FAIRFIELD CONNECTICUT BUILDING EXPERT
DIRECTORY AND CAPABILITIES

A Court-Side Seat: Citizen Suits, “Facility” Management and Some Nuance for Your Hazard Ranking

September 28, 2020 — Anthony B. Cavender - Gravel2Gavel
Some very interesting and fairly complex environmental law rulings have been released in the past few days. U.S. Supreme Court—Trump, et al. v. Sierra Club, et al. On July 31, 2020, in a 5-to-4 decision, the Supreme Court denied a motion to lift the stay entered by the Court a few days earlier. The earlier action stayed a preliminary injunction issued by the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California, which had enjoined the construction of a wall along the Southern Border of the United States which was to be constructed with redirected Department of Defense funds. The merits will be addressed by the lower court and perhaps the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit—Meritor, Inc. v. EPA In a case involving EPA’s administration of the Superfund National Priority List (NPL) of priority Superfund sites requiring expedited cleanup, the court held that EPA had acted in accordance with the law and its implementing rules, and denied relief. Meritor was spun off from Rockwell Corporation, and is responsible for Rockwell’s environmental liabilities, including sites Meritor never operated. In 2016, EPA added the Rockwell International Wheel & Trim facility in Grenada, Miss., to the NPL list. Meritor alleged that this listing was arbitrary and capricious, pointing to EPA’s failure to adequately consider the impact of a mitigation measure added to the facility to address vapor intrusion, a factor EPA must consider in its application of the agency’s hazard ranking system. However, the court was not impressed by these arguments, and denied relief. The court’s discussion of the nuances of the hazard ranking system is very instructive Read the court decision
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Reprinted courtesy of Anthony B. Cavender, Pillsbury
Mr. Cavender may be contacted at anthony.cavender@pillsburylaw.com

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Back to Basics: What is a Changes Clause?

July 18, 2018 — J. Cole Phillips – Smith Currie
The Changes Clause is one of the most important, perhaps the most important, provision in any construction contract. Project designs are rarely perfect. A Changes Clause provides a mechanism for dealing with such imperfections as well as allowing project owners the flexibility to update a project’s design as the project progresses. A good Changes Clause specifies when an owner can change the original scope of the contract, how the parties should resolve the value of the changed scope and when payment should be made to the contractor or a credit given to the owner. A good Changes Clause will also provide a mechanism for the contractor to notify the owner when it believes a change order is due and specify the time within which such notice must be given. For the contractor, failure to pay attention to the requirements of the Changes Clause can lead to forfeiture of the right to seek an adjustment to the contract value or contract completion date. For an Owner, failure to pay attention to and enforce the requirements of the Changes Clause can result in unnecessary payments to the Contractor. Read the court decision
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Reprinted courtesy of J. Cole Phillips, Smith Currie
Mr. Phillips may be contacted at jcphillips@smithcurrie.com

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New Jersey Law regarding Prior Expert’s Testimony

April 15, 2014 — Beverley BevenFlorez-CDJ STAFF
Mary Pat Gallagher writing for the New Jersey Law Journal reported that “[l]awyers who track down an opposing expert's testimony from prior cases must disclose that fact during discovery but need not say whether they plan to use it in cross-examining the expert at trial, a New Jersey appeals court says.” In Dalton v. Crawley, the Appellate Division held that “[d]ecisions about cross-examination ‘involve the attorney's mental processes, so they are inherently work product.’” The issue began when “one of the defense lawyers, Michael McGann, figured out from the deposition questions Mahoney directed at one of his experts that he had transcripts of testimony from earlier cases,” according to the New Jersey Law Journal. “Hit with a notice to produce the transcripts, [Plaintiff attorney Brian] Mahoney refused, saying they were ‘attorney work product and we will not be telling you what we have developed regarding this expert.’" The New Jersey Law Journal declared that the “ruling means both sides will have to indicate what transcripts they have gathered for use—giving the name of each expert as well as the name and docket number of the prior cases where those experts testified. “ Read the court decision
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Wisconsin “property damage” caused by an “occurrence.”

April 04, 2011 — CDCoverage.com

In American Family Mut. Ins. Co. v. American Girl, Inc., 673 N.W.2d 65 (Wis. 2004), the insured general contractor was hired by the owner to design and build a warehouse on the owner s property. The general contractor hired a soil engineer to do a soil analysis and make site preparation recommendations. The soil engineer determined that the soil conditions were poor and recommended a compression process which the general contractor followed. After the warehouse was completed and the owner took possession, excessive soil settlement caused the foundation to sink which in turn caused structural damage to the warehouse. The warehouse had to be torn down.



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Reprinted courtesy of CDCoverage.com

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Anticipatory Repudiation of a Contract — The Prospective Breach

July 05, 2021 — David Adelstein - Florida Construction Legal Updates
There are instances where a party can engage in the anticipatory repudiation of their obligations under a contract. In essence, this is basically a party prospectively breaching the contract by repudiating their obligations in the contract. A prospective breach of contract occurs where there is absolute repudiation by one of the parties prior to the time when his performance is due under the terms of the contract. Such a repudiation may be evidenced by words or voluntary acts but the refusal must be distinct, unequivocal, and absolute. Moreover, repudiation can be shown where one party makes additional demands not included in the initial agreement:

The law is clear that where one party to the contract arbitrarily demands performance not required by the contract and couples this demand with a refusal to further perform unless the demand is met, the party has anticipatorily repudiated the contract, which anticipatory repudiation relieves the non-breaching party of its duty to further perform and creates in it an immediate cause of action for breach of contract. 24 Hr Air Service, Inc. v. Hosanna Community Baptist Church, Inc., 46 Fla. L. Weekly, D1344a (Fla. 3d DCA 2021) (quotations and citations omitted).

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Reprinted courtesy of David Adelstein, Kirwin Norris, P.A.
Mr. Adelstein may be contacted at dma@kirwinnorris.com

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Illinois Court Assesses Factual Nature of Term “Reside” in Determining Duty to Defend

October 30, 2023 — James M. Eastham - Traub Lieberman
In State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Guevara, 2023 IL App (1st) 221425-U, P2, the Illinois First District Court of Appeals addressed an insurance carrier’s duty to defend under a homeowners insurance policy. The underlying suit stemmed from an alleged injury suffered at a residence located in Berwyn, Illinois and owned by named insured Luz Melina Guevara, a defendant in the suit. After Guevara tendered the suit, State Farm filed a complaint for declaratory judgment seeking a declaration that it had no duty to defend or indemnify Guevara because Guevara did not “reside” at the insured premises. The policy defined the "insured location" as the "residence premises," and residence premises was defined as "the one, two, three or four-family dwelling, other structures, and grounds or that part of any other building; where you reside and which is shown in the Declarations." In response to the underlying lawsuit, Guevara had filed an answer and affirmative defenses in which Guevara denied the allegation that "At all relevant times, [Guevara] resided in Berwyn, Cook County, Illinois." Guevara admitted that she owned the Berwyn property but denied that she "resided in, maintained and controlled the property". The declaratory judgment complaint alleged (among other things) that, based on admissions by Guevara in her answer, the Berwyn residence was not an "insured location" under the State Farm policy. State Farm moved for summary judgment at the trial court level on this ground and summary judgment was granted in State Farm’s favor. An appeal ensued wherein the parties disagreed as to whether there is a genuine issue of material fact that, under the language of the policy, State Farm had no duty to defend because the Berwyn property was not an "insured location" because she did not "reside" there. Read the court decision
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Reprinted courtesy of James M. Eastham, Traub Lieberman
Mr. Eastham may be contacted at jeastham@tlsslaw.com

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Court of Appeal Holds Only “Named Insureds” May Sue for Bad Faith Under California FAIR Plan Policy

May 10, 2021 — Valerie A. Moore & Kathleen E.M. Moriarty - Haight Brown & Bonesteel LLP
In Wexler v. California Fair Plan Association (No. 303100, filed 4/14/21), Brooke Wexler’s parents insured their residence, which was located in a mountainous high-fire risk area, with a California FAIR Plan Association owner-occupied dwelling policy. The policy only listed Wexler’s parents and did not name Wexler, their adult child, under the policy’s “Insured Name” section. The FAIR Plan expressly disclaimed coverage for “unnamed people,” referred to by the court as the “no-coverage-for-unnamed-persons clause.” FAIR Plan was created by the Legislature in 1968 and is a joint reinsurance association created to give homeowners in high risk areas access to basic property insurance and is a self-described “insurer of last resort.” Reprinted courtesy of Valerie A. Moore, Haight Brown & Bonesteel LLP and Kathleen E.M. Moriarty, Haight Brown & Bonesteel LLP Ms. Moore may be contacted at vmoore@hbblaw.com Ms. Moriarty may be contacted at kemoriarty@hbblaw.com Read the court decision
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Updates to Residential Landlord Tenant Law

October 18, 2021 — Lawrence S. Glosser - Ahlers, Cressman & Sleight
Over the past several months, there have been major updates to the residential landlord tenant laws in Washington State and Seattle. There are also some remaining moratoria or eviction restrictions in Washington and Seattle. The following is a general overview of the changes. Eviction Moratoria: Washington State Governor Inslee’s state-wide eviction moratorium technically ended on June 30, 2021. However, in late June 2021, Governor Inslee announced a “bridge” proclamation between the eviction moratorium and the housing stability programs put in place by the Washington State Legislature. The bridge is effective July 1 through September 30. The goal of the bridge period was to protect tenants from evictions for non-payment of rent to allow local governments to set up distribution programs for funds. More than $650 million of federal relief dollars allocated to assist renters was predicted to be available beginning in July. This is in addition to the $500 million previously released by the Department of Commerce to local governments for rental assistance and will help more than 80,000 landlords and renters. However, insofar as many localities have not established distribution protocols, the bridge period was instituted to allow time for those programs to be set up in various parts of the state. Read the court decision
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Reprinted courtesy of Lawrence S. Glosser, Ahlers, Cressman & Sleight
Mr. Glosser may be contacted at larry.glosser@acslawyers.com

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