Expansion of Statutes of Limitations and Repose in K-12 and Municipal Construction Contracts
March 27, 2019 —
Henry Bangert - Colorado Construction LitigationThe purpose of this whitepaper is to bring attention to a trend in K-12 and municipal construction contracts, which expands the time periods for law suits against construction professionals.
Introduction and Background
Under Colorado statute, the period of time within which a legal action for construction defects may be brought against a construction professional in Colorado is two years from when the claimant (or its predecessor in interest) discovers or in the exercise of reasonable diligence should have discovered the physical manifestations of a defect (the “Statute of Limitations”), but in no case may an action be brought more than six years after substantial completion of the improvement, unless the claim arises in the fifth or sixth year after substantial completion, in which event the action may be brought within two years of such date, i.e., up to eight years after substantial completion (the “Statute of Repose”). See C.R.S. § 13-80-104. While the triggering events differ for the Statute of Limitations and Statue of Repose, the periods are intended to run concurrently to limit the period of time an action may be brought against construction professionals for construction defects to, at most, eight years after substantial completion. Importantly, these limitations periods may be expanded by agreement.
Prior to 1986, Colorado law provided for a 10-year Statute of Repose. However, in 1986, Colorado’s legislature shortened the Statute of Repose time limit to the current six (or up to eight) year period. In 1986, Colorado also redefined the date the claim arises from the date the defect was discovered or should have been discovered to the date the physical manifestation of a defect was discovered or should have been discovered. Therefore, after 1986, the two-year limitations period could begin to run when a claimant should have discovered the manifestation of a defect, even if the claimant did not recognize that a defect existed.
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David McLain, Higgins, Hopkins, McLain & Roswell, LLCMr. McLain may be contacted at
mclain@hhmrlaw.com
Recovery Crews Swing Into Action as Hurricane Michael Departs
October 23, 2018 —
Tom Sawyer, Luke Abaffy, Thomas F. Armistead, & Jim Parsons - Engineering News-RecordBy the time the blustery remnants Hurricane Michael departed the East Coast around mid day on Oct. 12, with one last lashing of eastern regions from Virginia to New York, the trail of woe stretched from the Florida Panhandle through the southeastern states and well up the Eastern Seaboard. Authorities report the death toll stood at 16, with victims in Florida, Georgia, North Carolina and Virginia.
Reprinted courtesy of ENR reporters
Tom Sawyer,
Luke Abaffy,
Thomas F. Armistead and
Jim Parsons
Mr. Sawyer may be contacted at sawyert@enr.com
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Preventing Costly Litigation Through Your Construction Contract
August 17, 2011 —
Douglas Reiser, Builders Council BlogIt’s Tuesday, which means it ’s the middle of your work week. Tuesday is a great time to take an hour to look over your contracts, while the crews are pushing through their scheduled work. Today’s food for thought: How do you use your contract to reduce your litigation burden?
Your contract should do many things. It should discuss the scope of work, scheduling of work, quality of work, coverage for liabilities and conditions and timeliness for payment. But often overlooked is how your contract can lend to dispute resolution.
Commonly, you will see a simple provision that covers governing law, venue for disputes and the awarding of attorneys’ fees. But you can do better. Remember, a contract is enforced to the maximum extent possible in Washington state.
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Reprinted courtesy of Douglas Reiser of Reiser Legal LLC. Mr. Reiser can be contacted at info@reiserlegal.com
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Palo Alto Proposes Time Limits on Building Permits
October 01, 2013 —
CDJ STAFFPalo Alto, California has a problem. Too many construction or renovation projects have languished without any sign of completion. The city council has a solution: time limits. Under current rules, projects only have to complete enough work so that there’s something to inspect every six months.
Under the proposed rules, builders would have a set time to finish the project, with larger projects getting more time in which to finish. Projects that ran over that time would get fines.
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Design and Construction Defects Not a Breach of Contract
February 14, 2013 —
CDJ STAFFThe California Court of Appeals tossed out a breach of contract award in Altman v. John Mourier Construction. The decision, which was issued on January 10, 2013, sent the construction defect case back to a lower court to calculate damages based on the conclusions of the appeals court.
The case involved both design issues and construction issues. According to the plaintiffs’ expert, the design plans did not make the buildings sufficiently stiff to resist the wind, and that the framing was improperly constructed, further weakening the structures, and leading to the stucco cracking. Additionally, it was alleged that the roofs were improperly installed, leading to water intrusion. The contractor’s expert “agreed the roofs needed repair, but disputed what needed to be done to repair the roofs and the cost.”
The jury rejected the plaintiffs’ claims of product liability and breach of warranty, but found in their favor on the claims of breach of contract and negligence. The plaintiffs were awarded differing amounts based on the jury’s conclusions about their particular properties.
Both sides sought new trials. JMC, the contractor, claimed that the jury’s verdicts were “inconsistent in that the relieved JMC of liability for strict products liability and breach of warranty, but found JMC liable for breach of contract and negligence.” The plaintiffs “opposed the setoff motion on the ground that the jury heard evidence only of damages not covered by the settlements.” Both motions were denied. After this, the plaintiffs sought and received investigative costs as damages. JMC appealed this amended judgment.
The appeals court rejected JMC’s claims that evidence was improperly excluded. JMC sought to introduce evidence concerning errors made by the stucco subcontractor. Earlier in the trial, JMC had insisted that the plaintiffs not be allowed to present evidence concerning the stucco, as that had been separately settled. When they wished to introduce it themselves, they noted that the settlement only precluded the plaintiffs from introducing stucco evidence, but the trial court did not find this persuasive, and the appeals court upheld the actions of the trial court. Nor did the appeals court find grounds for reversal based on claims that the jury saw excluded evidence, as JMC did not establish that the evidence went into the jury room. Further, this did not reach, according to the court, a “miscarriage of justice.”
The court rejected two more of JMC’s arguments, concluding that the negligence award did not violate the economic loss rule. The court also noted that JMC failed to prove its contention that the plaintiffs were awarded damages for items that were covered in settlements with the subcontractors.
The appeals court did accept JMC’s argument that the award for breach of contract was not supported by evidence. As the ruling notes, “plaintiffs did not submit the contracts into evidence or justify their absence; nor did plaintiffs provide any evidence regarding contract terms allegedly breached.”
The court also did not allow the plaintiffs to claim the full amount of the investigative costs. Noting that the trial court had rational grounds for its decision, the appeals court noted that “the jury rejected most of the damages claimed by plaintiffs, and the trial court found that more than $86,000 of the costs itemized in plaintiffs’ invoices ‘appear questionable’ as ‘investigation’ costs/damages and appeared to the trial court to be litigation costs nonrecoverable under section 1033.5.”
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A Win for Policyholders: California Court of Appeals Applies Vertical Exhaustion for Continuous Injury Claims
August 24, 2020 —
Celia B. Waters - Saxe Doernberger & VitaFresh off the heels of the California Supreme Court’s landmark decision in Montrose Chemical Corp. v. Super. Ct. of L.A. Cty. (“Montrose III”),1 policyholders scored another victory as another California court rejected horizontal exhaustion in the context of continuous injury cases. The Court of Appeal of the State of California, First Appellate District, Division Four, in SantaFe Braun Inc. v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., adopted a rule of vertical exhaustion, holding that “[absent an explicit policy provision to the contrary] the insured becomes entitled to the coverage it purchased from the excess carriers once the primary policies specified in the excess policy have been exhausted.”2
The dispute in SantaFe Braun began in 1992 when asbestos-related claims were first filed against Braun. In 1998, Braun’s three primary insurers agreed in writing to defend and settle the underlying claims against Braun while resolving allocation among themselves. In 2004, Braun filed the current suit against its excess insurers, seeking a declaration that the excess insurers were obligated to help cover the costs of the underlying asbestos-related lawsuits.
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Celia B. Waters, Saxe Doernberger & VitaMs. Waters may be contacted at
cbw@sdvlaw.com
Architects Should Not Make Initial Decisions on Construction Disputes
July 05, 2023 —
Bill Wilson - Construction Law ZoneA common provision often deleted from the standard form AIA documents is the provision in the AIA A201 General Conditions requiring an Initial Decision Maker (IDM) for claims between the contractor and owner. In the A201, the contracting parties have the option of naming their own IDM for the project. If an IDM is not selected (which is typically the case) the architect serves this role by default. While it is in all parties’ best interests to resolve disputes quickly and efficiently, using the architect as the IDM is not the best way to achieve such a resolution.
Several reasons work against using the architect as the IDM. Contractors typically don’t trust architects to be impartial in resolving disputes because the architect is paid by the owner. Most architects don’t have the temperament or any training to facilitate dispute resolution. An architect’s “initial decision” could even drive the parties further apart and lead to further issues later in the project. The architect may also be perceived to be part of the problem that led to the dispute in the first place. Also, many architects simply prefer to avoid serving the thankless role of an IDM altogether. Lastly, inserting the architect into the dispute resolution process as a required IDM adds an additional unnecessary step to dispute resolution, which can delay the overall procedure.
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Bill Wilson, Robinson & Cole LLPMr. Wilson may be contacted at
wwilson@rc.com
Pennsylvania: Searching Questions Ahead of Oral Argument in Domtar
October 08, 2014 —
Robert Caplan – White and Williams LLPIf you have been following our coverage of Liberty Mutual Insurance Company v. Domtar Paper Co., you will recall that the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania decided on May 29, 2014 to hear the subrogated insurer’s appeal,1 despite the Superior Court’s holding against the subrogated insurer—based primarily on its own defective case law2 —and its denial of reargument, presumably due to the insurer’s briefing follies.3
The parties in Domtar, as well as numerous amici curiae (friends of the court),4 have submitted their respective briefs over the last few months, and the Supreme Court has scheduled oral argument to take place on October 8, 2014 in Pittsburgh, Pa. The Court has framed the issue as: “Does Section 319 of the Pennsylvania Workers’ Compensation Act, 77 P.S. § 671, allow the employer/insurer to step into the shoes of the insured employee to subrogate against the tortfeasor?”5
There are three possible outcomes in Domtar.
The first (and easiest) possible outcome for the Supreme Court would be to punt to the Pennsylvania General Assembly for a decision on the issue. Workers’ compensation legislation, perhaps more than any other type of legislation, “creates a highly structured balancing of competing interests.”6 It is basic civics that the legislature has a “superior ability to examine social policy issues and determine legal standards so as to balance competing concerns.”7
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Robert Caplan, White and Williams LLPMr. Caplan may be contacted at
caplanr@whiteandwilliams.com