Disputes Over Arbitrator Qualifications: The Northern District of California Offers Some Guidance
August 10, 2021 —
Justin K. Fortescue - White and WilliamsThe selection of an arbitration panel can often lead to disputes between the parties regarding things like whether a particular candidate is qualified, whether a challenge to an arbitrator’s qualifications can be addressed pre-award and whether a party that names an unqualified arbitrator should lose the opportunity to name a replacement. In Public Risk Innovations v. Amtrust Financial Services, No. 21-cv-03573, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 129464 (N.D. Ca. July 12, 2021), the court provided answers on all three of these issues.
In Amtrust, the parties filed cross-motions to compel arbitration. Although both parties agreed the dispute was arbitrable, they disagreed about whether Public Risk Innovations, Solutions and Management’s (PRISM) arbitrator was qualified under the terms of the applicable contract. In seeking to have PRISM’s arbitrator disqualified, Amtrust argued that he: (1) was not a “current or former official of an insurance or reinsurance company”; and (2) was not “disinterested.” Amtrust also argued that because PRISM named an unqualified arbitrator (and presumably the time to appoint had passed), PRISM should be deemed to have failed to select an arbitrator as required by the contract and that Amtrust had the right to select a second arbitrator of its choice.
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Justin K. Fortescue, White and WilliamsMr. Fortescue may be contacted at
fortescuej@whiteandwilliams.com
MetLife Takes Majority Stake in New San Francisco Office Tower
October 21, 2015 —
Hui-Yong Yu – BloombergMetLife Inc. is taking a majority stake in a 43-story office tower being built next to San Francisco’s Transbay Transit Center, expanding the biggest U.S. life insurer’s holdings in one of the country’s most expensive office markets.
MetLife formed a joint venture with Chicago-based John Buck Co. and Golub & Co. for the property, called Park Tower at Transbay, the companies said in a statement before the building’s groundbreaking Tuesday. The tower, which doesn’t yet have a tenant, is scheduled for completion in 2018.
Financial terms of the venture weren’t disclosed. Fred Pieretti, a spokesman for MetLife, said the company will own a majority interest in the building.
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Hui-Yong Yu, Bloomberg
An Increase of US Metro Areas’ with Normal Housing & Economic Health
February 05, 2015 —
Beverley BevenFlorez-CDJ STAFFAccording to the National Association of Home Builders’ (NAHB) Eye on Housing, 63 (out of 351) US metropolitan areas have returned to or exceeded their last normal level of housing and economic health—that’s up from 60 last quarter.
NAHB reported that “The Leading Markets Index measures a market’s proximity to normal as defined by the level of single-family housing permits, home prices and employment.”
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Illinois Supreme Court Announces Time Standards for Closing Out Cases
April 11, 2022 —
Zachary Shelton - Lewis Brisbois(April 4, 2022) - Beginning July 1, 2022, Illinois trial courts will begin imposing new time standards for closing out pending cases. This change follows the Illinois Supreme Court’s March 25, 2022 announcement setting new time standards for case closure in trial courts. This announcement will apply to all cases filed in the State of Illinois on or after January 1, 2022.
According to the recent announcement, the purpose of the new Time Standards Order (the Order) is to assist Illinois circuit courts with “meeting their fundamental obligation to resolve disputes fully, fairly, and promptly” by establishing a uniform, statewide expectation for parties, attorneys, and judges regarding the status of cases that will require each court to evaluate its actual performance compared to a statewide expectation.
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Zachary Shelton, Lewis BrisboisMr. Shelton may be contacted at
Zachary.Shelton@lewisbrisbois.com
When an Intentional Act Results in Injury or Damage, it is not an Accident within the Meaning of an Insurance Policy Even When the Insured did not Intend to Cause the Injury or Damage
June 06, 2022 —
Gary L. LaHendro - Haight Brown & Bonesteel LLPIn
Maryam Ghukasian v. Aegis Security Insurance Company (No. B311310, filed April 14, 2022, and certified for publication on May 5, 2022), the Court of Appeal of the State of California, Second Appellate District held that Maryam Ghukasian’s insurer, Aegis Security Insurance Company (“Aegis”), had no duty to defend her in an underlying lawsuit alleging she cleared land and cut trees on her neighbors’ property without their consent. The appellate court explained Ms. Ghukasian’s acts of intentionally cutting the trees and clearing the land were not accidental for purposes of insurance coverage, even if she acted on the good faith but mistaken belief the trees were on her property.
Ms. Ghukasian owns a home in Glendale, California. She purchased a homeowner’s insurance policy from Aegis for the policy period of June 13, 2018 to June 13, 2019 (the “Aegis Policy”). In August 2018, Ms. Ghukasian hired a contractor to clear and cut trees she believed were on her property. However, the trees were on the property of her neighbors, Vrej and George Aintablian.
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Gary L. LaHendro, Haight Brown & Bonesteel LLPMr. LaHendro may be contacted at
glahendro@hbblaw.com
The Fifth Circuit, Applying Texas Law, Strikes Down Auto Exclusion
July 11, 2022 —
Jeremy S. Macklin - Traub Lieberman Insurance Law BlogPenn-America Ins. Co. v. Tarango Trucking, LLC, 30 F.4th 440 (5th Cir. 2022), involved a coverage dispute over Penn-America Insurance Company’s (“Penn-America”) duty to defend and indemnify third-party claims against Tarango Trucking, LLC (“Tarango”) for a fatal accident on its property. At the time of the accident, Penn-America insured Tarango under a commercial general liability policy, which included an “Auto Exclusion” and “Parking Exception” provision. The Auto Exclusion stated the policy did not apply to bodily injury or property damage arising out of the use of any automobile, including the operation and loading or unloading. The Parking Exception stated the Auto Exclusion did not apply to parking an auto on Tarango’s premises. The main issues on appeal were whether the Parking Exception restored coverage otherwise precluded by the Auto Exclusion, and whether the district court prematurely decided Penn-America’s duty to indemnify. The appellate court answered yes to both.
On March 2, 2020, a truck driver employed by WS Excavation, LLC (“WS”), parked his tractor-trailer on Tarango’s property and proceeded to inspect and off-load heavy equipment. While operating the hydraulic lift, the tractor’s braking system disengaged. The tractor rolled back and struck the WS driver and his personal vehicle, resulting in his death and significant property damage. Notably, WS allegedly failed to properly maintain the tractor’s electronic and braking systems, and Tarango allegedly failed to maintain a level parking and loading facility compliant with industry standards and guidelines.
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Jeremy S. Macklin, Traub LiebermanMr. Macklin may be contacted at
jmacklin@tlsslaw.com
Gillotti v. Stewart (2017) 2017 WL 1488711 Rejects Liberty Mutual, Holding Once Again that the Right to Repair Act is the Exclusive Remedy for Construction Defect Claims
June 05, 2017 —
Richard H. Glucksman, Esq. & Chelsea L. Zwart, Esq. - Chapman Glucksman Dean Roeb & Barger BulletinBackground
In Gillotti v. Stewart (April 26, 2017) 2017 WL 1488711, which was ordered to be published on May 18, 2017, the defendant grading subcontractor added soil over tree roots to level the driveway on the plaintiff homeowner’s sloped lot. The homeowner sued the grading subcontractor under the California Right to Repair Act (Civil Code §§ 895, et seq.) claiming that the subcontractor’s work damaged the trees.
After the jury found the subcontractor was not negligent, the trial court entered judgment in favor of the subcontractor. The homeowner appealed, arguing that the trial court improperly construed the Right to Repair Act as barring a common law negligence theory against the subcontractor and erred in failing to follow Liberty Mutual Insurance Co. v. Brookfield Crystal Cove LLC (2013) 219 Cal.App.4th 98. The Third District Court of Appeal disagreed and affirmed the trial court’s judgment in favor of the subcontractor.
Impact
This is the second time the Third District Court of Appeal has held that Liberty Mutual (discussed below) was wrongly decided and held that the Right to Repair Act is the exclusive remedy for construction defect claims. The decision follows its holding in Elliott Homes, Inc. v. Superior Court (Hicks) (2016) 6 Cal.App.5th 333, in which the Court of Appeal held that the Right to Repair Act’s pre-litigation procedures apply when homeowners plead construction defect claims based on common law causes of action, as opposed to violations of the building standards set forth in the Right to Repair Act. Elliott is currently on hold at the California Supreme Court, pending the decision in McMillin Albany, LLC v. Superior Court (2015) 239 Cal.App.4th 1132, wherein Liberty Mutual was rejected for the first time by the Fifth District. CGDRB continues to follow developments regarding the much anticipated McMillin decision closely, as well as all related matters.
Discussion
The Right to Repair Act makes contractors and subcontractors not involved in home sales liable for construction defects only if the homeowner proves they negligently cause the violation in whole or part (Civil Code §§ 911(b), 936). As such, the trial court in Gillotti instructed the jury on negligence with respect to the grading subcontractor. The jury found that while the construction did violate some of the Right to Repair’s building standards alleged by the homeowner, the subcontractor was not negligent in anyway. After the jury verdict, the trial court found in favor of the grading subcontractor.
The homeowner moved for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict or a new trial on the grounds that the trial court improperly barred a common law negligence theory against the grading subcontractor. The trial court denied the motions on the grounds that “[t]he Right to Repair Act specifically provides that no other causes of action are allowed. See Civil Code § 943.” The trial court specifically noted that its decision conflicted with Liberty Mutual, in which the Fourth District Court of Appeal held that the Right to Repair Act does not eliminate common law rights and remedies where actual damage has occurred, stating that Liberty Mutual was wrongly decided and that the Liberty Mutual court was naïve in its assumptions regarding the legislative history of the Right to Repair Act.
In Gillotti, the Third District Court of Appeal stated that the Liberty Mutual court failed to analyze the language of Civil Code § 896, which “clearly and unequivocally expresses the legislative intent that the Act apply to all action seeking recovery of damages arising out of, or related to deficiencies in, residential construction, except as specifically set forth in the Act. The Act does not specifically except actions arising from actual damages. To the contrary, it authorizes recovery of damages, e.g., for ‘the reasonable cost of repairing and rectifying any damages resulting from the failure of the home to meet the standards....’ ([Civil Code] § 944).”
The Court also disagreed with Liberty Mutual’s view that because Civil Code §§ 931 and 943 acknowledge exceptions to the Right to Repair Act’s statutory remedies, the Act does not preclude common law claims for damages due to defects identified in the Act. The Court stated: “Neither list of exceptions, in section 943 or in section 931, includes common law causes of action such as negligence. If the Legislature had intended to make such a wide-ranging exception to the restrictive language of the first sentence of section 943, we would have expected it to do so expressly.”
Additionally, the Court of Appeal rejected the argument that Civil Code § 897 preserves a common law negligence claims for violation of standards not listed in Civil Code § 986. It explained that the section of Civil Code § 897, which provides, “The standards set forth in this chapter are intended to address every function or component of a structure,” expresses the legislative intent that the Right to Repair Act be all-encompassing. Anything inadvertently omitted is actionable under the Act if it causes damage. Any exceptions to the Act are made expressly through Civil Code §§ 931 and 934. The Court concluded in no uncertain terms that the Right to Repair Act precludes common law claims in cases for damages covered by the Act.
The homeowner further argued that she was not precluded from bringing a common law claim because a tree is not a “structure,” and therefore the alleged tree damage did not fall within the realm of the Right to Repair. The Court of Appeal also rejected this argument, holding that while the tree damage itself was not expressly covered, the act of adding soil to make the driveway level (which caused the damage) implicated the standards covered by the Right to Repair Act. The Court explained that since under the Act a “structure” includes “improvement located upon a lot or within a common area” (Civil Code § 895(a)), as the driveway was an improvement upon the lot, the claim was within the purview of the Right to Repair Act. As the soil, a component of the driveway, caused damage (to the trees), it was actionable under the Act.
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Richard H. Glucksman, Chapman Glucksman Dean Roeb & Barger and
Chelsea L. Zwart, Chapman Glucksman Dean Roeb & Barger
Mr. Glucksman may be contacted at rglucksman@cgdrblaw.com
Ms. Zwart may be contacted at czwart@cgdrblaw.com
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Insured's Claim for Water Damage Dismissed with Leave to Amend
August 12, 2024 —
Tred R. Eyerly - Insurance Law HawaiiThe court granted the insurer's motion to dismiss the insured's claim for water damage under a homeowners' policy, but granted leave to amend. Thompson v. State Farm Gen. Ins. Co., 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 98486 (C.D. Cal. June 3, 2024).
The insureds' first amended complaint alleged they "suffered a sudden and accidental water loss below their slab in their home." A plumber hired by the insureds discovered "a copper pipe burst inside a structural concrete footing between a manifold in the living room and the water heater." The insureds notified their insurer, State Farm.
Claim adjuster Andrea Acevedo conducted a visual inspection. The complaint alleged she did not "inspect or view the pipe, or have a testing conducted on the pipe." Acevedo sent a letter denying the insureds' claim based upon her finding that "because the loss was caused by a slab leak, there is no coverage available for the loss." The letter explained that the hot water supply line under the home failed due to wear, tear, deterioration and/or electrolysis. The predominant cause of loss to the failed pipe was due to one or a combination of rust, electrolysis, corrosion, wear, tear and/or deterioration. The policy did not cover water damage caused by water from below the surface of the ground. Further coverage for wear, tear, deterioration, rot, mold, maintenance, water from below the surface of the ground and a continuous or repeated seepage or leakage of water was excluded.
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Tred R. Eyerly, Damon Key Leong Kupchak HastertMr. Eyerly may be contacted at
te@hawaiilawyer.com
