Second Circuit Finds Potential Ambiguity in Competing “Anti-Concurrent Cause” Provisions in Hurricane Sandy Property Loss
November 28, 2018 —
CDJ STAFFThe Second Circuit recently held that competing “anti-concurrent cause” provisions in a commercial property policy present a potential ambiguity that could result in favor of coverage for losses sustained by Madelaine Chocolate after storm surge from Hurricane Sandy combined to cause substantial damage to Madelaine’s property and a resulting loss of income.
Madelaine was insured under an all-risk insurance policy issued by Chubb subsidiary Great Northern Insurance Company. By endorsement, Madelaine’s policy added “windstorm” as a covered peril and defined “windstorm” as “wind… regardless of any other cause or event that directly or indirectly contributes concurrently to, or contributed in any sequence to, the loss or damage.” The policy also included a common flood exclusion that removed coverage for loss or damage caused by or resulting from waves, tidal water, or tidal waves, or the rising, overflowing, or breaking of any natural harbors, oceans, or any other body of water, whether driven by wind or not. Like the windstorm endorsement, the flood exclusion contained concurrency language that broadened the exclusion to any loss to which flood contributed, regardless of any other cause or event that directly or indirectly contributed to the loss.
Reprinted courtesy of
Michael S. Levine, Hunton Andrews Kurth and
Tae Andrews, Hunton Andrews Kurth
Mr. Levine may be contacted at mlevine@HuntonAK.com
Mr. Andrews may be contacted at tandrews@HuntonAK.com
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Harmon Towers Duty to Defend Question Must Wait, Says Court
March 01, 2012 —
CDJ STAFFThe Harmon Towers project in Las Vegas was eventually halted short of the planned forty-seven stories after “it was determined that there was substantial defective construction, including defective installation of reinforcing steel throughout the Harmon.” The American Home Insurance Company and Lexington Insurance Company put forth a claim that they had no duty to defend Perini Construction, the builder of the defective Harmon Towers. Further, American Home seeks to recover the monies American reimbursed Perini. The United States District Court of Nevada ruled in the case of American Home Assurance Co. v. Perini Building on February 3, 2012.
The two insurance companies covered Perini and its subcontractors, Century Steel, Pacific Coast Steel, and Ceco Concrete Construction. Century Steel was the initial subcontractor for the reinforcing steel; they were later acquired by Pacific Coast Steel. In this current case, Perini Construction is the sole defendant.
Perini sought a dismissal of these claims, arguing that without the subcontractors joined to the case, “the Court cannot afford complete relief among existing parties.” The court rejected this claim, noting that the court can determine the duties of the insurance companies to Perini, which the court described as “separate and distinct from those of the subcontractors.” The subcontractors “have not claimed an interest in the subject matter of the action.” The court concluded that it could determine whether Perini was entitled or not to coverage without affecting the subcontractors. The court rejected Perini’s claim.
Perini also asked the court to abstain from the case, arguing that it was better heard in a state court. The court noted that several considerations cover whether a case is heard in state or federal courts. The court noted that if the case weighed heavily on state law, the state courts would be the obvious location. Further, if there were a parallel action in the state courts, “there is a presumption that the whole suit should be heard in state courts.” This is, however, no parallel state suit, although the court noted that Perini has “threatened” to do so.
However, the issue of who is to blame for the problems at Harmon Towers has not been resolved. The court concluded that until the “underlying action” was concluded, it was premature to consider the issues raised in this case while the earlier lawsuit was still in progress. The court denied Perini’s motion to dismiss the case. Given that the outcome of the earlier construction defect case may lead to further litigation in state court, the District Court granted Perini’s motion to abstain, but staying their judgment until the construction defect case is resolved.
Read the court’s decision…
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Comparing Contracts: A Review of the AIA 201 and ConsensusDocs - Part I
March 22, 2018 —
Michael Sams and Amanda Cox – Construction Executive, A publication of Associated Builders and Contractors. All Rights Reserved.Here’s a helpful comparison of and analysis of some important contract sections in the
AIA 201 (2007 and 2017 versions) and
ConsensusDocs (2014 and 2017 versions). While not intended to be all inclusive, this summary comparison of the contract documents will run as a three-part series. Part I covers Financial Assurances, Design Risk, Project Management and Contract Administration. Part II will cover Schedule/Time, Consequential Damages/LDs, Claims and Disputes/ADR. Part III will cover Insurance and Indemnification and Payment.
FINANCIAL ASSURANCES
- What assurances are there that the owner can pay for the project?
- The Contractor should have the right to request and obtain proof that the Owner has funding sufficient to pay for the Work. The provision should also provide that the Contractor may terminate the Contract if the Owner refuses to allow a review of funding documents, or should the Contractor reasonably determine that the Owner does not have sufficient funds to pay for the Work.
Relevant Sections:
- A201 2007 Section 2.2.1; 2017 Section 2.2.1-2.2.2 A201
- 2014 & 2017 ConsensusDocs 200: Section 4.2
AIA:
- Section 2.2.1 A201 2007 & 2017: Both editions require the Owner, upon Contractor’s written request, to provide, “reasonable evidence that the Owner has made financial arrangements to fulfill the Owner’s obligations under the Contract.” Thereafter, the Contractor may only request such evidence if (1) the Owner fails to make payments; (2) a change in the Work materially changes the Contract Sum; or (3) the Contractor identifies in writing a reasonable concern regarding the Owner’s ability to make payment when due. If the Owner does not comply, the Contractor may stop work.
- Additionally, A201 2017 Section 2.2.2 awards costs to the Contractor for demobilization and remobilization.
Reprinted courtesy of
Michael Sams , Kenney & Sams and
Amanda Cox, Kenney & Sams
Mr. Sams may be contacted at mpsams@KandSlegal.com
Ms. Cox may be contacted at ajcox@KandSlegal.com
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CLB Recommends Extensive Hawaii Contractor License Changes
January 27, 2014 —
Beverley BevenFlorez-CDJ STAFFIn 2013, the Hawaii senate passed a resolution, which asked the Contractors License Board to assess “each of the contractor licensing classifications under chapter 444, Hawaii Revised Statutes, and chapter 77, Hawaii Administrative Rules, and prepare a report that evaluates each classification,” according to Anna Oshiro’s blog, Hawaii Construction Law. The “board completed its task” and “recommends wholesale changes to the scope of work to be performed by licensed contractors in the State of Hawaii.” The report has been filed with the Legislative Reference Bureau.
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Is Your Business Insured for the Coronavirus?
March 16, 2020 —
J. Kelby Van Patten & Jared De Jong - Payne & FearsHow bad will the pandemic get? How much will it spread in the United States? Will we develop a vaccine in time to do any good?
As insurance lawyers, we have no idea. But we can help you figure out whether your business is insured for the coronavirus risks that keep business owners up at night.
Risk 1: An outbreak forces my business to close until the outbreak ends. Are my financial business losses covered?
Maybe. Many commercial property policies provide “business interruption coverage” which may apply.
This coverage typically requires that:
(i) Your business is shut down. If your business actually closes for a period of time, you may meet this requirement. However, you wouldn’t meet it if your business slows because half of your staff is home sick.
(ii) The shutdown is necessary. “Necessary” means something different than “desirable” or “prudent.” Whether a shutdown is necessary depends on the facts. If it is physically or legally impossible to enter your building, then closure is necessary. But if the government issues a public advisory recommending that businesses close, and you voluntarily comply, that’s a different story.
(iii) The shutdown is caused by physical damage to your property. Is a viral outbreak “damage” to your property? There’s not a clear answer. On the one hand, courts have found that hazardous contamination of a building constitutes property damage to the building. For example, asbestos incorporated into a building constitutes property damage to the building under a commercial general liability policy. Environmental contamination can also constitute property damage to the contaminated property. Policyholders whose businesses close during an outbreak will argue that property contaminated by the virus satisfies the “physical damage to property” requirement. On the other hand, insurers may argue that the real cause of the shutdown is not the contaminated building surfaces, but the need for social distancing in a neighborhood with many contagious people. Coverage will depend on the policy language and the details of the shutdown.
Reprinted courtesy of
J. Kelby Van Patten, Payne & Fears and
Jared De Jong, Payne & Fears
Mr. Van may be contacted at kvp@paynefears.com
Mr. Jong may be contacted at jdj@paynefears.com
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Dave McLain included in the 2023 edition of The Best Lawyers in America
March 06, 2023 —
David M. McLain – Colorado Construction LitigationColleagues and friends:
I am pleased to share with you that I have been recognized in the 2023 edition of The Best Lawyers in America for my work in construction law. This honor comes as a surprise and is a testament to the dedication and hard work of my team at Higgins, Hopkins, McLain & Roswell, LLC.
As many of you know, my practice focuses on the defense of complex construction lawsuits on behalf of developers, general contractors, and other construction professionals. I have been fortunate enough to work with some of the largest home builders and general contractors in the state and country, regional and custom builders, and numerous insurance carriers over the years. Through these experiences, I have been able to gain valuable insights into the construction industry, and I am proud to be considered an expert in this field.
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David McLain, Higgins, Hopkins, McLain & RoswellMr. McLain may be contacted at
mclain@hhmrlaw.com
Wait, You Want An HOA?! Restricting Implied Common-Interest Communities
September 17, 2018 —
Neil McConomy - Snell & Wilmer Real Estate Litigation BlogWhile the butt of many jokes and a thorn in the side of some property owners, homeowners associations (“HOAs”) serve the vital function of collecting and disbursing funds to care for and maintain common areas of residential developments. Without HOAs, neighborhood open spaces, parks, and other amenities risk falling into disrepair through a type of tragedy of the commons, wherein residents use such amenities but refuse to subsidize care and maintenance for these common areas believing someone else will pony-up the funds. HOAs, when properly organized and managed, avoid this problem by ensuring everyone pays their fair shares for the common areas. Colorado’s Common Interest Ownership Act (“CCIOA”), C.R.S. § 38-33.3-101 et seq., sets forth the manner in which such common-interest communities, and their related associations, must be established.
Earlier this summer, the Colorado Supreme Court issued an opinion limiting the application of previous case law that allowed for the establishment of common-interest communities (and their related HOAs) by implication. See McMullin v. Hauer, 420 P.3d 271 (Colo. 2018). Prior to McMullin, Colorado courts had been increasing the number of factual scenarios implying the creation of common-interest communities under CCIOA. See e.g., Evergreen Highlands Assoc. v. West, 73 P.3d 1 (Colo. 2003) (finding an implied obligation of landowners to fund a pre-existing HOA’s obligations); DeJean v. Grosz, 412 P.3d 733 (Colo. App. 2015) (finding an implied right of a homeowner to found an HOA after the developer filed a declaration expressing an intent to form one but ultimately failed to do so); and Hiwan Homeowners Assoc. v. Knotts, 215 P.3d 1271 (Colo. App. 2009) (finding the existence of an HOA despite no common property existing within the development). The McMullin opinion highlights the importance of strict compliance with CCIOA to preserve common areas in a development, ensure the ability to fund maintenance of such areas, and avoid future litigation.
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Neil McConomy, Snell & WilmerMr. McConomy may be contacted at
nmcconomy@swlaw.com
SCOTUS, Having Received Views of Solicitor General, Will Decide Whether CWA Regulates Indirect Discharge of Pollutants Into Navigable Water Via Groundwater
April 17, 2019 —
Anthony B. Cavender - Gravel2GavelPrior to deciding whether to review an important February 1, 2018, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit decision involving the jurisdictional reach of the Clean Water Act (CWA), Hawai’i Wildlife Fund, et al., v. County of Maui, the Supreme Court asked the Solicitor General for the views of the U.S. on the holdings of this case and the April 12, 2018 U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit decision, Upstate Forever, et al., v. Kinder Morgan Energy Partners, L.P., et al.
On February 19, the Supreme Court confirmed that certiorari was granted to Question 1 presented by the Petition,
Whether the CWA requires a permit when pollutants originate from a point source but are conveyed to navigable waters by a nonpoint source, such as groundwater. (33 U.S.C. § 1362 (12)
In County of Maui , the Ninth Circuit held that indirect discharges to navigable waters through groundwater may be subject to the Environmental Protection Agency’s (EPA) CWA the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) permitting authority, and in Kinder Morgan, the Fourth Circuit held that such an indirect discharge may be subject to regulation under the CWA when there is a direct hydrological connection between the discharge into groundwater and the direct discharge into navigable, surface waters.
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Anthony B. Cavender, PillsburyMr. Cavender may be contacted at
anthony.cavender@pillsburylaw.com
