Environmental Justice Update: The Justice40 Initiative
April 29, 2024 —
Anthony B. Cavender - Gravel2Gavel Construction & Real Estate Law BlogSoon after taking office, President Biden issued Executive Order 14008, entitled, “Tackling the Climate Crisis at Home and Abroad.” This is an unusually long and complex executive order and includes many provisions relating to environmental justice and the plight of “disadvantaged communities” that are overwhelmed by many environmental threats. Section 223 of the Order describes the President’s “Justice40 Initiative,” which is designed to ensure that 40% of Federal benefits flow to disadvantaged communities through an “all of government approach.” There is a recognition that some disadvantaged communities lack the personnel and resources to take advantage of this Initiative, so technical training funds will be made available. The Order establishes new offices throughout the Federal bureaucracy to handle and expedite environmental justice matters.
The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and the Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ) play a large role in implementing the Initiative by issuing appropriate guidance and assisting the Federal agencies to locate, among the thousands of programs they supervise, suitable programs that will assist disadvantaged communities. At last count, 518 Federal programs administered by 19 distinct Federal agencies could be a good source for the resources needed by disadvantaged communities to cope with air and water pollution and solid waste issues. Direct grants will be made in many cases, and other programs require the community to apply for the funds promised by the Executive Order. In addition, the Order requires participating Federal agencies to assess the value and effectiveness of the benefits bestowed. OMB and the CEQ have issued guidance documents and conducted many meetings with key personnel and members of the disadvantaged communities.
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Anthony B. Cavender, PillsburyMr. Cavender may be contacted at
anthony.cavender@pillsburylaw.com
You're Doing Construction in Russia, Now What?
May 16, 2022 —
Anazette Ray & Michael Vardaro - Zetlin & De Chiara LLPIn recent weeks, there has been a long list of companies, from all industries spanning from construction/engineering to fashion and hospitality, that have announced that they are completely severing ties with Russia, while a host of others have announced a temporary halt. See Jeffrey A. Sonnenfeld, Over 400 Companies Have Withdrawn from Russia – But Some Remain, Yale School of Management (Updated Mar. 21, 2022), https://som.yale.edu/story/2022/over-400-companies-have-withdrawn-russia-some-remain?utm_campaign=mb. For those developers, EPC contractors, and design professionals (engineers and architects) who have construction projects in Russia, the question is, “How should we proceed?”
The U.S. initially stated that it was not issuing a total embargo on business dealings and trade relations with Russia in response to the nation’s invasion of Ukraine. Instead, the U.S., along with many other Western nations, issued targeted sanctions. See Francesco Giumelli, Understanding Targeted U.N. Sanctions: An Empirical Analysis, International Affairs, 91(6), 1351-1368 (explaining the difference between embargoes and targeted sanctions). However, after evidence of war crimes by Russia emerged, President Biden issued an Executive Order prohibiting U.S. individuals, whether in the states or abroad, from new investments in Russia and prohibiting U.S. individuals from transactions with Russian state-owned entities. See April 6, 2022, Presidential Actions, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/presidential-actions/2022/04/06/prohibiting-new-investment-in-and-certain-services-to-the-russian-federation-in-response-to-continued-russian-federation-aggression/. This new Executive Order is said to not affect existing contracts in Russia, but instead prohibits new ones.
Reprinted courtesy of
Anazette Ray, Zetlin & De Chiara LLP and
Michael Vardaro, Zetlin & De Chiara LLP
Ms. Ray may be contacted at aray@zdlaw.com
Mr. Vardaro may be contacted at mvardaro@zdlaw.com
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Venue for Suing Public Payment Bond
June 15, 2017 —
David Adelstein - Florida Construction Legal UpdatesPublic payment bonds (excluding FDOT payment bonds) are governed under Florida statute s. 255.05. As it pertains to venue—the location to sue a public payment bond–the statute provides in relevant portion:
(5) In addition to the provisions of chapter 47, any action authorized under this section may be brought in the county in which the public building or public work is being construction or repaired.
***
(1)(e) Any provision in a payment bond…which restricts venue of any proceeding relating to such bond…is unenforceable.
Now, what happens if a subcontractor sues only a payment bond but its subcontract with the general contractor contains a mandatory venue provision? For example, what if the general contractor is located in Lee County and the subcontract contains a venue provision for Lee County, the project is located in Collier County, the subcontractor is located in Miami-Dade County, and the surety issues bonds in Miami-Dade County? Does venue have to be in Lee County per the mandatory venue provision?
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David Adelstein, Florida Construction Legal UpdatesMr. Adelstein may be contacted at
Dadelstein@gmail.com
New York’s Comprehensive Insurance Disclosure Act Imposes Increased Disclosure Requirements On Defendants at the Beginning of Lawsuits
February 07, 2022 —
Craig Rokuson & Lisa M. Rolle - Traub Lieberman Insurance Law BlogOn December 31, 2021, New York Governor Kathy Hochul signed into law the Comprehensive Insurance Disclosure Act, which amends Section 3101(f) of the Civil Practice Law & Rules (CPLR) to require the automatic disclosure of insurance-related items within sixty days of the filing of an answer in a civil suit. For lawsuits pending as of the effective date of the Act, the disclosures required by Section 3101(f) must be provided by March 1, 2022.
Pursuant to amended Section 3101(f), defendants (including third-party defendants, cross-claim defendants, and counterclaim defendants) must provide the following information to plaintiffs within sixty days of answering the affirmative pleading, accompanied with a certification from both the defendant and his/her/their/its defense counsel that the disclosures are accurate and complete:
- Copies of all insurance policies that may be liable to satisfy a judgment in the lawsuit, including the insurance application.
- The contact information of any individuals responsible for adjusting the claim on each policy, including his/her/their phone number and email address. If a TPA is involved, his/her/their contact information must also be disclosed.
Reprinted courtesy of
Craig Rokuson, Traub Lieberman and
Lisa M. Rolle, Traub Lieberman
Mr. Rokuson may be contacted at crokuson@tlsslaw.com
Ms. Rolle may be contacted at lrolle@tlsslaw.com
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Insurer's Attempt to Strike Experts in Collapse Case Fails
February 03, 2020 —
Tred R. Eyerly - Insurance Law HawaiiThe insurer's efforts to exclude two of the insured's experts in a collapse case were unsuccessful. Hudon Specialty Ins. Co. v. Talex Enterprises, LLC, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 150148 (S.D. Miss. Sept. 4, 2019).
The insureds' building collapsed. The remaining portions of the building required immediate stabilization. The insureds hired Mr. Laird, an engineer, to prevent further property destruction. The insured designated Mr. Laird as a non-retained expert for trial. Mr. Laird's report claimed that the collapse was caused because the building had been re-roofed many times without removal of the degraded underlying roofing materials, thereby adding additional weight to the roof structure.
The insureds also designated Steve Cox as a non-retained expert. Mr. Cox was an architect who owned property neighboring the building that collapsed. He opined that the building collapsed because of the condition of very old mortar and not because of water standing on the building roof or because of roof repairs.
Hudson sought to strike these two experts because their opinions were inconsistent with the admitted facts. A document produced by the insureds stated that a large amount of rainwater had collected on the roof and the weight of the rainfall was the proximate cause of the collapse. Hudson claimed that this statement qualified as a judicial admission, removing the question of causation from contention. The court disagreed that the statement was a judicial admission because it did not form any part of the pleadings. The statement may have been an evidentiary admission that could be controverted or explained by the parties.
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Tred R. Eyerly, Damon Key Leong Kupchak HastertMr. Eyerly may be contacted at
te@hawaiilawyer.com
Michigan: Identifying and Exploiting the "Queen Exception" to No-Fault Subrogation
May 13, 2014 —
Robert M. Caplan – White and Williams LLPIn Michigan, an employee’s entitlement to compensation for injuries sustained in a motor vehicle accident is governed by both the Workers’ Disability Compensation Act of 1969, MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 418.801 et seq., and Chapter 31 of The Insurance Code of 1956, MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 500.3101 et seq., commonly referred to as the “no-fault act.” Polkosnik v. United Canada Ins. Co., 421 N.W.2d 241, 242 (Mich. App. 1988).
PIP1 benefits payable arising from a motor vehicle accident in Michigan include, principally, (1) medical benefits unlimited in amount and duration, and (2) 85% of lost wages for up to three years. See DEPARTMENT OF INSURANCE AND FINANCIAL SERVICES, Brief Explanation of Michigan No-Fault Insurance. As of October 2013, lost wages are capped at $5,282 per month. Id. Such benefits constitute an injured worker’s “economic loss.” See generally Wood v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co., 668 N.W.2d 353, 355 (Mich. 2003).
Michigan’s no-fault legislation is no different than other no-fault legislation in regard to its purpose: The automobile insurer pays without any right of reimbursement out of any third party tort recovery. Sibley v. Detroit Auto. Inter-Ins. Exch., 427 N.W.2d 528, 530 (Mich. 1988). Moreover, just like in New York, for example, “where benefits are provided from other sources pursuant to state or federal law, the amount paid by the other source reduces the automobile insurer’s responsibility.” Id. at 530.
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Robert M. Caplan, White and Williams LLPMr. Caplan may be contacted at
caplanr@whiteandwilliams.com
Impaired Property Exclusion Bars Coverage When Loose Bolt Interferes with MRI Unit Operation
May 16, 2018 —
Christopher Kendrick & Valerie A. Moore - Haight Brown & Bonesteel, LLPIn All Green Electric v. Security National Ins. Co. (No. B279456, filed 3/19/18, ord. pub. 4/17/18), a California appeals court ruled that the impaired property exclusion barred coverage for a claim based on the insured’s failure to tighten a loose bolt that resulted in stray magnetic fields interfering with operation of an MRI machine and allegedly threatening the health of personnel.
All Green was an electrical contractor hired to perform wiring for an MRI unit installation. Stray magnetic fields interfered with the unit’s operation. Efforts to remediate the problem included installing shielding and ultimately relocating the unit to another room. An expert finally determined that a bolt left loose by All Green was causing the magnetic field, which disappeared when the bolt was properly tightened. The facility sought damages for negligence, including costs for unnecessary modifications and repairs, payments to outside sources for substitute mammography testing, operational costs and expenses, damage to reputation, lost profits, and the loss of an HMO contract.
Reprinted courtesy of
Christopher Kendrick, Haight Brown & Bonesteel LLP and
Valerie A. Moore, Haight Brown & Bonesteel LLP
Mr. Kendrick may be contacted at ckendrick@hbblaw.com
Ms. Moore may be contacted at vmoore@hbblaw.com
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Texas Legislature Puts a Spear in Doctrine Making Contractor Warrantor of Owner Furnished Plans and Specifications
May 31, 2021 —
Paulo Flores, Timothy D. Matheny & Jackson Mabry - Peckar & Abramson, P.C.The Texas Legislature has just sent Senate Bill 219 (“S.B. 219”) to the Governor for signature; if this legislation is signed by the Governor, it will further erode the Texas legal doctrine that makes the contractor the warrantor of owner-furnished plans and specifications unless the prime contract specifically places this burden on the owner.
Background
49 states follow what is known as the Spearin doctrine (named after the U.S. Supreme Court case of United States v. Spearin) in which owners warrant the accuracy and sufficiency of owner-furnished plans and specifications. Texas, on the other hand, follows the Texas Supreme Court created Lonergan doctrine, which has been an unfortunate presence in Texas construction law since 1907. In its “purest form,” as stated by the Texas Supreme Court, the Lonergan doctrine prevents a contractor from successfully asserting a claim for “breach of contract based on defective plans and specifications” unless the contract contains language that “shows an intent to shift the burden of risk to the owner.” Essentially, this then translates into the contractor warranting the sufficiency and accuracy of owner-furnished plans and specifications, unless the contract between them expressly places this burden on the owner. Over the years some Texas courts of appeal had ameliorated this harsh doctrine, but in 2012, the Texas Supreme Court indicated Lonergan was still the law in Texas, in the case of El Paso v. Mastec. In 2019, the Texas Legislature took the first step toward hopefully abrogating the Lonergan doctrine by implementing a new Chapter 473 to the Texas Transportation Code with respect to certain projects undertaken by the Texas Department of Transportation, and Texas political subdivisions acting under the authority of Chapters 284, 366, 370 or 431 of the Transportation Code, adopting, as it were, the Spearin Doctrine in these limited, transportation projects. Now, the legislature has further chipped away at the Lonergan doctrine with the passage of S.B. 219.
Reprinted courtesy of
Paulo Flores, Peckar & Abramson, P.C.,
Timothy D. Matheny, Peckar & Abramson, P.C. and
Jackson Mabry, Peckar & Abramson, P.C.
Mr. Flores may be contacted at PFlores@Pecklaw.com
Mr. Matheny may be contacted at tmatheny@pecklaw.com
Mr. Mabry may be contacted at jmabry@pecklaw.com
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