Life After McMillin: Do Negligence and Strict Liability Causes of Action for Construction Defects Still Exist?
January 24, 2018 —
Thomas Balestreri and Amanda Crawley - Balestreri, Potocki, & HolmesThe ruling is in but the battle will likely continue over the practical application of SB 800. On January 18, 2018 the California Supreme Court issued its decision in
McMillin Albany, LLC v. Superior Court (Van Tassel) (January 18, 2018, S229762) __ Cal.4th __, holding that the statutory prelitigation scheme in The Right to Repair Act (“the Act”) that provides for notice and an opportunity for the Builder to repair defects applies to all claims for construction defects in residential construction sold on or after January 1, 2003, regardless whether the claim is founded on a violation of the Act’s performance standards or a common law claim for negligence or strict liability. (
McMillin Albany, LLC v. Superior Court (Van Tassel) (January 18, 2018, S229762) __ Cal.4th __.) With this holding, has the Court ruled that common law causes of action for construction defect still survive? If so, what will they look like and what standards will be applied?
The short answer is that it appears that common law causes of action still survive, at least for now, but it is not clear from this decision what they will look like and what standards will apply.
Portions of the decision seem to suggest that the Act is the sole and exclusive remedy for construction defect claims: “…even in some areas where the common law had supplied a remedy for construction defects resulting in property damage but not personal injury, the text and legislative history [of the statute] reflect a
clear and unequivocal intent to supplant common law negligence and strict product liability actions under the Act.” (
McMillin (January 18, 2018, S229762) __Cal.4th.__ [p. 6].) (Italics added for emphasis) However, at the end of the decision, the Court seems to be saying that there may still be a place for common law claims for negligence and strict liability alongside the Act but that these causes of action may be subject to the performance standards in the Act.
The
McMillin case went up to the Supreme Court on a procedural issue: whether a common law action alleging construction defects resulting in both economic loss and property damage is subject to the Act’s prelitigation notice and cure procedures. The Van Tassels had dismissed their claims under the Act opting to proceed solely on their common law claims including negligence and strict liability. McMillin sought a stay to force the Van Tassels to comply with the Act’s prelitigation procedures. The Supreme Court held that the Van Tassels must comply with the statutory procedures and affirmed the stay issued by the trial court. But the question remained: now that the Van Tassels were left only with common law claims, how would they proceed under the Act?
To understand how the Court dealt with this question, one must first understand how the Court dealt with the narrow procedural question presented by the case. The Court provides a very detailed, clear explanation of the reasons why it felt the Legislature intended for all construction defect claims involving residential construction must comply with the prelitigation requirements of the Act. In summing up its conclusions the Court makes three definitive holdings.
First, for claims involving economic loss only—the kind of claims involved in
Aas—the Court holds that the Legislature intended to supersede
Aas and provide a statutory basis for recovery. (
McMillin (January 18, 2018, S229762) __Cal.4th.__ [p. 10].) In other words, the Court clearly agrees that the Act was meant to allow recovery of damages based solely on economic damages. No surprise there. Second, the Court held for personal injuries, the Legislature made no changes to existing law that provides common law remedies for the injured party. (Id.) Nobody has ever contested that. Finally, the Court held that for construction defect claims involving property damage and not just economic loss “the Legislature replaced the common law
methods of recovery with the new statutory scheme.” (
Id.,) (Italics added for emphasis.)
In other words, the Court is not saying that negligence and strict liability are not permitted causes of action. The Court is merely stating that these causes of action must comply with the Act’s statutory scheme just as the same as a claim for economic loss. Here the Court is focusing on the procedure that must be followed. “The Act, in effect, provides that construction defect claims not involving personal injury will be treated the same procedurally going forward whether or not the underlying claims gave rise to any property damage.” (
Id.)
Having laid out its fundamental premise, the Court then deals with Plaintiff’s arguments regarding the intent of the Legislature and makes light work of them all. In the process, the Court disapproves
Liberty Mutual Ins. Co. v. Brookfield Crystal Cove LLC (2013) 219 Cal. App. 4th 98, and
Burch v. Superior Court (2014) 223 Cal. App. 4th 1411, to the extent they are inconsistent with the views expressed in the
McMillin opinion.
This is where the decision gets interesting. The Court reminds us that the Van Tassels had dismissed their statutory causes of action for violation of the performance standards under Section 896. One would think at that point that Plaintiffs had to be wondering if they had any claims left given that the Court had ruled that the Act was the sole means of recovery for construction defects. Not so fast. The Court points out that the complaint still rests on allegations of defective construction and that the suit remains an “ ‘action seeking recovery of damages arising out of, or related to deficiencies in, the residential construction’ of the plaintiffs’ homes (§896)
and McMillin’s liability under the Van Tassels’ negligence and strict liability claims depends on the extent to which it [McMillin] violated the standards of sections 896 and 897.” (
McMillin (January 18, 2018, S229762) __Cal.4th.__ [p. 19].) (Emphasis added.) WHAT DID THE COURT JUST SAY? Did the Court just say that a plaintiff could bring a common law cause of action for negligence or strict liability based on a violation of the performance standards under Section 896? What exactly would that claim look like? What would be the elements of such a cause of action?
To answer these questions, the Court states in the very next paragraph, which also happens to be the last paragraph in the decision: “In holding that claims seeking recovery for construction defect damages are subject to the Act’s prelitigation procedures regardless of how they are pleaded,
we have no occasion to address the extent to which a party might rely upon common law principles in pursuing liability under the Act.” (
McMillin (January 18, 2018, S229762) __Cal.4th.__ [p. 19].) (Italics added for emphasis) Is the Court answering “No” to the questions posed above? Probably not. It is simply following the age old rule that an appellate court will
not rule on an issue that is not specifically presented by an appeal, leaving that question for another day.
All we know for sure from
McMillin is that every claim for construction defects falling within the scope of the Act must follow the prelitigation procedure. There are no hall passes for negligence and strict liability. The larger question posed by the last two paragraphs in the decision, is whether the law recognizes a cause of action for negligence and strict liability for construction defects based on the standards in Section 896. The answer will have to be worked out by judges and trial attorneys in courtrooms across the State! The parameters of this hybrid cause of action that the Court seems to have posited will need more careful consideration than can be offered on first reading of
McMillin v. Superior Court.
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Balestreri, Potocki, & Holmes
Structure of Champlain Towers North Appears Healthy
August 04, 2021 —
Nadine M. Post - Engineering News-RecordThere is good news for the residents of the occupied Champlain Towers North, the 12-story residential condominium in Surfside, Fla., located a short distance up Collins Avenue from its near-twin Champlain Towers South, which failed unexpectedly June 24. The unstable remaining wing of the Champlain Towers South concrete structure was imploded July 4, after the partial progressive collapse that killed at least 94 people and left another 22 still missing.
Reprinted courtesy of
Nadine M. Post, Engineering News-Record
Ms. Post may be contacted at postn@enr.com
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Los Angeles Warehousing Mecca Halts Expansion Just as Needs Soar
September 05, 2022 —
Ngai Yeung & Augusta Saraiva - BloombergCommunities in the Inland Empire, the US’s logistics mecca east of Los Angeles, are suspending new warehousing projects to examine the impact from decades of pollution -- putting the industry under pressure when it’s needed most.
This week, the city council for Pomona is set to vote on extending a temporary halt on industrial developments to study the environmental impact, while the nearby city of Norco will decide whether to establish a 45-day moratorium. The actions follow similar freezes by a handful of Southern California cities like Riverside, Colton, Chino and Redlands over the past several years.
Meanwhile, a state-level bill -- which is a long-shot to pass in the legislature but gives a reading of the mood -- proposes banning large industrial construction within 1,000 feet of non-industrial areas such as schools, homes and playgrounds in Riverside and San Bernardino counties, an area that spans 27,000 square miles.
Reprinted courtesy of
Ngai Yeung, Bloomberg and
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Nondelegable Duties
June 04, 2024 —
David Adelstein - Florida Construction Legal UpdatesHave you heard the expression “nondelegable duty”? The issue of a nondelegable duty comes into play when a party hires an independent contractor and the independent contractor commits negligence, primarily in the personal injury context. In other words, a plaintiff wants to hold a defendant liable for the injuries caused by the defendant’s independent contractor.
A nondelegable duty is one that “may be imposed by statute, contract, or the common law. In determining whether a duty is nondelegable, the question is whether the responsibility at issue is so important to the community that an employer should not be allowed to transfer it to a third party.” Garcia v. Southern Cleaning Service, Inc., 360 So.3d 1209, 1211 (Fla. 3d DCA 2023) (internal citation omitted).
When it comes to CONTRACTUAL duties:
[S]pecifically the principle that one who undertakes by contract to do for another a given thing cannot excuse himself to the other for a faulty performance by showing that he hired someone else to perform the task and that other person was the one at fault. In other words, where the contracting party makes it her or his duty to perform a task, that party cannot escape liability for the damage caused to the other contracting party by the negligence of independent contractors hired to carry out the task.
Gordon v. Sanders, 692 So.2d 939, 941 (Fla. 3d DCA 1997).
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David Adelstein, Kirwin Norris, P.A.Mr. Adelstein may be contacted at
dma@kirwinnorris.com
Court of Appeal Holds That Higher-Tiered Party on Construction Project Can be Held Liable for Intentional Interference with Contract
December 07, 2020 —
Garret Murai - California Construction Law BlogIn
Caliber Paving Company, Inc. v. Rexford Industrial Realty and Management, Inc., Case No. G0584406 (September 1, 2020), the 4th District Court of Appeal examined whether a higher-tiered party on a construction project can be held liable for intentional interference with contract when it interferes with the contract between lower-tiered parties even though the higher-tiered party has an economic interest in the contract between the lower-tiered parties.
The Caliber Paving Case
Project owner Rexford Industrial Realty and Management, Inc. owns and operates industrial property throughout Southern California. In 2017, Rexford hired contractor Steve Fodor Construction to perform repaving work at Rexford’s property in Carson, California.
Fodor Construction in turn hired subcontractor Caliber Paving Company, Inc. to perform the repaving work. The subcontract divided the parking lot into four areas, with separate costs to repave each area, and Caliber completed its work in one area in June 2017.
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Garret Murai, Nomos LLPMr. Murai may be contacted at
gmurai@nomosllp.com
The Metaphysics of When an Accident is an “Accident” (or Not) Under Your Insurance Policy
August 02, 2017 —
Garret Murai - California Construction Law BlogAs an undergrad, I remember taking an introductory philosophy class. When we came to the chapter on metaphysics our professor asked what makes an apple an apple? “We have a specific name for it, presumably, to distinguish it from other things,” she said. “But what makes an apple an apple?”
From there we went into a rabbit hole. With some students describing an apple by its colors, shape, size, smell and that it grows on trees and others trying to distinguish an apple from other things, which in turn led to further discussions such as why we believe apples come in red, green and yellow, whether an apple is still an apple if a person was colorblind, etc. In the end, we were questioning whether we were even in existence and sitting in a university classroom.
Insurance can be a bit like that sometimes. When is an accident an accident? If you engage in an intentional act that results in an unintended consequence, is it an accident? In Navigators Specialty Insurance Company v. Moorefield Construction, Inc. (December 27, 2016) 6 Cal.App.5th 1258, the Court of Appeals for the Fourth District, while not answering the question of the nature of existence, did shed some light on when an accident is an accident.
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Garret Murai, Wendel Rosen Black & Dean LLPMr. Murai may be contacted at
gmurai@wendel.com
Zero-Energy Commercial Buildings Increase as Contractors Focus on Sustainability
February 10, 2020 —
Jeffrey S. Wertman - Construction ExecutiveImagine a functional, low energy commercial building that annually consumes only as much power as the building creates with on-site, clean, renewable resources. From coast to coast, there is considerable momentum for zero-energy (ZE) buildings, also known as ZEB’s or net-zero energy buildings (NZEBs). Although still an emerging market, the growth trend for ZEBs is steep.
The world’s net-zero energy market for commercial and residential projects is expected to exceed $1.4 trillion by 2035. The number of ZEBs across North America has dramatically increased since 2010 which encompasses about 80 million square feet of commercial building space. ZE has captured the attention of building owners, developers, architects, engineers, contractors, designers, policymakers and others who see its potential to efficiently use clean energy resources to reduce the substantial carbon footprint of buildings.
Real Applications of Net Zero
From 2012 to 2019, the number of ZE projects has increased ten-fold. According to the “2019 Getting to Zero Project List” released in May 2019 by the New Buildings Institute, a nonprofit organization striving to achieve better energy performance in commercial buildings, the total number of certified, verified and emerging ZE projects grew to 607 in 2019. New projects continue to appear regularly. Today, hundreds of ZE buildings, including commercial buildings of all types (including retail, office, warehouse, hotel, educational and government) are being developed.
Reprinted courtesy of
Jeffrey S. Wertman, Construction Executive, a publication of Associated Builders and Contractors. All rights reserved.
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Know When Your Claim “Accrues” or Risk Losing It
August 20, 2019 —
Christopher G. Hill - Construction Law MusingsI have discussed statutes of limitation on construction claims in various contexts from issues with a disconnect on state projects to questions of continuous breach here at Construction Law Musings. For those that are first time readers, the statute of limitations is the time during which a plaintiff can bring its claim, whether under the Virginia Consumer Protection Act (VCPA), for breach of contract, or for any other legal wrong that was done to him, her or it by another. The range of limitations runs the gamut of times, for instance it is 5 years for breach of a written contract and 6 months for enforcement of a mechanic’s lien. This time period is calculated from the “accrual” of the right of action. “Accrual” is, in general terms, when the plaintiff was originally harmed or should have known it was harmed (depending on the particular cause of action).
A recent case out of the Circuit Court of Norfolk, Virginia examined when a cause of action for a construction related claim under the VCPA accrued and thus whether the plaintiff’s claim was timely. In Hyde Park Free Will Baptist Church v. Skye-Brynn Enterprises Inc., the Court looked at the following basic facts (pay attention to the dates):
The Plaintiff, Hyde Park Baptist Church, hired the Defendant, Skye-Brynn Enterprises, Inc., to perform certain roof repairs that were “completed” in 2015. Shortly after the work was done, in 2015, the Plaintiff informed Defendant that the roof still leaked and that some leaks were worse than before. The Defendant unsuccessfully attempted repair at the time. 14 months later in 2017, the church had other contractors examine the roof and opine as to its faulty installation. Also in 2017, the church submitted roof samples to GAF, the roof membrane manufacturer and in February 2018 GAF responded stating that the leaks were not due to manufacturing defects. The church filed its complaint on October 1, 2018 breach of contract, breach of warranty of workmanship and fraud in violation of the VCPA. Defendant responded with a plea in bar, arguing that the statute of limitations barred the claim.
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The Law Office of Christopher G. HillMr. Hill may be contacted at
chrisghill@constructionlawva.com
