California Trial Court Clarifies Application of SB800 Roofing Standards and Expert’s Opinions
February 18, 2020 —
Scott Calkins & Anthony Gaeta - Collinsworth, Specht, Calkins & Giampaoli; Mark Chapman - Bert L. Howe & Associates, Inc.Collinsworth, Specht, Calkins & Giampaoli partners Scott Calkins and Anthony Gaeta obtained a trial victory when the jury returned a 12-0 defense verdict against one plaintiff homeowner, and awarded the other homeowner less than $2,000, an amount well below the defendant’s pre-trial CCP 998 Offers to Compromise. One of the main issues in the case was the application of SB800 roofing standards. Plaintiffs’ roofing expert testified in deposition no water entered the structure or passed through a moisture barrier [Civ. Code §896(a)(4)], and no materials had fallen off the roof [§896(g)(11)]. In an attempt to circumvent the applicable performance standards, Plaintiffs argued Civ. Code §869(g)(3)(A), also known as the ‘useful life’ exception, applied because the various components of the roof (nailing pattern, tiles, vents, etc.) were installed in such a manner so as to reduce the useful life of the roof. Following pre-trial motions and objections made during Plaintiffs’ direct examination, the Court ruled Section 896(g)(3)(A) did not apply to a conventional roof, as it is not a “manufactured product” as defined in §896(g)(3)(C). Plaintiffs’ roofing claims were summarily dismissed and Plaintiffs’ expert was prevented from testifying.
In contrast, the defense expert, Mark Chapman, was allowed to testify regarding his expert opinions as to the appropriate SB800 standard relative to each alleged defect and whether the standards were violated. The SB800 performance standards were included on the jury verdict form, and the jury found Mr. Chapman’s testimony compelling, which was a substantial factor in awarding only minor damages to one Plaintiff.
For more information, contact
Scott Calkins (scalkins@cslawoffices.com),
Anthony Gaeta (ageta@cslawoffices.com) or
Mark Chapman (mchapman@berthowe.com).
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A Court-Side Seat: SCOTUS Clarifies Alien Tort Statute and WOTUS Is Revisited
July 11, 2021 —
Anthony B. Cavender - Gravel2GavelWhat follows is a brief account of some of the notable U.S. environmental and administrative law cases recently decided.
THE U.S. SUPREME COURT
Nestle USA, Inc. et al. v. Doe, et al.
The Supreme Court has decided another important case interpreting the Alien Tort Statute. Released on June 17, 2021, this decision reverses the Ninth Circuit which had ruled that the respondents—six individuals who alleged they were child slaves employed on Ivory Coast cocoa farms, could sue the American-based companies for aiding and abetting child slave labor. Without dissent, the Court rejected this reading of the ATS and affirmed its own recent rulings on the scope of the ATS.
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Anthony B. Cavender, PillsburyMr. Cavender may be contacted at
anthony.cavender@pillsburylaw.com
Sellers of South Florida Mansion Failed to Disclose Construction Defects
October 08, 2014 —
Beverley BevenFlorez-CDJ STAFFA couple who reportedly sold their custom, beach-front home on Golden Beach for more money than any other home in that town previously, may have failed to disclose construction defects, according to Daily Business Review.
The original owners, reported Daily Business Review, claimed (according to court documents) that “they were ‘unable to spend even one night because an overwhelming smell of mold in the home triggered a severe reaction in Mrs. Hochberg.’" They also alleged the new home had “cracked walls, drafty doors, leaky windows, poorly cut marble and peeling stucco.” The owners sued the subcontractors, but lost due to not filing within the four-year statute of limitations.
While water leaks were disclosed during the sale with a notation that all leaks had been repaired, “the extent of the home's repair history was not discussed during nearly eight months of haggling over the property, the buyer's broker said.”
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Court Sharpens The “Sword” And Strengthens The “Shield” Of Contractors’ License Law
July 24, 2023 —
Kyle S. Case - ConsensusDocsPerforming construction work without the necessary license can have significant repercussions on a contractor’s business. California in particular has become known for its imposition of “strict and harsh” penalties for a contractor’s failure to maintain proper licensure. In the realm of public works projects, any contract with an unlicensed contractor is deemed void. See Business & Professions Code Section 7028.15(e). On private projects, California’s Contractors’ License Law prohibits contractors from maintaining any action to recover payment for their work, and more severe, may require a contractor to disgorge all funds paid to it for performing unlicensed work. See Business & Professions Code Section 7031). These methods of deterrence are referred to as the “shield” and “sword” of the Contractors’ State License Law. Loranger v. Jones, 184 Cal. App. 4th 847, 854 (2010).
In any discussion surrounding licensure, it is important to review the language of the Business and Professions Code (“Bus. & Prof.”). Section 7031(a) states:
Except as provided in subdivision (e), no person engaged in the business or acting in the capacity of a contractor, may bring or maintain any action, or recover in law or equity in any action, in any court of this state for compensation for the performance of any act or contract where a license is required by this chapter without alleging that they were a duly licensed contractor at all times during the performance of that act or contract regardless of the merits of the cause of action brought by the person…
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Kyle S. Case, Watt, Tieder, Hoffar & Fitzgerald LLPMr. Case may be contacted at
kcase@watttieder.com
Fed. Judge Blocks Release of Records on FIU Bridge Collapse, Citing NTSB Investigation
October 23, 2018 —
Miami Herald - Engineering News-RecordOct. 05 --A federal judge Friday blocked the release of documents that could shed light on why a busy road outside Miami was not shut down before a brand-new bridge developing severe cracks collapsed and killed six people.
Judge William Stafford said the National Transportation Safety Board , the federal agency investigating the Florida International University bridge disaster, "was exercising its valid federal regulatory authority" in keeping the documents confidential from the media.
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Engineering News-RecordENR may be contacted at
ENR.com@bnpmedia.com
Flood Policy Does Not Cover Debris Removal from Property
May 07, 2015 —
Tred R. Eyerly – Insurance Law HawaiiThe Third Circuit affirmed the granting summary judgment to the insurer over a dispute as to debris removal under a Standard Flood Insurance Policy (SFIP). Torre v. Liberty Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 4902 (3rd Cir. March 26, 2015).
The Torres' property sustained substantial damage from Hurricane Sandy. Claims for flood damage were submitted to Liberty. Liberty paid a total of $235,751.68, which included the cost of removing debris from the house. An additional $15,520 for the cost of removing sand and other debris deposited on their land in front of and behind the Torres' home was denied on the grounds that the SFIP did not cover such removal.
The Torres filed suit and cross-motions for summary judgment were filed. The district court denied the Torres' motion and granted Liberty's motion.
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Tred R. Eyerly, Insurance Law HawaiiMr. Eyerly may be contacted at
te@hawaiilawyer.com
California Supreme Court Finds that the Notice-Prejudice Rule Applicable to Insurance is a Fundamental Public Policy of the State
October 14, 2019 —
Christopher Kendrick & Valerie A. Moore – Haight Brown & Bonesteel LLPIn Pitzer College v. Indian Harbor Ins. Co. (No. S239510, filed 8/29/19), the California Supreme Court held that California’s notice-prejudice rule is a fundamental public policy in the insurance context, supporting the application of California law under a choice of laws analysis. In addition, the Court held that the rule generally applies to consent (aka “no voluntary payments”) provisions in first party insurance policies but not to consent provisions in third party liability policies.
Pitzer College discovered soils contamination while building a new dormitory. Under pressure to complete construction before the start of the school year, Pitzer proceeded to remediate the soils, incurring $2 million in expense. Pitzer submitted a claim to Indian Harbor, which provided Pitzer insurance covering legal and remediation expenses resulting from pollution conditions discovered during the policy period.
The policy contained a notice provision requiring Pitzer to provide oral or written notice of any pollution condition to Indian Harbor and, in the event of oral notice, to “furnish … a written report as soon as practicable.” In addition, a consent provision required Pitzer to obtain Indian Harbor’s written consent before incurring expenses, making payments, assuming obligations, and/or commencing remediation due to a pollution condition. The consent provision had an emergency exception for costs incurred “on an emergency basis where any delay … would cause injury to persons or damage to property or increase significantly the cost of responding to any [pollution condition],” in which case Pitzer was required to notify Indian Harbor “immediately thereafter.” Lastly, a choice of law provision stated that New York law governed all matters arising under the policy.
Reprinted courtesy of
Christopher Kendrick, Haight Brown & Bonesteel LLP and
Valerie A. Moore, Haight Brown & Bonesteel LLP
Mr. Kendrick may be contacted at ckendrick@hbblaw.com
Ms. Moore may be contacted at vmoore@hbblaw.com
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Allegations That COVID-19 Was Physically Present and Altered Property are Sufficient to Sustain COVID-19 Business Interruption Suit
May 24, 2021 —
Michael S. Levine & Joseph T. Niczky - Hunton Insurance Recovery BlogOn Wednesday, a federal judge in Texas denied Factory Mutual’s Rule 12(c) motion for judgment on the pleadings, finding that the plaintiffs adequately alleged that the presence of COVID-19 on their property caused covered physical loss or damage in the case of Cinemark Holdings, Inc. v. Factory Mutual Insurance Co., No. 4:21-CV-00011 (E.D. Tex. May 5, 2021). This is the third COVID-19-related business interruption decision from Judge Amos Mazzant since March, but the first in favor of a policyholder. Taken together, the three decisions have two key takeaways and provide a roadmap for policyholders in all jurisdictions.
First, the Cinemark decision recognizes that the alleged presence of COVID-19 viral particles that physically altered the policyholder’s property is sufficient under federal pleading standards and controlling state law. In its motion, FM relied on Judge Mazzant’s recent decision in Selery Fulfillment, Inc. v. Colony Insurance Co., No. 4:20-CV-853, 2021 WL 963742 (E.D. Tex. Mar. 15, 2021), which dismissed a lawsuit alleging that the policyholder’s losses were caused by government orders that closed its business, rather than from the actual presence of the virus on its property. The Court held that government orders alone do not constitute physical loss or damage, and declined to rule on whether the physical presence of the virus does. Judge Mazzant reached the same conclusion weeks later in Aggie Investments, L.L.C. v. Continental Casualty Co., No. 4:21-CV-0013, 2021 WL 1550479 (E.D. Tex. Apr. 20, 2021).
Reprinted courtesy of
Michael S. Levine, Hunton Andrews Kurth and
Joseph T. Niczky, Hunton Andrews Kurth
Mr. Levine may be contacted at mlevine@HuntonAK.com
Mr. Niczky may be contacted at jniczky@HuntonAK.com
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