CAMBRIDGE MASSACHUSETTS BUILDING EXPERT
DIRECTORY AND CAPABILITIES

How Long is Your Construction Warranty?

February 26, 2015 — Craig Martin – Construction Contractor Advisor
The Nebraska Court of Appeals threw a wrench into the calculation of your warranty earlier this year in Adams v. Manchester Park, LLC and Southfork Homes, Inc. In that case, the court found that the statute of limitations for a warranty claim started running after the homebuilder’s warranty expired. So, the four year breach of warranty statute of limitations did not begin until after the one year homebuilder warranty expired. In this case, the homeowner purchased a home from Southfork in September, 2007. The purchase agreement provided for a one-year New Home Limited Warranty which covered material defects in workmanship and materials. The homeowner noticed cracks in the drywall and problems with windows within 6 months of the purchase. The builder told the homeowner to keep track of all the problems and they would be fixed at the yearend walk through. Read the court decision
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Reprinted courtesy of Craig Martin, Lamson, Dugan and Murray, LLP
Mr. Martin may be contacted at cmartin@ldmlaw.com

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Former Trump Atlantic City Casino Set for February Implosion

December 29, 2020 — Stephanie Loder - Engineering News-Record
The 39-story main tower of the former Trump Plaza hotel-casino on the Atlantic City, N.J., boardwalk, sold to investor Carl Icahn in 2016, will be imploded in February by a Philadelphia general contractor already in the process of dismantling the former showplace of President Donald Trump's real estate holdings. Reprinted courtesy of Stephanie Loder, Engineering News-Record ENR may be contacted at ENR.com@bnpmedia.com Read the full story... Read the court decision
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New Jersey’s Governor Puts Construction Firms on Formal Notice of His Focus on Misclassification of Workers as Independent Contractors

May 24, 2018 — Kevin J. O'Connor & Joseph M. Vento - Peckar & Abramson, P.C.
We have written quite a bit about the mounting threat to employers, both nationally and locally, of claims of misclassification of workers as independent contractors rather than employees. New Jersey’s new Gov. Phil Murphy signed an executive order last week that establishes a task force on employee misclassification to punish contractors who commit fraud by classifying their employees as independent contractors. In the words of Governor Murphy: “I am signing this order to crack down on unscrupulous contractors who commit 1099 fraud to exploit workers and rob them of family and medical leave and safe workplace protections that the law provides,” Murphy said. “The employer gives themselves an unfair business advantage and this practice is illegal. This is a question of enforcing what is already on the books.” He has vowed that any employer caught misclassifying workers will either be brought into compliance or put out of business. The task force will foster compliance with the law and conduct a comprehensive review of existing practices. Reprinted courtesy of Kevin J. O'Connor, Peckar & Abramson, P.C. and Joseph M. Vento, Peckar & Abramson, P.C. Mr. O'Connor may be contacted at koconnor@pecklaw.com Mr. Vento may be contacted at jvento@pecklaw.com Read the court decision
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The Colorado Supreme Court holds that loans made to a construction company are not subject to the Mechanic’s Lien Trust Fund Statute

February 21, 2013 — W. Berkeley Mann, Jr. — Higgins, Hopkins, McLain & Roswell, LLC
In a prior blog post, we summarized the Court of Appeals decision in the case of AC Excavating, Inc. v. Yale, ___ P. 3d. ___, 2010 WL 3432219 (Colo. App. Sept. 2, 2010) which provided an interpretation of the Colorado Mechanic’s Lien Trust Fund Statute, C.R.S. § 38-22-127 (hereafter “the Trust Fund Statute”). A divided Court of Appeals reversed the trial court, and held that capital loans infused into a limited liability company which performed construction could be subject to the provisions of the Trust Fund Statute. The Court of Appeals reasoned that this determination was necessary because the statute was considered applicable to “all funds disbursed on a construction project.” Additionally, the Court of Appeals held that the intent of the provider of funds was not relevant, and that the statute applied “irrespective of the [originator of the funds]’s intended use of the funds.” This decision was reviewed by the Colorado Supreme Court in an opinion released on February 4, 2013, and it reversed the Court of Appeals’ decision. See, Yale v. AC Excavating, Inc., ___ P. 3d. ___, 2013 WL 441895 (Colo. Feb. 4, 2013). The Supreme Court strongly disagreed that loaned or infused capital funds which were obtained by the general contractor entity were “funds disbursed on a construction project,” simply because some of the infused monies were used for operational purposes to pay down specific project obligations. Read the court decision
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Reprinted courtesy of W. Berkeley Mann, Jr.
mann@hlmrlaw.com

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Does Your 998 Offer to Compromise Include Attorneys’ Fees and Costs?

June 15, 2017 — Anthony J. Carucci - Snell & Wilmer Real Estate Litigation Blog
In California, the “prevailing party” in litigation is generally entitled to recover its costs as a matter of law. See Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 1032. But under California Code of Civil Procedure section 998, a party may make a so-called “offer to compromise,” which can reverse the parties’ entitlement to costs after the date of the offer, depending on the outcome of the litigation. Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 998. The potential payoff of a 998 offer to compromise is explained in section 998(c)(1):

If an offer made by a defendant is not accepted and the plaintiff fails to obtain a more favorable judgment or award, the plaintiff shall not recover his or her postoffer costs and shall pay the defendant’s costs from the time of the offer.

Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 998(c)(1) (emphasis added). The Basic Requirements for a Valid 998 Offer Pursuant to section 998(b), a 998 offer must satisfy three principal conditions: (1) it must be contained in a writing; (2) it must state the terms and conditions of the proposed judgment or award; and (3) it must contain a provision allowing the offeree to accept the offer by signing a statement to that effect. Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 998(b). Read the court decision
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Reprinted courtesy of Anthony J. Carucci, Snell & Wilmer
Mr. Carucci may be contacted at acarucci@swlaw.com

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Rent Increases During the Coronavirus Emergency Part II: Avoiding Violations Under California’s Anti-Price Gouging Statute

April 06, 2020 — Dan Schneider - Newmeyer Dillion
In my earlier article, Profiting From Fear: What You Need to Know About Price Gouging During the Coronavirus Emergency, I discuss price gouging and how the anti-price gouging statute, California Penal Code 396 (“CPC 396”), protects buyers of goods and services deemed vital and necessary for the health, safety and welfare of consumers. Part II of the article provides guidance to landlords on the parameters applicable to acceptable price increases and focuses attention on the application of CPC 396 to rental housing and related issues. California Penal Code 396 As it pertains to housing, defined as “any rental housing with an initial lease term of no longer than one year,” price gouging occurs when a landlord increases the rent of an existing or prospective tenant by more than 10 percent of the previously charged or advertised price following an emergency or disaster declaration for a period of 30 days.2 A residential landlord is only allowed to increase rent in excess of 10 percent if “the increase is directly attributable to additional costs for repairs or additions beyond normal maintenance that were amortized over the rental term that caused the rent to be increased greater than 10 percent or that an increase was contractually agreed to by the tenant prior to the proclamation or declaration” (CPC 396(e).) Further, landlords are prohibited from evicting a tenant and then re-renting the property at a rate that the landlord would have been prohibited from charging the evicted tenant under the statute (CPC 396(f).)3 Read the court decision
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Reprinted courtesy of Dan Schneider, Newmeyer Dillion
Mr. Schneider may be contacted at daniel.schneider@ndlf.com

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The EPA and the Corps of Engineers Propose Another Revised Definition of “Waters of the United States”

February 14, 2022 — Anthony B. Cavender - Gravel2Gavel
On December 7, 2021, the most recent proposed revision to the Clean Water Act’s term, “Waters of the United States” was published in the Federal Register. (See 86 FR 69372.) Comments on this proposal must be submitted by February 7, 2022. This term controls the scope of federal regulatory powers in such programs as the development of water quality standards, impaired waters, total maximum daily loads, oil spill prevention, preparedness and response plans, state and tribal water quality certification programs, the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) permit program, and the Corps of Engineers’ dredge and fill program. The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and the Corps of Engineers have jointly drafted this comprehensive proposed rule, which also responds to President Biden’s Executive Order 13990, issued in January 2021. Background The agencies noted that they have repeatedly defined and re-defined “Waters of the United States” since the Clean Water Act was enacted in 1972. This level of sustained commitment is unique to this program, perhaps reflecting the importance of the programs that are implemented through the Clean Water Act. The most recent rulemaking efforts took place in 2015, 2017, 2020 and now 2022, and the Supreme Court has issued several landmark rulings in response to these efforts. See City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 US 304 (1981), United States v. Riverside Bayview, 474 US 121 (1985), SWANCC v. United States, 531 US 159 (2001), Rapanos v. United States, 547 US 715 (2006), National Association of Manufacturers v. Department of Defense, 138 S Ct 617 (2018), and County of Maui, Hawaii v. Hawaii Wildlife Fund, 140 S, Ct 1462 (2020). The rules promulgated in 2015 and entitled, “Clean Water Act: Definition of Waters of the United States” expanded the scope of federal regulatory jurisdiction, but the 2020 rule, entitled the “Navigable Waters Protection Rule,” contracted that scope. Now, the agencies have proposed the “Revised Definition of ‘Waters of the United States,’” which will rescind the 2020 rule and inevitably restore something of the scope of the 2015 rule by returning to the familiar “1986 rules” that were issued by the Corps of Engineers in 1986 and EPA in 1988, as modified by the recent Supreme Court decisions mentioned above. Both the 2015 and 2020 rules were mired in litigation and the Corps and EPA view the resort to the 1986 rules as a fresh start for the Clean Water Act. In short, the topsy-turvy history of regulation under the Clean Water Act continues. Read the court decision
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Reprinted courtesy of Anthony B. Cavender, Pillsbury
Mr. Cavender may be contacted at anthony.cavender@pillsburylaw.com

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John Paulson’s $1 Billion Caribbean Empire Faces Betrayal

November 27, 2023 — Jim Wyss & Tom Maloney - Bloomberg
In the decade since hedge fund billionaire John Paulson took a grand gamble on Puerto Rico, he’s faced the wrath of the markets and mother nature. He’s navigated hurricanes, earthquakes, the pandemic and the largest municipal bankruptcy in US history to amass a portfolio of luxury hotels and resorts, high-end office blocks, and auto dealerships catering to the island’s rich. Now, just a few months after breaking ground on one of San Juan’s tallest and most exclusive residential towers, Paulson is facing a new wave of threats: lawsuits that strike at the heart of his Caribbean empire. Reprinted courtesy of Jim Wyss, Bloomberg and Tom Maloney, Bloomberg Read the court decision
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