Client Alert: Court of Appeal Applies Common Interest Privilege Doctrine to HOA Litigation Meetings
March 19, 2014 —
David W. Evans, Steven M. Cvitanovic, and Michael C. Parme - Haight Brown & Bonesteel LLPIn Seahaus La Jolla Owners Assoc. v. Superior Court (No. D064567, March 12, 2014), the California Court of Appeal held a homeowners association’s (“HOA”) litigation meetings related to the HOA’s construction defect lawsuit were subject to protection under the attorney-client privilege. Specifically, the court concluded the common interest doctrine applied to the subject litigation meetings, thereby barring the defendants in the HOA’s lawsuit from seeking discovery related to the content and disclosures made during those meetings.
The plaintiff HOA initiated a construction defect lawsuit against a residential developer and builder, seeking damages for construction defects related to common areas. The defendants took the depositions of individual homeowners and inquired regarding the communications and disclosures made at informational litigation update meetings. The meetings were conducted by the HOA’s counsel with groups of homeowners, some of whom had filed their own, separate lawsuits against the same defendants. Motions to compel were filed after attorney-client privilege objections were asserted by counsel for the HOA. After the court-appointed discovery referee opined that the common interest doctrine applied and that the communications presented at the meetings were subject to the attorney-client privilege, the trial court rejected this recommendation and overruled the HOA’s privilege objections. The HOA filed a petition for a writ of mandate.
The defendants argued the privilege had been waived based on the presence of persons who were not the clients of the HOA’s attorney, that the subject communications were not “confidential communications” and that the individual homeowners and the HOA did not share common interests at the time. After setting forth a comprehensive discussion of the statutory principles underlying the attorney-client privilege and the bases for waiver, as provided in California Evidence Code §§ 912 and 952, and summarizing applicable decisional law, the court specifically analyzed the question of whether the common interest doctrine applied in the context of the disputed HOA litigation meetings. The common interest doctrine protects confidential communications made by counsel to third parties if the third parties are present to further the interest of the client or are those to whom disclosure is reasonably necessary for the transmission of the information or the accomplishment of the purpose for which the lawyer was consulted.
Reprinted courtesy of
David W. Evans,
Steven M. Cvitanovic, and
Michael C. Parme of Haight Brown & Bonesteel LLP
Mr. Evans may be contacted at devans@hbblaw.com, Mr. Cvitanovic may be contacted at scvitanovic@hbblaw.com, and Mr. Parme may be contacted at mparme@hbblaw.com
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Antidiscrimination Clause Required in Public Works and Goods and Services Contracts –Effective January 1, 2024
January 22, 2024 —
Travis Colburn - Ahlers Cressman & SleightIn July 2023, the Washington legislature passed Senate Bill 5186, which mandates inclusion of select antidiscrimination clauses in every state contract and subcontract for public works, goods, or services executed after January 1, 2024.
[i] RCW 49.60.530(3) codifies the now-required antidiscrimination clauses, which prohibit four categories of discrimination against any person because of age, sex, marital status, sexual orientation, gender identity, race, creed, color, national origin, citizenship or immigration status, honorably discharged veteran or military status, the presence of any sensory, mental, or physical disability, or the use of a trained dog guide or service animal by a person with a disability (the “Protected Class”).
Under the new law, public contractors and subcontractors (“Public Contractor”) may not refuse to hire a person because that person is a member of the Protected Class, unless that refusal is based upon a bona fide occupational qualification or if a person with a particular disability would be prevented from properly performing the particular work involved.
[ii] Similarly, Public Contractors may not discharge or bar a person from employment or discriminate against any person – either in terms of compensation or other terms and conditions of employment – because that person is a member of the Protected Class.
[iii] Last, Public Contractors may not print or circulate (or cause to be printed or circulated) any statement, advertisement, publication, form of application for employment, or make inquiry in connection with prospective employment, which expresses any limitation, specification, or discrimination as to the Protected Class.
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Travis Colburn, Ahlers Cressman & SleightMr. Colburn may be contacted at
travis.colburn@acslawyers.com
Traub Lieberman Partner Eric D. Suben and Associate Laura Puhala Win Summary Judgment in Favor of Insurer, Determining it has No Duty to Defend
September 18, 2023 —
Traub LiebermanIn a declaratory judgment action brought before the United States District Court, Eastern District of New York, Traub Lieberman Partner Eric D. Suben and Associate Laura Puhala won summary judgment in favor of Plaintiff Foremost Signature Insurance Co. (“Foremost”), obtaining a declaration that it has no obligation to defend or indemnify Defendant 170 Little East Neck Road LLC (“Little East”) in an underlying state court personal injury action.
In the underlying action, a self-employed financial advisor leasing a suite for her business on the second floor of the property at 170 Little East Neck Road (the “Property”), sued Little East in New York Supreme Court, Suffolk County, alleging injuries resulting from slipping on ice on a walkway near an exterior door at the Property.
Reprinted courtesy of
Eric D. Suben, Traub Lieberman and
Laura S. Puhala, Traub Lieberman
Mr. Suben may be contacted at esuben@tlsslaw.com
Ms. Puhala may be contacted at lpuhala@tlsslaw.com
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Traub Lieberman
It’s Time to Change the Way You Think About Case Complexity
August 07, 2018 —
Ben Patrick - Gordon & Rees Construction Law BlogThere are few things that lawyers love more than telling war stories. Partially, that’s because many lawyers either only or primarily have friends who are lawyers, and war stories are a way for lawyers to relate to each other—your barber doesn’t understand the pain of reading through 5 paragraphs of irrelevant objections posed to each of 75 interrogatories, but your fellow lawyers will. One common feature of war stories is a note regarding how much was at issue in the case. “I was handling this $25 million claim once….” Lawyers include the dollar figure in dispute as a shorthand for the complexity of the case they’re talking about. “Oh, we’ll be in depositions for a month solid, this is a $10 million case!”
I don’t know where I picked up this habit, but I know exactly how I learned to rethink it. A friend of mine, as in-house counsel, was handling a case worth over a billion dollars. When he told me about it, my jaw dropped. One of the first things I asked him was, how do you manage a case that big? And he told me about the several law firms he had engaged, all the people working on it. But then he said: it’s not really a complicated case. There were only 4-5 real factual questions, and a similar number of legal ones. It’s just that every factual question had a very high price tag associated with it. The high price tag doesn’t make the factual question any more complex, or any harder to litigate. For example, your builders’ risk policy either has coverage for flood damage or it doesn’t. If it does, then it doesn’t matter whether the flood washed the whole building away or just some materials from the laydown area—coverage is coverage, irrespective of quantum.
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Ben Patrick, Gordon & Rees Scully MansukhaniMr. Patrick may be contacted at
jpatrick@grsm.com
“But it’s 2021!” Service of Motion to Vacate Via Email Found Insufficient by the Eleventh Circuit
June 21, 2021 —
Justin K. Fortescue - White and WilliamsWhile we are all getting used to the “new normal” of working remotely and relying on emails for almost all communications, a recent decision from the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit provides arbitration practitioners with a stark reminder – the “notice” requirements of the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) will be strictly enforced and providing notice of a motion to vacate via email may not qualify as proper service.
In O'Neal Constructors, LLC v. DRT Am., LLC, 991 F.3d 1376 (11th Cir. 2021), O’Neal Constructors, LLC (O’Neal) and DRT America (DRT) entered into a contract containing an arbitration provision. Following a dispute, the parties went to arbitration and, on January 7, 2019, the panel issued an award requiring DRT to pay O’Neal a total of $1,415,193. The amount awarded to O’Neal consisted of two parts: $765,102 for the underlying contract dispute and $650,090 for reimbursement of O’Neal’s attorneys’ fees. While DRT paid O’Neal the first portion of the award, DRT refused to pay the portion that related to O’Neal’s attorneys’ fees.
On April 4, 2019, as a result of DRT’s refusal to pay O’Neal’s attorneys’ fees, O’Neal filed a motion to confirm the award in Georgia state court (which was subsequently removed to the Northern District of Georgia). The next day, in a separate action, DRT filed a motion to vacate the attorneys’ fees portion of the award and, that same night, DRT’s counsel emailed O’Neal’s counsel a “courtesy copy” of DRT’s memorandum in support of the motion to vacate. A few weeks later, on April 30, 2019 (i.e., more than three months after the award was issued), DRT served O’Neal (via U.S. Marshall) with a copy of the motion to vacate.
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Justin Fortescue, White and WilliamsMr. Fortescue may be contacted at
fortescuej@whiteandwilliams.com
Colorado House Bill 17-1279 – A Misguided Attempt at Construction Defect Reform
March 29, 2017 —
David McClain - Colorado Construction LitigationOn March 17th, House Bill 17-1279, concerning the requirement that a unit owners’ association obtain approval through a vote of unit owners before filing a construction defect action, was introduced and assigned to the House State, Veterans, and Military Affairs Committee. The bill is currently scheduled for its first committee hearing on March 29th, at 1:30 in the afternoon. While, on its face, this appears to be a step in the right direction towards instituting “informed consent” before an HOA can file a construction defect action, the bill actually restricts the ability of developer to include more stringent requirements in the declaration of covenants, conditions, and restrictions for an association, thereby lowing the threshold of “consent” required to institute an action.
House Bill 17-1279 would amend C.R.S. § 38-33.3-303.5 to require an association’s executive board to mail or deliver written notice of the anticipated commencement of a construction defect action to each unit owner and to call a meeting of the unit owners to consider whether to bring such an action. Any construction professional against which a claim may attend the unit owners’ meeting and have an opportunity to address the unit owners and may include an offer to remedy any defect in accordance with C.R.S. § 13-20-803.5(3). The conclusion of the meeting would initiate a 120-day voting period, during which period the running of any applicable statutes of limitation or repose would be tolled. Pursuant to this bill, an executive board may only institute a construction defect action only if authorized by a simple majority of the unit owners, not including: 1) any unit owned by any construction professional, or affiliate of a construction professional, involved in the design, construction, or repair of any portion of the project; 2) any unit owned by a banking institution; 3) any unit owned in which no defects are alleged to exist, and/or 4) any unit owned by an individual deemed “nonresponsive.”
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David M. McLain, Higgins, Hopkins, McLain & Roswell, LLCMr. McLain may be contacted at
mclain@hhmrlaw.com
Asbestos Client Alert: Court’s Exclusive Gatekeeper Role May not be Ignored or Shifted to a Jury
February 07, 2014 —
Lee Marshall and Chandra L. Moore - Haight Brown & Bonesteel, LLPIn Estate of Henry Barabin v. AstenJohnson, Inc., - F.3d -, 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 774, 2014 WL 129884 (9th Cir., Jan. 15, 2014) en banc, the Ninth U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals vacated a $10.2 million judgment in the Plaintiffs’ favor in a case where Plaintiff alleged that occupational exposure to asbestos from dryer felts caused his mesothelioma. The Ninth Circuit held that the district court abused its discretion by neglecting its duty as a “gatekeeper” under Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., 509 U.S. 579, 113 S. Ct. 2786, 125 L. Ed. 2d 469 (1993), and Federal Rule of Evidence 702, by improperly admitting expert testimony at trial without first determining its reliability. The en banc court held that admitting the testimony on the debated theory that “each asbestos fiber causes mesothelioma” was prejudicial error and the court remanded the case for a new trial. The court also held that a reviewing court has the authority to make Daubert findings based on the record established by the district court, but in the instant case, the record was “too sparse” to determine whether the expert testimony was relevant and reliable or not.
This ruling is a victory for the defense in that it reaffirms the federal court’s exclusive gatekeeper role and holds that the role may not be ignored or shifted to a jury. Unfortunately, the court did not go so far as to evaluate the inherent reliability of expert opinions based on the theory that “each asbestos exposure causes mesothelioma.” As such, it did not provide guidance as to what specific foundational requirements are required to admit, or exclude, these types of opinions under a Daubert analysis.
In Barabin, Plaintiff alleged he was exposed to asbestos while working at a paper mill with dryer felts manufactured and supplied by Defendants. The issue was whether the dryer felts substantially contributed to Barabin’s development of mesothelioma, a determination that required expert testimony.
Reprinted Courtesy of Lee Marshall, Haight Brown & Bonesteel, LLP and
Chandra L. Moore, Haight Brown & Bonesteel, LLP
Mr. Lee may be contacted at lmarshall@hbblaw.com and Ms. Moore may be contacted at cmoore@hbblaw.com.
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Power & Energy - Emerging Insurance Coverage Cases of Interest
November 30, 2020 —
David G. Jordan & Tiffany Casanova - Saxe Doernberger & Vita, P.C.The Power & Energy sector faces a multitude of risks that impact output and profitability, requiring sound risk management and robust insurance programs. As of recent, like most industries, there have been significant challenges facing the industry in light of COVID-19. These issues, including decreased product demand as well as supply- side issues, have been well documented. However, other issues continue to impact Power & Energy providers, with significant insurance coverage implications that are worthy of note. Below is a summary of three open cases of interest, where declaratory relief has been sought by energy providers’ insurance carriers, seeking an avoidance of coverage.
1. Fracking Dispute and “Intentional Acts”
In the Texas case of The James River Insurance Co. v. Clearpoint Chemicals LLC et al., No. 4:20-cv-0076 (N.D.Tex), James River Insurance Company (“James River”) is asking a federal district court to declare that it does not owe defense or indemnity to its insured for acts it defines as both intentional and/or malicious acts.
Reprinted courtesy of
David G. Jordan, Saxe Doernberger & Vita, P.C. and
Tiffany Casanova, Saxe Doernberger & Vita, P.C.
Mr. Jordan may be contacted at DJordan@sdvlaw.com
Ms. Casanova may be contacted at TCasanova@sdvlaw.com
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