event later than 90 days following that receipt; subdivision (d) (2) provides an alternative by which the subcontractor pays a reasonable allocated share of the builder’s or general contractor’s defense fees and costs within 30 days of receipt of an invoice, subject to reallocation upon final resolution of the claim by settlement or judgment. Subdivision (e) sets forth remedies available to the builder or general contractor if a subcontractor fails to timely and adequately perform its obligations under either of the two alternatives in subdivision (d), including compensatory and consequential damages, reasonable attorneys’ fees in connection with the first alternative, and interest on defense and indemnity costs in connection with the second alternative. Subdivision (e) ends with provisions relating to reallocation of defense costs, and damages for failure to reallocate.

Application of these requirements in actual litigation is likely to be cumbersome and potentially fraught with conflicts. If retained pursuant to subdivision (d) (1) does the attorney represent the builder, the subcontractor, or both? To whom does the attorney owe his or her fiduciary duty? Can an appropriate informed written consent be formulated, for example, under Rule 3-310 of the California Rules of Professional Conduct, or Rule 1.7, ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct? Could an attorney retained by a subcontractor blame the subcontractor if that is in the developer’s best interests? If multiple subcontractors elect to defend directly, how would the defense be coordinated among the potentially multiple attorneys so retained? Would an attorney retained by one subcontractor be able, or inclined, to blame another subcontractor who also chose to defend directly, in other words, what would prevent inconsistent defense positions amongst the various counsel retained by subcontractors for the developer? There may be solutions to such practical and professional considerations but it seems an ethical thicket awaits any attorney involved in such circumstances.

Subdivision (e) and (f) preserve equitable indemnity claims for the builder, general contractor or subcontractor, the first in general, the second as against any supplier, design profession, or product manufacturer. Finally, the 2008 amendment added for the first time, in subdivision (h), language defining "construction defect" as used in section 2782 as a violation of standards set forth in S.B. 800.

The inclusion of these last three subsections would seem to work against simplification of litigation. A builder or general contractor is likely to allege a claim for equitable indemnity against any and all subcontractors in addition to claims for contractual indemnity and defense (however limited by the other provisions of section 2782). Nothing in the section suggests the subcontractor should, or even can, somehow take on the representation of the builder, etc., in connection with a claim of equitable indemnity back against the subcontractor.

And the limited definition of “construction defect” in subdivision (h) appears to raise an issue of the applicability of the limitations set forth in subdivision (c). Although there is a school of thought that section 941 limits residential construction defect claims only to breach of the performance standards under S.B. 800, it is still common for CD complaints to plead other legal theories, e.g., breach of contract, breach of warranty, negligence, etc., in addition to violation of S.B. 800 standards. With the addition of subdivision (h) it is arguable that the restrictions on indemnity and defense provisions spelled out in subdivisions (c) and (d), both of which relate to claims for residential construction defects, are applicable only to claims for violation of S.B. 800 standards, and not other residential construction defect claims. In other words, a developer might conceivably still be entitled to a broader scope of indemnity and concomitant defense for other types of claims, such as breach of contract, breach of warranty, negligence, etc., so long as the indemnity does not violate the limitation of subdivision (a) against Type I indemnity, which as noted above, has remained intact through these revisions.

Finally, it would seem that this version of section 2782 should be applicable to contracts executed between builders, general contractors, etc., on the one hand and subcontractors on the other hand on and after January 1, 2009. And, as noted above in connection with the 2005 and 2007 amendments, logic would suggest that those versions would ordinarily apply to contracts executed during the time periods mentioned above. But, the Legislative Counsel’s Digest for the 2008 amendment as it finally was enacted into law includes the following statements:

This bill would delete the provisions applicable to construction contracts entered into on or after January 1, 2008, that purport to indemnify the general contractor or contractor not affiliated with the builder. The bill would revise the provisions applicable to contracts entered into after January 1, 2006, to instead apply to contracts entered into after January 1, 2009, and to apply to agreements that purport to insure or indemnify the builder or the general contractor or contractor not affiliated with the builder, as described.

Although it seems a startling result, this legislative history suggests an argument can be made that the 2008 amendment retroactively nullified the effect of the 2005 and 2007 amendments, so that contracts executed from January 1, 2006, as to builders or January 1, 2008, for general contractors, etc., through December 31, 2008, are still governed by the provisions of section 2782 as it was on the books prior to the first post-S.B. 800 amendment in 2005.

2011 AMENDMENT

Section 2782 has been amended yet again in the 2011 session of the California Legislature, effective January 1, 2012; however, the substantive changes affect certain contracts entered on or after January 1, 2013. All of the provisions contained in the 2008 amendment have been carried forward in the most recent amendment, although re-numbered: (c) became (d), etc., through (h) becoming (i). So, the law governing construction contracts entered into after January 1, 2009, for residential construction, as between a builder, or a general contractor, etc., not affiliated with a builder, and regarding insurance, indemnity or defense relating to claims for construction defects, remains the same as in the 2008 amendment.

As noted above the substantive changes to section 2782 all affect contracts entered into on or after January 1, 2013. Subdivision (b) has been amended such that any provision in a contract with a public agency that purports to impose on any contractor, etc., or relieve the public agency from, liability for the active negligence of the public agency will be void and unenforceable. A new subdivision (c) has been added that imposes a similar restriction on construction contracts with the owner of privately owned real property to be improved and as to which the owner is not acting as a contractor or supplier of materials or equipment to the work. This new restriction in subdivision (c) does not apply to a homeowner performing a home improvement project on his or her own single family dwelling.

The 2011 bill amending section 2782 also added a new section 2782.05, which will make void and unenforceable any provision in any construction contract (again, entered on or after January 1, 2013) that purports to insure or indemnify, including the cost to defend, a general contractor, construction manager, or other subcontractor, by a subcontractor for claims that arise out of the active negligence or willful misconduct of the general contractor, etc., or other independent contractors, etc., or to the extent the claims do not arise out of the scope of work of the subcontractor. However, the section also includes a long list of situations to which it does not apply, including all of those covered by section 2782 (residential construction subject to S.B. 800, public agency contracts subject to section 2782 (b), and direct contracts with private property owners subject to the new section 2782 (c)) as well as eight other categories. This apparently is intended to serve as a “catch-all” to extend a limitation on indemnity agreements to all construction contracts not previously swept into this widening legislative scheme, although the exact phrasing is slightly different.⁷

The new section 2782.05 then permits a mutual agreement to the timing or immediacy of a defense under a scheme essentially identical to that imposed in the 2008 amendment to section 2782: defend with counsel of choice, and maintain control of the defense; or, pay a reasonable allocated share of defense fees and costs. The same logistical and ethical difficulties presented by the 2008 scheme discussed above would likely be present in cases that fall under the new section 2782.05.

CONCLUSION

The California Legislature has been revising section 2782 since shortly after the adoption of S.B. 800. Each revision has been more complicated than the last, and each has tied certain provisions of section 2782 more closely to S.B. 800. In particular, with regard to construction defect claims relating to residential dwellings which are subject to S.B. 800, the Legislature has apparently attempted to exercise more and more control over the scope of allowable indemnity and dictated a very narrow scheme to govern how the defense obligation arising from a contractual indemnity is to be implemented. It seems likely that any attempt to manage the defense of a construction defect case under the options that allow a subcontractor to defend directly and control the defense will create a logistical problem and an ethical difficulty for any attorney attempting to defend a developer at the behest and direction of a subcontractor. Finally, as set forth in the current version of section 2782 relating to contractual indemnity and defense of S.B. 800 type cases (subdivisions (c) through (h) in the 2008 version, now subdivisions (d) through (i) in the 2011 amendment), the Legislature has apparently narrowed the application to only claims of violation of S.B. 800 standards. This may have, in essence, removed the restrictions on indemnity and defense provisions as they relate to other theories pleaded against developers in construction defense cases, e.g., breach of contract, breach of warranty, negligence, and the like. It is not at all clear that the Legislature has accomplished what it set out do accomplish. Rather, the law may have come full circle back to where it began, except for one legal theory, i.e. violation of S.B. 800 standards, currently being used in residential construction defect cases. For any other legal theory the limitation of section 2782 (a) may be solely controlling.

California Civil Code section 43.99, and sections 895 to 945.5.
All statutory references in this article are to the California Civil Code unless otherwise specified.
Type I or specific indemnity does not exactly match the scope of proscribed indemnity as described in section 2782 (a) but it is the closest. More recent case law in California has eschewed a mechanical application of the MacDonald & Kruse typology in favor of examining the precise text of the actual contract (See, e.g., St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co. v. Frontier Pacific Ins. Co. (2003) 111 Cal.App.4th 1234, 1246, n. 6) but some recent cases still use the Type I, II and II classifications. And, an understanding of that “historical” typology is useful as an aid to evaluating and understanding express indemnity in general.
The provisions of S.B. 800 other than the prelitigation procedures of sections 910 through 938 apply to general contractors, subcontractors, etc., pursuant to section 936. The prelitigation procedures generally involve a “builder,” which is specifically defined in section 911 (a) by reference to entities or individuals in the business of selling residential units to the public or of building, developing, or constructing residential units for public purchase. Pursuant to section 911 (b) the term builder does not include general contractors, etc., not affiliated with the builder. Thus, a general contractor who constructs residential housing pursuant to a contract with a public agency is still subject to claims for violation of the standards set forth in sections 896 and 897, resulting from its negligent act or omission or breach of contract, pursuant to section 936.
As noted above, there has been no case law yet interpreting any of the “post S.B. 800” changes to Section 2782. One of the most important legal decisions relating to express indemnity and defense obligations and rights between developer-builders and sub-contractors was published after two of the amendments but based upon contracts executed and the language of section 2782 prior to January 1, 2006. (See, Crawford v. Weather Shield Mfg., Inc. (2008) 44 Cal.4th 541, 547, 566-67, fn. 14).
Subcontractor dissatisfaction with the perceived inadequacy of protection afforded by this provision apparently became the impetus for a 2008 amendment to section 2782, discussed below, at least based upon the numerous (form) letters submitted to legislators in connection therewith.
Section 2782 (a), where we started, and which has continued without change, prohibits indemnity for claims arising out of the sole negligence or willful misconduct of the promisee; sole negligence can be either active or passive. The various versions relating to residential construction prohibit indemnity for the negligence of the builder, etc., suggesting there is no express contractual indemnity for the negligence of the subcontractor if the builder, etc., is at all negligent. This is tempered a bit by the preservation of the right to equitable indemnity, which will now be found in section 2782 (g) and (h).

Courtesy of Michael D. Worthing of Borton Petrini, LLP. Mr. Worthing can be contacted at mworthing@bortonpetrini.com.

Read the court decision
Read the full story...
Reprinted courtesy of

Indiana Court of Appeals Rules Against Contractor and Performance Bond Surety on Contractor's Differing Site Conditions Claim

April 03, 2013 — Brian M. Falcon - Frost Brown Todd LLC
Earlier this year, the Indiana Court of Appeals issued an important opinion that impacts contractors and sureties alike. The decision should give contractors in Indiana pause before ceasing work while a dispute with the owner is pending. Sureties also have been placed on notice that strict compliance with the terms of their bonds is amongst their best defenses to claims made by owners and bond claimants. In Dave's Excavating, Inc. and Liberty Mutual Insurance Co. v. City of New Castle, Indiana, 959 N.E.2d 369 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012), the contractor (“Dave’s”) was the successful bidder on a public sanitary sewer and water main extension project. Dave's procured a performance bond from Liberty Mutual to guarantee its performance obligations to the owner (the "City"). After encountering what it deemed different subsurface conditions—and indeed after having been previously granted a change order to use excavated materials as backfill in light of the subsurface conditions on site—Dave’s placed the project engineer on notice of a differing site conditions claim. The total claim amounted to an 84% increase in the total contract price. With the claim, Dave's advised the project engineer it was ceasing further work until the project engineer provided direction. While the project engineer reviewed the claim, it reminded Dave's of its contractual obligation to "carry on the work and adhere to the progress schedule during all disputes or disagreements with the OWNER." A dispute immediately occurred regarding whether Dave's was required to continue to work while the project engineer resolved the differing site condition claim. After Dave's maintained its position that it was not required to continue to work, the project engineer placed it on notice of default and copied the letter to Liberty Mutual. Read the court decision
Read the full story...
Reprinted courtesy of Brian M. Falcon
Brian M. Falcon can be contacted at http://www.frostbrowntodd.com/contact.html

Righting Past Wrongs Through Equitable Development

January 17, 2022 — Bruce Buckley & Pam Radtke Russell - Engineering News-Record
Standing on a dead-end street in Spartanburg, S.C., Harold Mitchell can plainly see the history of injustice in his community. On one side lies the remains of his childhood home. On the other, a shuttered fertilizer plant that was operational when Mitchell was growing up. He distinctly recalls smells of ammonia and sulfur emanating through the neighborhood that “were so pervasive, you didn’t even think about it.” He remembers his father regularly cleaning white dust off their cars, and workers emerging from the plant gates “looking like the Pillsbury Doughboy” covered in fertilizer dust from head to toe. Sometimes, he’d walk with the plant’s night watchman, strolling alongside neon green sewage lagoons located not far from his bedroom window. Reprinted courtesy of Bruce Buckley, Engineering News-Record and Pam Radtke Russell, Engineering News-Record ENR may be contacted at enr@enr.com Read the full story... Read the court decision
Read the full story...
Reprinted courtesy of

Toll Brothers Snags Home Builder of the Year Honors at HLS

May 13, 2014 — Beverley BevenFlorez-CDJ STAFF
Builder magazine named Toll Brothers as their Builder of the Year during their Housing Leadership Summit in Laguna Niguel, California, according to Big Builder: “The Builder of the Year, BUILDER’s highest honor each year, is recognized for its excellence in successful business strategy, its achievements, and its corporate leadership.” “The company’s up-market price-point, lifestyle segmentation positions, and its best-of-breed execution set it apart from competitors in production home building and development as one of housing’s most powerful and promising brands,” BUILDER editorial director John McManus said while presenting the award, as quoted by Big Builder. “Toll Brothers one day will be a globally recognizable luxury housing and hospitality trademark along the lines of Four Seasons or Ritz-Carlton.” Read the court decision
Read the full story...
Reprinted courtesy of

Latosha Ellis Selected for 2019 Leadership Council on Legal Diversity Pathfinder Program

April 10, 2019 — Michael S. Levine - Hunton Andrews Kurth
Hunton Andrews Kurth has selected Latosha Ellis, an associate in the firm’s Insurance Coverage practice, for the 2019 Leadership Council on Legal Diversity (LCLD) Pathfinder Program. Pathfinder is a national yearlong program that trains diverse, high performing, early-career attorneys in critical career development strategies, including foundational leadership and building professional networks. Read the court decision
Read the full story...
Reprinted courtesy of Michael S. Levine, Hunton Andrews Kurth
Mr. Levine may be contacted at mlevine@HuntonAK.com

Power & Energy - Emerging Insurance Coverage Cases of Interest

November 30, 2020 — David G. Jordan & Tiffany Casanova - Saxe Doernberger & Vita, P.C.
The Power & Energy sector faces a multitude of risks that impact output and profitability, requiring sound risk management and robust insurance programs. As of recent, like most industries, there have been significant challenges facing the industry in light of COVID-19. These issues, including decreased product demand as well as supply- side issues, have been well documented. However, other issues continue to impact Power & Energy providers, with significant insurance coverage implications that are worthy of note. Below is a summary of three open cases of interest, where declaratory relief has been sought by energy providers’ insurance carriers, seeking an avoidance of coverage. 1. Fracking Dispute and “Intentional Acts” In the Texas case of The James River Insurance Co. v. Clearpoint Chemicals LLC et al., No. 4:20-cv-0076 (N.D.Tex), James River Insurance Company (“James River”) is asking a federal district court to declare that it does not owe defense or indemnity to its insured for acts it defines as both intentional and/or malicious acts. Reprinted courtesy of David G. Jordan, Saxe Doernberger & Vita, P.C. and Tiffany Casanova, Saxe Doernberger & Vita, P.C. Mr. Jordan may be contacted at DJordan@sdvlaw.com Ms. Casanova may be contacted at TCasanova@sdvlaw.com Read the court decision
Read the full story...
Reprinted courtesy of

Where There's Smoke...California's New Emergency Wildfire Smoke Protection Regulation And What Employers Are Required To Do

August 26, 2019 — Michael Studenka – Newmeyer Dillion
California employers need to pay heed to the recently announced California Division of Occupational Safety and Health Standards Board (Cal/OSHA) emergency regulation related to their duty to protect employees from the potential harm caused by wildfire smoke. As of July 29, 2019, employers are required to actively monitor their local Air Quality Index (AQI) and take steps to protect their employees from the harmful particulate matter contained within wildfire smoke. Which Workplaces Are Impacted? The regulation applies to all workplaces exposed to wildfire smoke with an AQI level of 151 or greater (ranging from "unhealthy" to "hazardous"). "Exposed" workplaces are those that are not in enclosed buildings, structures, or vehicles with mechanical ventilation and the ability to close all windows and doors. Outdoor occupations including construction, agriculture, landscaping, maintenance, commercial delivery, and others that expose the worker to the outside air for more than one hour will be the most impacted by this new regulation, although firefighters engaged in fighting wildfires are expressly exempt from the statute. What If I Have A Potentially Exposed Workplace? Employers with outdoor workplaces that are exposed to wildfire smoke are required to monitor the AQI before each shift, and "periodically throughout the day," all to ensure that the Air Quality Index for PM2.5 (particulate matter with an aerodynamic diameter of 2.5 micrometers or smaller) remains below 151. This can be done by visiting certain governmental websites, including U.S. Environmental Protection Agency's AirNow website (www.airnow.gov), which allow for regular email alerts to be issued to the employer. An employer with a potentially exposed workplace must also set up a communication system capable of communicating to all affected employees (in a language readily understood) the status of wildfire smoke hazards. The communication system must also provide the employees a process to inform the employer of worsening air quality and/or any adverse symptoms that they may be experiencing (e.g., asthma or chest pain). Finally, employers are required to add to their Injury and Illness Protection Program (IIPP) the provision of effective training and instruction (i.e., approximately 15 minutes) regarding:

the health effects of wildfire smoke;
the right to obtain medical treatment without fear of reprisal;
how employees can obtain the current AQI for PM2.5;
the requirements of this regulation;
the employer's communication system regarding wildfire smoke;
the employer's methods for protecting employees from wildfire smoke;
the importance, limitations, and benefits of using a respirator when exposed to wildfire smoke; and
the proper use and maintenance of respirators.

The Required Provision of Respiratory Protective Equipment Employers with exposed workplaces are required to provide effective NIOSH-approved respirators (e.g., N95 filtering facepiece respirators) when AQI for PM2.5 levels are 151-200 (unhealthy), 201-300 (very unhealthy), or 301-500 (hazardous). The N95 respirator typically costs less than a dollar per mask and can be easily purchased online. Employers are also required to clean, store, and maintain these respirators for times of need. Employees are free to decide whether to use a respirator when the AQI for PM2.5 level is between 151-500, although employers must be prepared to offer the equipment at an AQI level of 151 or higher. Use of the respirator by an employee exposed to an AQI for PM2.5 level that exceeds 500, however, is required by law. What Should Potentially Exposed Employers Do Now? Employers should immediately begin supplementing their IIPP platforms to include this regulation's prescribed training regarding wildfire smoke. Companies should also develop an adequate monitoring and communication plan regarding wildfire smoke hazards and effectively train their supervisors on the same. Finally, acquiring an adequate supply of N95 filtering respirators now will help ensure that employers are prepared for the next wildfire. Michael Studenka is a partner in Newmeyer Dillion's Labor & Employment practice group. His practice focuses on the life cycle of Employment law. Mike advises and trains companies on proactive measures to keep them protected and in compliance, and leverages his significant trial experience when faced with litigation. You can reach out to him at michael.studenka@ndlf.com. Read the court decision
Read the full story...
Reprinted courtesy of

The Unthinkable Has Happened. How Should Contractors Respond?

May 11, 2020 — Bruce Orr - AEC Business
Any construction veteran expects the economy to contract and expand. However, the global pandemic presents contractors with a challenge unlike any in recent memory. How should they respond in an environment of such uncertainty? For some perspective, I chatted with Dr. John Killingsworth, a construction management professor at Colorado State University who has conducted extensive research on how contractors can weather economic downturns. BRUCE ORR: John, let’s say you’re in IT or are a c-suite executive at a contracting firm. This event has occurred. What are some of the questions you should be asking right now? JOHN KILLINGSWORTH: For starters, we have to acknowledge that the uncertainties are so tremendous that many contractors have no choice but to be reactive in the short term. They’re literally not sure whether particular job sites will be open or closed tomorrow or whether they’ll go to work next week. They’re also looking at predictions—from highly qualified statisticians, public health officials and others—that are just all over the map due to the limited nature of the data we have at hand. Read the court decision
Read the full story...
Reprinted courtesy of Bruce Orr, AEC Business
Mr. Orr may be contacted at bruce@pronovos.com

CAMBRIDGE MASSACHUSETTS BUILDING EXPERT DIRECTORY AND CAPABILITIES