Kiewit Hired as EPC for Fire-Damaged Freeport Gas Terminal Fix
September 19, 2022 —
Mary B. Powers - Engineering News-RecordFreeport LNG’s $13.5-billion natural gas liquefaction plant and export terminal in Texas, closed since a June 8 fire and explosion that damaged the facility, said it will not partially reopen until possibly mid-November, and not fully operate until next March—the third delay it has announced.
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Mary B. Powers, Engineering News-Record
ENR may be contacted at enr@enr.com
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Quick Note: COVID-19 Claim – Proving Causation
August 03, 2020 —
David Adelstein - Florida Construction Legal UpdatesIn certain jurisdictions, the number of people testing positive for COVID-19 is on the rise. As this occurs, there is the possibility that a construction project will have to deal with one or more workers testing positive. That is the current reality. If the dialogue has not occurred before, now is the time to discuss any enhanced measures—above OSHA guidelines—that could be implemented to address this reality and mitigate the risk. Part of the reality, though, is that regardless of the enhanced measures and mitigation, it is impossible to truly prevent this risk.
No one disputes COVID-19. There may be a dispute as to whether COVID-19 constitutes a force majeure event or some other event, however, before you start labeling it, you still NEED TO PROVE the impact caused by COVID-19. There needs to be a cause-and-effect relationship so you can address (i) how this impacted the critical path of your schedule and/or (ii) how this impacted labor productivity. In other words, you need to prove causation. Stating there was a delay or loss of productivity without establishing the cause-and-effect relationship (i.e, causation) provides no value because it does not support the production impact or time extension and, without either, there is no basis for additional compensation (even if you establish it should be deemed an excusable, compensable delay).
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David Adelstein, Kirwin Norris, P.A.Mr. Adelstein may be contacted at
dma@kirwinnorris.com
California Condo Architects Not Liable for Construction Defects?
May 13, 2014 —
Beverley BevenFlorez-CDJ STAFFLaw360 reported that attorneys for the architects of a San Francisco, California condominium complex told the California Supreme Court that the designers “can’t be held liable for construction defects that caused units to overheat” and urged “the panel to reverse a lower court's ruling that the architects owed a duty of care to the condos’ buyers.”
The California appeals court ruling was based on California’s Right to Repair Act, however, “that law doesn’t apply to condo conversions.” The architects argued that since Beacon was “designed and originally rolled out as rental apartments before the units were sold as condos” the Right to Repair Act doesn’t apply.
However, Beacon Residential Community Association’s attorney Robert Riggs of Katzoff & Riggs “argued that the architects had a ‘cradle to grave’ involvement in the development of the Beacon.” Riggs stated, “They designed a very large building with essentially no ventilation system, along with windows that don't open.”
According to Law360, “[t]he justices took the arguments under submission and did not indicate which way they would rule.”
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Will There Be Construction Defect Legislation Introduced in the 2019 Colorado Legislative Session?
March 18, 2019 —
David McLain - Colorado Construction Litigation BlogWith the 2019 Colorado legislative session well underway, the construction industry is waiting with bated breath to see what the Democrat controlled legislature might do with respect to construction defect legislation. In recent years, having a split legislature has prevented any attempts to roll back positive changes in the law, either from the legislature or Colorado courts, that have been hailed by the construction community.
This year, odds are good that we will see at least one bill similar to two introduced last year that would hinder the ability to have disputes decided by binding arbitration. While not full frontal assaults on the Colorado Supreme Court decision in the Vallagio case, HB18-1261, the “Colorado Arbitration Fairness Act,” and HB 18-1262, the “Arbitration Services Provider Transparency Act,” would have negatively impacted the ability to resolve any type of case through arbitration. Anything that prevents the resolution of construction defect cases through arbitration will increase the judgments and settlements in such cases, ultimately increasing the costs of construction and for insurance for those in the industry.
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David McLain, Higgins, Hopkins, McLain & Roswell, LLCMr. McLain may be contacted at
mclain@hhmrlaw.com
Seven Former North San Diego County Landfills are Leaking Contaminants
April 07, 2011 —
Beverley BevenFlorez CDJ STAFFDeborah Sullivan Brennan of the North County Times reported that seven former dumps in San Diego are leaking contaminants into the surrounding groundwater. John R. Odermatt, a senior engineering geologist for the California Regional Water Quality Control Board s San Diego region, told the North County Times, “the risk to most county residents is very small or negligible, while local water supplies located in more rural areas may be at a somewhat elevated but unquantified level of risk.”
This issue is causing heavy scrutiny of a new proposed landfill in Gregory Canyon. The landfill would be located on 308 acres of undeveloped land near Pala, alongside the San Luis Rey River. The group “Save Gregory Canyon” has been speaking out against the landfill, stating that “the project threatens major detrimental impacts to both surface and groundwater, as well as a potential compromise of the two major San Diego Water Authority pipelines nearby.” Richard Felago, a Gregory Canyon Ltd. Consultant, told the North County Times that the 8-foot-thick liner, composed of layers of gravel and synthetic material, would not leak.
The appeal hearing is being rescheduled later this month after one of the three panelists recused himself due to having a competing interest in the property, according to the article by Gary Warth in the North County Times.
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Life After McMillin: Do Negligence and Strict Liability Causes of Action for Construction Defects Still Exist?
January 24, 2018 —
Thomas Balestreri and Amanda Crawley - Balestreri, Potocki, & HolmesThe ruling is in but the battle will likely continue over the practical application of SB 800. On January 18, 2018 the California Supreme Court issued its decision in
McMillin Albany, LLC v. Superior Court (Van Tassel) (January 18, 2018, S229762) __ Cal.4th __, holding that the statutory prelitigation scheme in The Right to Repair Act (“the Act”) that provides for notice and an opportunity for the Builder to repair defects applies to all claims for construction defects in residential construction sold on or after January 1, 2003, regardless whether the claim is founded on a violation of the Act’s performance standards or a common law claim for negligence or strict liability. (
McMillin Albany, LLC v. Superior Court (Van Tassel) (January 18, 2018, S229762) __ Cal.4th __.) With this holding, has the Court ruled that common law causes of action for construction defect still survive? If so, what will they look like and what standards will be applied?
The short answer is that it appears that common law causes of action still survive, at least for now, but it is not clear from this decision what they will look like and what standards will apply.
Portions of the decision seem to suggest that the Act is the sole and exclusive remedy for construction defect claims: “…even in some areas where the common law had supplied a remedy for construction defects resulting in property damage but not personal injury, the text and legislative history [of the statute] reflect a
clear and unequivocal intent to supplant common law negligence and strict product liability actions under the Act.” (
McMillin (January 18, 2018, S229762) __Cal.4th.__ [p. 6].) (Italics added for emphasis) However, at the end of the decision, the Court seems to be saying that there may still be a place for common law claims for negligence and strict liability alongside the Act but that these causes of action may be subject to the performance standards in the Act.
The
McMillin case went up to the Supreme Court on a procedural issue: whether a common law action alleging construction defects resulting in both economic loss and property damage is subject to the Act’s prelitigation notice and cure procedures. The Van Tassels had dismissed their claims under the Act opting to proceed solely on their common law claims including negligence and strict liability. McMillin sought a stay to force the Van Tassels to comply with the Act’s prelitigation procedures. The Supreme Court held that the Van Tassels must comply with the statutory procedures and affirmed the stay issued by the trial court. But the question remained: now that the Van Tassels were left only with common law claims, how would they proceed under the Act?
To understand how the Court dealt with this question, one must first understand how the Court dealt with the narrow procedural question presented by the case. The Court provides a very detailed, clear explanation of the reasons why it felt the Legislature intended for all construction defect claims involving residential construction must comply with the prelitigation requirements of the Act. In summing up its conclusions the Court makes three definitive holdings.
First, for claims involving economic loss only—the kind of claims involved in
Aas—the Court holds that the Legislature intended to supersede
Aas and provide a statutory basis for recovery. (
McMillin (January 18, 2018, S229762) __Cal.4th.__ [p. 10].) In other words, the Court clearly agrees that the Act was meant to allow recovery of damages based solely on economic damages. No surprise there. Second, the Court held for personal injuries, the Legislature made no changes to existing law that provides common law remedies for the injured party. (Id.) Nobody has ever contested that. Finally, the Court held that for construction defect claims involving property damage and not just economic loss “the Legislature replaced the common law
methods of recovery with the new statutory scheme.” (
Id.,) (Italics added for emphasis.)
In other words, the Court is not saying that negligence and strict liability are not permitted causes of action. The Court is merely stating that these causes of action must comply with the Act’s statutory scheme just as the same as a claim for economic loss. Here the Court is focusing on the procedure that must be followed. “The Act, in effect, provides that construction defect claims not involving personal injury will be treated the same procedurally going forward whether or not the underlying claims gave rise to any property damage.” (
Id.)
Having laid out its fundamental premise, the Court then deals with Plaintiff’s arguments regarding the intent of the Legislature and makes light work of them all. In the process, the Court disapproves
Liberty Mutual Ins. Co. v. Brookfield Crystal Cove LLC (2013) 219 Cal. App. 4th 98, and
Burch v. Superior Court (2014) 223 Cal. App. 4th 1411, to the extent they are inconsistent with the views expressed in the
McMillin opinion.
This is where the decision gets interesting. The Court reminds us that the Van Tassels had dismissed their statutory causes of action for violation of the performance standards under Section 896. One would think at that point that Plaintiffs had to be wondering if they had any claims left given that the Court had ruled that the Act was the sole means of recovery for construction defects. Not so fast. The Court points out that the complaint still rests on allegations of defective construction and that the suit remains an “ ‘action seeking recovery of damages arising out of, or related to deficiencies in, the residential construction’ of the plaintiffs’ homes (§896)
and McMillin’s liability under the Van Tassels’ negligence and strict liability claims depends on the extent to which it [McMillin] violated the standards of sections 896 and 897.” (
McMillin (January 18, 2018, S229762) __Cal.4th.__ [p. 19].) (Emphasis added.) WHAT DID THE COURT JUST SAY? Did the Court just say that a plaintiff could bring a common law cause of action for negligence or strict liability based on a violation of the performance standards under Section 896? What exactly would that claim look like? What would be the elements of such a cause of action?
To answer these questions, the Court states in the very next paragraph, which also happens to be the last paragraph in the decision: “In holding that claims seeking recovery for construction defect damages are subject to the Act’s prelitigation procedures regardless of how they are pleaded,
we have no occasion to address the extent to which a party might rely upon common law principles in pursuing liability under the Act.” (
McMillin (January 18, 2018, S229762) __Cal.4th.__ [p. 19].) (Italics added for emphasis) Is the Court answering “No” to the questions posed above? Probably not. It is simply following the age old rule that an appellate court will
not rule on an issue that is not specifically presented by an appeal, leaving that question for another day.
All we know for sure from
McMillin is that every claim for construction defects falling within the scope of the Act must follow the prelitigation procedure. There are no hall passes for negligence and strict liability. The larger question posed by the last two paragraphs in the decision, is whether the law recognizes a cause of action for negligence and strict liability for construction defects based on the standards in Section 896. The answer will have to be worked out by judges and trial attorneys in courtrooms across the State! The parameters of this hybrid cause of action that the Court seems to have posited will need more careful consideration than can be offered on first reading of
McMillin v. Superior Court.
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Timely Written Notice to Insurer and Cooperating with Insurer
June 21, 2017 —
David Adelstein - Florida Construction Legal UpdatesI harp on notifying a liability insurer in writing once a claim is asserted against you. As soon as possible. I harp on this because as an insured you want to remove any doubt or argument that the insurer was prejudiced due to a lack of timely notice.
In a recent opinion, Zurich American Insurance Co. v. European Tile and Floors, Inc., 2017 WL 2427172 (M.D.Fla. 2017), the insurer moved for summary judgment in a coverage action arguing that its insured failed to provide it timely written notice. Specifically, the insurer argued that the insured violated the clause in the liability policy that states:
2. Duties in the Event of Occurrence, Offense, Claim or Suit
b. If a claim is made or “suit” is brought against any insured, you must:
- Immediately record the specifics of the claim or “suit” and the date received; and
- Notify us as soon as practicable.
You must see to it that we receive written notice of the claim or “suit” as soon as practicable.
c. You and any other insured must:
- Immediately send us copies of any demands, notices, summonses or legal papers received in connection with the claim or “suit”;
- Authorize us to obtain records and other information;
- Cooperate with us in the investigation, settlement or defense of the claim or “suit”; and
- Assist us, upon our request, in the enforcement of any right against any person or organization which may be liable to the insured because of injury or damage to which this insurance may also apply.
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David Adelstein, Florida Construction Legal UpdatesMr. Adelstein may be contacted at
Dadelstein@gmail.com
Land a Cause of Home Building Shortage?
June 17, 2015 —
Beverley BevenFlorez-CDJ STAFFDiana Olick of CNBC reported that builders are not keeping up with the housing demand due to a lack of supply of developed lots as well as the increasing price of available land.
"You have to find the land, you've got to be able to buy it and you've got to persuade someone to let you develop it. The one you hear the most about is the last one," Paul Emrath, vice president of survey and housing policy research at the National Association of Home Builders (NAHB), told CNBC.
Olick wrote that “[l]and prices have actually surpassed their peak values in many markets where builders are particularly active, especially in Texas.”
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