SEATTLE WASHINGTON BUILDING EXPERT
DIRECTORY AND CAPABILITIES

Washington Supreme Court Upholds King County Ordinance Requiring Utility Providers to Pay for Access to County’s Right-of-Way and Signals Approval for Other Counties to Follow Suit

March 02, 2020 — Kristina Southwell - Ahlers Cressman & Sleight PLLC
On December 5, 2019, the Washington State Supreme Court released its opinion in King County v. King County Water Districts, et al.,[1] upholding King County’s Ordinance 18403, which requires utility companies who are franchise grantees to pay “franchise compensation” for their use of the County rights-of-way. Generally, utility companies must apply for and obtain from the County a franchise permitting it to do necessary work in the County rights-of-way. [2] Previously, King County only charged an administrative fee associated with issuing such a franchise. But with the new franchise compensation charges, King County estimates that it will raise approximately $10 million dollars per year for its general fund. Ordinance 18403 passed in November 2016 and was the first of its kind in the state. The ordinance created a rule, set forth in RCW 6.27.080, requiring electric, gas, water, and sewer utilities who are granted a franchise by King County to pay “franchise compensation” in exchange for the right to use the County’s rights-of-way. The rule provides that franchise compensation is in the nature of an annual rent payment to the County for using the County roads. King County decides an initial estimate of the charge by considering various factors such as the value of the land used, the size of the area that will be used, and the density of the households served. But utility companies can negotiate with the County over the final amount of franchise compensation. Read the court decision
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Reprinted courtesy of Kristina Southwell, Ahlers Cressman & Sleight PLLC
Ms. Southwell may be contacted at kristina.southwell@acslawyers.com

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Homebuyers Get Break as Loan Rates Defy Fed Tapering: Mortgages

February 14, 2014 — Kathleen M. Howley – Bloomberg
Ashley Underwood is taking advantage of the unexpected drop in mortgage rates by rushing to buy her first home before they go up again. “I’m ready to cancel plans at a moment’s notice to go look at a house,” said Underwood, 27, who lives in Indianapolis, Indiana. “I didn’t expect to see rates falling again, and I want to lock in something before I lose out.” The drop in the last month proved forecasters wrong, said Douglas Duncan, chief economist of Fannie Mae in Washington. After the Federal Reserve announced in December that it would begin tapering purchases of mortgage-backed securities, all the major housing forecasters said rates would jump this quarter. Economists didn’t foresee that investors would react to the Fed’s retreat by moving money from emerging markets into U.S. Treasuries, driving down home-loan rates. Read the court decision
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Reprinted courtesy of Kathleen M. Howley, Bloomberg
Ms. Howley may be contacted at kmhowley@bloomberg.net

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Conflicting Exclusions Result in Duty to Defend

October 21, 2015 — Tred R. Eyerly – Insurance Law Hawaii
The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's finding that the insurer had a duty to defend in light of conflicting endorsements in the policy. Panfil v. Nautilus Ins. Co., 2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 14621 (7th Cir. Aug. 20, 2015). JRJ Ada, LLC was a contractor. JRJ's two members, Joe Panfil and Renee Michelon, had a CGL policy with Nautilus. The employee of JRJ's subcontractor, Astro Insulation, fell through a hole while performing insulation work, injuring himself. The employee sued JRJ, who sought a defense from Nautilus. Nautilus refused to defend because JRJ was not an insured under the policy. Further, Nautilus relied upon the policy's Contractor-Subcontrated Work Endorsement and Employee Exclusion to deny coverage. Panfil and Michelon sued Nautilus. Cross-motions for summary judgment were filed and the court granted plaitniffs' motion while denying Nautilus' motion. The district court first found that the policy should be reformed to inlcude JRJ as an insured. Nautilus did not appeal this determination. The court also found that Nautilus breached its duty to defend and was therefore estopped from asserting policy defenses to coverage. Read the court decision
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Reprinted courtesy of Tred R. Eyerly, Insurance Law Hawaii
Mr. Eyerly may be contacted at te@hawaiilawyer.com

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Umbrella Policy Must Drop Down to Assist with Defense

May 12, 2016 — Tred R. Eyerly – Insurance Law Hawaii
The court determined that an umbrella carrier was obligated to assist the general liability insurer in defending the insured. Am. States Ins. Co. v. Insurance Company of the State of Pennsylvania, 2016 U.S. Dist LEXIS 38128 (E.D. Cal. March 23, 2016). Sierra Pacific Industries obtained rights to timber harvesting operation on a parcel of land in northern California. Sierra hired Howell's Forest Harvesting to perform certain timber harvest operations under the terms of a logging agreement. The logging agreement required Howell to obtain a CGL policy and to name Sierra as an additional insured. Read the court decision
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Reprinted courtesy of Tred R. Eyerly, Insurance Law Hawaii
Mr. Eyerly may be contacted at te@hawaiilawyer.com

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Cherokee Nation Wins Summary Judgment in COVID-19 Business Interruption Claim

February 01, 2021 — Sergio F. Oehninger, Geoffrey B. Fehling & Matt Revis - Hunton Insurance Recovery Blog
In a resounding victory for policyholders, an Oklahoma state court granted partial summary judgment for the Cherokee Nation in its COVID-19 business interruption claim. The Cherokee Nation is seeking coverage for losses caused by the pandemic—specifically, the inability to use numerous tribal businesses and services for their intended purpose. Based on the “all risks” nature of the policy and the fortuitous nature of its loss, the Cherokee Nation sought a partial summary judgment ruling that the policies afford business interruption coverage for COVID-19-related losses. The policy provided coverage for “all risk of direct physical loss or damage,” which the Cherokee Nation contended was triggered when the property was “rendered unusable for its intended purpose.” In support of this view, and consistent with established insurance policy interpretation principles, such as providing meaning to every term and reading the policy as a whole, the Cherokee Nation argued that a distinction must exist between “physical loss” and “physical damage.” This distinction demands an interpretation supporting the “intended purpose” reading of the policy language. Thus, the physical presence of COVID-19 depriving the Cherokee Nation of the use of covered property for its intended purpose triggered a covered loss. Reprinted courtesy of Sergio F. Oehninger, Hunton Andrews Kurth, Geoffrey B. Fehling, Hunton Andrews Kurth and Matt Revis, Hunton Andrews Kurth Mr. Oehninger may be contacted at soehninger@HuntonAK.com Mr. Fehling may be contacted at gfehling@HuntonAK.com Read the court decision
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Can We Compel Insurers To Cover Construction Defect in General Liability Policies?

December 09, 2011 — Douglas Reiser, Builders Council Blog

Recently, I read an article on Engineering News-Record that outlines a remarkable movement by as many as four states, to mandate coverage of construction defects in contractor general liability insurance policies. Say what? Is this a reality? What will become of affordable insurance?

Commercial General Liability insurance, or CGL, is your basic liability insurance. Every contractor doing business in the State of Washington, and most likely those abroad, has this insurance. Contractors buy this insurance to protect them from unforeseen liabilities arising from their negligence - and right now it’s reasonably affordable.

Why is it so affordable in such a risk-heavy industry? Because CGL policies significantly limit the scope of their coverage. Coverage is generally afforded for damages resulting from negligence (The roofer put a hammer through the drywall contractor’s wall) or which resulted from your defective construction (the roof leaked and flooded the rest of the house). But, that coverage does not include replacement of your faulty construction (the contents of the home might be protected by your leaky roof - the leaky roof itself is not).

The debate over coverage typically stems from the definition of “occurrence,” a term used to describe the event from which coverage arises, “resulting loss,” a term used to describe the type of loss covered.

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Reprinted courtesy of Douglas Reiser of Reiser Legal LLC. Mr. Reiser can be contacted at info@reiserlegal.com

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Texas Construction Firm Officials Sentenced in Contract-Fraud Case

August 07, 2018 — Tom Ichniowski – Engineering News-Record
Two top officials of a Texas construction company—Honest, Experienced, Reliable Contracting Solutions LLC—have been sentenced to federal prison terms for defrauding the State Dept. through a plan to steer more than $1 million in contracts to the company, the Dept. of Justice says. Read the court decision
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Reprinted courtesy of Tom Ichniowski, ENR
Mr. Ichniowski may be contacted at ichniowskit@enr.com

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Indemnitor Owes Indemnity Even Where Indemnitee is Actively Negligent, California Court Holds

June 15, 2017 — Garret Murai - California Construction Law Blog
Indemnity provisions are one of the most fought over provisions in design and construction contracts. But while parties generally understand the intent behind indemnity provisions — that one party (the “indemnitor”) agrees to indemnify (and often defend as well) another party (the “indemnitee”) from and against claims that may arise on a project — few understand how they are actually applied. In a recent Court of Appeals decision, Oltmans Construction Company v. Bayside Interiors, Inc. (March 30, 2017), Case No. A147313, the California Court of Appeals for the First District examined an indemnity provision and its “except to the extent of” provision whereby a subcontractor agreed to indemnify (and defend) a general contractor from claims arising on a project “except to the extent of” the general contractor’s active negligence or willful misconduct and whether such language either: (1) bars a general contractor from seeking indemnity where the general contractor was actively negligent; or (2) simply bars a general contractor from seeking indemnity where the general contractor was actively and solely negligent, thereby, requiring a subcontractor to indemnify the general contractor where the negligence of another party may have also contributed to the injury or damage. Read the court decision
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Reprinted courtesy of Garret Murai, Wendel Rosen Black & Dean LLP
Mr. Murai may be contacted at gmurai@wendel.com

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