Fairfield Connecticut Building Expert Directory

Latosha Ellis Selected for 2019 Leadership Council on Legal Diversity Pathfinder Program

April 10, 2019 — Michael S. Levine - Hunton Andrews Kurth
Hunton Andrews Kurth has selected Latosha Ellis, an associate in the firm’s Insurance Coverage practice, for the 2019 Leadership Council on Legal Diversity (LCLD) Pathfinder Program. Pathfinder is a national yearlong program that trains diverse, high performing, early-career attorneys in critical career development strategies, including foundational leadership and building professional networks. Read the court decision
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Reprinted courtesy of Michael S. Levine, Hunton Andrews Kurth
Mr. Levine may be contacted at mlevine@HuntonAK.com

Wait! Don’t Sign Yet: Reviewing Contract Protections During the COVID Pandemic

April 13, 2020 — Danielle S. Ward - Balestreri Potocki & Holmes
As the circumstances of the COVID pandemic change day by day, and we all rush to keep business moving where and when we can, companies should consider hitting the “pause button” before renewing or executing any new contracts. Developing contracts often takes considerable time and expense, and companies are not in the habit of reworking them often. A change in law may prompt a company to revisit their contract terms, but otherwise business is often carried out with a standard form contract for a period of years. With the COVID pandemic affecting nearly every business and industry, life is not business as usual, and companies should make sure their contracts consider what previously seemed like an unforeseeable event. Force Majeure clauses are included in many contracts to excuse contract performance when made impossible by some unforeseen circumstance. These clauses typically fall under two categories: general and specific. General force majeure clauses excuse performance if performance is prevented by circumstances outside the parties’ control. By contrast, specific force majeure clauses detail the exhaustive list of circumstances (acts of god, extreme weather, war, riot, terrorism, embargoes) which would excuse contract performance. Force majeure clauses are typically interpreted narrowly. If your contract has a specific clause and pandemic or virus is not one of the listed circumstances it may not apply. Whether a particular existing contract covers the ongoing COVID pandemic will vary depending on the language of the contract. Force majeure clauses previously made headlines when the great economic recession hit in 2008. A number of courts held that simple economic hardship was not enough to invoke force majeure. The inability to pay or lack of desire to pay for the contracted goods or services did not qualify as force majeure. In California, impossibility turns on the nature of the contractual performance, and not in the inability of the obligor to do it. (Kennedy v. Reece (1964) 225 Cal. App. 2d 717, 725.) In other words, the task is objectively impossible not merely impossible or more burdensome to the specific contracting party. California has codified “force majeure” protection where the parties haven’t included any language or the circumstances in the clause don’t apply to the situation at hand. Civil Code section 1511 excuses performance when “prevented or delayed by an irresistible, superhuman cause, or by the act of public enemies of this state or of the United States, unless the parties have expressly agreed to the contrary.” (Civ. Code § 1511.) What qualifies as a “superhuman cause”? In California, the test is whether under the particular circumstances there was such an insuperable interference occurring without the party's intervention as could not have been prevented by the exercise of prudence, diligence and care. (Pacific Vegetable Oil Corp. v. C. S. T., Ltd. (1946) 29 Cal.2d 228, 238.) If you find yourself in an existing contract without a force majeure clause, or the statute does not apply, you may consider the doctrine of frustration of purpose. This doctrine is applied narrowly where performance remains possible, but the fundamental reason the parties entered into the contract has been severely or substantially frustrated by an unanticipated supervening circumstance, thus destroying substantially the value of the contract. (Cutter Laboratories, Inc. v. Twining (1963) 221 Cal. App. 2d 302, 314-15.) In other words, performance is still possible but valueless. Note this defense is not likely to apply where the contract has simply become less profitable for one party. Now that COVID is no longer an unforeseeable event, but rather a current and grave reality, a party executing a contract today without adequate protections may have a difficult time proving unforeseeability. Scientists are not sure whether warm weather will suppress the spread of the virus, as it does with the seasonal flu, but to the extent we get a reprieve during the summer we may see a resurgence of cases this Fall or Winter. Companies should take care in reviewing force majeure clauses, and other clauses tied to timely performance such as delay and liquidated damages before renewing or executing new contracts. Your contract scenario may vary from the summary provided above. Please contact legal counsel before making any decisions. During this critical time, BPH’s attorneys can be reached via email to answer your questions. Read the court decision
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Reprinted courtesy of Danielle S. Ward, Balestreri Potocki & Holmes
Ms. Ward may be contacted at dward@bph-law.com

Suzanne Pollack Elected to Lawyers Club of San Diego 2021 Board of Directors

May 03, 2021 — Suzanne Pollack - Lewis Brisbois
San Diego Associate Suzanne Pollack was recently elected to the 2021 Lawyers Club of San Diego Board of Directors for a three-year term that will begin on July 1, 2021. Founded in 1972, the mission of Lawyers Club - San Diego’s largest specialty bar association - is to advance the status of women in the law and society. “I am honored to be joining Lawyers Club’s Board of Directors, particularly after this last year, during which we saw the dramatic impact that the pandemic had upon women in the workforce," said Ms. Pollack. "Promoting equality, diversity, and advocacy has never been more important, and I look forward to working with the Board to further these goals.” Read the court decision
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Reprinted courtesy of Suzanne Pollack, Lewis Brisbois
Ms. Pollack may be contacted at Suzanne.Pollack@lewisbrisbois.com

Supreme Court of New Jersey Reviews Statutes of Limitation and the Discovery Rule in Construction Defect Cases

July 18, 2018 — David Suggs – Bert L. Howe & Associates, Inc.
Robert Neff Jr. of Wilson Elser analyzed the recent case, Palisades at Fort Lee Condo. Ass’n v. 100 Old Palisade, LLC, 2017 N.J. Lexis 845, 169 A.3d 473 (Supreme Court of New Jersey, September 14, 2017), and states that this ruling “gives defendants the ability to defend against the assertion that the statute of limitations was tolled until the most recent owner (and plaintiff) discovered the cause of action.” Neff concludes that a statute of limitations test needs to be conducted at the beginning of each case: “In Palisades, the motions to dismiss based on the statute of limitations were filed at the conclusion of all discovery. While an initial analysis might yield the conclusion that certain discovery will be needed to ascertain the appropriate accrual date (or dates, in the case of multiple defendants), counsel will then know what discovery to seek during the discovery period.” Read the court decision
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Hawaii Supreme Court Tackles "Other Insurance" Issues

February 25, 2014 — Tred Eyerly – Insurance Law Hawaii
Responding to four certified questions from the Ninth Circuit, the Hawaii Supreme Court addressed various issues raised by competing "other insurance" provisions in two CGL policies. Nautilus Ins. Co. v. Lexington Ins. Co., 2014 Haw. LEXIS 59 (Haw. Feb. 13, 2014). Coverage for a development on Maui was at issue. The developer, VP & PK (ML) LLC, was insured by Lexington. The other insurance provision in Lexington's policy provided it was excess over "any other primary insurance available to you covering liability for damages arising out of the premises . . . for which you have been added as an additional insured." Kila Kila Construction was one of VP & PK's subcontractors. Kika Kila was not an additional insured under Lexington's policy. Kila Kila had its own CGL policy with Nautilus. The Nautilus other insurance clause stated the insurance was excess over "any other primary insurance available to you covering liability arising out of the premises or operations for which you ahve been added as an additional insured." An endorsement added VP & PK as an additional insured, but only for liability arising out of Kila Kila's negligence. Read the court decision
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Reprinted courtesy of Tred R. Eyerly, Insurance Law Hawaii
Mr. Eyerly may be contacted at te@hawaiilawyer.com

Project Completion Determines Mechanics Lien Recording Deadline

April 08, 2024 — William L. Porter - Porter Law Group
The California mechanics lien is one of the most powerful collection remedies available to contractors, subcontractors and suppliers who are unpaid for work performed and materials supplied in relation to a California private works construction project. The mechanics lien allows the claimant to actually sell the property where the work was carried out in order to obtain payment, entirely of course, against the wishes of the property owner. There are a number of important steps to follow and timelines to be met in order to pursue this remedy. First, Understand Your Preliminary Notice Deadline Working within deadlines is absolutely crucial to preserving mechanics lien rights under California law. The deadlines differ, depending on whether you are a “direct” contractor, also known as “original” or “prime” contractor (one who contracts directly with the property owner) or a subcontractor or material supplier. The process begins with the serving of a “preliminary notice” no later than 20 days after the party serving the preliminary notice begins supplying labor or materials to the project. Direct contractors are only required to serve the preliminary notice on the construction lender (Civil Code section 8200-8216), whereas subcontractors and material suppliers must serve not only the construction lender, but also the owner and direct contractor (see Civil Code section 8200(e)). Read the court decision
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Reprinted courtesy of William L. Porter, Porter Law Group
Mr. Porter may be contacted at bporter@porterlaw.com

Lessee Deemed Statutory Employer, Immune from Tort Liability by Pennsylvania Court

November 03, 2016 — Jerry Anders & Alison Russell – White and Williams LLP
The Superior Court of Pennsylvania addressed whether a lessee can be shielded from tort liability as a statutory employer and thus, immune from civil liability under the Workers’ Compensation Act. The court in Doman v. Atlas America, Inc. held that a primary contractor who leased property for the purposes of removing and drilling natural gas is a statutory employer under Section 302(a) of the Act and thus, entitled to tort immunity under Section 203 of the Act. Reprinted courtesy of Jerrold Anders, White and Williams LLP and Alison Russell, White and Williams LLP Mr. Anders may be contacted at andersj@whiteandwilliams.com Ms. Russell may be contacted at russella@whiteandwilliams.com Read the court decision
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Insurer's Motion in Limine to Dismiss Case for Lack of Expert Denied

June 26, 2014 — Tred R. Eyerly – Insurance Law Hawaii
The court denied the insurer's motion in limine seeking to dismiss the insureds' complaint due to the absence of expert testimony. Fabozzi v. Lexington Ins. Co., 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 74069 (E.D. N.Y. May 30, 2014). During the policy period, the insureds noticed their house had serious structural problems, including cracks in the walls and floors that were pitched toward the rear of the house. The insureds had to move from their house. When they submitted a claim, it was denied by Lexington because the losses were caused by "wear and tear, deterioration, earth movement, settlement, shrinking, bulging or expansion of the property leading to cracking of structural components." The insureds sued. Lexington filed a motion in limine to preclude the testimony of the insureds' expert and to dismiss the complaint for inability to offer prima facie proof of a covered loss absent such expert testimony. Read the court decision
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Reprinted courtesy of Tred R. Eyerly, Insurance Law Hawaii
Mr. Eyerly may be contacted at te@hawaiilawyer.com

FAIRFIELD CONNECTICUT BUILDING EXPERT DIRECTORY AND CAPABILITIES