California Supreme Court Confirms the Right to Repair Act as the Exclusive Remedy for Seeking Relief for Defects in New Residential Construction
February 22, 2018 —
Brenda Radmacher – Construction Law BlogThe California Supreme Court recently issued its decision on a critical issue in the residential construction industry – the claims for construction defects that a California homeowner can bring against a builder or seller of new residential properties in California.
Holding
In McMillin Albany v. The Superior Court of Kern County, the Court held that California’s Right to Repair Act (California Civil Code, sections 895, et seq.) (the “Act”) is the exclusive remedy for homeowners claiming defective construction of new residences in California.
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Brenda Radmacher, Gordon & ReesMs. Radmacher may be contacted at
bradmacher@grsm.com
NJ Court Reaffirms Rule Against Coverage for Faulty Workmanship Claims and Finds Fraud Claims Inherently Intentional
September 20, 2021 —
Anthony L. Miscioscia & Frank J. Perch, III - White and Williams LLPAwarding summary judgment to an insurer under both liability and directors & officers (D&O) coverage parts, a New Jersey trial court reaffirmed the principle that claims of defective workmanship without resulting “property damage” are not covered under a general liability policy, and further dismissed claims for fraud and breach of fiduciary duty, finding that such claims were inherently intentional and do not state a covered “occurrence.”
In Velez v. AR Management Company, et al., 2021 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1675 (Law Div. Bergen Co. Aug. 10, 2021), owners of a condominium unit rebuilt after a fire sued the condominium association, several association board members, the association’s property management company and the general contractor for the reconstruction work. The owners’ suit alleged faulty workmanship and incomplete repairs. In addition, the owners asserted fraud and breach of fiduciary duty claims against the management company, alleging conflicts of interest and self-dealing between the management company and the general contractor, which had common ownership.
In a third-party complaint, the management company sought coverage from the condo association’s liability and D&O insurer. The court dismissed the D&O coverage claim, noting that the management company was not a director or officer or otherwise entitled to insured status for the D&O coverage part.
Reprinted courtesy of
Anthony L. Miscioscia, White and Williams LLP and
Frank J. Perch, III, White and Williams LLP
Mr. Miscioscia may be contacted at misciosciaa@whiteandwilliams.com
Mr. Perch may be contacted at perchf@whiteandwilliams.com
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More Hensel Phelps Ripples in the Statute of Limitations Pond?
February 03, 2020 —
Christopher G. Hill - Construction Law MusingsAs is always the case when I attend the Virginia State Bar’s annual construction law seminar, I come away from it with a few posts on recent cases and their implications. The first of these is not a construction case, but has implications relating to the state project related statute of limitations and indemnification issues for construction contracts brought out in stark relief in the now infamous Hensel Phelps case.
In Radiance Capital Receivables Fourteen, LLC v. Foster the Court considered a waiver of the statute of limitations found in a loan contract. The operative facts are that the waiver was found in a Continuing Guaranty contract and that the default happened more than 5 years prior to the date that Radiance filed suit to enforce its rights. When the defendants filed a plea in bar stating that the statute of limitations had run and therefore the claim was barred, Radiance of course argued that the defendants had waived their right to bring such a defense. The defendants responded that the waiver was invalid in that it violated the terms of Va. Code 8.01-232 that states among other things:
an unwritten promise not to plead the statute shall be void, and a written promise not to plead such statute shall be valid when (i) it is made to avoid or defer litigation pending settlement of any case, (ii) it is not made contemporaneously with any other contract, and (iii) it is made for an additional term not longer than the applicable limitations period.
The Circuit Court and ultimately the Supreme Court agreed with the defendants. In doing so, the Virginia Supreme Court rejected arguments of estoppel and an argument that a “waiver” is not a “promise not to plead.”
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The Law Office of Christopher G. HillMr. Hill may be contacted at
chrisghill@constructionlawva.com
New Plan Submitted for Explosive Demolition of Old Tappan Zee Bridge
December 19, 2018 —
Eydie Cubarrubia - Engineering News-RecordWorker safety concerns sparked a new plan on how to demolish the remnants of the old Tappan Zee Bridge in New York.
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Eydie Cubarrubia, ENRMs. Cubarrubia may be contacted at
cubarrubiae@enr.com
M&A Representation and Warranty Insurance Considerations in the Wake of the Coronavirus Pandemic
April 06, 2020 —
Lori Smith & Patrick Devine - White and Williams Taking Care of Business BlogIncreasingly, M&A transactions are using representation and warranty insurance (RWI) to bridge the gap between a buyer’s desire for adequate recourse to recover damages arising out of breach of representations in the purchase agreement and a seller’s desire to minimize post-closing risk and holdbacks or purchase price escrows traditionally used as the means to satisfy such obligations. When it works, RWI provides a significant benefit to both parties: it mitigates the buyer’s risk in the event that the seller’s representations and warranties prove untrue, and it permits the seller to reduce the portion of the purchase price that it would otherwise have to leave in escrow to cover future claims for breach of those representations and warranties. However, as the coronavirus pandemic ravages the global economy, insurers are now expressly adding COVID-19 exclusions to their RWI policies. If RWI insurers decline coverage for these losses, the allocation of risk in the representations and warranties (and related indemnity provisions) will be more critical than the parties contemplated when they negotiated the transaction documents.
Unlike in the case of a natural disaster, insurers cannot quantify the economic fallout that may result from the coronavirus pandemic. This uncertainty breeds systemic concern about the number of insurance claims that covered parties of all varieties will bring, which in turn creates an industry-wide reluctance to cover the claims. Based on discussions with market participants, we understand that, at the present time, 70% to 80% of RWI insurers are broadly excluding losses resulting from COVID-19 and similar viruses, epidemics, and pandemics (including government actions in response thereto), 5% to 10% are narrowly excluding specific coronavirus-related losses that are more likely to be implicated in a particular transaction (e.g., losses caused by business interruption), and 10% to 15% may be willing to narrow their exclusions upon completion of the underwriting process, depending on their comfort level after conducting rigorous and heightened diligence. Insurers’ concerns are wide-ranging, but the representations and warranties causing the greatest distress appear to be those regarding customer retention, supply chain matters, undisclosed liabilities, and the absence of changes between the date of the seller’s most recent financial statements and the transaction closing date.
Reprinted courtesy of
Lori Smith, White and Williams and
Patrick Devine, White and Williams
Ms. Smith may be contacted at smithl@whiteandwilliams.com
Mr. Devine may be contacted at devinep@whiteandwilliams.com
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Massachusetts Court Holds Statute of Repose Bars Certain Asbestos-Related Construction Claims
April 17, 2019 —
Timothy J. Keough & Rochelle Gumapac - White and Williams LLPIn Stearns v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Company, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court (SJC) addressed whether the six-year statute of repose for improvements to real property applies to long-tail tort claims, such as those caused by exposure to asbestos. Reasoning that the language of § 2B is clear, unambiguous and unequivocal, the SJC held that Mass. Gen. Laws. c. 260 § 2B does in fact bar all tort claims arising out of a deficiency or neglect in the design, planning, construction or general administration of an improvement to real property filed after the expiration of the six-year repose period. Additionally, the court affirmed that the time limitations imposed by the statute of repose may not be tolled for any reason six years after either the opening of the improvement for use or the owner taking possession of the improvement for occupation upon substantial completion, whichever may occur first.
Reprinted courtesy of
Timothy J. Keough, White and Williams LLP and
Rochelle Gumapac, White and Williams LLP
Mr. Keough may be contacted at keought@whiteandwilliams.com
Ms. Gumapac may be contacted at gumapacr@whiteandwilliams.com
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Amendments to Federal Rule of Evidence 702 – Expert Testimony
October 30, 2023 —
William L. Doerler - The Subrogation StrategistIn April, the Supreme Court sent a list of proposed amendments to Congress that amend the Federal Rules of Evidence. Absent action by Congress, the rules go into effect December 1, 2023. The proposed amendments affect Rules 106, 615 and, relevant to this article, 702.
Rule 702 addresses testimony by an expert witness. The proposed rule reads as follows (new material is underlined; matters omitted are lined through):
A witness who is qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education may testify in the form of an opinion or otherwise if the proponent demonstrates to the court that it is more likely than not that:
- the expert’s scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will help the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue;
- the testimony is based on sufficient facts or data;
- the testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods; and
- the expert has reliably applied expert’s opinion reflects a reliable application of the principles and methods to the facts of the case.
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William L. Doerler, White and Williams LLPMr. Doerler may be contacted at
doerlerw@whiteandwilliams.com
Texas EIFS Case May Have Future Implications for Construction Defects
October 02, 2013 —
CDJ STAFFLennar Homes addressed a problem with EIFS in homes built in Texas in the 1990s by replacing every roof they had built. Some of those homes had problems with leaks, rotting, or termites, but other roofs hadn’t suffered any problems. Lennar’s insurers initially refused coverage. Lennar managed to settle with all but one, Markel American Insurance.
Their dispute formed the case Lennar Corp. v. Markel American Insurance Co. This was first tried before a jury and eventually appealed to the Texas Supreme Court. Brian S. Martin of Thompson Coe Cousins & Irons LLP discusses this case at Insurance Journal.
Markel’s claim was that under the policy language, Lennar could not make voluntary payments without getting Markel’s consent, which they did not. But the Texas Supreme Court disagreed, determining that Lennar took, as Mr. Martin notes, “a reasonable approach to a serious problem.”
Markel also made the claim that the whole amount of the damages was not covered by the policy, as they did not view the policy as covering the cost of determining the extent of the damage. The Court disagreed, noting that “under no reasonable construction of the phrase can the cost of finding EIFS property damage in order to repair it not to be considered ‘because of the damage.’”
Mr. Martin concludes by calling the Texas Supreme Court decision “a frontal assault on several critical provisions of liability policies that will assuredly lead to further litigation.” He also notes that the decision “may indicate a shift in the Court’s approach in insurance cases to a more result-oriented jurisprudence.”
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