Eighth Circuit Rejects Retroactive Application of Construction Defect Legislation
September 17, 2014 —
Tred R. Eyerly – Insurance Law HawaiiThe Eighth Circuit refused to retroactively apply an Arkansas statute establishing coverage for faulty workmanship. J-McDaniel Const. Co., Inc. v. Mid-Continent Cas. Co., 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 14911 (8th Cir. Aug. 4, 2014).
The homeowners sued J-McDaniel for faulty workmanship in constructing their home. The defective construction work was performed by subcontractors. Mid-Continent refused to defend or indemnify J-McDaniel.
The insured sued Mid-Continent. The district court dismissed the claim pursuant to Essex Ins. Co. v. Holder, 261 S.W. 3d 456, 460 (Ark. 2008). In Essex, the Arkansas Supreme Court held that defective workmanship resulting in damages only to the work product itself was not an occurrence. Although The Arkansas legislature overruled Essex by statute, the district court found that the Arkansas case law barred retroactive application of the statute.
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Tred R. Eyerly, Insurance Law HawaiiMr. Eyerly may be contacted at
te@hawaiilawyer.com
Women Make Slow Entry into Building Trades
December 04, 2013 —
CDJ STAFFIn the next seven years, about 200,000 carpenters will be added to workforce, but few of those are likely to be women. Sylas Demello, an electrical apprentice noted that it isn’t “made clear for women in high school to say, ‘hey, this is an option for you.’”
Tiffany Bluemle is trying to do something about that. She runs Vermont Works for Women, which trains women for jobs in which there are few women, including the building trades. She notes that “seventy-five percent of owners say they face labor shortages.”
Amy Judd is now one of those owners. Fifteen years ago, failing to find a teaching job, she started working as a carpenter. “It had never occurred to me that I would want to be a carpenter,” she said. Her firm employs eight people, half of whom are women.
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Is There a Conflict of Interest When a CD Defense Attorney Becomes Coverage Counsel Post-Litigation?
September 01, 2011 —
Chad Johnson of Higgins, Hopkins, McLain & Roswell, LLCIn Weitz Co., LLC v. Ohio Cas. Ins. Co., the U.S. District Court for the District of Colorado was asked to rule on a motion to disqualify counsel in an insurance coverage action. 11-CV-00694-REB-BNB, 2011 WL 2535040 (D. Colo. June 27, 2011). Motions to disqualify counsel are viewed with suspicion, as courts “must guard against the possibility that disqualification is sought to ‘secure a tactical advantage in the proceedings.’” Id. at *2 (citing Religious Technology Center v. F.A.C.T. Net, Inc., 945 F. Supp. 1470, 1473 (D. Colo. 1996).
Weitz Company, LLC (“Weitz”) is a general contractor and defendant in an underlying construction defect suit which had concluded before the action bringing rise to this order. In the underlying action, Weitz made third-party claims against subcontractors, including NPW Contracting (“NPW”). Weitz was listed as an additional insured under NPW’s policies with both Ohio Casualty Insurance Company and Mountain States Mutual Casualty Company (collectively “the Carriers”). The Carriers accepted Weitz’s tender of defense under a reservation of rights. However, neither insurance carrier actually contributed to Weitz’s defense costs in the underlying action. At the conclusion of the construction defect action, the parties unsuccessfully attempted to apportion the attorney’s fees and costs. Eventually, Weitz brought suit against the recalcitrant carriers. The Lottner firm, which had previously represented Weitz in the underlying construction defect action, continued to represent Weitz in this coverage action.
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Reprinted courtesy of Higgins, Hopkins, McLain & Roswell, LLC. Mr. Johnson can be contacted at johnson@hhmrlaw.com
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Insured's Failure to Challenge Trial Court's Application of Exclusion Makes Appeal Futile
November 15, 2022 —
Tred R. Eyerly - Insurance Law HawaiiThe Texas Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's granting of summary judgment to the insurer because the appeal failed to challenge the exclusion under which the insurer found no coverage. Sosa v. Auto Club Indemn. Co., 2022 Tex. App. LEXIS 6520 (Tex. Ct. App. Aug. 30, 2022).
Sosa's house was damaged during Hurricane Harry on August 26, 2017. Sosa filed a claim with Auto Club. She reported that two feet of floodwater had entered her home, her roof was missing shingles and was leaking, and she had sustained interior damage. An adjuster estimated the cost to prepare the roof damage was $1,191.96, less that her deductible. Auto Club determined that any remaining damage was caused by flood water, which was expressly excluded from coverage.
On November 11, 2020, Sosa filed suit against Auto Club for breach of the policy. Among other things, she argued the adjuster spent minimal time at her home inspecting and was inexperienced. In its answer, Auto Club asserted Sosa's claim was time-barred by the statute of limitations. Sosa then filed an amended complaint and changed the date of the loss from August 26, 2017, to June 28, 2019.
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Tred R. Eyerly, Damon Key Leong Kupchak HastertMr. Eyerly may be contacted at
te@hawaiilawyer.com
Construction Spending Highest Since April 2009
October 25, 2013 —
CDJ STAFFThe Commerce Department has announced that construction spending has increased by 0.6 percent, but that modest gain puts it at the highest it has been in four and a half years. The last time construction spending was this high was April 2009.
The rise in construction spending is due to increases in both public and private construction project. Public construction was up, despite a decrease in spending by the federal government. Private residential construction is at a five-year high.
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Saved By The Statute: The Economic Loss Doctrine Does Not Bar Claims Under Pennsylvania’s Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Law
May 10, 2021 —
Gus Sara - The Subrogation StrategistIn Earl v. NVR, Inc., No. 20-2109, 2021 U.S. App. LEXIS 6451, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit (Third Circuit) considered whether, under Pennsylvania law, the plaintiff’s Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Law (UTPCPL) claims against the builder of her home were barred by the economic loss doctrine. The UTPCPL is a Pennsylvania statute that prohibits “unfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any trade or commerce.” 73 Pa. Stat. Ann. § 201-3. The Third Circuit previously addressed the impact of the economic loss doctrine on UTPCPL claims in Werwinski v. Ford Motor Co., 286 F.3d 661 (3d Cir. 2002). In Werwinski, the court held that the plaintiff’s UTPCPL claim was barred by the economic loss doctrine. The Court of Appeals overturned its decision in Werwinski and held that the economic loss doctrine does not bar UTPCPL claims since such claims are statutory, and not based in tort.
In Earl, the plaintiff, Lisa Earl, entered into an agreement with defendant NVR, Inc. (NVR) for the construction and sale of a home in Allegheny County, Pennsylvania. Ms. Earl learned of the home through NVR’s marketing, which described the home as containing “quality architecture, timeless design, and beautiful finishes.” Ms. Earl alleged that during the construction of the home, she had further discussions with agents of NVR, who made representations that the home would be constructed in a good and workmanlike manner and that any deficiencies noted by Ms. Earl would be remedied. The defendant also assured Ms. Earl that the home would be constructed in accordance with relevant building codes and industry standards. After moving into the home, Ms. Earl discovered several material defects in the construction. She provided notice of these defects to NVR, but NVR’s attempts to repair some of the defects were inadequate.
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Gus Sara, White and WilliamsMr. Sara may be contacted at
sarag@whiteandwilliams.com
California Rejects Judgments By Confession Pursuant to Civil Code Section 1132
May 08, 2023 —
Drew M. Jorgenson & Louis "Dutch" Schotemeyer - Newmeyer DillionThe Elimination of Judgment by Confession
Following in the footsteps of Massachusetts and Florida, California recently updated California Code of Civil Procedure section 1132 which renders judgments by confession unenforceable and inadmissible in any superior court, effective January 1, 2023. The bar is not retroactive, so judgments by confession obtained or entered before January 1, 2023 are still valid. Moving forward, consider the following.
What is a Judgment By Confession?
A judgment by confession, also known as a confession of judgment or "cognovit" clause, is a mechanism by which a debtor agrees that a creditor may summarily obtain a legal judgment against that debtor and enforce it in the event of the debtor's breach of contract or default. In other words, it is a private admission by a debtor that they are liable for a debt without the need for a trial, and consequently, agree to forfeit very important rights. Most importantly, parties agreeing to such clauses are waiving rights such as the right to notice of the judgment and the right to assert defenses against the creditor or third party's claims. Historically, without any judicial involvement, these types of out-of-court judgments would be enforceable.
Reprinted courtesy of
Drew M. Jorgenson, Newmeyer Dillion and
Louis "Dutch" Schotemeyer, Newmeyer Dillion
Mr. Jorgenson may be contacted at drew.jorgenson@ndlf.com
Mr. Schotemeyer may be contacted at dutch.schotemeyer@ndlf.com
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$24 Million Verdict Against Material Supplier Overturned Where Plaintiff Failed To Prove Supplier’s Negligence Or Breach Of Contract Caused A SB800 Violation
June 05, 2017 —
Jon A. Turigliatto & Chelsea L. Zwart - CGDRB News & PublicationsThe Fourth District California Court of Appeal published its decision, Acqua Vista Homeowners Assoc. v. MWI, Inc. (2017) 7 Cal.App.5th 1129, holding that claims against a material supplier under SB800 (Civil Code §895, et. seq.) require proof that the SB800 violation was caused by the supplier’s negligence or breach of contract.
In this case, Acqua Vista Homeowners Association (“the HOA”) sued MWI, a supplier of Chinese pipe used in the construction of the Acqua Vista condominium development. The HOA’s complaint asserted a single cause of action for violation of SB800 standards, and alleged that defective cast iron pipe was used throughout the building. At trial, the HOA presented evidence that the pipes supplied by MWI contained manufacturing defects, that they leaked, and that the leaks had caused damage to various parts of the condominium development. The jury returned a special verdict against MWI, and the trial court entered a judgment against MWI in the amount of $23,955,796.28, reflecting the jury’s finding that MWI was 92% responsible for the HOA’s damages.
MWI filed a motion for a directed verdict prior to the jury’s verdict and motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict following the entry of judgment, both on the grounds that the HOA had failed to present any evidence that MWI had caused a SB800 violation as a result of its negligence or breach of contract, and had therefore failed to prove negligence and causation as required by SB800. MWI relied on the Fourth District’s prior decision in Greystone Homes, Inc. v. Midtec, Inc. (2008) 168 Cal.App.4th 1194, and its interpretation therein of Civil Code §936, which states, in relevant part, that the statute applies “to general contractors, subcontractors, material suppliers, individual product manufacturers, and design professionals to the extent that the general contractors, subcontractors, material suppliers, individual product manufacturers, and design professionals caused, in whole or in part, a violation of a particular standard as the result of a negligent act or omission or a breach of contract….” (emphasis added.) However, the trial court denied both motions, relying on the last sentence of Civil Code §936, which states in part, “[T]he negligence standard in this section does not apply to any…material supplier…with respect to claims for which strict liability would apply.”
Reprinted courtesy of
Jon A. Turigliatto, Chapman Glucksman Dean Roeb & Barger and
Chelsea L. Zwart, Chapman Glucksman Dean Roeb & Barger
Mr. Turigliatto may be contacted at jturigliatto@cgdrblaw.com
Ms. Zwart may be contacted at czwart@cgdrblaw.com
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