Supreme Court of New York Denies Motion in all but One Cause of Action in Kikirov v. 355 Realty Assoc., et al.
April 28, 2011 —
Beverley BevenFlorez CDJ STAFFIn the construction defect suit Kikirov v. 355 Realty Associates, LLC, et al., the Supreme Court of the State of New York granted a dismissal of the plaintiff’s fourth cause of action, but denied the defendants’ motion in all other respects. The plaintiff alleged breach of contract, among other claims. “355 Realty was the sponsor of 355 Kings Highway Condominium, a condominium project located at 355 Kings Highway, in Brooklyn, New York. The condominium units were allegedly marketed as ‘ultra luxury condos,’ and a ‘Manhattan style condominium building,’ which would be the ‘epitome of luxury and quality.’ The construction of the six-story 28 unit residential condominium building began in approximately November 2003. […] Plaintiff entered into a purchase agreement, dated December 21, 2005, with 355 Realty (which was executed on behalf of 355 Realty by Michael Marino, as its member) for the purchase of Unit 2G in the building.”
The plaintiff alleged that construction defects emerged soon after moving into the unit: “After taking occupancy of his condominium unit, plaintiff allegedly experienced serious leakage and moisture problems in his unit, which caused a dangerous mold condition to develop, in addition to causing actual damage to the structural elements of his unit. According to plaintiff, the walls, moldings, and wood floors of his unit are constantly wet and moist, and there is severe buckling of the wood floors. Plaintiff claims that these problems have caused his unit to be uninhabitable. Plaintiff alleges that he has been forced to remove all of his personal belongings from his unit and has been unable to occupy his unit.”
According to the plaintiff, Foremost attempted to repair the defects, but only made the situation worse: “Specifically, plaintiff asserts that Foremost’s contractors opened his walls to remove the stained drywall, but never corrected the cause of the leaks, destroyed the walls, and never properly taped and painted the sheet rock. Plaintiff alleges that Foremost repaired the openings in a defective manner. Plaintiff also claims that his floor was repaired at that time by a subcontractor hired by Foremost, but the basic structural problem was never resolved and the leaks continued, compromising the beams and causing the mold conditions, in addition to all of the physical damage present in the unit. On or about July 16, 2009, plaintiff allegedly sent a notice of the defects to 355 Realty and to the managing agent designated by the condominium board, by certified mail, return receipt requested. Plaintiff asserts that defendants have failed and refused to repair and remedy the defective condition, and that the damage is extensive and requires major structural repairs.”
The plaintiff filed suit on May 4, 2010, and the original complaint asserted eight causes of action. “By decision and order dated September 13, 2010, the court granted a motion by defendants to dismiss plaintiff’s second cause of action for breach of implied covenants of good faith and fair dealing, his third cause of action for breach of implied warranties, his fifth cause of action for negligence as against 355 Realty, Michael Marino, Anthony Piscione, Ahron Hersh, and Toby Hersh, his seventh cause of action for negligence as against Vision, Foremost, and MMJ, and his eighth cause of action for violations of General Business Law § 349 and § 350, and granted plaintiff leave to replead his first cause of action for breach of contract as against 355 Realty, Michael Marino, Anthony Piscione, Ahron Hersh, and Toby Hersh, his fourth cause of action for breach of statutory warranties, and his sixth cause of action for breach of contract as against Vision, Foremost, and MMJ.”
The plaintiff amended their complaint on October 18, 2010, and “has repleaded these three causes of action by asserting a first cause of action for breach of contract as against 355 Realty, Michael Marino, Anthony Piscione, Ahron Hersh, and Toby Hersh, a second cause of action for breach of statutory warranties, and a third cause of action for breach of contract as against Vision, Foremost, and MMJ. In addition, plaintiff, in his amended complaint, has added a fourth cause of action for fraud.”
The defendants, on the other hand, “argue that each of the four causes of action alleged by plaintiff in his amended complaint fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, and that plaintiff’s amended complaint must be dismissed pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7). Defendants also cite to CPLR 3211 (a) (1), and (5), asserting that dismissal is also required based upon documentary evidence and the Statute of Limitations contained in the limited warranty.” The defendants’ motion to dismiss the first cause of action, breach of contract against 355 Realty, was denied: “While defendants dispute that the alleged defects are actually structural in nature, plaintiff’s allegations as to their structural nature are sufficient, at this juncture, to withstand defendants’ motion to dismiss. Thus, dismissal of plaintiff’s first cause of action must be denied.”
Next, the court reviewed the second cause of action, which was breach of statutory warranties: “Defendants’ motion also seeks dismissal of plaintiff’s second cause of action for breach of statutory warranties, which alleges that, under applicable law, including General Business Law § 777-a, et seq., the sponsor warranted to purchasers of units that the units would be constructed in a skillful, careful, and workmanlike manner, consistent with proper design, engineering, and construction standards and practices, and free of material latent, design, and structural defects. Defendants argue that General Business Law § 777-a, known as the housing merchant implied warranty, is inapplicable to this case because it is limited to the construction of a ‘new home,’ defined in General Business Law § 777 (5) as ‘any single family house or for-sale unit in a multi-unit residential structure of five stories or less.’ As noted above, the building in which plaintiff’s condominium unit is located is a six-story building.”
The motion to dismiss the second cause of action is denied. The court provided this reasoning: “the full text of the offering plan has not been provided, the court is unable to examine the entire written agreement so as to determine the purpose of the inclusion of the text of General Business Law § 777.”
In the third cause of action, the plaintiff alleges “a breach of contract claim as against Vision, Foremost, and MMJ based upon their contract with 355 Realty, pursuant to which they agreed to be the general contractors/construction managers for the condominium, to undertake oversight responsibility for the design and construction of the condominium, to prepare and/or review drawings, plans, and specifications for the condominium, and to otherwise manage and oversee the project. Plaintiff alleges that Vision, Foremost, and MMJ breached their contractual obligations in that the condominium units were improperly and inadequately designed and constructed, and completed in an incompetent and unworkmanlike manner, with material design and construction defects.”
The motion to dismiss the third cause of action was denied as well: “Plaintiff alleges, in his amended complaint, that Vision, Foremost, and MMJ have acknowledged notice of the defects and have not denied that they are responsible for providing a warranty to plaintiff. Plaintiff also refers to this warranty, in his amended complaint, by noting that paragraph 16 of the purchase agreement stated that the ‘[s]eller shall not be liable to . . . the [p]urchaser for any matter as to which an assignable warranty . . . has been assigned . . . to [p]urchaser and in such case the sole recourse of such . . . [p]urchaser . . . shall be against the warrantor . . . except that in the event a contractor or subcontractor is financially unable or refuses to perform its warranty . . . [s]eller shall not be excused from its obligations enumerated in the [offering p]lan under Rights and Obligations of Sponsor.’ Consequently, the court finds that dismissal of plaintiff’s third cause of action as against Foremost and MMJ must also be denied.”
In the fourth cause of action, the plaintiff alleges “that defendants made false statements and representations orally, in advertisements, and in the purchase agreement, that the condominium was properly and adequately designed and constructed and completed in a competent and workmanlike manner, in accordance with the condominium plans and specifications and proper design, engineering, and construction standards and practices consistent with applicable standards for a first class, luxury condominium in Brooklyn.”
The court dismissed the fourth cause of action stating, “it must be dismissed because it is duplicative of his first cause of action for breach of contract.” Therefore, “defendants’ motion to dismiss plaintiff’s amended complaint is granted to the extent that it seeks dismissal of plaintiff’s fourth cause of action, and it is denied in all other respects.”
Read the court’s decision… Read the court decisionRead the full story...Reprinted courtesy of
New York Assembly Reconsiders ‘Bad Faith’ Bill
May 17, 2021 —
Copernicus T. Gaza, Adam Krauss, Robert S. Nobel, Craig Rokuson & Eric D. Suben - Traub LiebermanThe New York State Assembly is considering A07285, which creates a private right of action for bad faith “if the insurer unreasonably refuses to pay or unreasonably delays payment without substantial justification.” The bill was first introduced in 2013 but was reintroduced on May 3, 2021 and has received some recent attention. According to the bill, an insurer acts unreasonably when it (among other things):
- Fails to provide the claimant with accurate information regarding policy provisions relating to the coverage at issue; or
- Fails to effectuate in good faith a prompt, fair, and equitable settlement of a claim or portion of a claim and where the insurer failed to reasonably accord at least equal or more favorable consideration to its insured's interests as it did to its own interests, and thereby exposed the insured to a judgment in excess of the policy limits or caused other damage to a claimant; or
- Fails to provide a timely written denial of a claimant's claim, or portion thereof, with a full and complete explanation of such denial, including references to specific policy provisions wherever possible; or
Reprinted courtesy of
Copernicus T. Gaza, Traub Lieberman,
Adam Krauss, Traub Lieberman,
Robert S. Nobel, Traub Lieberman,
Craig Rokuson, Traub Lieberman and
Eric D. Suben, Traub Lieberman
Mr. Gaza may be contacted at cgaza@tlsslaw.com
Mr. Krauss may be contacted at akrauss@tlsslaw.com
Mr. Nobel may be contacted at rnobel@tlsslaw.com
Mr. Rokuson may be contacted at crokuson@tlsslaw.com
Mr Suben may be contacted at esuben@tlsslaw.com
Read the court decisionRead the full story...Reprinted courtesy of
What If Your CCP 998 Offer is Silent on Costs?
March 18, 2019 —
Tony Carucci - Snell & Wilmer Real Estate Litigation BlogIn California, the “prevailing party” in litigation is generally entitled to recover its costs as a matter of law. See Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 1032. But under California Code of Civil Procedure section 998, a party may make a so-called “offer to compromise,” which can reverse the parties’ entitlement to costs after the date of the offer, depending on the outcome of the litigation. Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 998. The potential payoff of a 998 offer is that “If an offer made by a defendant is not accepted and the plaintiff fails to obtain a more favorable judgment or award, the plaintiff shall not recover his or her postoffer costs and shall pay the defendant’s costs from the time of the offer.” Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 998(c)(1) (emphasis added).
But how do you determine whether a plaintiff obtained a more favorable judgment when the 998 offer is silent with respect to whether it includes costs?
In Martinez v. Eatlite One, Inc. (2018) 27 Cal.App.5th 1181, 1182–83, the defendant made a 998 offer of $12,001 that was silent regarding the treatment of attorneys’ fees and costs. Plaintiff did not respond to the offer, and the jury ultimately awarded plaintiff damages of $11,490. Id. In resolving the parties’ competing memoranda of costs and plaintiff’s motion for attorneys’ fees, the trial court awarded plaintiff her costs and attorneys’ fees. Id. at 1182. The trial court reasoned that plaintiff had obtained a more favorable judgment than the 998 offer because she was entitled to pre-offer costs and attorneys’ fees under the statute, which meant plaintiff’s ultimate recovery exceeded the 998 offer when added to the judgment. Id. at 1183. In other words, the court added plaintiff’s pre-offer costs and attorneys’ fees to the $11,490 verdict for the purposes of determining whether the “judgment” was greater than the 998 offer of $12,001. Id.
Read the court decisionRead the full story...Reprinted courtesy of
Tony Carucci, Snell & WilmerMr. Carucci may be contacted at
acarucci@swlaw.com
Legislation Update: S-865 Public-Private Partnerships in New Jersey Passed by Both Houses-Awaiting Governor’s Signature
July 02, 2018 —
Steven M. Charney & Charles F. Kenny - Peckar & Abramson, P.C.New Jersey is finally close to being among the many states with broad authority to develop or improve public projects through a Public-Private Partnership (P3) delivery method. This contracting model has stimulated growth and improvements in other States and led to the delivery of projects that may not otherwise have happened. Senate Bill 865 (“S-865”), after undergoing some last-minute amendments in a frenzied legislature dealing with budget and other critical issues, has passed in both houses of the Legislature and is waiting for Governor Murphy’s signature, which is expected shortly. The law will be effective 180 days from formal enactment. The administrative framework is now in place to make Public-Private Partnerships a reality in New Jersey.
Reprinted courtesy of
Steven M. Charney, Peckar & Abramson, P.C. and
Charles F. Kenny, Peckar & Abramson, P.C.
Mr. Charney may be contacted at scharney@pecklaw.com
Mr. Kenny may be contacted at ckenny@pecklaw.com
Read the court decisionRead the full story...Reprinted courtesy of
Spearin Doctrine 100 Years Old and Still Thriving in the Design-Build Delivery World
January 09, 2019 —
John P. Ahlers - Ahlers Cressman & Sleight PLLCThe Supreme Court’s ruling in United States v. Spearin, [1] also referred to as the Spearin doctrine, is a landmark construction decision.[2] The Spearin doctrine provides that the Owner impliedly warrants the information, plans and specifications which an Owner provides to a General Contractor. If a Contractor is bound to build according to plans and specifications prepared by the Owner, the Contractor will not be responsible for the consequences of defects in the plans and specifications.
Read the court decisionRead the full story...Reprinted courtesy of
John P. Ahlers, Ahlers Cressman & Sleight PLLCMr. Ahlers may be contacted at
john.ahlers@acslawyers.com
Yes, Indeedy. Competitive Bidding Not Required for School District Lease-Leasebacks
October 01, 2014 —
Garret Murai – California Construction Law BlogRemember when you discovered that the tooth fairy wasn’t real?
It was kind of a bummer on one hand learning that it wasn’t a fairy that magically appeared to swap your tooth for cold hard cash, but rather your mom or, visual horrors, dad.
At the same time, it was, to your nearly-halfway-to-a-decade-on-this-planet-wizened-six-year-old mind, confirmation of what you had a sneaking suspicion was the case in any event.
And, so it is with the next case.
Lease-Leasebacks
In California, most public school construction projects are built using the traditional design-bid-build project delivery method in which a design professional designs the project, the project is put out for competitive bid and the selected contractor builds the project.
But not all school construction projects are built this way.
Read the court decisionRead the full story...Reprinted courtesy of
Garret Murai, Kronick Moskovitz Tiedemann & GirardMr. Murai may be contacted at
gmurai@kmtg.com
How Small Mistakes Can Have Serious Consequences Under California's Contractor Licensing Laws.
February 15, 2018 —
Eric Reed - Myers, Widders, Gibson, Jones & Feingold, LLPIn construction, some risks have nothing to do with how well a contractor executes a project. Licensing problems is one of these risks. Even a brief lapse caused by an unintentional administrative error can give the CSLB grounds to discipline a contractor, or enable a customer to seek disgorgement and other remedies provided by Business and Professions Code section 7031. This article discusses five tips for mitigating the liabilities associated with licensing problems.
Tip 1: Take workers' compensation insurance very seriously. Workers’ compensation insurance problems can trigger license suspension in California. Business and Professions Code section 7125.4 calls for automatic suspension if a contractor cannot provide proof of workers’ compensation insurance for any period of time. This is particularly serious for residential remodelers who claim exemption for workers’ compensation but are later discovered – usually during litigation with a homeowner – to have “off the books” workers helping them. Courts can declare the contractor retroactively unlicensed under these circumstances and order it to disgorge,
i.e., to pay back, every penny paid by the customer for the entire project (even for materials). (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 7031, subd. (b);
Wright v. Issak (2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 1116.) The contractor will also find itself unable to collect any amounts owed to it by the customer. (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 7031, subd. (a).)
Tip 2: Watch out for licensing confusion after a merger or acquisition. The economic downturn of 2008 and 2009 resulted in consolidation throughout the building industry. The newly merged or acquired entities often allowed redundant licenses to expire, assuming they could complete all pending projects under the umbrella of the acquiring company's license. Many learned this was a mistake the hard way. Armed with the California Supreme Court's opinion in
MW Erectors, Inc. v. Niederhauser Ornamental & Metal Works Co., Inc. (2005) 36 Cal.4th 412, customers began refusing to pay invoices and demanding disgorgement under Business and Professions Code section 7031 because the original contractor did not maintain licensure “at all times.” Many of these customers succeeded.
Tip 3: If a license suspension has occurred or is imminent, prepare to prove substantial compliance. Section 7031(a) and (b) give a disgruntled or indebted customer every incentive to capitalize on a contractor's licensing problems. Subdivision (e) is where a contractor must turn to protect its interests if this happens. It allows the contractor to prove “substantial compliance” with licensing requirements and avoid (a)’s and (b)’s sharp edges if it can show the following:
(1) The contractor “had been duly licensed as a contractor in this state prior to the performance of the act or contract”;
(2) It “acted reasonably and in good faith to maintain proper licensure”; and
(3) It “acted promptly and in good faith to remedy the failure to comply with the licensure requirements upon learning of the failure.”
The Court of Appeal confirmed in
Judicial Council of California v. Jacobs Facilities, Inc. (2015) 239 Cal.App.4th 882 that a contractor, upon request, is entitled to a hearing on these three factors before it is subjected to disgorgement under Section 7031(b). The legislature amended Section 7031 shortly after the Court of Appeal published this case. The Assembly’s floor analysis went so far as to directly quote the opinion’s observation that penalizing a construction firm for “technical transgressions only indirectly serves the Contractors Law’s larger purpose of preventing the delivery of services by unqualified contractors.” (Assem. Com. on Bus. and Prof., Off. of Assem. Floor Analyses, analysis of Sen. Holden's No. 1793 (2015-2016 Reg. Sess.) as amended August 2, 2016, p. 2.) This echoed an industry consensus that clarifying the law was needed to ensure that properly licensed and law-abiding construction firms were not “placed at fatal monetary risk by malicious lawsuits motivated by personal gain rather than consumer protection.” (Assem. Com. on Judiciary, com. on Assem. Bill No. 1793 (2015-2016 Reg. Sess.), pp. 6-7.)
Unfortunately, existing law does not give many examples of what it means to act “reasonably and in good faith to maintain proper licensure” or to act “promptly and in good faith” to fix license problems. A practical approach is for a contractor to work backwards by assuming it will need to prove substantial compliance at some point in the future. Designated individuals within the organization should have clear responsibility over obtaining and renewing the proper licenses and should keep good records. If necessary, these designees can testify about the contractor's internal policies and their efforts to fix licensing problems when they arose. For example, if the suspension resulted from not providing the CSLB proof of workers’ compensation insurance, the designee can testify about the cause (a broker miscommunication, transmission error,
etc.) and produce documents showing how he or she worked promptly to procure a certificate of insurance to send CSLB. Saved letters, emails, and notes from telephone calls will provide designees and their successors with an important resource months or years down the line if a dispute arises and the contractor is required to reconstruct the chronology of a licensing glitch and prove its due diligence.
Tip 4: Don't sign new contracts unless all necessary licenses are active and any problems are resolved. A recently-formed contractor should not begin soliciting and signing contracts until all required licenses are confirmed as “active.” The first requirement of substantial compliance – being “duly licensed as a contractor in this state prior to the performance of the act or contract” – cannot be met by a contractor that first obtains its license mid-project. (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 7031, subd. (e)(1);
Alatriste v. Cesar’s Exterior Designs (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 656.) A licensed contractor should also consider refraining from signing new contracts if there is any reason to believe its license might be suspended in the near future – especially if the suspension will be retroactive. Having a suspension on record at the time of contracting may complicate the question of whether the contractor was “duly licensed . . . prior to performance” for the purposes of substantial compliance.
Tip 5: Any judgment against a contractor can cause license suspension if not handled promptly and correctly. The Business and Professions Code authorizes the CSLB to suspend the license of a contractor that does not pay a construction related court judgment within 90 days. The term “construction related” is interpreted to include nearly all types of disputes involving a contractor. (16 Cal. Code Reg. 868;
Pacific Caisson & Shoring, Inc. v. Bernards Bros. Inc. (2015) 236 Cal.App.4th 1246, 1254-1255.) This means a contractor should treat a judgment against it for unpaid office rent, for example, as one carrying the same consequences as one arising from a construction defect or subcontractor claim. The contractor should also not assume that filing an appeal, or agreeing with the other side to stay enforcement, automatically excuses the 90-day deadline in the eyes of the CSLB. It does not. A contractor must notify the CSLB in writing before this period expires, then post bond for the amount of judgment, if it wishes to delay payment for any reason. (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 7071.17, subd. (d).) A suspension may result if it does not. This applies even to small claims judgments.
Recent case law and the 2016 amendments to Business and Professions Code section 7031 provide some solace to those caught in the dragnet of California's licensing laws. But avoiding these problems altogether is preferable. Consider licensing the foundation of a successful business and deserving of the same attention as the structures a contractor builds.
Eric R. Reed is a business and insurance litigator in the Ventura office of Myers, Widders, Gibson, Jones & Feingold, LLP.
Read the court decisionRead the full story...Reprinted courtesy of
Eric Reed, Myers, Widders, Gibson, Jones & Feingold, LLPMr. Reed may be contacted at
ereed@mwgjlaw.com
The Great Fallacy: If Builders Would Just Build It Right There Would Be No Construction Defect Litigation
January 21, 2015 —
David McLain – Colorado Construction LitigationAs the 2015 Colorado legislative session gets into full swing, there is a lot of anticipation and discussion regarding this year’s construction defect reform bill. It seems like every time a reporter broaches this issue in an article, there is a quote from a plaintiffs’ attorney stating that if builders would just build homes right, there would be no need for construction defect litigation. This is the sentiment expressed in the site www.BuildOurHomesRight.com.
The problem with this argument is that it assumes that the “construction defects” for which associations sue are those only that affect the performance of the homes, or are likely to affect the performance of the homes during the useful life of the component at issue. Unfortunately, this is simply not the case. Over the years, the plaintiffs’ bar has stacked the deck, so to speak, making actionable every technical building code violation, regardless of whether it has any impact, or will ever likely have any impact, on the performance of the homes involved.
Read the court decisionRead the full story...Reprinted courtesy of
David M. McLain, Higgins, Hopkins, McLain & Roswell, LLCMr. McLain may be contacted at
mclain@hhmrlaw.com
