Illinois Appellate Court Addresses Professional Services Exclusion in Homeowners Policy
August 03, 2022 —
James M. Eastham - Traub LiebermanIn Stonegate Ins. Co. v. Smith, 2022 IL App (1st) 210931, the Insured was performing plumbing work at a multi-story townhouse when a fire ensued causing damage to the second story unit. Although a carpenter by trade, the Insured was performing plumbing work consisting of the replacement of a shower valve as a favor for a friend. To accomplish the task, the Insured utilized a small propane torch to attempt to remove the old water piping to the shower. In doing so, the insulation behind the bathroom wall caught fire and the flame spread upward to the neighboring unit. Stonegate had issued a homeowner’s policy to the Insured during the relevant time period. The homeowner's policy excluded coverage for property damage "[a]rising out of the rendering of or failure to render professional services." Subsequent to tender of the loss, Stonegate initiated a declaratory judgment action seeking a declaration that it owned no duty to defend or indemnity pursuant to the professional services exclusions.
In finding in favor of the Insured, the Court began its analysis by noting that the homeowner's policy did not define the term "professional services" such that it was the Court’s task to determine whether the Insured’s work qualified as a "professional service" for purposes of the exclusion. The Court further prefaced its holding by stating that for an exclusionary clause to effectively deny coverage, its applicability must be clear and free from doubt because any doubts as to coverage will be resolved in favor of the insured. Looking to Illinois case precedent, the Court found that the term "professional service" is not limited to services for which the person performing them must be licensed by a governmental authority. Rather, "professional services" encompass any business activity conducted by an insured that (1) involves specialized knowledge, labor, or skill, and (2) is predominantly mental or intellectual as opposed to physical or manual in nature.
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James M. Eastham, Traub LiebermanMr. Eastham may be contacted at
jeastham@tlsslaw.com
A Termination for Convenience Is Not a Termination for Default
April 22, 2024 —
David Adelstein - Florida Construction Legal UpdatesA termination for convenience is NOT a termination for default. They are NOT the same. They should NOT be treated as the same. I am a huge proponent of termination for convenience provisions because sometimes a party needs to be able to exercise a termination for convenience, but the termination is not one that rises to a basis for default. However, exercising a termination for convenience does not mean you get to go back in time and convert the termination for convenience into a termination for default. It does not work like that. Nor should it.
An opinion out of the Civilian Board of Contract Appeals – Williams Building Company, Inc. v. Department of State, CBCA 7147, 2024 WL 1099788 (CBCA 2024 – demonstrates a fundamental distinction between a termination for convenience and a termination for default, i.e., that you don’t get to conjure up defaults when you exercise a termination for convenience:
Because a termination for convenience essentially turns a fixed-price construction contract into a cost-reimbursement contract, allowing the contractor to recover its incurred performance costs, the resolution of this appeal will involve identifying the total costs that [Contractor] incurred in performing this contract before [Government] terminated it for convenience. Since [Government] terminated the contract for convenience rather than for default, it no longer matters whether, in the past,[Contractor] acted intentionally in overstating the amount of its incurred costs or committed a contract breach. Ultimately, as permitted in response to a termination for convenience, [Contractor] will recover those allowable costs that [Contractor]establishes it incurred in performing the contract.
Williams Building Company, supra.
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David Adelstein, Kirwin Norris, P.A.Mr. Adelstein may be contacted at
dma@kirwinnorris.com
Tennessee Court of Appeals Holds Defendant Has the Burden of Offering Alternative Measure of Damages to Prove that Plaintiff’s Measure of Damages is Unreasonable
July 18, 2018 —
Gus Sara - The Subrogation StrategistIn Durkin v. MTown Construction, LLC, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 128, the Court of Appeals of Tennessee considered whether the lower court properly took judicial notice of an alternative measure of damages to the measure of damages advanced by the plaintiff. The Court of Appeals held that the defendant has the burden of offering evidence of alternative measures of damages if it seeks to argue that the plaintiff’s measure of the damages is unreasonable. The Court of Appeals found that the lower court erred in taking judicial notice of alternative measures of damage when the defendant failed to meet its burden of proof. The court’s holding establishes that, if the defendant does not offer evidence of alternative measures of damage, then the measure of damages introduced by the plaintiff will apply.
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Gus Sara, White and Williams LLPMr. Sara may be contacted at
sarag@whiteandwilliams.com
United States Supreme Court Grants Certiorari in EEOC Subpoena Case
March 29, 2017 —
Jeffrey M. Daitz & Rashmee Sinha - Peckar & Abramson, P.C.On September 29, 2016, the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari in McLane Co. Inc. v. EEOC, case number 15-1248, a case that asks the Court to resolve a split in the Circuit Courts of Appeals on the proper standard of review applied to a district court decision to quash or enforce a subpoena issued by the United States Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC"). The decision by our highest court on the correct standard of review will have important implications for businesses, because if a litigant is displeased with a lower court's decision, it may get two bites at the apple. Such an outcome will likely encourage more appeals, drawn-out investigations and increase legal fees.
On the other hand, if the Supreme Court decides that the Ninth Circuit was wrong and that a deferential standard of review (as opposed to a de nova standard) is appropriate, the losing side in future cases is more likely to accept the decision of the lower district court, knowing its chances of winning on appeal are slim.
Reprinted courtesy of
Jeffrey M. Daitz, Peckar & Abramson, P.C. and
Rashmee Sinha, Peckar & Abramson, P.C.
Mr. Daitz may be contacted at jdaitz@pecklaw.com
Ms. Sinha may be contacted at rsinha@pecklaw.com
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Be Careful When Walking Off of a Construction Project
November 24, 2019 —
Christopher G. Hill - Construction Law MusingsI am truly grateful that my buddy Craig Martin (@craigmartin_jd) continues his great posts over at The Construction Contractor Advisor blog. He is always a good cure for writer’s block and once again this week he gave me some inspiration. In his most recent post, Craig discusses a recent Indiana case relating to the ever present issue of termination by a subcontractor for non-payment. In the Indiana case, the court looked at the payment terms and determined that the subcontractor was justified in walking from the project when it was not paid after 60 days per the contract.
This result was the correct, if surprising. Why do I say surprising? Because I am always reluctant to recommend that a subcontractor walk from a job for non payment if it is possible to continue. This is not so much for legal reasons (not paying a sub is a clear breach of contract by a general contractor) but practical ones. The practical effect of walking from the job is that the subcontractor is put on the defensive. Instead of arguing later that it performed but was not paid, that subcontractor is put in the position of arguing that the general contractor cannot collect its completion related and other damages because it breached first. This is a more intuitively difficult argument and one that is not as strong as the first.
Of course, all of this is contingent on the language in your contract (is there a “pay if paid” or language like that in the Indiana case?).
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The Law Office of Christopher G. HillMr. Hill may be contacted at
chrisghill@constructionlawva.com
SB800 CONFIRMED AS EXCLUSIVE REMEDY FOR CONSTRUCTION DEFECT CLAIMS
January 24, 2018 —
Jeffrey Brower and Nathan Owens - Newmeyer & Dillion, LLPIn
McMillin Albany LLC v. Superior Court (Cal. Ct. App., Aug. 26, 2015) 2015 Daily Journal D.A.R. 9931 (“
McMillin”), the Fifth Appellate District Court of Appeal in California published a resounding win for builders, general contractors, and others entities seeking the protections of the Right to Repair Act, Civil Code sections 895, et seq. (“SB800”). The
McMillin Court firmly rejected the reasoning and outcome of both
Liberty Mutual Ins. Co. v. Brookfield Crystal Cove LLC (2013) 219 Cal.App.4th 98 (“
Liberty Mutual”) and
Burch v. Superior Court (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 1411 (“
Burch”), and held that:
the Legislature intended that all claims arising out of defects in residential construction, involving new residences sold on or after January 1, 2003 (§ 938), be subject to the standards and the requirements of the Act; the homeowner bringing such a claim must give notice to the builder and engage in the prelitigation procedures in accordance with the provisions of Chapter 4 of the Act prior to filing suit in court.
(
McMillin, Opinion, p. 15.) The
McMillin Court further held that even if the claimant’s counsel intentionally pleads around SB800 by asserting only tort causes of action, SB800 still applies to all defect claims and a stay of the action to require SB800 compliance is appropriate.
Newmeyer & Dillion has strongly supported builders’ efforts to enforce the Right to Repair Act since its inception. The firm filed an amicus brief in
McMillin on behalf of Leading Builders of America (“LBA”), an association of the leading residential homebuilders in the United States. For years, LBA members developed their warranty and dispute resolution procedures according to the Right to Repair Act and performed prelitigation repairs to the satisfaction of thousands of homeowners.
Liberty Mutual and
Burch undermined the Right to Repair Act by allowing plaintiffs’ attorneys to circumvent the prelitigation procedures to the detriment of homeowners and builders, resulting in confusion and increased litigation. The
McMillin decision breathes new life into the Right to Repair Act and sets the stage for future review by the California Supreme Court.
The
McMillin Court focused on the express language of the Right to Repair Act to arrive at its conclusion that Civil Code sections 896, 897, 943 and 944 demonstrate a clear Legislative intent to occupy the field of construction defect litigation – a belief held by nearly all in the construction industry and the California Superior Courts before
Liberty Mutual. The
McMillin Court found further support for SB800’s comprehensive nature in the Legislative history, which consistently described the Act as “groundbreaking reform” and a “major change” in construction defect litigation, designed to “significantly reduce the cost of construction defect litigation and make housing more affordable.” (
McMillin, Opinion, pp. 18-19.) The
McMillin Court found it inescapable that the Right to Repair Act exclusively governs construction defect litigation involving homes sold on or after January 1, 2003.
The
McMillin, decision will have a significant impact on construction litigation moving forward in two respects. First,
McMillin, is the only appellate decision to date to address whether a builder has the right to enforce SB800 when the claimant’s counsel deliberately attempts to plead around SB800 by asserting only tort claims. Second, the decision provides trial courts with the authority and precedent to ensure compliance with the Right to Repair Act. Trial courts may also find it necessary to revisit prior rulings against builders that relied on
Liberty Mutual.
Newmeyer & Dillion will continue to advocate in support of builders and general contractors by working vigorously to gain further support for the
McMillin, decision and setting the stage for review by the California Supreme Court.
Jeffrey R. Brower is an associate at the Newport Beach office of Newmeyer & Dillion, LLP. His practice focuses on business and construction litigation. Jeffrey can be reached at jeffrey.brower@ndlf.com.
Nathan Owens is the managing partner of the Las Vegas office for Newmeyer & Dillion, LLP. He represents businesses and individuals operating in a wide array of economic sectors including real estate, construction, insurance and health care in all stages of litigation in state and federal court. Nathan can be reached at nathan.owens@ndlf.com.
About Newmeyer & Dillion
For more than 30 years, Newmeyer & Dillion has delivered creative and outstanding legal solutions and trial results for a wide array of clients. With over 70 attorneys practicing in all aspects of business, employment, real estate, construction and insurance law, Newmeyer & Dillion delivers legal services tailored to meet each client’s needs. Headquartered in Newport Beach, California, with offices in Walnut Creek, California and Las Vegas, Nevada, Newmeyer & Dillion attorneys are recognized by The Best Lawyers in America©, and Super Lawyers as top tier and some of the best lawyers in California, and have been given Martindale-Hubbell Peer Review's AV Preeminent® highest rating. For additional information, call 949.854.7000 or visit
www.ndlf.com
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Hawaii Federal District Court Rejects Bad Faith Claim
November 30, 2016 —
Tred R. Eyerly – Insurance Law HawaiiThe federal district court for the district of Hawaii rejected the insured's argument that the insurer acted in bad faith because the insured had to contribute to a settlement of the underlying case. Hanover Ins. Co. v. Anova Food, LLC, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 146114 (D. Haw. Oct. 21, 2016).
After a prior round of briefing, the court determined that Hanover had a duty to defend, but rejected Anova's claim for pre-tender fees.
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Tred R. Eyerly, Insurance Law HawaiiMr. Eyerly may be contacted at
te@hawaiilawyer.com
First-Time Homebuyers Make Biggest Share of Deals in 17 Years
February 22, 2018 —
Prashant Gopal – BloombergMillennials are playing homeownership catch-up.
First-time buyers rushed into the market last year, making 38 percent of all U.S. single-family home purchases, the biggest share since 2000, data released Thursday by Genworth Mortgage Insurance show. The 2.07 million new or existing homes bought by first-timers was 7 percent more than in 2016, according to the insurer, part of
Genworth Financial Inc.
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Prashant Gopal, Bloomberg
