Arizona Supreme Court Confirms Eight-Year Limit on Construction Defect Lawsuits
July 18, 2011 —
CDJ STAFFActing on the case of Albano v. Shea Homes Ltd. Partnership, the Arizona Supreme Court has ruled that Arizona’s eight-year statute of repose applies. The case was referred to the court by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals which had asked for a clarification of Arizona law. The case focused on three questions:
1. Does the filing of a motion for class certification in an Arizona court toll the statute of limitations for individuals, who are included within the class, to file individual causes of action involving the same defendants and the same subject matter? 2. If so, does this class-action tolling doctrine apply to statutes of repose, and more specifically, to the statute of repose for construction defects set forth in Arizona Revised Statutes ("A.R.S.") § 12-552? 3. If the doctrine applies to statutes of repose, and specifically § 12-552, may a court weigh the equities of the case in determining whether, and to what extent, an action is tolled?
The litigation at hand has a lengthy history, starting with a case referred to as “Hoffman” in 2003. The Albano plaintiffs were not able to join in Hoffman, and they filed their own lawsuit in 2006. An additional lawsuit was filed by the Albano plaintiffs in 2007. The courts decided that the Albano plaintiffs’ lawsuit was untimely.
The Arizona Supreme Court concluded that the statute of repose was the appropriate standard for this case. They noted that “the eight-year statute of repose period began to run on November 6, 1997, the date of the Town of Gilbert’s final inspection. Albano II was filed on November 5, 2007.”
The court found that the plaintiffs had waited too long for start their suit. As a result, they found it unnecessary to answer the first or third questions. Justice A. John Pelander of the Arizona Supreme Court wrote the opinion, dated June 30, 2011.
Read the court’s decision…
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$24 Million Verdict Against Material Supplier Overturned Where Plaintiff Failed to Prove Supplier’s Negligence or Breach of Contract Caused an SB800 Violation
November 21, 2017 —
Jon A. Turigliatto, Esq. & Chelsea L. Zwart, Esq. – Chapman Glucksman Dean Roeb & Barger BulletinOriginally published by CDJ on March 16, 2017
Acqua Vista Homeowners Assoc. v. MWL Inc. (2017) 2017 WL 371379
COURT OF APPEAL EXTENDS GREYSTONE HOMES, INC. v. MIDTEC, INC., HOLDING THAT CIVIL CODE §936 CREATES A NEGLIGENCE STANDARD FOR CLAIMS AGAINST MATERIAL SUPPLIERS BROUGHT UNDER SB800.
The Fourth District California Court of Appeal recently published its decision Acqua Vista Homeowners Assoc. v. MWI, Inc. (2017) 2017 WL 371379, holding that claims against a material supplier under SB800 (Civil Code §895 and §936) require proof that the SB800 violation was caused by the supplier's negligence or breach of contract.
Civil Code §936 states in relevant part, that it applies "to general contractors, subcontractors, material suppliers, individual product manufacturers, and design professionals to the extent that the general contractors, subcontractors, material suppliers, individual product manufacturers, and design professionals caused, in whole or in part, a violation of a particular standard as the result of a negligent act or omission or a breach of contract .... [T]he negligence standard in this section does not apply to any general contractor, subcontractor, material supplier, individual product manufacturer, or design professional with respect to claims for which strict liability would apply."
Reprinted courtesy of
Jon A. Turigliatto, Esq., Chapman Glucksman Dean Roeb & Barger and
Chelsea L. Zwart, Esq., Chapman Glucksman Dean Roeb & Barger
Mr. Turigliatto may be contacted at jturigliatto@cgdrblaw.com
Ms. Zwart may be contacted at czwart@cgdrblaw.com
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Additional Insured Coverage Confirmed
February 23, 2016 —
Tred R. Eyerly – Insurance Law HawaiiThe Texas Court of Appeals found that Exxon Mobil Corporation was an additional insured under the CGL policy for Exxon's service provider. Liberty Surplus Ins. Corp. v. Exxon Mobil Corporation, 2015 Tex. App. LEXIS 12757 (Tex. Ct. App. Dec. 17, 2015).
Exxon contracted with Wyatt Field Service Company to perform "services" as set forth in various work orders from Exxon's affiliates. The contract also required Wyatt to maintain $5 million of commercial general liability insurance. The contract provided that the policies must cover Exxon and its affiliates "as additional insureds in connection with the performance of Services."
In 2008, Wyatt was assigned to work on a flexicoker unit at Exxon's refinery. Wyatt was to reinstall dummy nozzles and chains. It completed this service in October 2008. Three years later, one of the dummy nozzles pulled free, and the escaping steam and coke burned three individuals who were working on the unit. After the accident, it was discovered that the safety chain had been installed in the wrong location so that it did not properly secure the dummy nozzle.
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Tred R. Eyerly, Insurance Law HawaiiMr. Eyerly may be contacted at
te@hawaiilawyer.com
Three's a Trend: Second, Fourth and Ninth Circuits Uphold Broad "Related Claims" Language
February 23, 2016 —
Greg Steinberg – White and Williams LLPThe hallmark of a claims-made insurance policy is that the policy only provides coverage for claims that are “first made” during the policy period. As noted by the Texas Supreme Court, “for the insurer, the inherent benefit of a claims-made policy is the insurer's ability to close its books on a policy at its expiration and thus to attain a level of predictability unattainable under standard occurrence policies.”[1]
To ensure this “level of predictability,” claims-made insurance policies contain provisions stating that all “Related Claims” will be treated as a single claim deemed first made at the time the earliest of such claims was made. The “Related Claims” provision is an issue that comes up time and again – claims can span years, especially in the context of regulatory investigations, which often culminate in enforcement proceedings and litigation. This inevitably leads to disputes regarding whether later claims can be related back to the earlier claim, an issue that becomes even thornier when different insurers participate on different policy years.
Over time, case law on “Related Claims” has been mixed and somewhat inconsistent, with each case tending to hinge on its own unique set of facts, making it difficult to identify a clear standard for determining whether claims are related. However, three recent decisions out of the Second, Fourth and Ninth Circuits show that courts are increasingly deferring to the plain language of the policy and applying these provisions broadly.
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Greg Steinberg, White and Williams LLPMr. Steinberg may be contacted at
steinbergg@whiteandwilliams.com
Properly Trigger the Performance Bond
January 04, 2018 —
David Adelstein - Florida Construction Legal UpdatesOriginally Published by CDJ on January 5, 2017
A performance bond is a valuable tool designed to guarantee the performance of the principal of the contract made part of the bond. But, it is only a valuable tool if the obligee (entity the bond is designed to benefit) understands that it needs to properly trigger the performance bond if it is looking to the bond (surety) to remedy and pay for a contractual default. If the performance bond is not properly triggered and a suit is brought upon the bond then the obligee could be the one materially breaching the terms of the bond. This means the obligee has no recourse under the performance bond. This is a huge downside when the obligee wanted the security of the performance bond, and reimbursed the bond principal for the premium of the bond, in order to address and remediate a default under the underlying contract.
A recent example of this downside can be found in the Southern District of Florida’s decision in Arch Ins. Co. v. John Moriarty & Associates of Florida, Inc., 2016 WL 7324144 (S.D.Fla. 2016). Here, a general contractor sued a subcontractor’s performance bond surety for an approximate $1M cost overrun associated with the performance of the subcontractor’s subcontract (the contract made part of the subcontractor’s performance bond). The surety moved for summary judgment arguing that the general contractor failed to property trigger the performance bond and, therefore, materially breached the bond. The trial court granted the summary judgment in favor of the performance bond surety. Why?
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David Adelstein, Florida Construction Legal UpdatesMr. Adelstein may be contacted at
dadelstein@gmail.com
The Prompt Payment Rollercoaster
February 23, 2016 —
Garret Murai – California Construction Law BlogThis past year we
wrote about a case involving California’s prompt payment laws and the current state of confusion with the prompt payment statutes which are
scattered throughout the state Code and which are inconsistent in the use of their terminology and, thus importantly, application.
In
United Riggers & Erectors, Inc. v. Coast Iron & Steel Co., California Court of Appeals for the Second District, Case No. B258860 (December 18, 2015), the Court of Appeals for the Second District addressed whether under one of the prompt payment statutes, Civil Code section 8814, a general contractor may withhold retention without being subject to prompt payment penalties if there is a dispute of any kind between the general contractor and the subcontractor, or only when the dispute relates to the retention itself.
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Garret Murai, Wendel Rosen Black & Dean LLPMr. Murai may be contacted at
gmurai@wendel.com
Housing Starts in U.S. Drop to Lowest Level in Three Months
February 23, 2016 —
Michelle Jamrisko – BloombergNew-home construction in the U.S. unexpectedly cooled in January, indicating there is a limit to how much gains in residential real estate will boost growth at the start of 2016.
Housing starts dropped 3.8 percent to a 1.1 million annualized rate, the weakest in three months, from a 1.14 million pace the prior month, a Commerce Department report showed Wednesday in Washington. The median forecast of 76 economists surveyed by Bloomberg was 1.17 million. Permits, a proxy for future construction, were little changed.
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Michelle Jamrisko, Bloomberg
Parties Can Agree to Anything In A Settlement Agreement………Or Can They?
October 17, 2023 —
Alexa Stephenson & Ivette Kincaid - Kahana FeldA settlement agreement is a contract. When parties to pending litigation enter into a settlement, they enter into a contract. Such a contract is subject to the general law governing all contracts. (T. M. Cobb Co. v. Superior Court (1984) 36 Cal.3d 273, 280 [204 Cal. Rptr. 143, 682 P.2d 338] [offers by a party to compromise under Code Civ. Proc., § 998].) Courts seek to interpret contracts in a manner that will render them “lawful, operative, definite, reasonable, and capable of being carried into effect’” without violating the intent of the parties. (Robbins v. Pacific Eastern Corp. (1937) 8 Cal.2d 241, 272–273; Kaufman v. Goldman, (2011) 195 Cal. App. 4th 734, 745.
A settlement agreement like a contract is a document that is typically negotiated between the parties to the agreement and it is up to the parties to determine its terms. Settlements take time and sometimes negotiating the settlement terms takes longer. This is especially true in complex litigation and multiparty matters where negotiating the settlement terms is just as contentious as litigating the matter. Just like contracts, in a settlement agreement the parties cannot agree to terms that violate public policy. A contract is thought to be against public policy if it results in a breach of law, harms citizens, or causes injury to the state. Contracts that are voided on public policy grounds carry no legal obligations. For example, an employer cannot force an employee to sign a contract that forbids the worker from joining a union.
Reprinted courtesy of
Alexa Stephenson, Kahana Feld and
Ivette Kincaid, Kahana Feld
Ms. Stephenson may be contacted at astephenson@kahanafeld.com
Ms. Kincaid may be contacted at ikincaid@kahanafeld.com
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