Traub Lieberman Partner Gregory S. Pennington and Associate Emily A. Velcamp Obtain Summary Judgment in Favor of Residential Property Owners
December 13, 2022 —
Gregory S. Pennington & Emily A. Velcamp - Traub LiebermanTraub Lieberman Partner Gregory S. Pennington and Associate Emily A. Velcamp obtained summary judgment in favor of their clients, owners of a residential property [the “Owners” or “Defendants”] used as a short-term rental in Beach Haven, New Jersey. Plaintiff alleged injuries resulting from a fall into an open water meter pit, located in the public sidewalk abutting the Owners’ property during the time within which the property was rented to plaintiff and his family. According to plaintiff, defendants breached their duty owed to him, relying on a Borough of Beach Haven Ordinance, thereby allowing the water meter pit to be raised in an unsafe manner, which resulted in plaintiff’s fall and subsequent injuries.
After the Court denied defendants’ initial Motion for Summary Judgment on the grounds that issues of material fact existed regarding defendants’ duty and the alleged breach of that duty, a Motion for Reconsideration was filed. Mr. Pennington and Ms. Velcamp argued that their clients, as residential landowners, owed no duty of care to plaintiff for the raised condition of the water meter pit lid, located in the abutting sidewalk, as they did not cause or contribute to the alleged condition. Defendants further argued that even if a duty of care existed, no breach occurred given the lack of notice to defendants, either actual or constructive. Plaintiff attempted to argue that defendants had constructive notice of the lid’s raised condition, relying on his expert report and the fact that defendants had 3.5 months from the date the property was purchased, to the date of the subject accident to discover the lid’s raised condition. Mr. Pennington and Ms. Velcamp successfully argued that despite plaintiff’s allegations and the findings contained in plaintiff’s expert report, authored 2 months after the alleged accident, there was still no credible, material evidence to say how long the water meter pit lid was in that raised condition to allow defendants a reasonable time to discover it, remedy it, or report it to the Borough.
Reprinted courtesy of
Gregory S. Pennington, Traub Lieberman and
Emily A. Velcamp, Traub Lieberman
Mr. Pennington may be contacted at gpennington@tlsslaw.com
Ms. Velcamp may be contacted at evelcamp@tlsslaw.com
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Life After McMillin: Do Negligence and Strict Liability Causes of Action for Construction Defects Still Exist?
January 24, 2018 —
Thomas Balestreri and Amanda Crawley - Balestreri, Potocki, & HolmesThe ruling is in but the battle will likely continue over the practical application of SB 800. On January 18, 2018 the California Supreme Court issued its decision in
McMillin Albany, LLC v. Superior Court (Van Tassel) (January 18, 2018, S229762) __ Cal.4th __, holding that the statutory prelitigation scheme in The Right to Repair Act (“the Act”) that provides for notice and an opportunity for the Builder to repair defects applies to all claims for construction defects in residential construction sold on or after January 1, 2003, regardless whether the claim is founded on a violation of the Act’s performance standards or a common law claim for negligence or strict liability. (
McMillin Albany, LLC v. Superior Court (Van Tassel) (January 18, 2018, S229762) __ Cal.4th __.) With this holding, has the Court ruled that common law causes of action for construction defect still survive? If so, what will they look like and what standards will be applied?
The short answer is that it appears that common law causes of action still survive, at least for now, but it is not clear from this decision what they will look like and what standards will apply.
Portions of the decision seem to suggest that the Act is the sole and exclusive remedy for construction defect claims: “…even in some areas where the common law had supplied a remedy for construction defects resulting in property damage but not personal injury, the text and legislative history [of the statute] reflect a
clear and unequivocal intent to supplant common law negligence and strict product liability actions under the Act.” (
McMillin (January 18, 2018, S229762) __Cal.4th.__ [p. 6].) (Italics added for emphasis) However, at the end of the decision, the Court seems to be saying that there may still be a place for common law claims for negligence and strict liability alongside the Act but that these causes of action may be subject to the performance standards in the Act.
The
McMillin case went up to the Supreme Court on a procedural issue: whether a common law action alleging construction defects resulting in both economic loss and property damage is subject to the Act’s prelitigation notice and cure procedures. The Van Tassels had dismissed their claims under the Act opting to proceed solely on their common law claims including negligence and strict liability. McMillin sought a stay to force the Van Tassels to comply with the Act’s prelitigation procedures. The Supreme Court held that the Van Tassels must comply with the statutory procedures and affirmed the stay issued by the trial court. But the question remained: now that the Van Tassels were left only with common law claims, how would they proceed under the Act?
To understand how the Court dealt with this question, one must first understand how the Court dealt with the narrow procedural question presented by the case. The Court provides a very detailed, clear explanation of the reasons why it felt the Legislature intended for all construction defect claims involving residential construction must comply with the prelitigation requirements of the Act. In summing up its conclusions the Court makes three definitive holdings.
First, for claims involving economic loss only—the kind of claims involved in
Aas—the Court holds that the Legislature intended to supersede
Aas and provide a statutory basis for recovery. (
McMillin (January 18, 2018, S229762) __Cal.4th.__ [p. 10].) In other words, the Court clearly agrees that the Act was meant to allow recovery of damages based solely on economic damages. No surprise there. Second, the Court held for personal injuries, the Legislature made no changes to existing law that provides common law remedies for the injured party. (Id.) Nobody has ever contested that. Finally, the Court held that for construction defect claims involving property damage and not just economic loss “the Legislature replaced the common law
methods of recovery with the new statutory scheme.” (
Id.,) (Italics added for emphasis.)
In other words, the Court is not saying that negligence and strict liability are not permitted causes of action. The Court is merely stating that these causes of action must comply with the Act’s statutory scheme just as the same as a claim for economic loss. Here the Court is focusing on the procedure that must be followed. “The Act, in effect, provides that construction defect claims not involving personal injury will be treated the same procedurally going forward whether or not the underlying claims gave rise to any property damage.” (
Id.)
Having laid out its fundamental premise, the Court then deals with Plaintiff’s arguments regarding the intent of the Legislature and makes light work of them all. In the process, the Court disapproves
Liberty Mutual Ins. Co. v. Brookfield Crystal Cove LLC (2013) 219 Cal. App. 4th 98, and
Burch v. Superior Court (2014) 223 Cal. App. 4th 1411, to the extent they are inconsistent with the views expressed in the
McMillin opinion.
This is where the decision gets interesting. The Court reminds us that the Van Tassels had dismissed their statutory causes of action for violation of the performance standards under Section 896. One would think at that point that Plaintiffs had to be wondering if they had any claims left given that the Court had ruled that the Act was the sole means of recovery for construction defects. Not so fast. The Court points out that the complaint still rests on allegations of defective construction and that the suit remains an “ ‘action seeking recovery of damages arising out of, or related to deficiencies in, the residential construction’ of the plaintiffs’ homes (§896)
and McMillin’s liability under the Van Tassels’ negligence and strict liability claims depends on the extent to which it [McMillin] violated the standards of sections 896 and 897.” (
McMillin (January 18, 2018, S229762) __Cal.4th.__ [p. 19].) (Emphasis added.) WHAT DID THE COURT JUST SAY? Did the Court just say that a plaintiff could bring a common law cause of action for negligence or strict liability based on a violation of the performance standards under Section 896? What exactly would that claim look like? What would be the elements of such a cause of action?
To answer these questions, the Court states in the very next paragraph, which also happens to be the last paragraph in the decision: “In holding that claims seeking recovery for construction defect damages are subject to the Act’s prelitigation procedures regardless of how they are pleaded,
we have no occasion to address the extent to which a party might rely upon common law principles in pursuing liability under the Act.” (
McMillin (January 18, 2018, S229762) __Cal.4th.__ [p. 19].) (Italics added for emphasis) Is the Court answering “No” to the questions posed above? Probably not. It is simply following the age old rule that an appellate court will
not rule on an issue that is not specifically presented by an appeal, leaving that question for another day.
All we know for sure from
McMillin is that every claim for construction defects falling within the scope of the Act must follow the prelitigation procedure. There are no hall passes for negligence and strict liability. The larger question posed by the last two paragraphs in the decision, is whether the law recognizes a cause of action for negligence and strict liability for construction defects based on the standards in Section 896. The answer will have to be worked out by judges and trial attorneys in courtrooms across the State! The parameters of this hybrid cause of action that the Court seems to have posited will need more careful consideration than can be offered on first reading of
McMillin v. Superior Court.
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Balestreri, Potocki, & Holmes
Hawaii Supreme Court Finds Excess Can Sue Primary for Equitable Subrogation
October 21, 2015 —
Tred R. Eyerly – Insurance Law HawaiiIn responding to a certified question from the U.S. Distric Court, the Hawaii Supreme Court determined that an excess carrier can sue the primary carrier for failure to settle a claim in bad faith within primary limits. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 2015 Haw. LEXIS 142 (Haw. June 29, 2015).
St. Paul, the excess carrier, and Liberty Mutual, the primary carrier, issued polices to Pleasant Travel Service, Inc. The primary policy covered up to $1 million.
Pleasant Travel was sued for damages resulting from an accidental death. St. Paul alleged that Liberty Mutual rejected multiple pretrial settlement offers within the $1 million primary policy limit. A trial resulted in a verdict of $4.1 million against Pleasant Travel. The action settled for a confidential amount in excess of the Liberty Mutual policy limit. St. Paul paid the amount in excess.
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Tred R. Eyerly, Insurance Law HawaiiMr. Eyerly may be contacted at
te@hawaiilawyer.com
Hawaii Bill Preserves Insurance Coverage in Lava Zones
May 20, 2015 —
Tred R. Eyerly – Insurance Law HawaiiThe Hawaii legislature passed a bill in its recently concluded session to protect homeowners and businesses affected by lava flows from losing coverage.
The Puna district on the Big Island was severely impacted by the Pu`u O`o lava flow as it crept closer to homes, businesses, schools and populated areas. Problems were created by the imposition of a moratorium on the sale of new policies in certain areas of the Puna district.
SB 589 grants relief to homeowners who have had continuous insurance in lava zone areas that are declared to be in a state of emergency. The bill (1) allows the homeowners to have their policies renewed, (2) permits continued coverage for homeowners who wish to sell their homes, (3) grants coverage for new buyers of an insured property, and (4) allows homeowners who have not previously had insurance to purchase coverage from the Hawaii Property Insurance Association.
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Tred R. Eyerly, Insurance Law HawaiiMr. Eyerly may be contacted at
te@hawaiilawyer.com
Suppliers Must Also Heed “Right to Repair” Claims
October 16, 2013 —
CDJ STAFF“Right to repair” statutes don’t only affect general contractors, but everyone involved in the building of a home, down to those who supply materials, warns Paul Gary in a post on Window & Door. He notes that “if you sell your window or door products in one of the growing number of states with a ‘Notice and Opportunity to Cure’ or ‘Right to Repair’ statute, you need a plan in the event you receive a defect notice relating to your product.”
A supplier that receives a statement that a defect exists should, according to Mr. Gary, carefully document not only when the notice was received, but when it was sent, according to postmark, and whether the sender complied with all the regulations. From there, the supplier should determine if there were previous, informal complaints. Finally, determine sales information. At this point, the supplier has the information its insurer will require.
His next caution is that in what follows, other may “seek defense and indemnity from you.” And while you may point out problems with the notice,” he counsels that “if you confirm there is an issue with your product, don’t be afraid to make a fair proposal for repair.”
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California Cracking down on Phony Qualifiers
July 23, 2014 —
Beverley BevenFlorez-CDJ STAFFGarret Murai in his California Construction Law Blog stated that “California’s Senate Bill 862, and amended Business and Professions Code 7068.1” has given the California Contractors State License Board (CSLB) “additional enforcement authority to crack down on phony qualifiers by allowing the CLSB to take disciplinary action against a qualifier and a licensee if the qualifier is not actively involved in the construction activities of the licensee’s business.”
Murai explained that “[r]enting a qualifier means that you pay an individual who holds a California contractor’s license to act as the Responsible Managing Officer (RMO) or Responsible Managing Employee (RMO) of a construction company when they have no actual involvement in the day-to-day operations of the company.”
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Alabama Court Determines No Coverage For Insured's Faulty Workmanship
June 28, 2013 —
Tred EyerlyThe Alabama Supreme Court found there was no coverage for the insured cabinet maker for claims arising from alleged faulty workmanship. Shane Traylor Cabinetmaker, L.L.C. v. Am. Resources Ins. Co., Inc., 2013 Ala. LEXIS 42 (May 3, 2013).
The insured was sued by a homeowner for property damage caused by faulty workmanship. The insurer refused to defend, contending there was no "occurrence." The trial court granted summary judgment to the insurer.
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Tred EyerlyTred Eyerly can be contacted at
te@hawaiilawyer.com
Entire Fairness or Business Judgment? It’s Anyone’s Guess
January 09, 2015 —
Maurice Pesso, Greg M. Steinberg and Christopher J. Orrico – White and Williams LLPIn lawsuits challenging the validity of business transactions and combinations, the most significant issue is often which standard of review the court applies: the defense-friendly “Business Judgment Rule” or the more stringent “Entire Fairness Standard.” The standard utilized by the court – or more often times the standard which the parties think the court will apply – can drive decisions on motion practice, settlement discussions, and resolution strategy. Under the Business Judgment Rule, directors are presumed to have acted in good faith and their decisions will only be questioned when they are shown to have engaged in self-dealing or fraud. However, if a “Controlling Shareholder” stands on both sides of the transaction, the court will often scrutinize the transaction under the more plaintiff-friendly “Entire Fairness Standard.”
So, what constitutes a “Controlling Shareholder?” If the party in question owns more than 50% of a company’s equity, the answer is clear-cut. However, for cases involving stockholders who own less than 50% of a company’s equity and stand on both sides of the disputed transaction, the answer is not so simple. This uncertainty was highlighted in back-to-back decisions by the Delaware Chancery Court in November 2014. On November 25, 2014, the court granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss a derivative lawsuit alleging breach of fiduciary duty in In Re Sanchez Energy Derivative Litigation (“Sanchez”). Vice Chancellor Glasscock held that the complaint failed to plead facts sufficient to raise an inference that two directors with a collective 21.5% equity interest in the company were Controlling Shareholders. The very next day, in In Re Zhongpin Inc. Stockholders Litigation (“Zhongpin”), the Delaware Chancery Court denied the defendants’ motion to dismiss breach of fiduciary duty claims against an alleged “Controlling Shareholder” and members of the company’s board. In Zhongpin, Vice Chancellor Noble held that sufficient facts were plead to raise an inference that a CEO with a 17.5% equity was a “Controlling Shareholder.”
Reprinted courtesy of White and Williams LLP attorneys
Maurice Pesso,
Greg M. Steinberg and
Christopher J. Orrico
Mr. Pesso may be contacted at pessom@whiteandwilliams.com
Mr. Steinberg may be contacted at steinbergg@whiteandwilliams.com
Mr. Orrico may be contacted at orricoc@whiteandwilliams.com
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