Of Pavement and Pandemic: Liability and Regulatory Hurdles for Taking It Outside
September 21, 2020 —
Jeff Clare - Gravel2Gavel Construction & Real Estate Law BlogAs the COVID-19 pandemic continues to ravage the U.S. economy, restaurateurs and bar owners are feeling the brunt of business closures and adaptations necessary to combat the disease. Where cozy and intimate dining was once de rigueur for the restaurant industry, these businesses must now shift to outdoor dining with adequate space and airflow between parties. In response to these concerns, many cities across the country who once fought against the loss of any parking have turned to a post-automobile tactic: outdoor dining in thoroughfares and parking lots. While at first glance it might seem a simple enough prospect—throw some chairs and a table out front, and voilà—property owners and restaurateurs must remain cognizant of various liability and regulatory hurdles for operating outside.
With Great Space Comes Great … Potential Liability.
One of the largest concerns for landowners in operating in a new space for business is liability. Who is on the hook if someone gets hurt dining in an impromptu dining space in a parking lot? Prior to beginning new outdoor dining operations, landowners and restaurateurs should contact their insurance providers to ensure that the new space is included in their insurance coverage. This is a particular concern for larger commercial landowners who may have various businesses vying to use their parking lot for business. Many leases have carefully crafted clauses limiting where a business may operate and where their liability ceases. Landowners and business owners should review their leases for any such clauses and negotiate with one another to ensure that liability in these new spaces is clearly defined.
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Jeff Clare, PillsburyMr. Clare may be contacted at
jeff.clare@pillsburylaw.com
Millennials Want Houses, Just Like Everybody Else
September 17, 2014 —
Peter Coy – BloombergThe proportion of homeownership among young adults has fallen from a third to a quarter over the past half-century. But the idea that today’s millennials are allergic to deeds and mortgages is a myth, says a report based on a survey of more than 1,000 Americans aged 18-29 by the Demand Institute, a nonprofit jointly operated by the Conference Board and Nielsen (NLSN).
“Like most myths, there is some truth here—but only some,” says the report’s introduction. The true part is that millennials are financially squeezed because of “graduating into a weak job market with growing student loan debt,” Jeremy Burbank, a Demand Institute vice president, said in a statement. The false part, the report says, is that millennials don’t want to own their homes.
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Peter Coy, BloombergMr. Coy may be contacted at
pcoy3@bloomberg.net
Disputes Will Not Be Subject to Arbitration Provision If There Is No “Significant Relationship”
November 29, 2021 —
David Adelstein - Florida Construction Legal UpdatesAs you know from prior articles, arbitration is a creature of contract. This means if you want your disputes to be resolved by binding arbitration, as opposed to litigation, you want to make sure there is an arbitration provision in your contract. If there are certain types of disputes you do not want subject to arbitration, you want to specify those types of disputes/claims in your arbitration provision. If you are not sure, make sure to discuss the pros and cons of arbitration with your counsel when drafting and negotiating the contract. However, even with a broad arbitration provision, there are times where a dispute may still fall out of the scope of the arbitration provision, i.e., the dispute is not arbitrable. If this occurs, such dispute will be resolved by litigation. Parties that have buyer’s remove and do not want to arbitrate their dispute may try to make this argument that the dispute is not subject to the scope of the arbitration provision. There are times this argument carries weight because the dispute has no significant relationship to the agreement with the arbitration provision, as shown below.
In Deweees v. Johnson, 46 Fla. L. Weekly D2356b (Fla. 4th DCA 2021), a plaintiff purchased a home in a private residential community. The purchase contract with the developer contained a broad arbitration provision that materially provided that, “all post-closing claims, disputes, and controversies…between purchaser and seller will be resolved by binding arbitration except those arising under section G.5 and G.6 above.” Dewees, supra. Sections G.5 and G.6 provided that the purchaser will not interfere in the sales process with other purchasers and will not interfere with workmen during the construction process. There was also a workmanship and structural defect warranty for the dwelling that also contained an arbitration provision.
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David Adelstein, Kirwin Norris, P.A.Mr. Adelstein may be contacted at
dma@kirwinnorris.com
Life After McMillin: Do Negligence and Strict Liability Causes of Action for Construction Defects Still Exist?
January 24, 2018 —
Thomas Balestreri and Amanda Crawley - Balestreri, Potocki, & HolmesThe ruling is in but the battle will likely continue over the practical application of SB 800. On January 18, 2018 the California Supreme Court issued its decision in
McMillin Albany, LLC v. Superior Court (Van Tassel) (January 18, 2018, S229762) __ Cal.4th __, holding that the statutory prelitigation scheme in The Right to Repair Act (“the Act”) that provides for notice and an opportunity for the Builder to repair defects applies to all claims for construction defects in residential construction sold on or after January 1, 2003, regardless whether the claim is founded on a violation of the Act’s performance standards or a common law claim for negligence or strict liability. (
McMillin Albany, LLC v. Superior Court (Van Tassel) (January 18, 2018, S229762) __ Cal.4th __.) With this holding, has the Court ruled that common law causes of action for construction defect still survive? If so, what will they look like and what standards will be applied?
The short answer is that it appears that common law causes of action still survive, at least for now, but it is not clear from this decision what they will look like and what standards will apply.
Portions of the decision seem to suggest that the Act is the sole and exclusive remedy for construction defect claims: “…even in some areas where the common law had supplied a remedy for construction defects resulting in property damage but not personal injury, the text and legislative history [of the statute] reflect a
clear and unequivocal intent to supplant common law negligence and strict product liability actions under the Act.” (
McMillin (January 18, 2018, S229762) __Cal.4th.__ [p. 6].) (Italics added for emphasis) However, at the end of the decision, the Court seems to be saying that there may still be a place for common law claims for negligence and strict liability alongside the Act but that these causes of action may be subject to the performance standards in the Act.
The
McMillin case went up to the Supreme Court on a procedural issue: whether a common law action alleging construction defects resulting in both economic loss and property damage is subject to the Act’s prelitigation notice and cure procedures. The Van Tassels had dismissed their claims under the Act opting to proceed solely on their common law claims including negligence and strict liability. McMillin sought a stay to force the Van Tassels to comply with the Act’s prelitigation procedures. The Supreme Court held that the Van Tassels must comply with the statutory procedures and affirmed the stay issued by the trial court. But the question remained: now that the Van Tassels were left only with common law claims, how would they proceed under the Act?
To understand how the Court dealt with this question, one must first understand how the Court dealt with the narrow procedural question presented by the case. The Court provides a very detailed, clear explanation of the reasons why it felt the Legislature intended for all construction defect claims involving residential construction must comply with the prelitigation requirements of the Act. In summing up its conclusions the Court makes three definitive holdings.
First, for claims involving economic loss only—the kind of claims involved in
Aas—the Court holds that the Legislature intended to supersede
Aas and provide a statutory basis for recovery. (
McMillin (January 18, 2018, S229762) __Cal.4th.__ [p. 10].) In other words, the Court clearly agrees that the Act was meant to allow recovery of damages based solely on economic damages. No surprise there. Second, the Court held for personal injuries, the Legislature made no changes to existing law that provides common law remedies for the injured party. (Id.) Nobody has ever contested that. Finally, the Court held that for construction defect claims involving property damage and not just economic loss “the Legislature replaced the common law
methods of recovery with the new statutory scheme.” (
Id.,) (Italics added for emphasis.)
In other words, the Court is not saying that negligence and strict liability are not permitted causes of action. The Court is merely stating that these causes of action must comply with the Act’s statutory scheme just as the same as a claim for economic loss. Here the Court is focusing on the procedure that must be followed. “The Act, in effect, provides that construction defect claims not involving personal injury will be treated the same procedurally going forward whether or not the underlying claims gave rise to any property damage.” (
Id.)
Having laid out its fundamental premise, the Court then deals with Plaintiff’s arguments regarding the intent of the Legislature and makes light work of them all. In the process, the Court disapproves
Liberty Mutual Ins. Co. v. Brookfield Crystal Cove LLC (2013) 219 Cal. App. 4th 98, and
Burch v. Superior Court (2014) 223 Cal. App. 4th 1411, to the extent they are inconsistent with the views expressed in the
McMillin opinion.
This is where the decision gets interesting. The Court reminds us that the Van Tassels had dismissed their statutory causes of action for violation of the performance standards under Section 896. One would think at that point that Plaintiffs had to be wondering if they had any claims left given that the Court had ruled that the Act was the sole means of recovery for construction defects. Not so fast. The Court points out that the complaint still rests on allegations of defective construction and that the suit remains an “ ‘action seeking recovery of damages arising out of, or related to deficiencies in, the residential construction’ of the plaintiffs’ homes (§896)
and McMillin’s liability under the Van Tassels’ negligence and strict liability claims depends on the extent to which it [McMillin] violated the standards of sections 896 and 897.” (
McMillin (January 18, 2018, S229762) __Cal.4th.__ [p. 19].) (Emphasis added.) WHAT DID THE COURT JUST SAY? Did the Court just say that a plaintiff could bring a common law cause of action for negligence or strict liability based on a violation of the performance standards under Section 896? What exactly would that claim look like? What would be the elements of such a cause of action?
To answer these questions, the Court states in the very next paragraph, which also happens to be the last paragraph in the decision: “In holding that claims seeking recovery for construction defect damages are subject to the Act’s prelitigation procedures regardless of how they are pleaded,
we have no occasion to address the extent to which a party might rely upon common law principles in pursuing liability under the Act.” (
McMillin (January 18, 2018, S229762) __Cal.4th.__ [p. 19].) (Italics added for emphasis) Is the Court answering “No” to the questions posed above? Probably not. It is simply following the age old rule that an appellate court will
not rule on an issue that is not specifically presented by an appeal, leaving that question for another day.
All we know for sure from
McMillin is that every claim for construction defects falling within the scope of the Act must follow the prelitigation procedure. There are no hall passes for negligence and strict liability. The larger question posed by the last two paragraphs in the decision, is whether the law recognizes a cause of action for negligence and strict liability for construction defects based on the standards in Section 896. The answer will have to be worked out by judges and trial attorneys in courtrooms across the State! The parameters of this hybrid cause of action that the Court seems to have posited will need more careful consideration than can be offered on first reading of
McMillin v. Superior Court.
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Balestreri, Potocki, & Holmes
Another Municipality Takes Action to Address the Lack of Condominiums Being Built in its Jurisdiction
March 12, 2015 —
Heather M. Anderson – Higgins, Hopkins, McLain & Roswell, LLCWhether you are in the market to downsize or are looking to be a first time home buyer, you have likely noticed that your housing options in Colorado have become extremely limited over the course of the last several years. If you are a contractor and have worked on multi-family projects in the recent past, you know why the housing options are limited in the State of Colorado. In the past two years, there have been studies commissioned and articles published in local periodicals investigating the extreme slowdown seen in the construction of owner-occupied multi-family housing, namely condominiums and townhomes. Those of us involved in and with the construction industry are intimately familiar with the lengthy, complicated, and incredibly expensive construction defect litigation that has plagued multi-family construction in the State of Colorado and brought it to a virtual halt.
And now, local municipalities and elected officials are starting to take notice. Most recently, the City of Lone Tree passed Ordinance No. 15-01, to become effective on April 1, 2015. According to the City of Lone Tree, Ordinance No. 15-01 is “aimed at encouraging the development of owner-occupied, multi-family residential projects through the adoption of regulations designed to balance the risk and exposure to builders and developers of such projects, while still protecting homeowners from legitimate construction defect claims.”
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Heather M. Anderson, Higgins, Hopkins, McLain & Roswell, LLCMs. Anderson may be contacted at
Anderson@hhmrlaw.com
Conn. Appellate Court Overturns Jury Verdict, Holding Plaintiff’s Sole Remedy for Injuries Arising From Open Manhole Was State’s Highway Defect Statute
June 14, 2021 —
Christy Jachimowski - Lewis BrisboisSection 13a-149 of the Connecticut General Statutes, commonly known as Connecticut’s highway defect statute, provides that claims arising from injuries or damages to people or property resulting from a defective road or bridge can be asserted against a party responsible for maintaining that road or bridge. Conn. Gen. Stat. §13a-149. The statute also extends to sidewalks and further provides that written notice of an alleged injury must be given to a defendant municipality within ninety days of the injury.
Recently, in Dobie v. City of New Haven, 2021 Conn. App. LEXIS 162 (App. Ct. May 1, 2021), the Connecticut Appellate Court overturned the trial court’s denial of a municipal defendant’s post-trial motion to dismiss. The court held that even though the plaintiff attempted to assert allegations of negligence against the defendant municipality, Connecticut’s highway defect statute was the plaintiff’s exclusive remedy. Since the plaintiff failed to meet the requisite notice requirements, pursuant to the statute, the Appellate Court held that the trial court erred in denying the municipality’s motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
The Underlying Case
In February of 2013, Plaintiff William Dobie filed suit against the City of New Haven alleging injuries and damages as a result of the negligence of a City of New Haven snowplow operator. Dobie’s claims arose from an incident that occurred on January 21, 2011, in which he was driving behind the City snowplow driver, who was in the process of plowing snow from a municipal street located in New Haven, Connecticut. As the defendant employee was operating his snowplow, he knocked off a manhole cover, causing Dobie’s vehicle to drive over the open manhole. Dobie claimed personal injuries as a result of his vehicle dropping into the open manhole, including injuries to his jaw.
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Christy Jachimowski, Lewis BrisboisMs. Jachimowski may be contacted at
Christy.Jachimowski@lewisbrisbois.com
Rooftop Solar Leases Scaring Buyers When Homeowners Sell
June 26, 2014 —
Will Wade – BloombergDorian Bishopp blames the solar panels on his roof for costing him almost 10 percent off the value of the home he sold in March.
That’s because instead of owning them he leased the panels from SunPower Corp. (SPWR), requiring the new owner of the house to assume a contract with almost 19 years remaining. He had to shave the asking price for the house in Maricopa, Arizona, to draw in buyers unfamiliar with the financing arrangement.
Leasing is driving a boom in solar sales because most require no money upfront for systems that cost thousands of dollars. That’s made solar affordable for more people, helping spur a 38 percent jump in U.S. residential installations in the past year. Since the business model only gained currency in the past two years, the details embedded in the fine print of the deals are only starting to emerge.
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Will Wade, BloombergMr. Wade may be contacted at
wwade4@bloomberg.net
Fifth Circuit Rules that Settlements in Underlying Action Constitute "Other Insurance"
April 17, 2019 —
Tiffany Casanova - Saxe Doernberger & Vita, P.C.The Fifth Circuit ruled that settlements between an insured and its subcontractors qualified as “other insurance” to the extent those settlements were used to pay for damages covered by an excess insurance policy. Policyholders should note the outcome of this case as it demonstrates the significant impact that settlements can have on coverage.
Satterfield & Pontikes Construction, Inc. v. Amerisure Mutual Ins. Co.1 was the result of a construction project gone wrong. Zapata County, Texas hired Satterfield & Pontikes (“S&P”) as a general contractor for the construction of a courthouse building. When the project did not go as planned, Zapata County terminated S&P, hired new subcontractors to complete the project, and sued S&P.
S&P, in turn, sought indemnification from its subcontractors, who were contractually obligated to indemnify S&P and procure insurance for any damage the subcontractors caused at the project. S&P also sought coverage from its own primary insurers, American Guarantee and Liability Insurance Company (“AGLIC”) and Amerisure Mutual Insurance Company (“Amerisure”), and its excess insurer, U.S. Fire Insurance Company (“U.S. Fire”) who provided liability coverage for S&P’s potential liabilities at the project. The policies contained exclusions for losses arising from mold and did not provide coverage for attorney’s fees or similar legal costs.
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Tiffany Casanova, Saxe Doernberger & Vita, P.C.Ms. Casanova may be contacted at
tlc@sdvlaw.com
