Fraudster Sells 24-Bedroom ‘King’s Speech’ London Mansion
May 20, 2015 —
Neil Callanan – BloombergEdward Davenport, jailed for fraud for his role in a fake lender, sold a 24-bedroom mansion in London’s Marylebone district that was featured in the film “The King’s Speech.”
The money raised from the sale will be used to repay 13 million pounds ($20 million) from a confiscation order by Her Majesty’s Courts and Tribunals Service, the Serious Fraud Office said in a statement Wednesday.
Davenport was jailed for more than seven years in October 2011 for his role in Gresham Ltd., a company that said it offered to provide commercial funding in return for advance fees, the SFO said. After securing the payments, employees would make deceptive assertions to extract further fees, the SFO said in 2011.
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Neil Callanan, Bloomberg
Michigan Supreme Court Finds Faulty Subcontractor Work That Damages Insured’s Work Product May Constitute an “Occurrence” Under CGL Policy
November 02, 2020 —
Jason Taylor - Traub Lieberman Insurance Law BlogIn Skanska USA Bldg. Inc. v. M.A.P. Mech. Contractors, Inc., 2020 WL 3527909 (Mich. June 29, 2020), the Michigan Supreme Court addressed whether unintentionally faulty subcontractor work that damages an insured’s work product constitutes an “accident” under a commercial general liability insurance policy. In aligning itself with a growing number of jurisdictions, the Michigan Supreme Court answered, “yes.” In Skanska, a construction manager brought an action against a commercial general liability (CGL) insurer seeking coverage as additional insured for the cost of repairs to correct faulty work performed by its subcontractor in renovation of medical center. In 2009, the construction manager hired MAP to install a steam boiler and related piping for the medical center’s heating system. MAP’s installation included several expansion joints, which it was later discovered, were installed backward. Significant damage to concrete, steel, and the heating system occurred as a result. The construction manager performed the work of repairing and replacing the damaged property to the tune of $1.4 million, and submitted a claim to MAP’s CGL insurer, Amerisure, seeking coverage as an additional insured.
Amerisure denied the claim contending that MAP’s defective construction was not a covered “occurrence” within the CGL policy. The policy defined “occurrence” as “an accident, including continuous or repeated exposure to substantially the same general harmful conditions,” but did not define the term “accident.” The trial court looked to the Court of Appeal’s decision in Hawkeye-Sec. Ins. Co. v. Vector Const. Co., 185 Mich. App. 369 (1990), which defined “accident” as “…a result which is not anticipated and…takes place without the insured’s foresight or expectation and without design or intentional causation on his part.” But, again citing Hawkeye, the trial court concluded that “[d]efective workmanship, standing alone, is not an occurrence within the meaning of a[ ] general liability insurance contract[;] an occurrence exists where the insured’s faulty work product damages the property of another.”
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Jason Taylor, Traub LiebermanMr. Taylor may be contacted at
jtaylor@tlsslaw.com
St. Mary & St. John Coptic Orthodox Church v. SBS Insurance Services, Inc.
January 18, 2021 —
Michael Velladao - Lewis BrisboisIn St. Mary & St. John Coptic Orthodox Church v. SBS Insurance Services, Inc., ----Cal.App.5th--- (November 23, 2020), the California First District Court of Appeal reversed the trial court's entry of judgment in favor of SBC Insurance Services ("SBC") regarding a claim for water damage sustained by a residence owned by St. Mary & John Coptic Church ("St. Mary") under property coverage afforded by a policy issued by Philadelphia Indemnity Insurance Company ("Philadelphia"). The policy was procured by SBC on behalf of St. Mary. Philadelphia denied coverage of the claim based on the vacancy exclusion in its policy, but entered into a settlement and loan receipt agreement, whereby St. Mary gave Philadelphia the right to control litigation in St. Mary’s name against SBC or third parties who might be liable for the loss in exchange for a loan of money to repair and remediate the damage sustained by the residence. The loan was to be repaid out of any recovery made against SBC or third parties. After a bench trial, the trial court found in favor of SBC and held that the vacancy exclusion was ambiguous. Essentially, the exclusion did not apply to the time period prior to the time St. Mary purchased the residence, such that the 60-day vacancy requirement could not be satisfied. The trial court reasoned that since St. Mary did not have an insurable interest in the property before it purchased the property, the 60-day requirement did not include the period before such residence was purchased and St. Mary held an insurable interest.
The parties’ dispute arose of out of the Pope of the Coptic Church requesting St. Mary to purchase a home to be used as his papal residence in the Western United States. St. Mary also intended to use the home as a residence for visiting bishops. The home was purchased on May 28, 2015. As part of the purchase, SBC placed the home under St. Mary’s commercial policy, rather than purchasing a separate homeowner’s policy for the residence. Subsequently, the home sustained water damage due to a broken pipe. The water damage was discovered on July 24, 2015, 57 days after the inception of the Philadelphia policy and the loss. St. Mary tendered the property loss to Philadelphia, which denied coverage of the claim based on the reasoning that the home had been vacant for 60 consecutive days prior to the loss. Subsequently, St. Mary filed suit against SBC after securing the loan receipt agreement with Philadelphia based on the argument that the vacancy exclusion barred coverage of the claim and SBC breached its duty of care by not securing the proper coverage of the home. The trial court entered judgment in favor of SBC finding that the vacancy exclusion did not apply to bar coverage of the loss, such that SBC did not breach its duty of care owed to St. Mary as its broker.
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Michael Velladao, Lewis BrisboisMr. Velladao may be contacted at
Michael.Velladao@lewisbrisbois.com
‘Like a War Zone’: Malibu Fire Ravages Multimillion-Dollar Homes
December 04, 2018 —
John Gittelsohn, Anousha Sakoui, & Christopher Palmeri - BloombergMalibu resident Lance Schultz was jolted awake at 2 a.m. Friday with word that he needed to evacuate. With a roaring fire approaching the coastal community, he gathered his girlfriend, dog and 8-month-old son and headed to nearby Zuma Beach.
He returned Sunday to survey the damage. His home was saved after his girlfriend’s 82-year-old father returned to hose down the property he had built years before. But Schultz estimates about one-fifth of the houses in the neighborhood are gone, including a mansion down the block that was on sale for $16 million. Much of the rest of the area is covered in black soot.
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John Gittelsohn, Anousha Sakoui, & Christopher Palmeri, Bloomberg
Limiting Plaintiffs’ Claims to a Cause of Action for Violation of SB-800
November 18, 2011 —
Samir R. Patel, Esq., Lorber, Greenfield, & Polito, LLPThere has been a fair share of publicity about the SB-800 amendments to the Civil Code (Civil Code section 896, et seq.) that codified construction defect litigation in 2002. Most of the publicity is geared toward the pre-litigation standards allowing a builder the right to repair before litigation is commenced by a homeowner. Less focus and attention has been given to the fact that violation of the SB-800 performance standards is being used by plaintiff’s counsel as an additional tool in the plaintiff’s pleading tool box against builders. Closer scrutiny to SB-800 reveals that those provisions should in fact act as a limitation to the pleading tools available to plaintiffs and an additional tool for builders in the defense of cases governed by SB-800.
The typical construction defect complaint contains the boiler plate versions of numerous causes of action. These causes of action include Strict Liability, Negligence, Negligence Per Se, Breach of Contract, Breach of Contract – Third-Party Beneficiary, Breach of Express Warranties, Breach of Implied Warranties, among others. The wide array of causes of action leave a defendant “pinned to the wall” because they require a complex defense on a multitude of contract and tort related causes of action. Furthermore, the statutes of limitations as to these claims widely differ depending upon if the particular defect is considered latent or patent. The truth of the matter remains, no matter what the circumstances, if a construction defect matter ultimately goes to trial, it is inevitable that plaintiffs will obtain a judgment on at least one of these causes of action.
On its own, the Strict Liability cause of action can be a thorn in a defendant’s side. A builder is obviously placing a product into the stream of commerce and strict liability is a tough standard to defend against, particularly when it concerns intricate homes comprised of multiple components that originally sold for hundreds of thousands of dollars. A Negligence cause of action can also be difficult to defend because the duty of care for a builder is what a “reasonable” builder would have done under the circumstances. An interpretation of this duty of care can easily sway a jury that will almost always consist of sympathetic homeowners. A Negligence Per Se cause of action can also leave a defendant vulnerable to accusations that a builder violated the Uniform Building Code or a multitude of other obscure municipal construction-related code provisions during the construction of the home. Lastly, the Breach of Contract cause of action leaves a builder relying on dense and intricate purchase and sale agreements with dozens of addenda which leave the skeptical jurors turned off by what they view as one-side, boilerplate provisions. Ultimately, when a matter is about to go to trial, the complexity of these complaints can benefit a plaintiff and increase a plaintiff’s bargaining power against a defendant who is attempting to avoid a potentially large judgment.
Enter the SB-800 statutes. The SB-800 statutes apply to all homes sold after January 1, 2003. Civil Code section 938 specifically states that “[t]his title applies only to new residential units where the purchase agreements with the buyer was signed by the seller on or after January 1, 2003.” (Civil Code §, 938.) As time progresses, more residential construction defect cases will exclusively fall under the purview of SB-800. Slowly but surely more SB-800 governed litigation is being filed, and its exclusive application is looming on the horizon.
On its surface, this “right to repair” regime has left builders with a lot to be desired despite the fact that it is supposed to allow the builder the opportunity to cure any deficiencies in their product before litigation can be filed by potential plaintiffs. However, the application of the time line for repair has shown to be impractical for anything but the most minor problems involving only small numbers of residential units. Moreover, the fact that the fruits of the builder’s investigation into the claimed defects in the pre-litigation context can freely be used as evidence against it in litigation makes builders proceed with trepidation in responding with a repair. For these reasons, more SB-800 litigation can be expected to result due to the shortcomings of the pre-litigation procedures, and savvy defense counsel should anticipate the issues to be dealt with in presenting the defense of such cases at trial.
This fact should not necessarily be met with fear or disdain. Within the SB-800 statutes, the legislature made it clear that they were creating a new cause of action for construction defect claims, but it further made it clear that this cause of action is a plaintiff’s exclusive remedy. The legislature giveth, but at the same time, the legislature taketh away. Throughout numerous provisions within the SB-800 statutes, the Civil Code states that claims for construction defects as to residential construction are exclusively governed by the Civil Code, and that the Civil Code governs any and all litigation arising under breaches of these provisions. Civil Code section 896 specifically states:
In any action seeking recovery of damages arising out of, or related to deficiencies in, the residential construction … the claimant’s claims or causes of action shall be limited to violation of, the following standards, except as specifically set forth in this title. (Civil Code §, 896.)
Civil Code section 896 then provides approximately fifty-plus standards by which a construction defect claim is assessed under that provision. Civil Code section 896 covers everything from plumbing to windows, and from foundations to decks, and in several instances expressly dictates statutes of limitations as to specific areas of construction that severely truncate the 10-year latent damage limitations period. As for any construction deficiencies that are not enumerated within Civil Code section 896, Civil Code section 897 explicitly defines the intent of the standards and provides a method to assess deficiencies that are not addressed in Civil Code section 896. Civil Code section 897 states:
Intent of Standards
The standards set forth in this chapter are intended to address every function or component of a structure. To the extent that a function or component of a structure is not addressed by these standards, it shall be actionable if it causes damage. (Civil Code §, 897.)
Therefore, Civil Code section 897 acts as a catch-all by which defects that are not covered within Civil Code section 896 can be evaluated on a damage standard mirroring the Aas case (damages must be present and actual). The result of sections 896 and 897 being read in combination is a comprehensive, all-inclusive set of performance standards by which any defect raised by Plaintiffs can be evaluated and resolved under a single SB-800 based cause of action.
Civil Code section 943 makes clear that a cause of action for violation of SB-800 performance standards is a plaintiff’s sole remedy for a residential construction defect action. Specifically, Civil Code section 943 states:
Except as provided in this title, no other cause of action for a claim covered by this title or for damages recoverable under 944 is allowed. In addition to the rights under this title, this title does not apply to any action by a claimant to enforce a contract or express contractual provision, or any action for fraud, personal injury, or violation of a statute. (Civil Code §, 943.)
Civil Code section 944 provides the method for computing damages within a construction defect action, as follows:
If a claim for damages is made under this title, the homeowner is only entitled to damages for the reasonable value of repairing any violation of the standards set forth in this title, [and] the reasonable cost of repairing any damages caused by the repair efforts… . (Civil Code §, 944.)
A cursory review of these statutes yields the conclusion that the legislature was attempting to create an exclusive cause of action that trumps all other causes of action where SB-800 applies. The remedy available to plaintiffs is limited to that allowed by the Civil Code. As noted above, “[n]o other cause of action for a claim covered by this title…is allowed.” (Civil Code §, 943.) Therefore, Civil Code sections 896, 897, 943, and 944 specifically prohibit the contract-based and tort-based causes of action typically pled by plaintiffs.
Plaintiff’s counsel has seized upon the language of section 943 to advance the argument that SB-800 still allows a plaintiff to advance typical contract and tort based causes of action. On the surface, this argument may seem compelling, but a minimum of scrutiny of the express language of section 943 dispels this notion. Section 943 says that it provides rights “[i]n addition” to those under the SB-800 Civil Code provisions. Clearly, the language in section 943 is intended to expressly underscore the fact that a plaintiff is not precluded from seeking relief in addition to that allowed under SB-800 for damages not arising from a breach of the SB-800 standards or for damages in addition to those recoverable under Section 944. This language does not provide an unfettered license to bring a Strict Liability, Negligence or other cause of action against a builder where SB-800 applies.
In fact, this language only keeps the door open for plaintiffs to pursue such causes of action not arising from a breach of the SB-800 standards should there be such supporting allegations. For example, if a plaintiff alleges that a builder breached an “express contractual provision” related to the timing of the completion of the home and close of escrow, and the contract specifies damages in this regard, a plaintiff may have a viable separate cause of action for Breach of Contract for recovery of those damages precisely because that is not an issue expressly dealt with in SB-800 in the performance standards under sections 896 and 897, or in the damage recovery terms under 944. As it stands, the vast majority of complaints are seeking redress for violation of the same primary right; that is, defects specifically outlined in Section 896 and 897 or which result in damages as stated in Section 944.
So, how does a builder defend against a complaint that contains multiple causes of action regarding construction defects for a home sold after January 1, 2003? There are numerous ways to approach this. First and foremost, these superfluous and improper causes of action can be attacked by demurrer seeking dismissal of all causes of action other than the cause of action alleging violation of SB-800. If the the time period within which to file a demurrer has passed already, a motion for judgment on the pleadings can be utilized to attack the improper causes of action in the same way as a demurrer can be used for this purpose.
The limitation to a demurrer or motion for judgment on the pleadings is that the judge is restricted to viewing only the four corners of the pleading when making a ruling. It is typical for plaintiffs’ counsel to cleverly (or one might even say, disingenuously) leave the complaint purposely vague to avoid a successful defense attack on the pleadings by not including the original date the residence was sold. In that instance, a motion for summary adjudication can be used to attack a plaintiff’s complaint. By simply providing evidence that the homes were originally sold after January 1, 2003, the improper causes of action should be subject to dismissal by summary adjudication. If the plaintiff is a subsequent purchaser, the builder still has recourse to enforce the pleading limitations under SB-800. Civil Code section 945 states that “[t]he provisions, standards, rights, and obligations set forth in this title are binding upon all original purchasers and their successors-in-interest.” (Civil Code §, 945.)
Attacking a plaintiff’s complaint to eliminate multiple causes of action can have numerous benefits. The practical result is that a plaintiff will only have one viable cause of action. The advantage is that the SB-800 performance standards include the defined performance standards and shortened statutes of limitations periods with regard to specific issues. Furthermore, as to defects which are not specifically provided for in Civil Code section 896, Civil Code section 897 requires a proof of actual damages. Therefore, a plaintiff must provide evidence of current damages and not simply conditions that may potentially cause damage in the future.
The Appellate Courts have yet to directly address and interpret these SB-800 provisions. The time for that is undoubtedly drawing near. For now, however, plaintiffs will have to find ways to accurately plead construction defect claims within the confines of one cause of action for breach of the performance standards enumerated within the Civil Code.
Printed courtesy of Lorber, Greenfield & Polito, LLP. Mr. Patel can be contacted at spatel@lorberlaw.com and Mr. Verbick at tverbick@lorberlaw.com.
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2019 Legislative Changes Affecting the Construction Industry
July 09, 2019 —
Melinda S. Gentile & Cadian T. Baker - Peckar & Abramson, P.C.The 2019 Florida Legislative Session recently concluded and a number of important construction-related House Bills (HB) and Senate Bills (SB) were presented during the Session. Below is a summary of those construction-related bills set to become law in 2019.
Bills Becoming Law in 2019
HB 1247: Relating to Construction Bonds. This bill passed both the House and the Senate and is awaiting the Governor’s signature. Once the Governor has approved the bill it becomes effective as of October 1, 2019.
This bill addresses how to properly perfect a claim against a contractor’s payment bond.
(1) The Notice of Nonpayment that must be served on the contractor and the surety, must be made under oath and include the following provisions:
The nature of the labor or services performed or to be performed;
The materials furnished or to be furnished;
The amount paid on the account; and if known, the amount owed and the amount to become due.
A Notice of Nonpayment that includes the sums for retainage must specify the portion of the amount claimed for retainage.
(2) A subcontractor, laborer, or material supplier (claimant) who files a fraudulent Notice of Nonpayment loses their rights under the bond. The filing of a fraudulent notice is a complete defense to claimant’s claim against the bond. A notice is fraudulent if the claimant willfully exaggerated the amount due, willfully included a claim for work not performed or materials not furnished or prepared the notice with willful and gross negligence, which resulted in willful exaggeration. However, a minor mistake in the notice, or a good faith dispute as to the amount due, is not considered fraudulent. Please note that this provision mirrors the existing statute relative to a fraudulent lien.
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Melinda S. Gentile, Peckar & Abramson, P.C.Ms. Gentile may be contacted at
mgentile@pecklaw.com
High Attendance Predicted for West Coast Casualty Seminar
March 19, 2014 —
Beverley BevenFlorez-CDJ STAFFWith the diverse speakers and topics planned for this year’s West Coast Casualty Seminar in Anaheim, California on May 15th and 16th, attendance should be high. In 2013, there were approximately 1600 attendees coming from across the country as well as the United Kingdom. The event planners recently added additional blocks of rooms, as the Disneyland Hotel has sold out 90% of the previously allotted room blocks. The planners urge attendees to book their rooms soon.
Seminar and panel topics have been announced. Thomas J. Halliwell, Esq. and Barry Vaughan, Esq. will be starting the seminar off with a discussion of “Recent California, Arizona and Nevada Court Decisions that Impact Construction Litigation and Defect Claims.” May 16th will feature a number of interesting break-out sessions including “Working Smarter with Technology” with speakers Brian Kahn, Esq., Paul R. Kiesel, Esq., Hon. Peter Lichtman (ret), Hon. Nancy Wieben Stock (ret), Peter S. Curry and Don MacGregor (Bert L. Howe & Associates, Inc.).
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EPA Looks to Reduce Embodied Carbon in Materials With $160M in Grants
August 19, 2024 —
James Leggate - Engineering News-RecordThe U.S. Environmental Protection Agency estimates that construction materials used for buildings and built infrastructure account for more than 15% of global greenhouse gas emissions. The agency now hopes to boost adoption of materials with lower embodied emissions by offering $160 million in grants to better track and ultimately reduce climate pollution associated with those materials.
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James Leggate, Engineering News-Record
Mr. Leggate may be contacted at leggatej@enr.com
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