Repair of Part May Necessitate Replacement of Whole
February 10, 2012 —
CDJ STAFFJudge Gleuda E. Edmonds, a magistrate judge in the United States District Court of Arizona issued a ruling in Guadiana v. State Farm on January 25, 2012. Judge Edmonds recommended a partial summary judgment in favor of the plaintiff.
Ms. Guandiana’s home had water damage due to pluming leaks in September 2004. She was informed that polybutylene pluming in her house could not be repaired in parts “it must be completely replaced.” She had had the plumbing replaced. State Farm denied her claim, arguing that “the tear-out provision did not cover the cost of accessing and replacing those pipes that were not leaking.”
In September 2007, State Farm filed a motion to dismiss. The court rejected this motion, stating that “If Guadiana can establish as a matter of fact that the system that caused the covered loss included all the pipes in her house and it was necessary to replace all the pipes to repair that system, State Farm is obligated to pay the tear-out costs necessary to replace all the pipes, even those not leaking.”
In March 2009, State Farm filed for summary judgment, which the court granted. State Farm argued that “the tear-out provision only applied to ‘repair’ and not ‘replace’ the system that caused the covered leak.” As for the rest of the piping, State Farm argued that “the policy does not cover defective materials.”
In December 2011, Ms. Guadiana filed for summary judgment, asking the court to determine that “the policy ‘covers tear-out costs necessary to adequately repair the plumbing system, even if an adequate repair requires replacing all or part of the system.”
In her ruling, Judge Edmonds noted that Ms. Guadiana’s claim is that “the water damage is a covered loss and she is entitled to tear-out costs necessary to repair the pluming system that caused that covered loss.” She rejected State Farm’s claim that it was not obligated to replace presumably defective pipes. Further, she rejected State Farm’s argument that they were only responsible for the leaking portion, noting “Guadiana intends to prove at trial that this is an unusual case where repair of her plumbing system requires replacement of all the PB plumbing.”
Judge Edmonds concluded by directing the District Court to interpret the tear out issue as “the tear-out provision in State Farm’s policy requires State Farm to pay all tear-out costs necessary to repair the plumbing system (that caused the covered loss) even if repair of the system requires accessing more than the leaking portion of the system.”
Read the court’s decision…
Read the court decisionRead the full story...Reprinted courtesy of
Fifth Circuit Holds Insurer Owes Duty to Defend Latent Condition Claim That Caused Fire Damage to Property Years After Construction Work
September 21, 2020 —
Jeremy S. Macklin - Traub LiebermanMost general liability policies only provide coverage for “property damage” that occurs during the policy period. Thus, when analyzing coverage for a construction defect claim, it is important to ascertain the date on which damage occurred. Of course, the plaintiffs’ bar crafts pleadings to be purposefully vague as to the date (or period) of damage to property. A recent Fifth Circuit decision applying Texas law addresses this coverage issue in the context of allegations of a condition created by an insured during the policy period that caused damage after the policy expired.
In Gonzalez v. Mid-Continent Cas. Co., 969 F.3d 554 (5th Cir. 2020), Gilbert Gonzales (the insured) was a siding contractor. In 2013, the underlying plaintiff hired Gonzales to install new siding on his house. In 2016, the underlying plaintiff’s house was damaged in a fire. The underlying plaintiff sued Gilbert in Texas state court alleging that when Gonzalez installed the siding in 2013, he hammered nails through electrical wiring and created a dangerous condition that caused a fire three years later in 2016.
At the time Gilbert performed construction work, he was insured by Mid-Continent Casualty Company. Mid-Continent disclaimed coverage to Gonzales on the basis that the complaint unequivocally alleged that property was damaged in 2016 and there were no allegations that property damage occurred prior to 2016 or was continuing in nature.
Read the court decisionRead the full story...Reprinted courtesy of
Jeremy S. Macklin, Traub LiebermanMr. Macklin may be contacted at
jmacklin@tlsslaw.com
Not so Fast – Florida’s Legislature Overrules Gindel’s Pre-Suit Notice/Tolling Decision Related to the Construction Defect Statute of Repose
May 11, 2020 —
Rahul Gogineni - The Subrogation StrategistAs discussed in a prior blog post, in Gindel v. Centex Homes, 2018 Fla.App. LEXIS 13019, Florida’s Fourth District Court of Appeal held that when the plaintiffs provided a pre-suit notice in compliance with §558.004 of Florida’s construction defect Right-to-Cure statute, Fla. Stat. §§ 558.001 to 558.005, et. seq., they commenced a “civil action or proceeding,” i.e. an “action,” within the meaning of Florida’s construction defect Statute of Repose, Florida Statue § 95.11(3)(c). Thus, the court held that the plaintiffs commenced their action prior to the time Florida’s 10-year statute of repose period ended. In overturning the lower court’s dismissal of the action, the court found that because the Right-to-Cure statute, §558 of the Florida Statutes, sets out a series of mandatory steps that must be taken prior to bringing a judicial action, filing pre-suit notice of claim sufficiently constituted an “action” for purposes of Florida’s Statute of Repose.
For various reasons, the parties appealed the decision to the Supreme Court of Florida. In July of 2019, before the Florida Supreme Court could decide whether to hear the case, the Florida legislature passed legislation that effectively overruled the decision. To overrule the decision, the Florida Legislature modified § 558.004 of Florida’s Right-to-Cure statute to expressly state that a notice of claim served pursuant to the Right-to-Cure statute does not toll the 10-year statute of repose period for construction claims. See Fla. Stat.
§ 558.004(d).
Read the court decisionRead the full story...Reprinted courtesy of
Rahul Gogineni, White and Williams LLPMr. Gogineni may be contacted at
goginenir@whiteandwilliams.com
Nevada Senate Rejects Construction Defect Bill
June 07, 2011 —
CDJ STAFFThe Las Vegas Sun reports that Assembly Bill 401, the construction defect bill, lost in a vote of 9 to 12. The measure extended the time for construction defect suits to be filed, awarded legal costs only to successful plaintiffs, and set a definition of construction defects. Two Democrats joined the Republicans in the Senate in defeating the bill.
Read the full story…
Read the court decisionRead the full story...Reprinted courtesy of
Killer Subcontract Provisions
January 20, 2020 —
Patrick McNamara - Porter Law GroupWe are frequently requested by subcontractor clients to review the subcontract that has been prepared by the prime contractor, before our client signs it. While no two agreements are identical, there are a number of problematic contract provisions that appear in many agreements. Here is a list of ten such provisions (and their variations) that are potential “deal breakers”:
- PAY IF/WHEN PAID (e.g. “Contractor shall have the right to exhaust all legal remedies, including appeals, prior to having an obligation to pay Subcontractor.”) “Pay-if-paid” provisions (“Receipt of payment from Owner shall be a condition precedent to Contractor’s duty to pay Subcontractor”) are illegal in California. However, the only legal limit on “Pay-When-Paid” provisions is that payment must be made “within a reasonable time.” The example above, as written, essentially affords the prime contractor a period of several years following completion of the project before that contractor has an independent duty to pay its subcontractors – not a “reasonable” amount of time, to those waiting to be paid. A compromise is to provide a time limit, such as 6 months or one year following substantial completion of the project.
- CROSS-PROJECT SET-OFF (e.g. “In the event of disputes or default by Subcontractor, Contractor shall have the right to withhold sums due Subcontractor on this Project and on any other project on which Subcontractor is performing work for Contractor.”) Such provisions are problematic and likely unenforceable, as they potentially bar subcontractors’ lien rights. Such provisions should be deleted.
- CONTRACTOR/SUBCONTRACTOR RESPONSIBILITY FOR DESIGN QUALITY (e.g. “Subcontractor warrants that the Work shall comply with all applicable laws, codes, statutes, standards, and ordinances.”) Unless a subcontractor’s scope of work expressly includes design work, this provision should either be deleted or modified, with the addition of the following phrase: “Subcontractor shall not be responsible for conformance of the design of its work to applicable laws, codes, statutes, standards, and ordinances.”
Read the court decisionRead the full story...Reprinted courtesy of
Patrick McNamara, Porter Law GroupMr. McNamara may be contacted at
pmcnamara@porterlaw.com
BP Is Not an Additional Insured Under Transocean's Policy
April 01, 2015 —
Tred R. Eyerly – Insurance Law HawaiiResponding to a certified question from the Fifth Circuit, the Texas Supreme Court determined that BP was not an additional insured under Transocean's liability policy and had no coverage under the policy for the deaths caused by the explosion of the Deepwater Horizon. In re Horizon, 2015 Tex. LEXIS 141 (Tex. Feb. 13, 2015). We have previously posted on this case in the federal courts here and here.
Transocean owned the Deepwater Horizon, a mobile offshore drilling unit operating in the Gulf of Mexico pursuant to a contract with BP. After an explosion in April 2010, the rig caught fire, killing eleven crew members. Both Transocean and BP sought coverage under Transocean's primary and excess policies. Although they did not dispute that BP was an additional insured, Transocean and its insurers argued that BP was not entitled to coverage for pollution-related liabilities arising from subsurface oil releases in connection with the Deepwater Horizon accident.
Read the court decisionRead the full story...Reprinted courtesy of
Tred R. Eyerly, Insurance Law HawaiiMr. Eyerly may be contacted at
te@hawaiilawyer.com
#9 CDJ Topic: Vallagio at Inverness Residential Condominium Association, Inc. v. Metropolitan Homes, Inc., et al.
December 30, 2015 —
Beverley BevenFlorez-CDJ STAFFDavid M. McClain of
Higgins, Hopkins, McLain & Roswell, LLC reported on the Colorado Court of Appeals ruling in the above mentioned case regarding the Vallagio condominiums developed by Metro Inverness, LLC. McClain concluded, “As a builder, the moral of the story here is that you need not rely on the Colorado Legislature to protect your ability to arbitrate construction defect claims asserted against you by homeowners associations. All you need to do is to include within your declaration a valid and enforceable declarant consent provision requiring your consent to amend out of the declaration the arbitration requirement for construction defect claims.”
Read the full story...
Read the court decisionRead the full story...Reprinted courtesy of
Defend Trade Secret Act of 2016–-Federalizing Trade Secret Law
October 07, 2016 —
Erin M. Stines and Reed Cahill - Ahlers & Cressman PLLCThe Defend Trade Secret Act of 2016 (DTSA) was signed into law on May 11, 2016, and became effective immediately. The DTSA allows an owner of a trade secret to sue in federal court for trade secret misappropriation. Previously, only state law governed civil misappropriation of trade secrets. While the DTSA largely mirrors the current state of the law under the Uniform Trade Secrets Act (UTSA), adopted by 48 states, including Washington,[1] there are some additions found in the new law.
The DTSA imposes the same three-year statute of limitations and authorizes remedies similar to those provided under the UTSA. The DTSA also offers new forms of relief, including a provision permitting ex parte seizure orders (that is, without a hearing or response from the opposing party) to prevent further misappropriation of the trade secret. The DTSA further provides for a new definition of trade secret. The UTSA's definition of a trade secret is a “formula, pattern, compilation, program, device, method, technique, or process.” Under the DTSA, the definition of a “trade secret” is broadened to include “all forms and types of financial, business, scientific, technical, economic, or engineering information...whether tangible or intangible...” [2]
Read the court decisionRead the full story...Reprinted courtesy of
Erin M. Stines & Reed Cahill, Ahlers & Cressman PLLCMs. Stines may be contacted at
erin.stines@ac-lawyers.com
